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Abstract 
Two assumptions pervade contemporary metaphysics: that there is a fun-
damentallevel to reality, and that physics will one day describe it. In the 
first part of this thesis, I consider whether physics may have a greater role 
for fundamentality metaphysics than that which it is typically accorded. In 
particular, I consider whether physics might contribute not just to questions 
of the content of an assumed fundamental level, but to the existence of such 
a level itself. I argue that if we are to use physics to do such a thing, it 
must be through what I call the 'internal' approach, in which fundamentality 
questions are addressed through the lens of extant physical theory. Through 
two case studies drawn from particle physics, I show that it is indeed possi-
ble to deny fundamentality through this means - or at least, that one may 
do so as legitimately as one may make other propositions of physicalistic 
metaphysics. 
While this is a non-trivial achievement, the internal approach nevertheless 
imposes a profound limitation on the sort of fundamentality that we can 
use physics to deny, in that it precludes the denial of fundamental physical 
principles. This raises the question of whether such principles ought to be 
regarded as somehow more fundamental even than particles. I argue that this 
question is naturally construed as the question of whether we ought to regard 
the category of dynamical structures as more ontologically fundamental than 
the category of objects. The claim that structure is ontologically prior to 
objects is the signature claim of ontic structuralism, and in the second part 
of this thesis I consider whether it can be defended. I ultimately argue that 
structuralism can indeed be supported, but that it is only its moderate version 
that is vindicated. 
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Introduction 
1.1 Two canonical assumptions of metaphysics 
I begin by highlighting two assumptions that are salient in much contem-
porary metaphysics. l The first concerns 'an intuition commonly held by 
metaphysicians' - namely, the intuition 'that there must be a fundamental 
layer of reality, i.e., that chains of ontological dependence must terminate: 
there cannot be turtles all the way down'.2 As pointed out by Schaffer, this 
assumption 'pervades contemporary metaphysics'.3 The 'layers of reality' 
appealed to here are taken to be related by ontological priority relations, with 
the 'deepest' or most fundamental layer - or, as I will say, level - being defined 
as that which is ontologically prior to all of the others. Since the priority 
relations that structure the levels hierarchy are standardly assumed to form 
partial orderings, the fundamentalist intuition may be expressed by saying 
that priority relations comprise well-founded partial orderings.4 Thus, for 
1 It can also be found in canonical philosophy of science; a classic example is 
Oppenheim and Pumam [1958], in which it is asserted that 'There must be a unique 
lowest level' (p409), which they take to be populated by elementary particles. 
2Cameron [2008], pI. Note that Cameron uses 'ontological dependence' to denote 
(the converse of) ontological priority; I, however, will take the latter to be a more 
general relation, whose converse admits ontological dependence as a species but may 
permit other species as well. All this will, of course, be expanded on below. 
3 Schaffer [2003],p498. 
4See for example Cameron op. cit.; Schaffer likewise 'assume[s] that the priority 
relations among actual concrete objects form a well-founded partial ordering ... Well-
foundedness is imposed by requiring that all priority chains terminate' ([201OJ, 
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example, if one takes supervenience relations with properties as their relata 
to constitute ontological priority relations, the intuition is that there must 
exist a set of properties on which all other properties supervene but that are 
not themselves supervenient on anything. Or, if it is mereological relations 
with objects as their relata that constitute the priority relations in question, 
the intuition is that there must exist a set of objects that compose everything 
but that do not themselves admit of proper parts. 
Worlds in which every object resolves itself into a set of mereologica11y basic 
objects may be called 'atomic' worlds, while worlds in which at least some 
objects contain parts ad infinitum are often termed 'gunky' worlds. Underpin-
_ . ning the intuition that the world must be atomic is the 'anti-gunk worry' that, 
in a gunky world in which every object has proper parts, 
composition could never have got off the ground. If the existence 
of each complex object depends for its existence on the existence 
of the complex objects at the level below, and if we never reach 
a bottom level, then it is hard to see why there are any complex 
objects at all... In Schaffer's charming phrase, 'Being would be 
infinitely deferred, never achieved'. 5 
The 'worry' is presumably analogous for any other priority relations that one 
might identify. 
The second salient assumption within metaphysics is that, whether conceived 
of as populated by objects, properties or laws, the fundamental level is 
physical in nature. The most familiar contemporary proponent of this thought 
is probably Lewis, who sees it as 'a task of physics to provide an inventory 
of all the fundamental properties and relations that occur' in an assumed 
fundamental supervenience basis for this world.6 The belief that it is the job 
of physics to fill in the details of this basis is a pervasive one; Kim, for example, 
observes that 'the bottom level is usually thought to consist of elementary 
particles, or whatever our best physics is going to tell us are the basic bits of 
matter out of which all material things are composed'.7 
p37). 
sCameron [2007]. p.6. The word 'gunk' as a tenn for objects all of whose parts 
themselves have proper parts was introduced by Lewis in his [1991]. 
6Lewis [1999],p292. 
7Kim [1998], pIS. 
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The philosophical position outlined here - and which I take to be deeply 
entrenched - is therefore constituted by two elements: (1) an a priori intuition 
that the structure of priority relations is well-founded - that is, that the actual 
world possesses a fundamental level - and (2) a delegation to physics in 
settling what that fundamental level is like. But it will be immediately obvious 
that this state of affairs is deeply dissatisfying from a naturalistic point of 
view. Under the assumption that the fundamental basis exists, physics gets a 
role in saying what it is like; that the basis exists in the first place, however, 
is relegated to armchair contemplation. But those, like me, who endorse a 
naturalistic approach to metaphysics will surely want physics to contribute 
to every aspect of our metaphysics, if at all possible, not for it to be pre-
assigned piecemeal roles; we certainly do not want fundamental questions 
about the structure of reality to be answerable only to our intuitions and 
hunches about what must be so. The first question I shall be concerned with 
in this thesis, therefore, is whether physics can contribute to questions not 
just of the content of an assumed fundamental level, but of the structure 
of priority itself, and in particular to the question of whether we can use 
physics to deny that a fundamental level even exists. In a nutshell, I begin by 
asking: Can physics deny fundamentality? This is the question that serves as 
the springboard for this essay. 
1.2 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis is comprised of two parts. Part 1, entitled 'Denying the Existence 
of a Fundamental Level', will focus on the question introduced a moment 
ago, and thus upon whether we can use physics to deny the existence of a 
fundamental level. To this end, the labour will be divided as follows. In the 
next chaptet; Chapter 2, I will continue my introductory remarks by defending 
the idea that it makes sense to conceive of the world as containing a levels 
structure - something that is obviously presupposed in the question of whether 
we can deny that there is a lowest level to it. With that in place, I will survey 
in Chapter 3 the major arguments in the contemporary literature for the 
existence of a fundamental level. After all, only if these arguments are found 
wanting will there be any point in considering whether physics in particular 
has any hope of denying that existence. But found wanting they will be, and 
3 
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the discussion of them will lead naturally to a consideration, in Chapter 4, 
of another argument that is prominent in the contemporary literature, this 
one put forward by Schaffer. Schaffer's argument is unusual, however, in that 
it argues against the fundamentalist intuition that pervades contemporary 
metaphysics, and moreover attempts to do so on broadly naturalistic grounds. 
Nonetheless, I will argue that this argument falls short in its ambitions, and 
also that it fails to exemplify the naturalistic approach to fundamentality 
questions that I seek here. Schaffer's argument can, however, be regarded 
as a useful starting point and a good example of what not to do, and as 
such it offers valuable lessons on how we might tackle the question I am 
concerned with in this part. In the wake of these insights, I will propose that 
the best way to attempt to deny the existence of a fundamental level is by 
adopting (what I will call) the 'internal' approach, in which fundamentality 
questions are viewed through the lens of an extant physical theory. Then, 
in Chapters 5 and 6, I will demonstrate through two case studies that it is 
indeed possible to use the internal approach in the service of arguing against 
fundamentality, and thus that we can have good naturalistic grounds to deny 
a fundamental level. The first of these case studies concerns the so-ca.l1ed 
Analytic S-matrix theory of the strong interactions, which will be enlisted to 
show that we can use physical theory to argue against the existence of a level 
of mereologically fundamental particles. The second case study will concern 
quantum field theory and the 'effective' interpretation of it, and will argue 
that this theory provides us - modulo certain assumptions - with grounds to 
deny the existence of a fundamental level of laws. 
It will be a significant consequence of the internal strategy adopted in Chapters 
5 and 6 that naturalistic arguments against fundamentality are limited in a 
very important sense, in that certain physical principles must always be at 
least treated as fundamental in order for their conclusions to go through. In 
Part 2 of this thesis, ~guing for the Fundamentality of Structure', I will reflect 
upon some of the fundamentality issues that are raised by this implication. In 
particular, I will meditate in Chapter 7 on the question of whether we can, or 
should, regard the sorts of principles that were used to deduce an infinitely 
descending hierarchy of levels as being, in some sense, more ontologica1ly 
fundamental than any of the inhabitants of those levels. This discussion will 
forge rich connections with the ontic structuralist tradition in the philosophy of 
4 
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physics - a tradition that claims to recommend a re-think of other entrenched 
fundamentality assumptions, complementary to those that were the focus of 
Part 1. In particular, a version of ontic structuralism demands that we reject 
the idea that objects comprise a fundamental category and that we introduce 
structure as a category of greater ontological standing. I will therefore consider, 
in Chapters 8 and 9, whether any of structuralism's revisionary fundamentality 
claims may be regarded as justified. While structuralism is arguably not 
concerned with denying that there is a fundamental level of particles, versions 
of it can nevertheless be construed as claiming that there are no fundamental 
particles. As such, the discussion of structuralism in Part 2 will not only help 
us gain a deeper understanding of the implications of the internal arguments 
that were the focus of Part 1, but will also offer an interesting twist on the 
question of anti-fundamentality that was raised in that first part. Chapter 10 
is the conclusion. 
Before I embark on any of that, however, I would like make a few points 
of clarification. Firstly, and as already stated, I favour a broadly naturalistic 
approach to metaphysics, and as such I view the latter as largely continuous 
with physics. While there is, of course, a great deal that one could say about 
what precisely that means, I hope it will nonetheless be agreed that this thesis 
maintains a recognisably naturalistic tenor throughout.8 Secondly, and in 
accord with the naturalistic approach, I want questions about the structure of 
priority relations to be settled, as far as they can be, by the relevant phyics, 
and thus I will not begin with prior assumptions about the logical fonn of 
ontological priority relations. In particular, I will not assume at the outset 
that priority relations fonn partial orders. I therefore apologize that the tenn 
'priority' is awkward if we do not, as I do not, simply presume that it is an 
asymmetric relation, given that the very word itself connotes asymmetry. 
However, rather than invent a tenn that is somehow neutral between the 
various ways of spelling out priority and that does not carry such asymmetric 
connotations, I think it is best to use the tenninology already in use even 
though that terminology inconveniently betrays the presumption that the 
levels are asymmetrically ordered - an assumption I do not myself make here. 
Therefore, to clarify my terminology at the outset, I will not take x's being 
8Something by way of a statement of my view regarding the relationship between 
physics and metaphysics may be found in French and McKenzie [2012J. 
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prior to y to be sufficient for x's being more fundamental than y; I will take x 
to be more fundamental only if, in addition, y is not also prior to x. Where 
y is also prior to x, I will take x to be as fundamental as y. Finally - and 
again perhaps relatedly - unlike much contemporary metaphysics, including 
fundamentality metaphysics, the focus will be on actuality throughout. Thus, 
in stating that I am interested in the question of whether physics can give us 
grounds to deny the existence of a fundamental level, I am asking a question 
about physics' capacity to ground denials of a fundamental level to this world 
in particular. And since I intend to use physics to engage with the metaphysics 
of fundamentality, the physics theories I shall be primarily concerned with 
are those that are regarded as the most fundamental working theories that 
we have managed to produce to date - namely, our theories of high-energy 
particle physics.9 Therefore another, more pithy way of stating my project 
in this thesis is to say that I am investigating fundamentality metaphysics 
through the lens of fundamental physics. 
In sum, then, Part 1 this thesis will examine whether we can use physics to 
deny the existence of a fundamental level to the actual world, and Part 2 will 
ask whether, and how, the approach taken to answering that question suggests 
further changes in our fundamentality metaphysics. With the terrain we are 
entering into mapped out, I will embark on my discussion by expanding on 
some of the assumptions implicit in the question set in Part 1. In particular, 
I will begin by clarifying what it means to consider reality to be structured 
into a levels hierarchy, and whether one may legitimately regard it as so 
structured. 
90f course, the term 'fundamental' has been a disputed term in physics; see, e.g. 
Martin [forthcoming]. 
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~~--------------------------------~ 
Defining the Terms of the 'Levels' 
Picture 
The 'layers of reality' picture that I alluded to in the last chapter depicts the 
world as being stratified into levels, with the most fundamental level lying at 
the bottom of it. What sort of priority relation it will be appropriate to cite in 
defining the levels structure will in part be a function of how the levels are 
conceived - that is, whether they are regarded as being constituted by, for 
example, objects, properties or laws. It is therefore important to articulate at 
the beginning some aspects of what these priority relations may be taken to 
involve. 
2.1 Defining 'Priority' 
Before I get to the specific relations that have been cited for this purpose, it 
may be helpful to note at the outset that priority relations may be sorted into 
two broad classes depending on what we take the role of the fundamental 
to be. On the one hand, we may view the fundamental as that which is in 
some sense sufficient for the existence of the non-fundamental. We might 
thus consider the fundamental to be that whose existence implies the non-
fundamental: to be such that, given it, nothing else need be supplied for 
the non-fundamental to come into existence. This is arguably the concept of 
fundamentality that is presented to us in the work of Armstrong and Lewis, in 
9 
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which the fundamental level of a given world is regarded as a supervenience 
base for that world. 1 According to this conception, then, we may say that the 
fundamental is that which determines the non-fundamental- both the way that 
it is, and the fact that it exists at all. 2 On the other hand, we may regard the 
fundamental as a necessary condition on the existence of the non-fundamental; 
that is, we may choose to conceive of the fundamental as that without which 
the non-fundamental could not exist. It it thus intuitively correct to say on 
this conception that the non-fundamental is ontologically dependent on the 
fundamental. Such a dependence-based conception of relative fundamentality 
is to be found in the works of, amongst others, Schaffer and Fine. 3 
Each of these ways of conceiving of the fundamental - that is, as a sufficient 
condition for the existence of the non-fundamental, or as a necessary condition 
on it - may thus be taken to present us with a different class of priority rela-
tion. I will designate these classes as determination and dependence relations 
respectively. Indeed, one may argue that these two ways of conceiving of 
relative fundamentaIity are not only conceptually quite distinct, but also that 
are they are not co-extensive.4 Thus, although the two classes of relation 
ISee for Armstrong [1997]; Lewis [1999]. Actually, there are slight differences 
in Armstrong and Lewis' concepts of supervenience, such that Armstrong's implies 
Lewis' but not (necessarily) vice versa; see Johansson [2002]. I will put forward a 
definition of supervenience below that is intuitive and implies both of their versions. 
20n how this concept of supervenience amounts to a notion of determination, see 
Yoshimi [2007], Section 2. 
3See e.g. Schaffer [2009] and Fine [1995a]. Note that I am not saying that 
dependence consists in no more than a necessary condition. This will become clearer 
in Chapter 9, where I will side with Fine in holding that purely modal analyses 
of dependence are too coarse-grained to be of use, so that, while dependence 
attributions imply statements of necessity, the converse may not be true. 
4 As Yoshimi argues, the supervenience of the mental on the physical permits free-
floating Cartesian minds, which cannot be said to depend upon physical properties 
(op. cit., Section 3). (Additional support for this claim comes from consideration of 
the supervenience of necessary properties, and will be discussed below.) Conversely, 
it may be argued that there are cases of dependence without supervenience. To 
take an example from the history of philosophy, Descartes held that the attributes of 
objects depend on those objects having extension, but he would presumably not have 
held that, for example, the colour of a table supervenes on its extension (see Yoshimi 
[2007], Section 5). For a more contemporary example, consider how the spin state of 
a pair of entangled electrons is dependent on its relata having some value of absolute 
spin - that is, dependent on its relata being spin-l/2 particles, spin-1 particles, or 
any kind of particle that has spin - but cannot be said to supervene on such properties 
(cf. Teller [1986],; Maudlin [1998]. 
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are often conflated in the literature, we should be clear in our heads that 
these two broad approaches to characterizing relative fundamentality may 
each pick out different relations.s With that in mind, I will move on now to 
consider some of the more specific relations that are taken to populate each 
class. 
A variety of priority relations are discussed in the literature, each tailored to 
the entities in terms of which we might choose to define the levels. According 
to Schaffer, the 'central connotation' of the levels structure is in mereological 
terms - that is, in terms of 'the part-whole relation'.6 And it certainly is the 
case that part-whole relations are frequently alluded to when articulating 
the levels structure. For example, the above quote from Kim concerning 
the fact that the bottom level is thought to consist 'of elementary particles, 
or whatever our best physics is going to tell us are the basic bits of matter' 
continues: 
As we go up the ladder, we successively encounter atoms, molecules, 
cells, larger living organisms, and so on. The ordering relation 
that generates the hierarchical structure is the mereological (part-
whole) relation: entities belonging to a given level, except those 
at the very bottom, have an exhaustive decomposition, without 
remainder, into entities belonging to the lower levels. 7 
The same sort of sentiment is sometimes echoed in the physics community 
as well; think, for example, of particle physicists' frequent claims that they 
are 'in search of the ultimate building blocks' of nature e:md that this search 
constitues the principal business of physics.8 Such a rendering of the level-
structuring relation will clearly be appropriate only if the relata at hand can 
meaningfully be conceived of as admitting a part-whole structure, and thus 
levels related through this relation will typically, though perhaps not always, 
be defined in terms of objects. 9 Since by definition a composite object requires 
SThus Schaffer [2003] refers to supelVenience as 'dependence'; Kim likewise 
frequently speaks of 'dependence or determination' as if they were one and the same 
thing (see e.g. Kim [1993], p143). See again Yoshimi [2007] for discussion. 
6Schaffer[2003],pSOO. 
7Kim [1998], pIS. 
BThis is, for example, the title of t'Hooft's book on the development of the Standard 
Model (t'Hooft [1996]). 
9That is, though we may in some sense say that laws have 'parts', such as the 
terms that are summed to fonn the relevant equation, we do not use sharing of 
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for its existence the existence of parts (at least some parts, and typically at 
least sufficiently similar to those it as a matter of fact has), the part-whole 
relation is taken as the paradigmatic ontological dependence relation. Other 
paradigmatic species of dependence relations besides mereological relations 
include the set-theoretic relation of having as a member and - more generally 
- being defined in terms of.10 Indeed, there are a number of approaches to 
dependence that are completely neutral on the category of their relata, and 
thus can apply equally well to physical objects and sets as to properties and 
laws. 11 Such category-independent approaches to priority will be useful to us 
in Pan 2. 
In addition to this mereological construal of priority, Schaffer cites (i) 'a. 
supervenience structure, ordered by asymmetric dependencies', and (ll) 'a 
nomological structure, ordered by one-way bridge principles between families 
of lawfully inter-related properties' (though he states that these are merely 
'peripheral' connotations relative to the mereological relation). 12 Of these 
two relations, the most prominent is doubtlessly that of supervenience (and 
probably in large part owing to the influence of Armstrong and Lewis). Super-
venience paradigmatically obtains between properties, and so it could be an 
appropriate priority relation if we took the levels hierarchy to be defined in 
terms of more and less fundamental properties. Howeve~ since presumably 
these 'parts' to make for more and less fundamental laws. Similarly, Armstrong 
[1978] tried to articulate the relationship between structural universcili - such as 
those instantiated by molecules - and those universals instantiated by their atomic 
components in mereological terms, but seemingly with limited success; see Lewis 
[1986].) 
lOIndeed, for Fine 'being defined in terms of is what ontological dependence is, in 
general, ultimately all about, and I will expand on this notion later on in Chapter 9. 
llSee for ~xample the survey in Correia [2008], but to take just one example 
for the purposes of illustration: Simons has proposed that ontological dependence 
can be analyzed as nothing more than a necessaty condition on existence, so that x 
will depend upon y if necessarily, x exists only if y exists (Simons [1991]). Clearly, 
such an understanding of priority does not require its relata to be of any specific 
category. (I note that although the approach to dependence that we will look at in 
detail in Chapter 9 rejects purely modal approaches such as this, that is not really to 
the present point.) 
12Schaffer op. cit. Note that asymmetry is explicitly being assumed a priori here. 
Once again, I will not do this; in my case studies I will try to derive the appropriate 
structure of the priority relations in play. I should point out too that Schaffer also 
cites 'a realization structure, ordered by functional relations' as an example of a 
priority relation, but this relation will not be discussed here. 
12 
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everything, of any category, has to have at least some properties in order to 
have any existence at all, we may take supervenience to be a relation that can 
hold between entities of whatever category, so long as it is remembered that 
it is the properties of those entities that are directly related. 13 While there are 
a number of (inequivalent) formulations of supervenience in the literature, I 
will hold that A-type properties supervene on B-type properties iff indiscem-
ability with respect to B-properties entails indiscemability with respect to 
A-properties.14 This formulation entails that variation between some specific 
A-properties implies variation in the specific B-properties, and hence that 
differences in the supervenient A-type properties entail differences in the sub-
venient B-type properties - which is Lewis' formulation of supervenience. 15 
And since B-indiscemibility entails A-indiscemibility, the formulation also 
implies that instantiation of the specific subvenient properties suffices for the 
instantiation of the specific supervenient properties - which is Armstrong's 
formulation of supervenience. 16 This latter implication makes it especially 
clear that supervenience, as I have defined it, is a natural candidate for a 
determination relation, since it implies that specific subvenient properties 
determine that specific supervenient properties are likewise instantiated.17 
However, since it may be easily seen that properties that anything necessarily 
has will supervene on any properties whatsoever, supervenience is not in 
general recognized as a dependence relation. 18 This is (in part) because 
13Thus, as Jantzen reminds us, when we say that objects supervene upon some 
other entities, we usually mean that the properties of those objects supervene upon 
the properties of those other entities (Jantzen [2011], p434). 
14See e.g. Yoshimi [2007], p116. Various modal modifications of this are of course 
possible. We will say that the supervenience is mere nomological supervenience, for 
example, if this is only required to hold in worlds in which the actual laws of nature 
operate: and so on. But this will do for present purposes. 
lsFor Lewis, 70 say that so-and-so supervenes on such-and-such is to say that 
there can be no difference in respect of so-and-so without difference in respect of 
such-and-such' (Lewis [1999], p29.) 
16According to Armstrong, 'We shall say that entity Q supervenes upon entity P if 
and. only if it is impossible that P should exist and Q not exist, where P is possible', so 
that 'supervenience in my sense amounts to entity P entailing the existence of entity 
Q' (Armstrong [1997], pll). 
17Indeed, Yoshimi points out that 'Most varieties of supervenience can be thought 
of as varieties of determination relation' (op. cit., p117). 
18See McLaughlin and Bennett [2011], Section 3.5. The reason is simple: two 
things cannot differ with respect to necessary properties, hence cannot so differ 
without differing in other respects too. (Note that the grade of necessity of the 
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necessary properties are not conditional for their instantiation upon any other 
property, and thus - assuming either a modal analysis of dependence or any 
stronger analysis that implies it - necessary properties will fail to be depen-
dent upon any other property.19 Sincesucb properties may nonetheless be 
shown to supervene upon every other property, it is held that supervenience 
should not be construed as a dependence relation. I therefore place it in the 
determination category here.2O 
The nomological relations that Schaffer cites also seem to be good candidates 
for determination relations, albeit of a less general sort (since they obviously 
obtain only between laws of nature). The reason, of course, is that such 
relations are paradigmatica1ly conceived of in deductive terms, hence in terms 
that make it the case that the more fundamental law implies, hence determmes, 
the less fundamental law. 21 As the above quote from Schaffer indicates, where 
such derivations are possible it will typically be modulo the use of 'bridge 
principles' relating the two theories' vocabularies: this is of course the outline 
of the Nagelian model of inter-theoretic reduction.22 Where such derivations 
are possible, we will want to say that the derived laws are less fundamental 
than those they are derived from. This will have as a result that, to take 
Nagel's own example, the laws of thermodynamics will be less fundamental 
than those of statistical mechanics on account of the fact that the former 
- or, better, 'corrected approximations' of them - can be derived from the 
latter. 23 Let me therefore designate these priority relations as 'relations of 
property (i.e. nomologically, metaphysically etc.) involved here is matched by the 
grade of the supervenience.) 
19Fine's non-modal analysis, to be discussed in Chapter 9, entails the modal account 
(but not vice versa), and so the fact that the instantiation of necessary properties does 
not entail the instantiation of any other properties implies that they do not depend 
upon them in Fine's account as well. 
20 Again, in agreement with Yoshimi [20071. 
21See e.g. Schaffer [2003], p 500. 
22There is thus a sense in which these relations may be taken to involve elements of 
determination and dependence, if we take the bridge principles to express definitions 
of the terms in the reduced theory (and hence indicative of dependence relations 
if conceived of in definitional terms a La Fine). However, as Dizadji-Bahmani et aL 
[2010], Section 4, point out, such a strong reading of bridge principles is in no way 
forced upon us; we may take the bridge laws to express, for example, mere de facto 
correlations. 
23For a brief discussion of this notion, and references to extended discussion, see 
Dizadji-Bahmani et al., op. cit., Section 3.1. 
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nomic derivation'. Invoking such relations is of course likely to be appropriate 
if we take the world's levels structure to be carved out in terms of the laws of 
nature that operate in it. 
The levels hierarchy is typically articulated in terms of these specific depen-
dence or determination relations - namely parthood, or supervenience and 
nomic derivation, respectively. But some philosophers have argued that not all 
of these relations are appropriate for defining the levels structure, given either 
(i) what we intuitively want ascriptions of relative fundamentality to mean, or 
(ii) the naturalistic demands that we should place on our metaphysics. It has 
been argued, for example, that supervenience is not appropriate for defining 
a levels hierarchy given what we want ascriptions of relative fundamentality 
to do. Others have argued that, on the contrary, we ought to approach the 
issue in terms of supervenience, since the obvious alternative, the notion of 
composition, has outlived its usefulness in physics. Furthermore, the very 
idea that there is anything· that is both useful and sufficiently general that 
can be said about inter-theoretic derivations of laws has been subject to a 
great deal of scrutiny. But, of course, if turns out that none of these relations 
are suitable for defining a levels hierarchy, then the idea that we can even 
meaningfully assume the existence of such a thing - and thus meaningfully 
address questions 9f whether there is a fundamental level to it - will come 
under a great deal of pressure. It is therefore important to consider the 
reasons why these claims have been made and the right response in the fac~ 
of them, and it is to these issues that I now tum. 
2.2 Criticisms of Supervenience as a 
Level-Structuring Relation 
Perhaps the best known of the above criticisms is that the notion of super-
venience is not appropriate for expressing relative fundamentality, on the 
grounds that the notion is simply too weak to capture what we intend by 
ontological priority. As Kim points out, for example, one can easily construct 
'common cause' -type scenarios in which one can say that A supervenes upon 
B, and that both supervene upon C, while by hypothesis both A and B are as 
fundamental as one another and only C is more fundamental. (This would 
15 
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be the case if, for example, B made finer discriminations than A.)24 Similarly, 
and as Maudlin points out, in any deterministic theory of physics the later 
state of the world may be said to (nomically) supervene on the earlier states.2S 
But we do not thereby want to count the latter as somehow less ontologically 
fundamental than the former, for intuitively both time-slices of the world 
are on a par with one another from an ontological point of view. As these 
examples make clear, supervenience relations can relate what seem to be 
(and what we might call) 'horizontally' related states of affairs, and as such it 
seems that the notion is insufficiently fine-grained to express the sought-for 
notion of hierarchy. 
There is in fact now 'a growing consensus that modal notions in general are 
too coarse for metaphysics, and that notions in the vicinity of "fundamental-
ity", "in virtue of", and· the like, should not be understood in modal terms.,26 
Nonetheless, it remains that the view that relative fundamentality is to be 
cashed out in supervenience terms still pervades the recent literature, and 
my response to these criticisms of supervenience as a priority relation will 
be somewhat glib in consequence.27 In particular. given that supervenience 
remains fairly ubiquitous as a means of expressing relative fundamentality, 
I will simply bracket the problems associated with its ability to adequately 
do so in the one case study in which I invoke it.28 After all. the criticism of 
supervenience made by Kim and others is that supervenience is too weak. too 
coarse-grained. to capture relative fundamentality. That of course does not 
24Kim [1993]. pl46. 
2sMaudlin [2007], p3153. 
26Sider [2011a], pviii. 
27This is no doubt due to the prevailing Humean stance in contemporary meta-
physics, which motivates the attempted analysis of priority in purely modal terms. As 
Wilson discusses puts it, for Humeans priority is not sui generis but rather understood 
in terms of 'asymmetric existential necessitation or metaphysical supervenience, with 
the rough idea being that if some entity a asymmetrically existentially necessitates 
(provides a supervenience base for) some entity b, but not vice versa, then a is less 
fundamental than b' (Wilson [forthcoming], p4). 
28That is, when looking at structuralist proposals regrading the priority of symmetry 
structures over objects in Chapter 8 I will assume that supervenience ascriptions 
can be used to express priority - primarily because structuralists themselves often 
phrase priority in precisely these terms. Note, however, that I will also argue in 
Chapter 9 that supervenience is not the most appropriate way for structuralists 
to capture priority, and I will reconsider their claims when interpreted through a 
dependence-based account of priority. 
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preclude that supervenience may nonetheless be regarded as an important 
part of the story about how priority ought to be cashed out, at least in some 
cases, and in fact Kim himself suggests exactly thi~. 29 If supervenience can 
be so regarded, then establishing a supervenience claim can be seen as an 
important step towards establishing a priority claim, even if it may not ul-
timately be sufficient for it. For the moment, then, I will simply note that, 
although arguments abound that it is problematic to employ supervenience 
(or supervenience alone) to cash out relative fundamentality, many commen-
tators nonetheless do exactly that. As such, any interesting results about the 
levels structure defined in these terms that are deduced in what follows will 
represent valuable contributions to this extensive literature, flawed though 
that literature may ultimately have to be taken to be. 
2.3 Criticisms of 'The Part-Whole Relation' as a 
Level-Structuring Relation 
Besides supervenience, another relation that philosophers have taken issue 
with as a legitimate candidate for a level structuring relation is 'the part-
whole relation'. Now, in choosing to adopt Schaffer's term here I am arguably 
stacking the deck in favour of the sceptic, since naturalistic philosophers have 
argued that there simply is no such thing as 'the' composition relation. As 
Ladyman and Ross write, for example, 
A good part of most of the special sciences concerns the partic-
ular kinds of composition relevant to their respective domains ... 
Metaphysicians do not dirty their hands with such details but seek 
instead to understand something more fundamental, namely the 
general composition relation itself. But why suppose that there 
is any such thing? It is supposed to be the relation that obtains 
between parts of any whole, but the wholes [concerned can be] 
hugely disparate and the composition relations studied by the spe-
cial sciences are sui generis. [Footnote: Cf. Paul's mention of the 
'primitive relation of fusing, already a part of standard ontology' ... 
29Kim [1993], pl48. 
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Again 'fusion' in the metaphysician's sense has nothing to do with 
real composition, and the 'standard' ontology appealed to here is 
standard, if at all, only among metaphysicians.]30 
Ladyman and Ross therefore claim that there is no such thing as 'the part-
whole relation'; rather, composition is resolved into a class of different re-
lations, each of which is suited to the domain at hand. More strongly still, 
however, Brown and Ladyman seem to claim that appeals to any sort of 
mereological relation are illegitimate. According to them, 'like materialism, 
mereological structures are obsolete philosophical conceptions in the face 
of modem physics, and have lost credibility and utility in the effort to de-
scribe reality'. 31 As such, they hold that a levels structure should not be 
phrased in compositional terms at all, but rather in terms of a supervenience 
structure. 
There are a number of different strands of thought in play here, and I will 
address these two objections to the idea that compositional relations are 
relevant to defining a levels structure in tum. First of all, the fact that there 
are sui generis notions of composition in the sciences - which there doubtlessly 
are - does not in itself seem to undennine the claim that part-whole relations 
can be used to define a levels structure. To my mind, all that Ladyman 
and Ross' observation that compositional relations are sui generis shows is 
that the relevant part-whole relations should, if necessary, be understood 
differently as we traverse the domains of the various sciences (and indeed 
perhaps the domains of the various theories within each). Thus, while we 
can take issue with the idea that the dominant a priori theory of mereology 
- a theory in which parthood (i) is typically understood spatially (in terms 
of 'overlap' etc.), (ii) has a partially ordered structure imposed upon it a 
priori and (iii) is such that wholes are represented simply as the 'fusion', or 
'mereological sum', of their parts - has any claim to describing the 'most 
general' form of composition, we can still claim that there is a recognizable 
notion of composition that may take on different forms, including different 
logical forms, in play across the sciences.32 Indeed, were we not even able to 
30Ladyman and Ross [2007], p21. 
31 Brown and Ladyman [2009], p.28 
32Healey [2011], Section 1 presses that philosophers often conceive of composition 
in spatia-temporal terms, but that such conceptions are increasingly redundant in 
post-classical physics. Note, however, that while mereology often is conceived of 
18 
Chapter 2. Defining the 'Levels' Picture 
recognize that the various sui generis composition relations have something 
in common - namely, the fact that they are composition relations - it seems 
that Ladyman and Ross' claim above would not even make sense. And if it is 
the case that the existence of a multitude of sui generis composition relations 
does not undermine the idea that it makes sense to speak of part-whole 
relations, we can still hold on to the idea that the levels structure may be 
delineated with respect to part-whole relations, with the qualification that 
those relations should be understood in the specific sense appropriate to the 
levels in question. 
The claim of Brown and Ladyman that the very notion of composition is 
obsolete in modem physics, on the other hand, is ~ very different, and at 
first sight much stronger, claim than that of Ladyman and Ross. But even 
if it is true (on which more in a moment), it first of all does not clearly 
follow that compositional relations are thereby useless for defining a levels 
hierarchy. All this obsolescence would mean, after all, is that compositional 
relations are of no use when defining the levels structure within that portion 
of reality that is described by modem physics. In regimes in which concepts 
of classical physics are applicable (to a good approximation), or in regimes 
best described by sciences other than physics, it may still be the case that 
compositional relationships play at least some role in defining the levels 
hierarchy, even if they cannot be employed across the board. More strongly 
still, I think that the very fact that there is a point in the hierarchy at which 
such relationships break down - so that the levels must be conceived of 
in wholly different tenns from that point on - should strike us as a very 
interesting feature of the hierarchy, not one that means that mereology should 
be dispensed with tout court in defining priority structure. Still, if Brown 
and Ladyman are right that mereological structures are obsolete in modem 
physics, it follows that composition cannot be the whole story when it comes 
to relative fundamentality, and as such that any mereological construal of it 
must be supplemented with another priority relation. 
But it is not at all clear that they are right. To my mind, it seems more 
representative to say that across modem physics we find a rich array of 
spatially - Decock for example states that 'mereology is the study of the relation of 
part-whole in the spatial sense' [2002], p227 - others hold that mereology can be 
divorced from spatial concepts (see e.g. Paul [forthcoming]). 
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compositional relations - as has been described by, for example, Shimony and 
Healey. 33 In particular, it is certainly not the case that quantum mechanics 
lacks any principle of composition, for that principle is furnished by the tensor 
product of the Hilbert spaces associated with each component system.34 
50 it cannot simply be true to say that quantum mechanics recognizes no 
notion of composition at all. That is not to say, of course, that composition 
in quantum mechanics is not radically different in many respects from the 
quasi-Democritean concepts of composition that typically govern philosophical 
mereology. 3S As Healey points out, for example, there are contexts in quantum 
physics (and indeed classical field theories) in which linear superposition 
arguably plays the role of a composition relation.36 But since superpositions 
are always invertible, if superposition defines a composition relation then 
anything that is regarded as a constituent of a whole may just as well be 
regarded as having that whole as its constituent. And since parthood is 
standardly taken to be asymmetric, this represents a radical departure from 
mereological orthodoxy.37 Now, of course, whether we say that this symmetric 
relation represents a different (and perhaps more general) sort of composition 
relation than those considered hitherto, or rather, as Brown and Ladyman 
suggest, that compositional relations are simply obsolete in this context, 
is to some extent a purely semantic matter. But, in light of the fact that 
composition relations in contemporary physics can be sui generis, various, 
and even highly counter-intuitive, it seems that the fairest thing to say is that 
questions of composition are subtle, delicate, necessarily qualified and context-
dependent, not that there is simply no place for the notion of composition in 
contemporary physics at all. (Such a claim would be far too hasty.) While 
there is of course much more that one could say about composition in modem 
physics, I will take it that sui generis composition relations remain at work 
in that context and as such that mereological relations, of some suitable 
sort at least, remain plausible candidates for defining the levels structure. 
33Shimony [1987]; Healey Ope cit.. 
34This is discussed in Shimony op. cit., p194; Healey [2010], Section 7; and 
Butterfield [2010], Section 3.1.2. 
3S I take impenetrability, indivisibility and immortality to be features of Democritean 
atoms (cf. Shimony Ope cit.). 
36Healey op. cit., Section 3. 
37Note that some 'non-standard' fonnal mereologies have been developed in which 
asymmetry need not be respected; see e.g. Healey op. cit., pii for references. 
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Nonetheless, I will concede that it is possible that there could be a regime 
in high-energy physics in which notions of composition are either too far 
removed from other, antecedently familiar forms to be usefully described as 
such, or even that they are simply nowhere to be found. 38 If composition 
does indeed break down in some physical regime then I grant that another 
structuring relation will be needed. Once again, I take it that that itself would 
constitute an interesting feature of the levels structure, and not one that 
renders composition simply useless to the project of defining it. 
2.4 Criticisms of Nomic Derivation as a 
Level-Structuring Relation 
Given the possibilities raised above, perhaps a safer - that is, more likely 
to be universally applicable - structuring relation would be one that relates 
more and less fundamental laws. It is difficult, after all, to imagine physics 
ever doing without laws.39 As indicated in Schaffer's list above, the relation 
standardly taken to perform the role of relating laws is a deductive relation - or, 
as I am designating it, a 'relation of nomic derivation' - where this deduction 
will typically involve the use of bridge principles relating their various terms 
381 should note that it is not just Brown and Ladyman who have mooted this view, 
for Steven Weinberg has foreshadowed it. As I will have cause to mention again in 
Chapter 7, Weinberg likewise believes that the concept has outgrown its usefulness 
in defining reductionism, and as such he holds that fundamentality ought to be 
conceived of in wholly different terms - namely, in terms of fundamental principles 
(on which much more in Part 2). As he writes, 'it is not possible to give a precise 
meaning to statements about particles being composed of other particles', giving 
as an example how the constituent quark model is only a part of the story when 
it comes to hadron structure (Weinberg [1995a]). He then goes on to claim that, 
because of this, fundamentality ought to be construed not in terms of constituents, 
but in terms of fundamental physical principles, since it is only the latter that have 
a clear meaning. But, once again, to say the fact that the notion of composition is 
bewildering in that context is not to say that there is no useful notion of composition 
to be had at all (as the fact that the constituent quark model is at least part of the 
picture suggests). Nonetheless, if Weinberg is right, it does mean that compositional 
relations are of limited applicability and thus cannot by themselves tell the whole 
story about the levels structure. 
39See, however, Wheeler [1983]. 
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a la Nagel. 40 
However, the idea that Nagelian relations between laws could be used to 
define a levels hierarchy might seem naive for a number of reasons. First, the 
physicalist assumption that all special science laws ultimately reduce to the 
laws of physics is regarded as contentious, at least in some quarters.41 Indeed, 
even the question of whether theories within physics - such as Newtonian 
mechanics or thermodynamics - stand in well-defined deductive relations to 
other, prima facie more fundamental theories of physics, such as quantum 
mechanics, can be very difficult to argue.42 Second, the idea that (something 
like) Nagel's model of inter-theory reduction constitutes an adequate repre-
sentation of relations between realistic theories has come in for a good deal 
of criticism.43 One of the chief criticisms of Nagel's model is that it is typically 
not the putatively 'less fundamental theory' that is derived (via the bridge 
principles), but only some approximation of it. Yet no independent criterion 
of how these approximations are to be conceived, or what their acceptable 
quantitative limits are, can be antecedently provided.44 This has been argued 
to render Nagel's account vacuous.45 
Instead of trying to survey all the relevant literature on this issue, I will settle 
with saying the following on each of these points. The point regarding special 
science laws I will simply reject by fiat; I adopt a reductive world-view in 
which the laws of chemistry and biology ultimately, and irrespective of our 
grasp of how they do so, reduce to the laws of physics. I will not argue for that 
view here.46 Regarding the point concerning the adequacy of (something like) 
Nagel's model to capture inter-theory relations, I will here refer to recent and 
4O'fhe Original statement of this is in Nagel [1979]. 
410ne need not even go to biology to find examples of this view, for some even 
deny that the laws of chemistry reduce to those of physics. See e.g. Hendry [2010], 
Section 3. 
42See e.g. Bokulich [2008) 
43These last two points are clearly not independent of one another, for in the 
absence of at least some defensible model of reduction the claim that these theories 
do or do not stand in well-defined relations of relative fundamenality cannot even be 
asserted. 
44See for example Problem 7 of Dizadji-Bahmani et al., op. cit. 
45 Of course, other points have been waged against the theory. such as Feyerabend's 
that bridge principles are incoherent on semantic grounds. See ibid. for replies. 
46 A critical survey of the anti-reductionist arguments in chemistry. which ultimately 
places the problems motivating that world-view squarely within problems in the 
interpretation of physics, may be found in McKenzie [2008]. 
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persuasive work by Butterfield and by Dizadji-Bahmani, Frigg and Hartmann 
defending the Nagelian account from the objections that have been levelled at 
it. 47 What I will say, however, regarding the criticism of Nagel's model mooted 
above concerning the fact that no general prescription for approximation 
has been given is more or less just what I said in the mereological case -
namely, that the fact that the question of inter-theory derivations is subtle, 
complex, and not amenable to blanket generalization does not in itself mean 
that such an approach to structuring the levels hierarchy is ruled out.48 
Given that (something like) Nagel's approach arguably is the right way to 
conceive of the relative fundamentality of theories, the question of whether 
the known laws of physics can thus be taken to stand in well-defined relations 
of relative fundamentality becomes an a posteriori question to be settled by 
examination of the theories themselves, such that if well-defined relations of 
nomic derivation may be shown to exist between certain laws, then we will be 
justified in taking those laws to be aligned in well-defined relations of relative 
fundamentality. That, in any case, is all I will need for my purposes.49 
2.5 The World as Possessing a Levels Structure 
In the wake of that (brief) discussion, I believe that we have grounds to assert 
that there exist a variety of priority relations, each of which is prima facie 
feasible for defining (at least some portion of) the levels hierarchy. But this 
embarrassment of riches raises another potentially problematic issue - namely, 
whether each of these levels 'comport' with one another. 50 To ask whether the 
levels comport is to ask whether the relations align with one another such that, 
if two entities (such as two objects) are related by one priority relation (say a 
part-whole relation), then either they or some feature of them (such as their 
47Butterfield [2011], Section 3 (especially 3.2.2); Dizadji-Bahmani et al., op. cit .. 
48This is echoed in Dizadji-Bahmani et al., Section 4, reply to Problem 7. 
49Indeed, in the case study I will look at in which laws define the levels hierarchy, 
namely the 'effective' approach to quantum field theory, laws may indeed be taken 
- at least at the level of detail at which I will study the issue - to stand in such 
relationships. (As Castellani has already pointed out, assessing questions of relative 
fundamentality pertaining to laws proves to be much more transparent in this context 
than in the general case (Castellani [2002], p253-4); much more on this in Chapter 
6 below.) 
sOCf. Schaffer [2003], pSOO. 
23 
Chapter 2. Defining the 'Levels' Picture 
properties or the laws governing them) will likewise be so related by another 
priority relation. However, the various priority relations may be expected 
to comport in this way appears prima facie unlikely. As Schaffer notes, Kim 
has argued that one and the same object can instantiate both the sub- and 
supervenient properties associated with some phenomenon. 51 If so, then 
it follows that supervenience structure may come apart from mereological 
structure, in the sense that, where a mereological relation discerns one level 
in that object, a supeivenience relation discerns two. Another example may 
be gleaned from elementary particle physics. Few would regard quantum 
electrodynamics as a fundamental theory (on account of the fact that it is 
derivable from the more unified Weinberg-Salam model), but nonetheless the 
electrons and photons that QED relates are currently regarded as fundamental 
particles, in the sense that they are regarded to lack any constituents. 52 Thus 
it appears possible that the hierarchy of laws has structure extending beneath 
the fundamental mereologicallevel (if such a level there be). According to 
Schaffer, if it were to be the case that the levels did not align, it may be 
that 'the entire "levels" metaphor is best abandoned'; but this seems wholly 
unwarranted to me. S3 After all, just because there may be as many foliations 
to make of the structure as there are priority relations does not itself mean 
that reality is not objectively structured; given that it contains structure with 
respect to each relation, it seems better to say that it is more richly structured 
than we may at first have assumed. To my mind, all any lack of 'comporting' 
would imply is that, when speaking of relative fundamentality, we need to 
take care to specify which particular relation it is that we have in mind. In 
consequence, it seems that the notion of 'relative fundamentality' should 
itself be understood as relative to a particular priority relation. And that 
need not, of course, undermine the objectivity of any relative fundamentality 
51 Ibid., footnote 2. 
s20f course, whether this is true depends on how exactly we conceptualize what it 
is for a particle of contemporary physics to have constituents! (In case the reader's 
mind is wandering in this direction, I note Shimony's point that the fact that an 
'elementary particle' can undergo decay into a superposition of other particles need 
not compromise the view that it lacks constituents; it only requires that we abandon 
'the Democritean equating of noncompositeness with immortality' (op. cit., p209). A 
very nice discussion of some of the subtleties involved in concepts of composition as 
they appear in high-energy physics may be found in Heisenberg [1975]; I too will 
have more to say about superposed particles and compositeness in Chapter 5. 
53 Schaffer op. cit., p500. 
24 
Chapter 2. Defining the 'Levels' Picture 
attribution. 
With all that now in place, let me take stock of where the discussion is at this 
point. The task I set myself in Pan 1 of this work is to adjudicate on whether 
physics can deny the existence of a fundamental level. Such a task clearly 
presupposes that it makes sense to speak of levels in the first place, and we 
have just seen that such talk is enmeshed in subtleties and controversies of 
various sorts. Still, I do not think that anything I have said so far drastically 
undermines the thought that such talk can be meaningfully engaged in, or 
that it is appropriate to conceive of the world in these terms. The assumption 
that nature may be fractioned into more and less fundamental levels is thus 
one that I will take seriously in this essay, though I happily c~ncede that 
which priority relation I choose to use to express that relative fundamentality 
will have to be a function of the relevant physical or philosophical context. 
(Indeed, if all goes well, the justification for assuming that there is a well-
defined levels strUcture will become clearer in the course of the two case 
studies I will look at in Pan 1 of this thesis.) 
What I will, however, subject to much closer scrutiny than the question of 
whether the levels hierarchy exists is the assumption that priority relations 
must be well-founded, and hence that there must be a fundamental level to 
the hierarchy that I take to exist in nature. A$ already noted, there seems to be 
a widespread presupposition in metaphysics in favour of the existence of such 
a level. It is therefore surprising that, at least until very lately, the justification 
for this assumption has been almost non-existent. As Schaffer puts it, 'the 
proposition that there is a fundamental level is widely accepted but seldom 
defended.'S4 This situation is changing, however, and it is the quality of 
the justifications for the fundamentalist assumption that I want to examine 
now. After all, only if I can show that we are not committed a priori to the 
existence of a fundamental level will there be any point in asking whether 
physics in particular is in any position to contradict that assumption. Let me 
therefore now consider what good reasons, if any, there are for believing in a 
fundamental level. 
S4Ibid., p498; p499. 
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b::::3----------------------~ 
The View from Metaphysics: 
Contemporary Fundamentalist 
Arguments 
A particularly expedient way of arguing for the existence of a fundamental 
level to the actual world would be to argue that such a level is metaphysically 
necessary, and hence a feature of all possible worlds. Now, arguments for the 
metaphysical necessity of some state of affairs admittedly have an unfortunate 
tendency to wither in the face of developments in physics. l Nonetheless, if a 
good argument for the neessity of a fundamental level could be constructed -
and one that is consistent with the physics that we currently possess - it seems 
that this would constitute about as compelling a justification for the belief 
in a fundamental level as one could reasonably hope for. After all, it seems 
unfair to hold speculations about what future physics might produce against 
a contemporary metaphysical hypothesis - not least since essentially the same 
thing could be said of our best current physical hypotheses. And of course, 
if we did succeed in convincing ourselves that such a level is metaphysically 
necessary, then we would simultaneously convince ourselves that physics too 
was necessarily committed to the existence of such a level, and hence also 
that physics could not be used to argue against it. 
In spite of the prevalence of the fundamentality assumption within con-
lA classic statement of this is Putnam [1963]. 
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temporary metaphysics, however, the current consensus in fundamentalist 
metaphysics seems to be that the existence of a fundamental level is not in fact 
metaphysically necessary. Cameron, for example, reviews a series of a priori 
arguments - some of which have been prominent in the history of philosophy 
and some of which are of his own making - in support of the conclusion that 
'there must exist a realm of ontologically independent objects which provide 
the ultimate ontological basis for all the ontologically dependent entities', 
where the 'must' is understood as having metaphysical force. 2 But he argues, 
correctly I think, that none of these arguments fare any better than the cos-
mological argument for the existence of God as the ultimate locus of causal 
relations - an argument which is well-known to have come under withering 
attack frortl, amongst others, Russell and Hume.3 In response to his own 
criticisms of arguments for the necessity of fundamentality, Cameron suggests 
that we 'should abandon the attempt to give a metaphysical argument for 
the intuition under discussion and instead justify it on broadly theoretical 
grounds', and in particular, in terms of the virtues that theories that posit 
fundamentality are claimed to possess.4 Such grounds, he claims, would 
constitute 'a reason to believe in the truth of the intuition against infinitely 
descending chains of ontological priority', and hence to believe in the actuality 
of a fundamental level, but they provide 'no justification for the claim that the 
intuition is necessarily true'. 5 But since it is the more restricted question of 
whether the actual world possesses a fundamental basis that I am interested 
in here, were theoretical considerations to furnish us only with a justification 
for endorsing the more limited conclusion that the actual world does, as a 
matter of fact, possess a fundamental level, then that need not be seen as any 
shortcoming of an argument based on them from my point of view. Rather, all 
2Cameron [2008], p8. Cameron assesses these arguments in Section V of his 
paper. 
3The most compelling objection one can make against the cosmological argu-
ment, in my view, is that which Bertrand Russell waged against Father Copel-
ston. In this famous exchange, Russell argued that the supposed fact that ev-
erything needs a cause no more implies the conclusion that there is a cause of 
everything than the fact that every human requires a mother implies that there 
must be a mother of everyone. (A transcript of the discussion is available here: 
http://www.philvaz.com/apologetics/p20.htm.) Nowadays such arguments are of 
course known as 'quantifier shift' arguments. 
4Ibid., p13. 
sIbid. 
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that our failure to come up with an argument for the necessity of fund amen-
tality need signify is that one particularly expedient way of arguing for the 
actuality of fundamentality is precluded. Cameron's argument is therefore 
one that should be considered here. 
As noted, Cameron employs the notion of theoretical virtues to argue for the 
actuality of fundamentality. Cameron is not alone in using theoretical consid-
erations to this end, howeveI; as Sider has recently offered a related, though 
different, argument with fundamentalist implications that draws on similar 
concepts. I will therefore consider in this chapter whether these contemporary 
arguments, arguments predicated on the features that fundamentalist theories 
supposedly enjoy, are arguments for the well-foundedness of priority relations 
that we ought to take seriously. I begin with that of Cameron. 
3.1 FundamentaIity through VIrtue 1: Cameron's 
Argument from 'Theoretical Utility' 
A!:. mentioned, Cameron seeks to justify the fundamentalist intuition on 
'broadly theoretical' grounds - namely, on the basis of the virtues that fun-
damentalist theories are supposed to possess in comparison with their anti-
fundamentalist rivals. The virtue that Cameron primarily appeals to to this 
end is that of unification.6 As he writes, 
If we seek to explain some phenomena, then, other things be-
ing equal, it is better to give the same explanation of each phe-
nomenon than to give separate explanations of each phenomenon. 
A unified explanation of the phenomena is a theoretical benefit. 7 
It is therefore clear that Cameron views more unified explanations, in the 
sense just given, to be in some sense 'better'. The key point, for Cameron, is 
that if chains of priority do not terminate, then while everything that exists has 
an explanation, 'there is no explanation of everything that needs explaining' 
- that is, we cannot provide a [i.e. the same] explanation for everything 
6Instead of using the term 'theoretical virtUes' directly, Cameron speaks of theo-
retical 'costs and benefits' (see e.g. ibid., p12). 
70p. cit., p12. 
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non-fundamental,.8 He moreover takes this to mean that anti-fundamentalist 
explanations are less unified than their fundamentalist counterparts. Putting 
everything together, then, fundamentalists give better explanations of whatever 
needs explaining than anti-fundamentalists do. But better explanations are, 
claims Cameron, more likely to be true. As such, 
the status [he] attribute[s] to the intuition is like that enjoyed 
by Ockham's razor: we should accept it because if it is true the 
theories we arrive at give a better explanation of the phenomena 
to be explained, and hence are more likely to be true. 9 
This is taken to 'provide some evidence for the intuition' that priority relations 
amongst actual entities do indeed bottom out somewhere. Now, as already 
mentioned, Cameron concedes that such virtues do not secure the necessity of 
fundamentality, but claims that they nonetheless provide grounds for thinking 
that this, the actual world does in fact possess a fundamental basis. In his 
words, 
[S]uch principles of theory-choice do not appear necessary; it is 
not as if the world is necessarily such that the simplest explanation 
is the right one - we just hope that our world is like this. Relying 
on these principles could have taken us badly wrong, but we live 
in hope that they do not in fact do so. I have offered a reason to 
believe in the truth of the intuition against infinitely descending 
chains of ontological priority, but I can think of no reason to 
believe in its necessity.1o 
That, in a nutshell, is Cameron's argument. 
How seriously ought we to take it? In sum, the premises of the argument 
seem to be that (i) fundamentality gives the best explanation of what needs 
to be explained, on grounds of superior unification, and that (ii) it therefore 
provides the more likely explanation than its anti-fundamentalist rival. From 
these it is concluded that it is more likely than not that the world possesses a 
fundamental basis (even though we cannot claim that the world is necessarily 
that way). However, it is doubtful that even this modally weakened conclusion 
8/bid.; italics added. 
9Ibid., p13. 
lOIbid. 
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is sanctioned by Cameron's argument. I contend that one can take issue 
with each of Cameron's premises, and moreover do so from a number of 
angles. 
Criticism of the first premise has already been lodged by Orilia, who argues 
that it is, contra Cameron, entirely unclear that fundamentalist explana-
tions do in fact fare better with regard the virtue cited - namely, that of 
unity.ll As Orilia puts it, saying that there is a unified explanation of two 
non-fundamental existents on the grounds that they both have explanations 
in the fundamental basis 
is like saying that there is a uniform causal explanation of two 
disparate phenomena, the breaking of the glass and John's recov-
ery from pneumonia, because there is a collection of two events, 
namely {Tom's hurling a stone, John's taking antibiotics}, such 
that one of these two events caused the glass to break and the 
other John to recover. Clearly this kind of 'uniformity' is too gerry-
mandered for it to confer any advantage over rival explanations 
that do not enjoy a similar uniformity[.p2 
This seems hard to deny. Nonetheless, Cameron might have a way out 
in shifting the emphasis from unity to simplicity: while a fundamentalist 
explanation may have no clear claim to unity, it seems that he might be 
entitled to claim that such an explanation would be simpler, since any full 
and satisfactory anti-fundamentalist explanation would necessarily fail to 
terminate (at least if it was to be non-circular). And it seems at least plausible 
that a form of explanation that terminates has a claim to being 'simpler' than 
one that in principle does not - indeed simpler than one for which there is not 
even any principled place for it to begin.13 So given that Cameron's general 
strategy is to defend the actuality of a fundamental level by appealing to 
llSee Orilia [2009]. 
12Ibid., p.338. 
13 As Callender writes in the context of discussing Schaffer's anti-fundamentalist 
argument, to be discussed below: 'The obvious point to make is that a theory 
appealing to only a finite descent is far simpler than an infinite descent model. 
Simplicity is perhaps the cardinal theoretical virtue of scientific theories. [ ... J What is 
simplicity? Who knows? On any discussion of simplicity I have ever seen, an infinite 
hierarchy of entities and theories of those entities doesn't count as simple.' (Callender 
[2001], p6.) 
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theoretical virtues, it seems he could meet (or at least avoid) Orilla's objection 
by placing the emphasis on simplicity as opposed to unity. Doing so would 
likely prompt him to make an explicit appeal to some version of Ockham's 
razor to justify his conclusion, as opposed to merely citing it to communicate 
the structure of the argument that he does adopt concerning unity.14 
Let us therefore - at least for argument's sake - concede that fundamentalist 
explanations do indeed fare better with respect to some virtue, such as the 
virtue of simplicity, even if they fail to exemplify a high degree of unification. 
However, even if we do grant this, we may still take issue with the idea that 
the possession of such virtues by the fundamentalist theory gives grounds for 
ascribing greater relative likelihood to it. Suppose we begin by thinking about 
the general issue in the context of scientific theories. As is well known, the 
optimistic idea that virtues such as simplicity enjoy any obvious or general 
connection with truth has come under sustained attack in the philosophy 
of science. In that context, anti-realists (and perhaps most notably van 
Fraassen) might well agree that simpler theories are 'better', but will hold 
that this 'bettemess' is ultimately pragmatic in character and of no epistemic 
significance. Thus, they would reject the slide from the idea that a given 
explanation is 'better' insofar as it is simpler (or indeed more unified) to the 
idea that it is therefore more likely to be true, since the 'bettemess' of the 
explanation has nothing whatsoever it do with its truth (they will hold). As 
van Fraassen writes, 
Simplicity... is obviously a criterion in theory choice, or at least 
a term in theory appraisal. For that reason, some ... suggest that 
simple theories are more likely to be true. But it is surely absurd to 
think that the world is more likely to be simple than complicated 
(unless one has certain metaphysical or theological views not 
usually accepted as factors in scientific inference). The point is 
that the virtue, or patchwork of virtues, indicated by the term is 
a factor in theory appraisal, but does not ... make a theory more 
likely to be true. 15 
14Indeed, Sider uses simplicity considerations in support of fundamentalist conclu-
sions, as I will discuss in the next section. 
15van Fraassen, [1980], p90; quoted in Musgrave [1985], p202. 
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As is equally well known, however, scientific realists have worked hard to 
circumvent this objection and have typically done so by holding that simplicity 
and other virtues need not be seen as purely pragmatic in character, nor as 
purely metaphysical (or indeed 'theological'). Musgrave, for example, has 
claimed that if one can show that 'theories constructed under [the] aegis [of 
simplicity] are empirically successful, while theories which violate it are not', 
then we could 'point to the empirical success of science in vindication of our 
belief' that 'Nature is simple (in some carefully specified sense or senses)'.16 If 
we could indeed show that, we would then be warranted in choosing between 
the underdetermined theories accordingly. Defenders of the realist import 
of theoretical virtues will therefore urge that since appeals to simplicity or 
unity have repeatedly led us to well-confirmed theories, the idea that nature 
is accurately described in particularly simple or unified terms is one that has 
received indirect confirmation along with those theories themselves - no doubt 
noting that Einstein himself famously held such a view. 17 There is thus a 
tradition in the philosophy of science that holds, in the face of these sorts 
of empiricist objections, that virtues such as simplicity can be taken to have 
genuine truth-tracking import. 
Whatever can be said for such moves, any such appeal is obviously going to be 
parasitic on the track record of science, and in particular on the case that one 
can make for the claim that appeals to the relevant vinues have indeed led to 
empirically successful theories. But suppose we now consider theories that 
do not receive any empirical confirmation. Prima facie at least, we might be 
tempted to deny of such theories that any feature of them has been confirmed, 
directly or indirectly, since by hypothesis these theories do not enjoy any 
confirmation; hence, it seems, nor do their features either. So while it may 
be that historico-empirical facts can be cited to warrant appeals to virtues 
in the case of scientific theories, it is entirely unclear that such warrants 
transfer to non-empirical theories, to which the concept of confirmation of 
course does not apply. But it is clear that the rival (fundamentalist and anti-
16Musgrave [1985], p203-4. 
17See e.g. Musgrave op. cit., p204; Einstein [1934]. Of course, such a claim 
has no bite without some working criterion of simplicity. But both scientists and 
philosophers of science have tried to articulate what sort of thing they intend by it, 
and the motivation for putting in this work is largely because emminent scientists 
are 'always appealing' to such virtues (Musgrave op. cit.). 
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fundamentalist) theories of 'metaphysical explanation' that Cameron has in 
mind are examples of just such theories. What the theories he discusses are 
to 'explain', after all, is just the existence of the non-fundamental. It is of no 
relevance whatsoever to either theory what these entities are like - what 
properties they have, or how they behave - since any non-fundamental entity, 
whatever it is like, is to be accounted for by each of these theories. By contrast, 
of course, empirical theories cannot be expected to account for everything non-
fundamental, regardless of its properties. For one thing, unless there exists 
some phenomena that they are incompatible with, and hence cannot hope 
to explain, they will never qualify as falsifiable. As such, whatever suppon 
appeals to theoretical virtues may have gained from historical episodes of 
successful confirmation, that support seemingly cannot be appealed to here, 
on the grounds that the theories Cameron considers are simply not the sort 
of thing to which confirmation can apply. If appeals to simplicity are to 
be warranted in this context, then, that warrant must issue from another 
source. And until we discover what that warrant is in the case of metaphysical 
theories, we remain threatened by the sort of predicament that van Fraassen 
alludes to - a predicament m which virtues may make for 'lovely' features but 
nonetheless none that have any demonstrable connection to truth. 
However, one might object that the argument just lodged against Cameron 
is too hasty. In particular, one might object to the idea that the fact that 
his metaphysical theories are not subject to confirmation implies that their 
features are not either. For suppose that the realist defences as applied to 
empirical theories are warranted, and the virtue of 'simplicity', however we 
may choose to cash it out, has received confirmation in the case of such 
theories. One may then be tempted to claim that it has therefore received 
confirmation simpliciter - for would not the fact that nature favours simplicity 
when it comes to its physical structure give grounds for thinking that it favour 
simplicity regarding its metaphysical structure as well? Indeed, one might be 
tempted to argue that if, as I do, we want to keep our metaphysics naturalistic, 
we must presume that the same virtues that we take to govern our physical 
theories govern our metaphysical theories as well. 
Compelling as it may at first seem, however, the slide from the idea that the 
virtues can be epistemically backed up as features of scientific theories to the 
idea that they can be supported as features of metaphysical theories is not 
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as innocuous as it looks.18 This is because the notion of simplicity that is 
appealed to in the sciences involves a constraint that renders it inapplicable 
to the sort of metaphysical theories that Cameron discusses. Moreover, it is 
unclear that there is any notion of simplicity that is applicable to metaphysical 
theories and that can be appealed to without begging the question at issue. 
To see this, let us recall what Cameron has to say about simplicity, and in 
particular about Ockham's razor: 
Such principles of theory choice do not appear necessary: it is not 
as if the world is necessarily such that the simplest explanation is 
the right one - we just hope that our world is like this. 19 
This conveys that the understanding of Ockham's razor that Cameron is work-
ing with is something like 'the simplest explanation is the best explanation'. 
But such a rendering concedes far too much to simplicity, for it is of course not 
the case that we regard the simplest explanation as the most preferable one 
in general. The simpler of two putative explanations need not be regarded as 
the better one if it is already acknowledged, for example, that the phenomena 
to be explained are at root very complicated, and hence not the sort of thing 
that could be be adequately explained in simple terms. (Indeed, in such a 
case the 'simplest explanation' is unlikely to be regarded as an explanation 
. at all.) For although the explanation of, for example, the solidity of matter 
in terms of it being composed of interlocking impenetrable atoms may well 
be 'simpler' than the explanations offered by contemporary atomic physics, 
we obviously regard the latter as 'better' - presumably in part because we are 
now well aware that the world is a far more complicated place than we used 
to think it was. Thus, a much better statement of the sentiment that is - or 
that ought to be - expressed by Ockham's razor often goes by the name of 
'Einstein's razor', and is pithily presented as the maxim that 'everything should 
be made as simple as possible, but not simpler'. Holding that things should be 
made only as simple as possible to satisfactorily explain is clearly not the same 
thing as valuing simplicity of explanation in some unqualified sense, and - as 
the above example makes clear - the qualification is surely necessary. 
18Saatsi has also discussed the dangers of assuming that the non-empirical features 
we cite in warranting our beliefs in scientific theories will automatically be citable in 
justifying choices between metaphysical theories; see Saatsi [2011]. Similar issues 
are also discussed in Ladyman [2012]. 
190p. cit., p13. 
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But how should we understand the qualification 'as possible' that distinguishes 
Einstein's from Ockham's razor? Consider first of all how the maxim is 
understood in the context of scientific theories. In this context, 'as simple as 
possible' has a clear meaning, and one that is expressed in Einstein's original 
statement of the principle that bears his name: 
It can scarcely be denied that the supreme goal of all theory is 
to make the irreducible basic elements as simple and as few as 
possible without having to surrender the adequate representation 
of a single datum of experience.20 
In this context, then, to say that a theory should be made 'as simple as possible' 
means that it should be made 'as simple as it can be without compromising its 
empirical power'. In other words, the maxim counsels us to construct theories 
of the unobseIVable in such a way that they are able to recover all of a relevant 
class of phenomena whilst being kept as free as they can be of 'loose wheels' 
that do not support discernible differences in that phenomena. Now, the 
reason that such a feature is regarded as so useful in underdetermination 
disputes is because, although an empirically equivalent theory can (it is 
claimed) always be 'cooked up' from a pre-existing theory, it is perceived 
as highly likely that the cooked-up theory will contain more in the way of 
empirically superfluous elements - contain more in the way of 'loose wheels' -
than the original theory doeS.21 Einstein's maxim would then council us to 
choose the simpler theory in such cases, and thus help us to ward off this 
particular realist bogeyman (provided, of course, that the maxim can indeed 
be given realist support). But what is absolutely key to the utility of appeals 
to simplicity in such disputes is that the criterion for how simple would be too 
simple may be stated without reference to what is in dispute between the two 
underdetermined theories, namely, the nature of the unobservable world. How 
simple things are allowed to get is settled with reference only to a domain 
of empirical phenomena, which by definition is not an issue that divides 
underdetermined alternatives. 
But now the problem that Cameron faces in appealing to simplicity is clear. 
We know that explanations should not aim to be simple in some unqualified 
sense, but that they should only be as simple as possible; but how are we to 
20 Einstein [1934], p165. 
21 Musgrave op. cit. 
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specify how simple is too simple in the case of two rival, purely metaphysical 
theories? Since there are no relevant empirical phenomena to constrain such 
theories, any qualified notion of simplicity that is applicable in metaphysics 
must therefore be different to that which applies in the sciences. And in 
the absence of any obvious criterion of how simple is too simple that is 
theory-independent in the way that empirical data is and that is applicable 
in the case of non-empirical theories, it seems that any appeal to simplicity 
must beg the question against the anti-fundamentalist. The reason for this 
is as follows. Although I have granted that it may well be 'simpler' in some 
unqualified sense to explain the non-fundamental in terms of the fundamental 
(perhaps, I hazarded, because explanations that can in principle terminate 
are simpler than those that necessarily do not), any explanation that is simple 
in this sense would clearly be too simple an explanation for cases in which the 
non-fundamental cannot be explained in this nice and simple way - namely, 
in worlds that lack fundamentality. In such worlds, it would simply be wrong 
to cite a fundamental basis in such explanations, and thus wrong to adopt 
such a simple explanation. Thus in defending the existence of a fundamental 
basis, the fundamentalist cannot appeal to a feature of simplicity as a virtue 
of explanations if possession of that feature would make an explanation too 
simple than would be appropriate in worlds that lack such a basis, since doing 
so would simply beg the question against the anti-fundamentalist. And nor 
does there appear to be any reason why exactly the same thing cannot be said, 
mutatis mutandis, for unity as a feature of explanations - even if Cameron's 
claim that fundamentalist explanations are more unified went through. 
All things considered, then, it appeals that Cameron's appeal to theoretical 
virtues in the effort to secure fundamentalist conclusions simply does not 
work. Let me summarize what has been shown. As is well known, there is no 
a priori and general connection between truth and theoretical virtues. In the 
case of empirical theories, however, there is at least the possibility of making 
an appeal to the history of science to say that some virtues of successful 
theories have received indirect confirmation through the confirmation of those 
theories themselves. Unfortunately for Cameron's theories of 'metaphysical 
explanation', however, no such appeal can be made. And even if one were to 
claim, perhaps on some sort of putative naturalistic grounds, that if simplicity 
has been confirmed as a truth-tracking feature of theories of natural science 
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then we should be able to appeal to it in the case of theories of metaphysics, 
we should be clear that the notion of simplicity that is of interest in the 
sciences is qualified, and qualified in such a way as to make it inapplicable 
to non-empirical theories such as Cameron's theories. Furthermore, in the 
absence of some theory-independent criterion of how simple is too simple 
that is applicable in the metaphysical case, it seems that simplicity cannot 
be appealed to without begging the question at hand. In sum, then, if the 
supposed possession of virtues by certain metaphysical theories is all we have 
to go on regarding the existence of a fundamental level, then it seems that 
the best thing to say at this point is that we simply do not know whether 
there is one or not - nor, contra Cameron, do we have any inkling of the 
relative likelihoods of the fundamentalist and anti-fundamentalist theories. 
As such, Cameron's argument furnishes us with no good grounds to believe in 
a fundamental level - whether of this world or of any other. 
3.2 Fundamentality through VlI'tue 2: Sider's Ar-
gument from 'Ideological Parsimony' 
In the last section, I noted that there is no obvious and general justification 
for the claim that the world is more likely to be simple than complicated, 
and that, even if some support for this claim can be garnered through the 
empirical success of suitably 'simple' theories histOrically, it is not a kind of 
success that theories of metaphysics have any obvious claim to. But that does 
not detract from the fact that there may be specific forms of simplicity for 
which there is a clear connection with truth-likeness. Thus if theories with 
fundamentalist implications can be shown to possess such a feature, then we 
will have rational grounds for holding that the world admits a fundamental 
level (or at least, a la Cameron, that it probably does so). It seems to be 
such a specific notion of simplicity that Sider exploits in his argument for 
'mereological nihilism'. The latter is the view that nothing has proper parts, 
so that there are (despite appearances) no composite objects - a view that is 
of course committed to the idea that whatever objects exist are mereological 
simples. Mereological nihilism is therefore a variant of the view that all objects 
bottom out into fundamental particles - even if in this case the 'bottoming out' 
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is entirely trivial, since there are no objects but the fundamental ones. Since it 
is incompatible with the existence of 'gunk', we can construe Sider's argument 
for mereological nihilism as an argument with fundamentalist implications. 22 
Sider's is perhaps the most well-known of the contemporary arguments in 
support of such conclusions, and it is this that I will examine now. 
It is the idea that theories that exhibit, in particular, greater ideological par-
simony that are more likely to be true that forms the basis of Sider's fun-
damentalist argument. As such, a crucial element of the backdrop to his 
proposal is a realism about 'theoretical ideology', and to communicate what 
this notion involves it may be helpful to begin by explaining where this notion 
came from. The notion of ideology (in this context) traces back to Quine, 
in an essay aimed at Bergmann's claim that the structural properties of the 
world reflect themselves in an ideal language. According to Bergmann, the 
primitive predicates of such a language are ontologically significant and as 
such demand the existence of properties. Predictably, however, Quine saw 
this conclusion as one that ought to be resisted, and he went on to argue that 
the primitive predicates of a theory correspond merely to what ideas could 
be expressed in it. These primitive predicates were thus said to belong to the 
ideology of a theory. 
The ideology of a theory is a question of what the symbols mean; 
the ontology of a theory is a question of what the assertions say or 
imply there is.23 
By taking 'ideology' to pertain within the intensional realm of ideas and 
meaning, while keeping ontology in the'more respectable, extensional realm 
of reference and quantification, Quine presented ideology as a psychological 
quirk with a bleak scientific future. As he put how he saw matters, 
The theory of reference treats of naming, denotation, extension, 
coextensiveness, values of variables, truth; the theory of meaning 
treats of synonymy, analyticity, syntheticity, entailment, intension. 
The question of the ideology of a theory. .. obviously tends to fall 
22Indeed, as I will argue the parsimony argument in favour of a nihilist theory, 
containing only mereological simples, over a theory which also contains composites 
of those simples, and the parsimony argument for a nihilist theory over a gunky 
theory are perfectly analogous: if one works, so does the other. 
23Quine [1951], p14. 
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within the theory of meaning; and, insofar, it is heir to the mis-
erable conditions, the virtual lack of scientific conceptualization, 
which characterize the theory of meaning.24 
As such, the ideology of a theory was regarded by Quine as of no objective or 
worldly significance. 
But this is not the view of ideology that is adopted in contemporary fun-
damentality metaphysics. Indeed, it is not even the view of ideology that 
Quine himself was to endorse in his later work - work which moved away 
from the hardline nominalism and extensionalism that was so characteristic 
of the earlier doctrines. The motivation for Quine taking ideology seriously, 
and hence also its attendant notion of the meaning of physical predicates, 
issued from his famous study of proxy functions.2S His construction and use 
of such functions showed that sentences about physical objects in spacetime 
could in principle be reduced to the language of set theory, which in tum 
showed that, if we continue to retain an extensional approach to predicates, 
the ontology of physics can be reduced to an ontology of pure sets only.26 
But Quine (rightly) saw the 'hyper-Pythagorean' idea that the ontology of 
physics (or chemistry, or zoology, or any other science) could be reduced to 
an ontology of sets as disastrous.27 If this state of affairs is to be avoided, 
there is therefore no alternative but to relax the thesis of extensionality and 
concede that predicates carry further significance - significance that can only 
be understood in intensional terms. As he wrote: 
We must note that this triumph of hyper-Pythagorean ism has to 
do with the values of the variables of quantification, and not with 
what we say about them. It has to do with ontology and not with 
ideology. The things that a theory deems there to be are the values 
of a theory's variables, and it is these that have been resolving 
themselves into numbers and kindred objects - ultimately into 
24Jbid., pIS. 
2SSee Decock [2002], Chapter S for a full discussion of this transition. 
26Jbid., pIS8. 
27He referred to it as an 'ontolologicaI debacle;' see ibid., pIS7. Note too that 
retaining a commitment to extensionalism, and hence downplaying the significance 
of the domestic interpretation, entails a parallel 'ideological debacle', in which the 
only predicates required to construct theories of physics are set-theoretic. See ibid., 
pIS9. 
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pure sets. The ontology of our system of the world reduces thus 
to the ontology of set theory, but our system of the world does not 
reduce to set theory; for our lexicon of predicates and functors still 
stands stubbornly apart ... We might most naturally react to this 
state of affairs by attaching less importance to mere ontological 
considerations than we used to do. We might come to look to pure 
mathematics as the locus of ontology as a matter of course, and 
consider that the lexicon of natural science, not the ontology, is 
where the metaphysical action is.28 
The work on proxy functions thus led Quine to view the way that we describe 
our ontology as of equal - or even greater - significance than the ontology 
itself. 
It is hard to see how a more complete retreat from the austere doctrines 
characteristic of Quine's earlier work - work which today remains synony-
mous with him - would be possible, and Quine never developed a satisfactory 
statement of the shape of his programme in the wake of the grave problems 
he himself ultimately raised against it.29 But irrespective of the difficulties 
the seeming fact that ideology 'is where the metaphysical action is' caused 
for the pillars of Quine's programme, it is this realistic conception of ide-
ology that holds sway in contemporary fundamentality metaphysics. Sider 
in particular has deployed the notion of ideology to articulate his notion of 
'realism about structure,' which is now constitutive of his own metaphysical 
programme.3O 
The term 'ideology', in its present sense, comes from Quine (1951a; 
1953). It is a bad word for a great concept. It misleadingly suggests 
that ideology is about ideas - about us. This in tum obscures the 
fact that the confirmation of a theory confirms its ideological 
28Quine [1976], pp503-4; quoted in Decock op. cit., p157. 
29 Ibid. pp45-46. According to Decock, the proxy function argument shows that 
'logical regimentation of physics is possible, but that the transparency that Quine 
hopes to gain is entirely lost because no austere explanation of our physical lexicon, 
our physical ideology, is feasible' (op. cit., p161). (Note that the claim is not that 
predicates must be taken to individuate a meaning, but that they nevertheless must 
have meaning, viz. that which they have according to the domestic interpretation of 
our theories (ibid.». 
30This is developed in Sider [2011a]. 
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choices and hence supports beliefs about structure. A theory's 
ideology is as much a part of its worldly content as its ontology.31 
Amongst a theory's ideology, Sider, like Quine, counts its primitive predicates. 
Thus a theory's fixing on the right ideology to describe the world is it fixing 
on the ways that the world's ontology is, which includes getting its structure 
right. As examples of theoretical ideology, Sider cites the non-Euclidean 
structure of spacetime postulated by general relativity. While an anti-realist 
could adopt a Reichenbachian conventionalism, according to which the points 
of spacetime may legitimately be carved up in any of a number of ways, the 
realist about GR's ideology will say that CO there is a non-Euclidean structure 
out in the world for a theory to get !ight, and that eii) GR gets it right. 32 
There is more to ideology for Sider than predicates, however: for him, the 
ideology of a theory 'corresponds to its primitive notions... which includes 
its logical notions as well as its predicates'.33 Sider admits this extension of 
ideology beyond predicates is 'vague', and the idea that, for example, the 
logical quantifiers could count as reflective of 'the way the world is' is a 
difficult one to come to grips with.34 But the only ideology that is relevant to 
the fundamentalist argument about to be discussed will be that of primitive 
predicates, and this portion of ideology is, I take it, sufficiently clear to be 
getting along with. 
So with all that in hand, let me now tum to that argument. As already noted, 
Sider uses the notion of ideological parsimony to argue for 'mereological 
nihilism' - namely, the view that nothing is a proper part of anything. and 
thus that there are no composite objects. All there are are simples arranged 
in the requisite fashion. As he puts it, 
... the situation is this: i) ordinary evidence apparently leaves open 
whether composites exist or whether there exist only appropriately 
31Sider [2011a], p13; italics added. 
32See ibid., especially Section 3.4. Just to be clear - as there may be some confusion 
in this context - here 'ideology' is not to be confused with the notion of a 'stance'. 
The realist stance is that knowledge of the structure of e.g. spacetime is possible; 
the realist's ideology is the predicates (and perhaps some other elements) that are 
needed to describe that structure itself. 
33Sider [2009], p417. 
34Ibid. Note that Quine himself initially suggested that the quantifiers of a theory 
could count amongst its ideology, but later he was unequivocal that it was the 
predicates alone that did so. See Decock Ope cit., Chapter 1, notes S2 and 54. 
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arranged particles; and ti) ideological parsimony gives us a positive 
reason to reject parthood, and thus composites. 35 
He then goes on to say that 'the opposing case for composite objects is surpris-
ingly weak', and hence that, as far as he can see, nothing 'counterbalances' his 
case that all existent objects are mereologica1 simples. As pointed out above, 
nihilism is inconsistent with the existence of gunk, and is thus committed 
to the existence of a (mereologically) fundamental level. Sider's argument 
may thus be viewed as an argument for a fundamentalist conclusion.36 I 
will now unpack exactly how it is that Sider takes the notion of ideological 
parsimony to give us 'positive reason' to endorse mereological nihilism, and 
thus embrace fundamentalism. 
The parsimony argument that Sider employs is in essence very simple, and it 
may be presented as follows.37 
1. A world in which no object is composite requires, ceteris paribus, less 
ideology to describe it than would be required in worlds in which some 
composite objects exjst, since the notion of 'is a part of is not required 
to give a full description of the former.38 
2. Theories containing less ideology are more likely to be true. 39 
.'. A theory in which there are no composite objects is, ceteris paribus, more 
likely to be true than a theory in which there are such objects. 
Laying the argument out in this way makes it clear that, if the notion of 
parsimony can be used to argue against the existence of composite objects 
in fundamentalist worlds, it can be used to argue in favour of fundamental-
ist over gunky worlds. After all, 'ordinary evidence' presumably leaves the 
question of whether the world is gunky or not at least as open as it leaves 
the question of whether my table is a bona fide object or rather just 'simples 
arranged tablewise' (assuming that such simples exist), so that the argument 
for the existence of gunk, and that for the existence of composites of simples, 
seem to be on a par with one another in this respect. Furthermore, the 'ceteris 
3SSider [2011b], p4. 
36Jbid., p20. 
37 Adapted from Sider [2011bj. 
3BIbid., p2. 
391bid., p3. 
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paribus' clause could be satisfied, for present purposes, between theories 
containing composites of simples and theories containing simples just as well 
as it can between gunky and fundamentalist theories.40 All that is required 
is that in each case the theory containing composites contains no extra ide-
ology than is required in fundamentalist worlds (other than parthood, of 
course). Such would be the case between gunky and fundamentalist worlds 
if the same qualitative predicates are required repeadedly ad infinitum as 
we descend down levels in the gunky worlds. 41 Thus, while as presented 
Sider's argument is aimed at the conclusion that we should prefer theories 
containing only simples over theories containing composites of simples, it 
seems that the very same argument could equally well be used to argue for 
mereologically fundamentalist over gunky worlds. I will therefore assess his 
argument now. 
As the argument is clearly valid, I will proceed directly to assessing the 
premises. Since we are counting primitive predicates as ideology, and 'is 
a part of' is standardly taken to be just such a predicate, we may regard 
the first premise as true by definition.42 I in any case will be happy to 
grant it here. What I do want to scrutinize, however, is the much more 
contentious-looking second premise. The problem here, of course, is just the 
familiar one that it·is far from obvious what the epistemological significance 
of ideological parsimony is. Indeed, in places Sider replaces 'ideologically 
more parsimonious' with the less polysyllabic 'simpler', and I have stressed 
already how there is in general no straightforward connection between a 
theory's perceived simplicity and its truth.43 
That point notwithstanding, it is nevertheless easy to construct cases in which 
an ideologically more parsimonious theory will indeed be more likely to be 
true. For suppose that we construct a (let's assume finitely axiomatized) theory 
T( e) of some entity e, perhaps a world, by means of a finite stock of predicates 
{Pi}' Now suppose we construct a new theory T'(e) = T(e) 1\ s(e), where s 
401 will argue below that the ceteris paribus clause cannot be appropriately satisfied 
in either case. 
41Schaffer [2003] refers to such worlds as 'boring worlds'. The worlds we will 
have cause to look at in Chapter 5 are arguably just such worlds. 
42See however Barnes [ms] for a discussion of the notion that parthood may be 
reduced to other notions. 
43See e.g. Sider op. cit., p3. 
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is a contingent sentence formulated in terms of a new primitive predicate 
p not in {Pi}.44 Since primitive predicates count amongst - indeed are the 
clearest representatives of - a theory's ideology, it is clear that T( e) is more 
ideologically parsimonious than T'(e). But we can also say with confidence 
that T(e) is more likely to be true than T'(e), since it is a consequence of the 
basic axioms of probability theory that a conjunction cannot be more likely 
to be true than any of its conjuncts, and will be determinately less likely if 
any of the other conjunct(s) are contingent. To quote a famous example, it 
cannot be more likely that Susie is a banker than that Susie is a banker and a 
feminist: since more is predicated of Susie in the latter case, there are more 
conditions for her to fulfill than in the former case and thus there is a lower 
probability of her fulfilling the latter description. It follows that we can indeed 
say, in cases in which theories are structurally related in this way, that the more 
ideologically parsimonious theory will be more likely to be true than the less 
parsimonious one. 
Indeed, the example that Sider gives in illustrating the general strategy - and 
uses to butter us up to the idea that more ideologically parsimonious theories 
are to be preferred in general-. could be construed as having precisely this 
form.4s The example concerns the debate over pre-relativistic spacetime to be 
found in the philosophy of physics. 
My argument presupposes a sort of realism about ideology. Ide-
ologically simpler theories aren't just more convenient for us. 
They're more likely to be true, since the worlds they posit are sim-
pler, contain less structure. (Ideology is a worldly matter, not about 
ideas at all.) Compare the common belief amongst philosophers 
of physics that neo-Newtonian spacetime is simpler and hence 
more cboiceworthy than Newtonian spacetime. The difference in 
simplicity has nothing to do with ontology. The same points of 
spacetime exist according to the two theories (and neither needs 
to reify relations over points of space-time). Instead, the difference 
concerns ideology. Describing neo-Newtonian spacetime requires 
a certain ideology, such as the notion of three points being on a 
44The sentence s can be presumed to be contigent if it is to constitute a non-
redundant component of a theory of a world. 
4sWhether this i.s the best construal is something I will return to parenthetically 
below. 
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straight line through spacetime; describing Newtonian spacetime 
requires this ideology and then some further ideology as well: 
the notion of two points of spacetime being at the same absolute 
position. Given the added ideology of the Newtonian theory, the 
spacetime that it describes has more structure, is more complex. 46 
In the case just discussed, then, the two rival theories do not differ in their 
ontologies: both of them describe the same set of spacetime points. But the 
Newtonian theory makes a demand on the ontology of spacetime points that 
the latter does not - namely, that the points of spacetime resolves themselves 
into relations of being at the same place. Since there is nothing in the neo-
Newtonian theory corresponding to absolute position, the Newtonian theory 
contains an additional predicate relative to its rival. Supposing that we 
conceive of the latter theory as different from the former only in that the 
former makes an additional demand relative to the former, we may then 
represent the relation between the two theories just as was done a moment 
ago, with e being the set of spacetime points, T( e) being the neo-Newtonian 
theory, and s( e) representing this extra demand concerning the classes that 
the points must resolve themselves into according to the Newtonian theory. In 
accordance with our argument above, then, there is here a clear sense in which 
Sider's claim that the more ideologically parsimonious theory, namely neo-
Newtonian theory, is more likely to be true goes through - at least assuming 
that the theories are indeed taken to be related in this way.47 
But it is not the issue of whether pre-relativistic spacetime should be taken 
to admit of absolute position that I am interested in here, but rather that of 
46Sider op. cit., p3. 
470{ course, one could well object to the idea that the two theories are related in 
this way. If one considers the mathematical models of these theories, it is indeed 
the case that Newtonian theory differs from neo-Newtonian only in that the former 
contains a vector field - a 'rigging' - that is absent from the latter; see for example 
Friedman [1986J, Chapter 3, especially Section 3.2. (There he talks of 'Galilean' 
instead of 'neo-Newtonian' spacetime.) However, one may consider the theory of 
neo-Newtonian spacetime to consist of the proposition that the spacetime contains 
the structure contained in the corresponding model, and no other structure. Were that 
the case, then instead of the Newtonian theory simply saying more than the former, 
the two theories will positively exclude one another. And if that were to be the case, 
then we are back to square one regarding why it is that we should take the greater 
relative likelihood to accrue to the more ideologically parsimonious theory, and I 
must simply refer back to my discussion of Cameron in Section 1. 
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whether we ought to believe in fundamental objects. It is of course implicit in 
the act of using the neo-Newtonian and Newtonian theories to communicate 
how ideological parsimony maps onto relative likelihoods that Sider believes 
the same sort of conclusions will apply to the theories in which there do and 
do not exist (only) fundamental objects as applied to those theories.48 It 
is therefore crucial to consider whether the latter pair of theories stand in 
relevantly similar relations to one another as the former pair do. 
However, it is clear on a moment's reflection that there is a significant disanal-
ogy between the two pairs of theories that prevent the conclusion regarding 
likelihood that was reached in the case of the spacetime theories - modulo 
our assumptions about how they are to be represented and thus related to 
one another - from going through in the case of the theories in question. The 
reason for this is that parthood is a predicate with ontological implications, 
and as such, two theories cannot differ over whether or not they require a 
notion of parthood to give a complete deSCription of those ontologies without 
also differing in their ontologies. Thus suppose for example that our world 
is fundamentalist, bottoming out at the level of quarks and electrons (say), 
and suppose that we take there to be only such fundamental particles in that 
world (so that all putative composite objects, such as tables for example, are 
analyzed merely as 'fundamental particles arranged tablewise'). Now consider 
a gunky counterpart of this world, in which those particles resolve themselves 
into more and more fundamental objects ad infinitum and thus is such that 
the parthood predicate is required to fully describe them. Clearly there are 
'additional' objects in that latter world compared to this one, in that there will 
be objects in that world that lack counterparts in this. It follows from that, 
however, that the fundamentalist theory and the gunky theory each describe 
worlds that necessarily differ with respect to their ontology; and it follows 
from that in turn that the theory of a gunky world cannot be represented as 
that of a fundamentalist world conjoined with some extra constraints, for the 
two theories are about different things. Thus while we can concede that the 
gunky theory contains more in the way of ideology than the fundamentalist 
theory, and is therefore less parsimonious, there is no obvious way to establish 
48The 'only' here serves to differentiate the 'anti-nihilistic' theory in which there 
exist composites of simples in addition to simples and the 'gunky' theory in which 
there exist no simples at aU. As argued above, the same argument affects one and 
other equally. As already mentioned, the same conclusions will apply in either case. 
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that the less parsimonious theory is less likely to be true than its rival, since 
the two theories in this case are not related 'by conjunction' as the Newtonian 
and neo-Newtonian theories may (arguably) be argued as being. Rather, they 
are simply two different theories of two different things. Thus saying that it is 
somehow obvious that the more ideologically parsimonious theory is more 
likely to be true in this case is like saying that it is a priori more likely that 
Susie is a banker than that Sophie is a banker and a feminist. But since these 
theories of Susie and Sophie concern two different things, the latter is not 
the conjunction of the former with another proposition and thus there is 
simply no way that we can assess their relative likelihoods in the absence of 
further information. It certainly does not follow a priori from the axioms of 
probability theory in any case.49 
In summary, then, it is not at all obvious that the notion of ideological 
parsimony in itself has any bearing on relative likelihood - at least not 
unless it is accompanied by special constraints on the logical forms of the 
theories that are being compared. But while the spacetime theories that 
were discussed for the purpose of illustration may perhaps be regarded as 
satisfing these constraints, they do not seem to be satisfiable in the case of 
present concern. Of course, one may, in the face of this objection, defend the 
idea that the theory that dispenses with parthood is more likely to be true 
merely by reference to the fact that ideological parsimony is (so it is claimed) 
valued in theories of physics. But if that is the avenue taken, then we must 
again confront head-on the issues raised in the last section concerning the 
difficulties of importing features valorized as epistemic virtues in the case of 
empirical theories into the context of theories of metaphysics. It therefore 
seems that we find ourselves staring in the face once again the same problems 
that plagued Cameron. 
I conclude at this stage that neither of these two arguments drawn from the 
contemporary metaphysiCS literature aiming at fundamentalist conclusions 
via theoretical virtues have been at all convincing. There is simply no obvious 
route from the nice-making features that metaphysical theories are supposed 
to possess to rational beliefs that this world is amenable to fundamentalist 
49 Again, though somewhat extraneous to present concerns, exactly the same thing 
may be said, mutatis mutandis, of the nihilist theory of fundamentalist worlds and its 
non-nihilistic counterpart. 
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description. Given that Cameron's and Siders arguments are, to my knowl-
edge, the only serious arguments to be found in the current metaphysics 
literature as to why we ought to believe in a fundamental level, and given 
that each has been found deeply wanting, the prospect that science might be 
marshalled to argue against fundamentality remains, at this stage, very much 
a live option. 
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The View from Science: A Posteriori 
Arguments For and Against 
Fundamentality 
In the last chapter, I showed that the arguments circulating in the contempo-
rary metaphysics literature for the existence of a fundamental level are not at 
all persuasive. The space thus seems to be clear for asking whether we can 
use science to argue against the existence of such a level, and in this chapter 
I will begin to consider how we might go about doing so. First, however, a 
little more groundwork is required. The reason is that, as I made clear at the 
start, I hold that a naturalistic approach to metaphysics should be adopted 
wherever possible. The fact that armchair metaphysics fails to provide us 
with good grounds for assuming a fundamental level can therefore hardly be 
taken to exhaust the competition. What we must also contemplate is whether 
naturalism itself somehow enjoins us to commit to fundamentalism, and it is 
this issue that I want to address now. 
4.1 Methodological Grounds for Fundamentalism? 
An obvious way in which one might tty to argue that naturalism itself entails 
commitment to fundamentalism would be by appealing to scientific method-
ology. Given that physicists often describe the basic business of physics as the 
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search for the 'deepest layers' of reality, the 'ultimate building blocks' of the 
world and the 'most fundamental' laws of nature, one could easily get the 
impression that belief in fundamentality and the very practice of physics go 
hand in hand with one another. 1 The fundamentalist might therefore cite this 
feature of physicists' own conception of their enterprise in support of their 
view. If, after all, it turns out to be a presupposition of the scientific enterprise 
that there is a fundamental level, how could the naturalistic metaphysician 
possibly find herself in a position to deny that there exists such a thing? 
While the view just cited might represent the majority view amongst physicists, 
there are nonetheless both philosophers of physics and physicists themselves 
who reject this idea that a fundamentalist perspective is demanded by physics 
practice. Bohm, for example, held that the physics was perfectly consistent 
with the 'qualitative infinity of nature', and that choosing to regard the 
world as bottoming out into fundamental entities was reflective of a purely 
philosophical prejudice, and not in any way dictated by either the evidence or 
practices of science. As he wrote, 
the mechanistic thesis that certain features of our theories are 
absolute and final is an assumption that is not subject to any 
conceivable kind of experimental proof, so that it is, at best, purely 
philosophical in character.2 
But Bohm did not hold that questions of fundamentality should thereby be 
regarded as wholly underdetermined, since according to him there are in fact 
good methodological reasons for preferring the anti-fundamentalist stance. 
He held that it is more useful for physicists to suppose that what they are 
studying at any given time is just a limited portion of the 'qualitative infinity 
of nature', since that supposition 
constitutes a broader point of view, in the sense that it contains 
within it all of those consequences of mechanism which represent 
1 For a variety of statements to this effect, see, for example, the testimonies of the 
particle physicists who were engaged in the debate with condensed matter physicists 
over the construction of the superconducting supercollider, described in detail in 
Martin [forthcoming]. This was in many ways a debate over the meaning of the term 
'fundamental' in physics, and although it is a fascinating episode I will only refer to 
Martin's discussion of it here. 
2Bohm [1957J, p132. I will discuss the possibility of anti-fundamentalist hypothe-
ses being empirically testable in Chapter 5 below. 
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a genuine contribution to the progress of scientific research, while 
it does not contain those which make no such contribution and 
which impede scientific research... [N] ot only can nothing of real 
value for scientific work be lost if we adopt the notion of the 
qualitative infinity of nature in the specific form that has been 
described here, but on the contrary, much can be gained by doing 
this.3 
For Bohm, to adopt the fundamentalist perspective is to risk missing out 
on valuable new contributions to scientific knowledge, while adopting the 
contrasting perspective may offer rich gains. 
The same sentiment that anti-fundamentalism constitutes the most natural 
and fruitful scientific world-view may also be found in Popper. It is perhaps 
somewhat predictable that Popper might hold such an outlook, since fun-
damentalism is rather disconsonant with his portrait of scientific activity as 
a process of successive 'conjectures and refutations'. After all, if scientists 
are always engaged in attempts to falsify, and thus to go beyond, even our 
best current theories, then it must make sense to deny that scientists are ever 
committed to the fundamentality of those theories. And if we see science 
- and thus, for Popper, this process - as continuing without limit, then a 
positively anti-fundamentalist perspective quickly follows suit. Popper himself 
explicitly committed to such a view. As he put it, 
the task of science constantly renews itself. We may go on for 
ever, proceeding to explanations of a higher and higher level of 
universality - unless, indeed, we were to arrive at an ultimate 
explanation; that is to say, at an explanation which is neither 
capable of any further explanation, nor in need of it. 
But are there ultimate explanations? [ ... J I do not believe in the 
essentialist doctrine of ultimate explanation. [ ... J Although I do 
not think that we can ever describe, by universal laws. an ultimate 
essence of the world, I do not doubt that we may seek to probe 
deeper and deeper into the structure of our world or, as we might 
say, into properties of the world that are more and more essential, 
3Ibid., pp 134-6. 
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of greater and greater depth.4 
Popper's vision of scientific knowledge may therefore be described as one in 
which there is continual progressivism without peifectionism, and as such it 
may be described as an anti-fundamentalist world-view.s 
The view that the practice of physics in itself somehow imposes fundamentalist 
commitments upon us is therefore one that has some illustrious critics. It is, 
however, abundandy clear that the interminable progress of scientific research 
and limidess accumulation of knowledge that Popper and Bohm envisage is 
only possible if there is in fact no fundamental level. (After all, the fact that 
scientists could continue to ask new questions of nature indefinitely need not 
mean that those questions will in fact turn out to have neW answers.) As 
such, appealing to the view of science as an endlessly progressive enterprise 
in any attempt to defend anti-fundamentalism cannot but beg the question. 
Nevertheless, the very coherence of the idea that physics might fruitfully take 
place against an anti-fundamentalist background undercuts any temptation 
to think that there are substantive methodological reasons, based on some 
stated 'aims' of science, that force the naturalist to buy into fundamentalism. 
In order to assess whether there is anything in the concept of naturalism 
that should incline us towards fundamentalism, we should therefore consider 
whether there are any epistemic considerations that might marshal support 
for this view. 
4.2 Epistemic Grounds for Fundamentalism? 
An obvious epistemic consideration we might invoke in the attempt to extract 
fundamentalism from naturalism is, of course, the audacious success of the 
reductive paradigm since the time of Newton.6 Given that many theories 
of nature have assumed the existence of fundamental entities and been so 
oudandishly successful, we might try to argue that the assumption of funda-
mentality has been indirecdy confirmed along with those theories. Indeed, it 
4Popper [1972], pp194-196. 
sef. Schaffer [2003], p404. 
6Many historians of physiCS hold that this paradigm became genuinely successful 
only with the work of Newton; see e.g. Friedman [2001], Lecture 1. 
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is hard to imagine what better justification a naturalist could hope to have for 
belief in fundamentality than that our best theories of physics have posited it 
and were subsequently highly confirmed. 
But it is immediately obvious that such an argument has little hope of con-
vincing anyone. Even if we focus just on the twentieth century, it cannot be 
disputed that there have been plenty of theories that treated their subject 
matter as fundamental and were highly successful in spite of the fact that 
their fundamentality assumptions subsequently turned out to be wrong. 7 It 
is therefore clear that the truth of any fundamentality assumptions that a 
theory might contain is by no means a necessary condition on the success of 
that theory.8 Thus the obvious epistemic route from the success of fundamen-
talist science to belief in fundamentality seems blocked off at the outset by 
history. 
This point that the historical success of fundamentalist science does not 
in itself constitute an argument for fundamentalism has been put forward 
somewhat recently by Schaffer.9 However, Schaffer wants to go much further 
than merely undermining the idea that the success of fundamentalist science 
lends support to fundamentality assumptions, for he argues that the history 
of science in fact gives us reason not just to fail to commit to fundamentalism, 
but to adopt a positively anti-fundamentalist stance. Schaffer's is in fact the 
only major argument in the extant literature for such an anti-fundamentalist 
7Early, highly successful theories of nuclear physics, for example, supposed pro-
tons and neutrons to lack internal structure; likewise, as hadron physics proper came 
into being in the 1950s and early 60s, hadrons in general were taken to be elementary 
particles. How this latter point of view came to be abandoned will be described in 
Chapter 8. 
BIt should be noted that success of a fundamentalist theory despite the falsity of 
its (implicit or otherwise) fundamentality assumptions can be attributed simply to the 
fact that the relevant more fundamental entities were empirically inaccessible in the 
period in which the theory was successful. This empirical inaccessibility thus need not 
impinge upon the fact that the qualitative properties of the non-fundamental entities 
described in the theory, bar their fundamentality status, were correctly described 
in that theory. The fact that a fundamentalist theory can be successful in spite of 
the falsity of its fundamentality assumptions is therefore much less troubling than 
the claim made by anti-realists in the context of the 'pessimistic meta-induction' (cf. 
Laudan [1981]). The latter, of course, is that theories can give descriptions of nature 
that are wildly qualitatively inaccurate and yet be empirically successful, not simply 
that they fail to provide an exhaustive description of nature and be successful. 
9Schaffer [2003]. 
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conclusion. 10 Since the question we are currently concerned with is that 
of whether we can use physics to deny fundamentality, then if Schaffer's 
argument can be shown to succeed in its objectives it seems that the job 
will have been done - and the question answered in the affirmative. It is 
therefore imperative to examine Schaffer's argument, and I will do so carefully 
now. 
4.3 Introducing Naturalistic Anti-Fundamentalism: 
Schaffer's Meta-Induction 
Schaffer's challenge is directed to the assumption that there exists a set of 
fundamental objects that ultimately compose everything. It is therefore, as 
presented, an argument against fundamentality mereologically construed. 
His argument consists of a reflection on over a century of developments in 
the study of the structure of matter, and he urges that in spite of the success 
of the theories involved, the more scientifically informed position does not -
as might at first have been assumed - sanction belief in a fundamental level 
at all. In fact, quite the opposite is true. Though annotated with facts and 
observations of various sorts, Schaffer's core argument is easy to summarise; 
it is (what we might call) a meta-induction, and in a nutshell it is this. 
The history of science is a history of seeking ever-deeper structure. 
We have gone from 'the elements' to 'the atoms' (etymology is 
revealing), to the subatomic electrons, protons and neutrons, to 
the zoo of 'elementary particles', to thinking that the hadrons are 
built out of quarks [ ... ] Should one not expect the future to be like 
the past?l1 
101 am not aware of any a priori arguments for similar anti-fundamentalist conclu-
sions. See, however, Amtzenius [2008] for a (somewhat) a priori argument that a 
Whiteheadian, 'gunky' structure for spacetime is to be preferred over its 'pointy' rival, 
on grounds of parsimony considerations. 
llSchaffer [2003], pS03. Note that the examples he chooses are not all on a par 
with one another: that the relationship between 'the elements' and 'the atoms' is 
compositional in anything like the sense that atoms are composed of nuclei and 
electrons is far from clear. But I will not pursue this here. 
56 
Chapter 4. A Posteriori Arguments 
In other words, the claim is that, since progress in the study of matter has 
largely consisted of instances of fractioning entities thought to be fundamental 
into the more fundamental entities they are composed of, it is better in 
keeping with the history of physics to positively deny the existence of a 
fundamental level. As noted, the claim is that we have good inductive and 
naturalistic grounds for denying, in particular, mereological fundamentality, 
though history presumably has similar implications for fundamentality theses 
that are cashed out in supervenience-based or nomological terms. 12 
It should be immediately clear that if Schaffer's argument succeeds in its am-
bitions, it will be a remarkable result. The question of the infinite divisibility 
of matter was, after all, one of Kant's antinomies. 13 A clear demonstration, 
on the basis of history, that one should not believe in fundamental entities 
would dismantle an edifice of prevalent contemporary metaphysical thinking 
in strikingly succinct terms. And there are some who believe that it does 
succeed. Though citing discomfiture with certain aspects of Schaffer's ap-
proach - specifically his use of mereological concepts in expressing priority (cf. 
the discussion in Chapter 2, Section 3) - Ladyman and Ross are tentatively 
supportive of the spirit of Schaffer's proposal, citing that 
arguably we do have inductive grounds for denying that there is a 
fundamental level since every time one has been posited, it has 
turned out not to be fundamental after all. 14 
12Callender [2001] notes his misgivings about the fact that Schaffer's discussion 
concerns particles and compositional relations. This, Callender feels, is illegitimate 
on the grounds that the 'fundamental particles' are today conceived of as fields, and 
that although fields are 'in some sense infinitely divisible', they are only 'horizontally' 
so. But it seems to me that this objection has, as it stands, yet to be fully made out, 
since particle physics does apparently recognise a distinction between fundamental 
and composite fields. There is, for example, currently an open question in 'beyond 
the Standard Model' physics of whether the Higgs field ought to be regarded as 
fundamental or as a composite of top quark fields; Salam [1979], for instance, is 
full of examples of models utilizing composite lepton and gauge fields. But note too 
that Callender himself recommends that we be charitable and understand Schaffer's 
argument 'loosely' in less contentious, supervenience-based terms (which is what 
Brown and Ladyman op.cit. also do), and the argument against Schaffer that I will 
adduce below will apply equally to either construal. 
13Kant [1965], A435 / B463. 
14Ladyman and Ross [2007], p178. Of course, what they are saying is not quite 
right insofar as the entities we currently regard as fundamental have not yet turned 
out to be otherwise! 
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It is therefore clear that Schaffer's argument has its supporters. I, however, do 
not recommend that we join them in endorsing his meta-inductive approach. 
However appealing it may in some sense be - and though it should certainly 
give the fundamentalist pause - Schaffer's argument fails both to secure its 
anti-fundamentalist conclusion and, moreover, to exemplify the naturalistic 
approach that I seek. 
To cite the first problem with the argument, and one that Callender has 
highlighted, Schaffer surely stretches the inductive evidence - a handful of 
cases - beyond breaking point to take it to support the infinite amount of 
work that the argument needs it to do.1s M goes without saying, science must 
itself inevitably use forms of induction, including the simple enumerative 
induction that Schaffer deploys in making his case.16 Furthermore, sometimes 
scientists do themselves draw conclusions, as Schaffer does, via enumerative 
methods on the basis of relatively few observations, as when the boiling 
point of a chemical substance is inferred through a small number of repeated 
experiments. I7 However, the legitimacy for the latter inductions is typically 
underwritten - or at least is taken to be underwritten - by appeal to the fact 
that such inductions relate the members of a given 'natural kind'.18 But the 
idea that the particles in general - that is, the totality of particles that are, or 
ever will be, studied in physics - comprise a natural kind in anything like the 
sense that a given particle or chemical kind does will obviously not stand up. 
Schaffer therefore cannot likewise defend the slimness of his inductive base on 
these grounds. We may note further that the induction involved in Schaffer's 
argument is from a known domain into domains that we ex hypothesi know 
nothing about. Yet there is surely a gulf between inducing that, for example, 
unobserved protons will behave as the observed protons do, and inducing 
that a set of entities about which one can say almost nothing will continue to 
possess features that observed particles, such as protons, do. In particular, in 
the latter case we cannot usefully exploit the inductive principle that 'things 
that are similar in some respects are liable to be similar in others', so this 
cannot be invoked to support Schaffer's inference either. 
lsCallender [2001], p3. 
16See, e.g., Earman and Salmon [1999], Chapter 2. 
17Cf. Norton [2003], p649. 
18Ibid. 
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There are thus deep problems associated with inductively projecting from the 
historical evidence in the manner that Schaffer does. A second significant 
problem,however, is that Schaffer's use of that historical evidence arguably 
begs the question. Indeed, this is not just Schaffer's problem, for it seems 
that any historico-inductive argument aimed at establishing a fundamentality-
related conclusion must be guilty of the same fallacy. To see this, note that 
Callender claims that given 'the simple fact that science has (virtually) always 
gone for a fundamental level' , it follows that the history of science does not 
support an infinite descent more than fundamentalism - if anything quite 
the opposite'.19 Thus Callender takes the historical track record to speak in 
favour of fundamentalism - a conclusion that is diametrically opposed to 
that which Schaffer draws. So which conclusion does the history of physics 
support? 
Let us grant that Callender is right that science does 'virtually always' posit a 
fundamental level, and that Schaffer is also right in that these posits - at least 
until the last such posit - have all been refuted. Then both of these sets of facts 
constitute the historical evidence in play. Given that evidence, it seems that 
one could claim, as Schaffer does, that the historical process of refutations of 
fundamentality assumptions implies that there is no fundamental level only 
if one also assumes that the historical process of successively postulating a 
fundamental level will repeat forever - or, in other words, if one assumes that 
there is no fundamental level. Likewise, one can argue alongside Callender 
that the repeated postulation of a fundamental level supports the idea that 
such a level exists .only if one also holds that the process of subsequent 
refutation will come to an end - or, in other words, if one assumes that that 
there is a fundamental level. It therefore appears that the argument for either 
conclusion on the basis of the historical evidence must simply beg the question 
at hand. And it is hard to see how any such meta-induction, whether for or 
against fundamentality, could avoid doing the same. 
Each of these objections represent grave problems for Schaffer's basic strategy. 
But there is a yet more pertinent and structural difficulty with his approach 
from a naturalistic point of view. Consider again the picture that Schaffer is 
offering us. It is a picture in which that which was thought to be fundamental 
19Callender op. cit. Callender's is, of course, a statement of the widely-held idea 
that the reductive paradigm in science supports fundamentalism. 
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is revealed as being ontologically secondary to other things. Again and 
again the assumed fundamental basis changes, but what remains the same 
throughout is the nature of the priority relation connecting the various levels, 
and indeed its structure. (One obviously cannot infer from an observed finite 
segment of a chain of partially-ordered priority relations to its being infinitely 
long without already assuming that the relations will continue to form a 
chain in the hitherto unobserved regimes.) But since the fundamental is 
standardly defined as that which is ontologically secondary to nothing, it is 
ontological priority that constitutes the central concept in any fundamentality 
debate. If we want that debate to be naturalized, then surely we cannot permit 
questions of either the nature or the structure of that relation to be insulated 
from the jurisdictions of physics - any more than we want the question of their 
well-foundedness to be so insulated.20 It would surely, in any case, be unwise 
to make assumptions as to the priority structure that will be suggested to us 
by the metaphysics of future physics. 
This idea that it would be unwise to project contemporary priority assumptions 
into hitherto unknown regimes has already been mooted by Bohm. In the 
context of his discussion of the 'qualitative infinite of nature', he writes; 
We are Itot supposing that the same pattern of things is necessarily 
repeated at all levels, and secondly, we are not even supposing 
that the general pattern of levels that has been so widely found 
in nature thus far must necessarily continue without limit ... More 
generally still, it is evidently quite possible that as we penetrate 
further still, we will find that the character of the organization 
of things into levels will change so fundamentally that even the 
2ONote that when I presented the levels structure above in Chapter 2, I (i) pro-
vided a variety of candidate priority relations, without presenting those relations 
as exhaustive; (ii) was happy to concede that some of these relations - including 
mereological relations - may simply become inapplicable at some point in the levels 
hierarchy, and (iii) did not lay down any a priori prescription on the logical form 
of any of these relations. I did not insist, for example, that compositional relations 
are necessarily asymmetric, nor that supervenience was either - for I defined the 
latter merely as the failure of independent variation of A given B, which does not 
preclude, for example, that B might likewise not vary independently of A. Thus in 
presenting the levels structure, I did not assume that priority relations must take 
some pre-meditated logical form. Schaffer, on the other hand, does. And I do not 
find that naturalistically acceptable. 
60 
Chapter 4. A Posteriori Arguments 
pattern of levels itself will eventually fade out and be replaced by 
something quite different ... This notion [of the qualitative infinity] 
does not require a priori the continuation of any special feature of 
the general pattern of things that have been found thus far, nor 
does it eXclude a priori the possibility that any such feature may 
continue to be encountered, perhaps in new contexts and in new 
forms, no matter how far we go. Such questions are left to be 
settled entirely by the results of future scientific research.21 
One could even claim, in fact, that this possibility of priority assumptions 
being subject to revision in the face of physics is not a mere possibility, but 
in fact already realized. We. have already seen above in Chapter 2, Section 3 
that it has been claimed that mereological relations may take on logical forms 
in the quantum context than are different to those postulated in classical 
mereology. But additionally, the fact that the property supervenience structure 
exhibited in composite quantum systems can be argued to be (in some sense) 
the opposite of what would have been expected classically arguably also 
confirms that a priori assumptions regarding priority structure in hitherto 
unknown regimes are· apt to go awry.22 Given the surprises that modem 
physics has thrown at us, it would not be outrageous to hazard that the only 
safe inference to make from the history of physics is that we essentially have 
no idea of what it is going to throw at us in the future, beyond that there will 
be correspondence in the limit.23 As Oppenheimer described how he would 
place his bets, 
Physics will change even more... If it is radical and unfamiliar. .. 
we think that the future will be only more radical and not less, 
only more strange and not more familiar, and that it will have its 
own new insights for the inquiring human spirit. 24 
21Bohm op. cit., p139. 
22A classic paper on this issue is Teller [1986]. 
23Cf. Post [1971]. Of course, correspondence in the limit is consistent with the 
successor theory being radically different from the precursor theory - as history 
itself counsels us. And although, as Post also reminds us, we can fruitfully use 
certain features and pathologies inherent within current theories as heuristics for 
constructing new theories, such features remain just that - heuristics. 
24From the transcript of Oppenheimer's 1953 BBC Reith Lectures, quoted in Salam 
[1979]. (While Oppenheimer and I differ on many, many things, this is one thing 
that I think we can agree on.) 
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But if physics can change in ways that we cannot yet hope to envisage, facts 
about priority relations between physical entities may be presumed to be 
subject to change too. Therefore, given that meta-indutive arguments against 
fundamentality necessarily bank on the idea that a given priority relation, 
with a structure imposed either a priori or on the basis of past observation, 
is going to be relevant infinitely far into the future of high-energy physics 
research, I suggest that naturalism counsels us that Schaffer's argument is not 
one that we can accept. 
In summary, then, it seems that there are insuperable problems with historic-
inductive arguments against fundamentality such as Schaffer's in that they 0) 
rest on wild inductive leaps into (by assumption) infinite domains that we 
know almost nothing about; (ii) beg the question at issue, and (iii) necessarily 
rest upon speculative assumptions regarding the metaphysics of future physics 
that are surely at odds with the naturalistic agenda.25 As such, while Schaffer's 
. argument certainly problematizes the fundamentalist's assumptions, given its 
failure to secure the sought-for anti-fundamentalist conclusion I do not think 
it recommends anything more than agnosticism, pending further argument, 
regarding the existence of a fundamental level. In particulaI; there is just no 
escaping the fact that the historical record cannot inductively support the 
expansive conclusion Schaffer needs it to sustain. 
Nevertheless, Schaffer's argument represents a first stab at using science to 
deny the existence of a fundamental level, and as such we should treat the 
criticisms of it in as constructive a fashion as possible. Let us therefore now 
consider how, if at all, the problems just raised might inform us of a more 
25The reader may be wondering why I regard Schaffer's argument to be so weak, 
given that the pessimistic meta-induction - which is also historico-inductive in struc-
ture - is regarded as a devastating argument against scientific realism (cf. Laudan 
[1981]). The answer is that, despite the surface similarity, there are critical differ-
ences between the two arguments. Most saliently perhaps, the PMI uses a handful 
of cases from the history of science to argue that we should regard our current best 
theory (or theories) as false. Thus it moves from a small number of theories to 
extrapolate a conclusion about another small number of theories. Schaffe~ on the 
other hand, uses a small number of cases to make an induction about infinitely many 
theories, and moreover theories that we know nothing about, and is therefore much 
more problematic qua inductive argument than the PMI. (Note also that it is essential 
that Schaffer moves 'infinitely far' beyond current theories, for even the fundamen-
talist may be happy to admit that the entities that are presented as fundamental in 
current theories may not in fact be fundamental.) 
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fruitful naturalistic approach to denying fundamentality. 
4.4 Introducing the Internal Approach 
One thing that the problems raised above make clear is that the history of 
science is compatible with the fundamentalist and the anti-fundamentalist 
possibilities.26 It seems we may therefore conclude that patterns in the history 
of science do not constitute a good starting point for defending an anti-
fundamentalist worldview. But given that, in the absence of clairvoyance, 
speculations as to the future of science surely cannot constitute an acceptable 
naturalistic basis for argument, it seems that the only viable alternative is to 
approach the issue directly through the structure and content of a given, extant 
scientific theory, and such a theory alone.27 It therefore appears unavoid-
able that if we are to avoid the problems that blight Schaffer's speculative 
approach, arguments against fundamentality should always be formulated 
not from historical patterns between theories, but from within the perspective 
of a physical theory that we already have in hand, understand, and know how 
to use. What we therefore need to do, I claim, if we want to use physics to 
argue against the existence of a fundamental level is to investigate whether 
there exist physical theories that can be argued to imply that there is no such 
thing. Arguments against fundamentality that have this form I will call, with 
a nod to Lakatos, internal arguments against fundamentality. 
Adopting such an internal approach to denying fundamentality would without 
question be thoroughly naturalistic. Insofar as fundamentality questions are 
framed with respect to a given theory, which describes in detail a given portion 
of reality, arguments developed through the internal approach would not 
rest upon speculations as to the content of physical regimes about which we 
26Indeed, the case can easily be made that not only is that history consistent with 
each, but to be expected by each. 
27By 'extant scientific theories', I include both empirically successful, recognizably 
'mature' theories that we commit to at present, as well as theories that have that 
enjoyed such status in the past even though they have since been discarded. The 
reason I will include past theories in my discussion is because I am primarily interested 
in the question of whether it is possible to use physical theories to deny fundamentality, 
not so much in that of whether we should in fact deny fundamentality. More on this 
follows below. 
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can say nothing. Such a theory would also bring in its train an ontological 
package, so that the set of priority relations appropriate to it, and indeed 
the structure of those relations, may be surveyed from within the perspective 
of that theory. Were we to adopt this approach to denying fundamentality, 
then, we would circumvent the need to simply stipulate what relations will be 
relevant, and what logical form they will take, in regimes infinitely removed 
from the purview of current theories. And given that, as Callender points 
out, science 'virtually always' posits a fundamental level, it would clearly not 
be question-begging of the anti-fundamentalist to approach the issue in this 
way. 
We should also be clear that there is in a sense nothing new about this ap-
proach to anti-fundamentalism, insofar as it is simply the mirror image of 
(what I take to be) the most convincing naturalistic motivation one could 
have for committing to fundamental entities - namely, that our best physics 
supports it.28 According to the proposed approach, we should likewise deny 
the existence of fundamental entities when and only when our best current 
theories recommend to us that there are no such things. But while the strategy 
is in some sense already familiar to us, and the potential advantages of it are 
clear, what is much less clear is that realistic physical theories do in fact have 
the capacity to positively deny, as opposed to assert, fundamentality assump-
tions. While as naturalists we might like it if the absence of a fundamental 
level could be argued for through physics and not remain the purview of 
purely armchair speculation, there is a legitimate worry that the proposition 
that reality extends to infinite depth is simply so metaphysical in character, 
280f course - and as I have already pointed out - Schaffer's argument should breed 
a healthy scepticism about the idea that the success of a theory that made funda-
mentalist assumptions is indicative of the truth of those assumptions. Nonetheless, 
since as a naturalist I do not believe that metaphysics ought to be approached from 
some Archimidean point, but rather always at some time and from the perspective of 
some physical theory. Therefore if we are given a highly successful theory that posits 
fundamental entities, and if we have at that time no reason to doubt on empirical 
grounds that those entities are fundamental, then I believe that the rational thing to 
believe in is the fundamentality of those entities. That of course does not imply that 
such a belief should not be regarded as defeasible. Nonetheless, what I want to inves-
tigate here is whether there have been theories that themselves imply (defeasible) 
anti-fundamentalist conclusions. Since it typically seems to be assumed (d. Schaffer 
and Callender's discussion) that theories 'always' posit fundamental entities and it is 
only ever history that proves them wrong, that is the novel aspect of the discussion I 
am about to engage in. 
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so far removed from experience, that it is just not the sort of claim that can 
admit of empirical support. Furthennore, in the pictures painted by Schaffer 
(and indeed Popper), anti-fundamentalism is equated with (something like) 
the successive falsification of successive theories. How, then, can we use a 
theory to ground anti-fundamentalist claims? 
My principal purpose in the remainder of Part 1 is to show that these wor-
ries can be overcome - to show, in other words, that it is possible to deny 
fundamentality through the internal approach, and thus to do so through 
genuinely naturalistic means. I will argue for this claim by showing that 
physical theories have already been developed whose internal logic can be 
used in support of anti-fundamentalist interpretations: that it is not the case 
that theories of matter must assume fundamentality and that it is only ever 
history that proves those assumptions wrong. This I will do through two case 
studies. The first will be a theory of particle physics, and in particular a theory 
of the strongly-interacting particles, from the late 1950s and early 60s. This is 
the Analytic S-matrix theory of the strong interactions, to be discussed in the 
next chapter.29 The chief protagonist of this theory, Geoffrey Chew, pushed 
the anti-fundamentalist implications of this theory almost from its inception, 
and in particular pressed the idea that it can be marshalled in support of the 
idea that there is no mereologicalfundamentality (that our world is a 'gunky' 
world, if you will). 30 Since compositional structure is taken to be the 'central 
connotation' of priority structure, this is a nice place to start.31 Nonetheless, 
and as I will be the first to point out, this theory may still be deemed to 
constitute a rather odd starting point from which to address the issue of 
whether we can deny the existence of a fundamental basis to the actual world 
29This is also sometimes known as the 'bootstrap theory' of strong interactions. 
30lt should be noted, however, that since the S-matrix theory concerns only the 
strongly interacting particles, it has nothing to say on the existence or non-existence 
of fundamental particles of any other sort (such as leptons). Nonetheless, the 
existence of even a proper subset of objects for which the 'chains of dependence' do 
not terminate is sufficient to refute the idea that the world possesses a mereologically 
fundamental basis. 
31Schaffer [2003], pSOO. Recalling my comments in Chapter 2, Section 3 above, I 
reiterate that with the term 'mereological' I do not wish to connote a commitment 
to any purely philosophical theory of composition, such as with 'fusion' and an a 
priori prescription on logical form, etc. Rather, I will attempt below to extract the 
appropriate logic of part-whole relations in this context from the S-matrix theory's 
own assumptions. 
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through science; the theory has, after all, barely seen the light of day since 
the 1960s. However, the principal question I am interested in answering is 
not so much whether we should in fact believe in anti-fundamentalism about 
the actual, but whether it is possible for physics to deny fundamentality. If 
a respectable physical theory can be found that has these implications, then 
presumably the answer to that question is yes - even if that theory, and hence 
the case it makes for anti-fundamentalism, is subsequently disconfirmed.32 
Viewed in this light, the choice is in fact very fitting since S-matrix theory 
is both well-understood and contains a number of theoretical and empirical 
features that are highly relevant for this purpose. Indeed, the very means 
through which it ultimately came to be rejected will prove to have interesting 
consequences for the present project. 
Despite that, it would be nice if there were an example of a live theory that 
is taken to have anti-fundamentalist implications - for if those implications 
can be sustained, we will be in a position to believe not just that physics can 
deny fundamentality, but that it does deny it (and thus that so should we). 
As it turns out, there is arguably just such a theory (or better, framework for 
theories) - namely, quantum field theory and the so-called 'effective' approach 
to it.33 Indeed, while criticising Schaffer's meta-inductive strategy, Callender 
notes that 'Schaffer perhaps misses the best support he has in science by 
neglecting a recent debate concerning effective quantum field theories', and 
thus some discussion of the matter here seems almost inevitable.34 On 
account of its live nature, this case has received more discussion in the 
recent philosophy of physics literature than the previous one. However, the 
32Indeed, to appreciate that it is worthwhile considering previously successful 
but now defunct theories in assessing whether it is possible to use physics to argue 
against fundamentality, one need only imagine that we are trying to do so SO 
years ago, and thus during the period in which it was the S-matrix theory that 
held sway in hadron physics. An argument for the conclusion that we should in 
fact deny fundamentality would then have been framed with respect to this theory. 
This sanctions weaker conclusion that it is possible for physical theories to have 
anti-fundamentalist implications. 
33Though I will not discuss it here, there is also a growing body of literature on 
how dualities in string theory can undermine fundamentalist assumptions: see for 
example Rickles [2011], Section 3.2, and Castellani [2009]. While I have chosen 
not to attempt to interpret these here, it is my hope that they will be included in the 
prospective next phase of this project. 
34Callender Ope cit. 
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arguments for anti-fundamentalism that have already been made in this 
context have been almost universally criticized, and it will be worthwhile to 
consider afresh the physical and philosophical assumptions required to extract 
anti-fundamentalist conclusions from this theory. That will be the topic of 
Chapter 6. 
The point of these case studies is therefore to argue that questioning the 
existence of a fundamental basis can be regarded as just as legitimate a 
topic for naturalistic metaphysics as more familiar topics in the metaphysics 
of physics. And, given that fundamentality issues are almost by definition 
connected to everything else in metaphysics, we can expect the discussion 
I am about to engage in to connect with other key issues in the philosophy 
of science. But, of course, these claims are - at least at this point - more 
than a little premature. So let me now backpedal somewhat and go back a 
little over half a century to the childhood of accelerator physics, and to the 
theoretical impasse that occasioned the introduction of a new approach to 
strong-interaction theory. 
67 
Chapter 4. A Posteriori Arguments 
68 
I 5 Chapter --______________ ---.J 
Arguing Against Fundamentality 1: 
The Analytic S-Matrix 
5.1 Inttoducing the Analytic S-Matrix 
By the tum of the 1960s, quantum field theory (QFI') was experiencing critical 
complications. The fundamental conceptual problem was that relativity 
requires fields to be defined at localized space-time points, which - via the 
Heisenberg uncertainty relation - implies that field interactions cannot be 
finite in energy.l A great number of theoretical studies seemed to confirm that 
an 'insuperable pathology' plagued the concept of the local field interactions, 
as can be appreciated by flicking through the proceedings of the 12th Solvay 
Conference in "1961.2 While it was known that these divergences could 
be formally tempered via the process of renormaIization, that procedure, 
at least then, was regarded with deep suspicion. 3 Aside from the crises 
in QFT in general, however, specific problems faced the possibility of a 
field theory of the strong interactions in particular. The renormalization 
procedure that was developed by Tomonaga, Schwinger and Feynman took 
place within the framework of perturbation theory, but the large coupling 
constant associated with the strong force at hadronic distances - around g = 
15 - rules out the use perturbation theory here. The prospects for a field theory 
lSee Cushing [199OJ, pp18-19. 
2See Chew [1968b], p763. 
3Renormalization will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
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of the strong interaction therefore seemed highly remote, and with it the 
prospect of a relativistic quantum theory of the hadrons. Fortunately, however, 
another approach was waiting in the wings, largely thanks to the work of 
Heisenberg. Some years before, in 1937, Wheeler had introduced the concept 
of the scattering matrix, or 'S-matrix', into nuclear physics.4 Heisenberg then 
proposed, in 1943, that this object should be made fundamental in a root-and-
branch revision of the whole approach to relativistic quantum theory.5 His 
proposal was that we try to circumvent the route from the Hamiltonian to the 
S-matrix - a route which, by the late 1930s, was well-known to be plagued by 
divergence difficulties - and to work with the S-matrix directly.6 It was this 
basic idea in Heisenberg's work that laid the foundation of the theory to be 
examined here. 
The S-matrix is in one sense a very simple object. Like any matrix, it is an 
array of numbers. The elements Sij of this matrix encode the probability 
of obtaining a state j of free particles as the output of a collision event 
given that state i, another state of free particles, serves as the input. These 
probabilities can be directly inferred from experiment (provided, of course, 
that the relevant experiment can in fact be performed). Since all that quantum 
mechanics predicts are these probabilities of measurement, the totality of 
such elements would constitute the entire empirical output of any theory of 
quantum particles.7 Thus if one could find a method of reliably and (at least 
'in principle') exhaustively computing these elements, one would have a claim 
to possessing a complete quantum theory of the strong interactions. This in 
any case was the view of Geoffrey Chew, the chief architect of the theory that 
came to be based on this object. Chew took it that 
since elements of the S-matrix describe all hadron experiments, 
ability to predict this matrix would constitute a complete hadronic 
theory.8 
Heisenberg's strategy for predicting the elements of this matrix while bypass-
4See Cushing [1990], pp30-1 and Chew [1966], p4. 
sReferences to the Heisenberg's works in this field may be found in Cushing 
[1990], p33. 
6Heisenberg himself referred to the S-matrix as the 'characteristic matrix'. 
7Thus 'general quantum theory makes no predictions beyond those made by 
S-matrix theory' (Stapp [1971], pI303). 
8Chew [I968b], p763. 
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ing the use of any Hamiltonian was based on the idea that certain constraints 
placed upon the matrix as a whole would suffice to determine its individual 
elements. For example, Heisenberg demanded that all of the elements had 
to be Lorentz invariant functions of the particle variables (so that it would 
be suitable for relativistic regimes), and that the matrix had to be unitary 
(in order to respect the basic principles of quantum mechanics). However, 
Heisenberg failed to identify a principle that the S-matrix had to satisfy that 
might determine the results of experiments involving interacting particles. He 
could not find anything, in other words, that could mimic the codification of 
forces in the traditional Hamiltonian method. In consequence, it was not long 
before Heisenberg lost interest in his attempt to build up relativistic quantum 
theory on the basis of the S-matrix alone.9 Instead, he threw all of his efforts 
behind developing a field-theoretic approach of his own. 10 
According to Chew, however, Heisenberg gave up too quickly. In Chew's eyes, 
the problem was that 
the property now called maximal analyticity was not appreciated 
in the forties... and without this notion S-matrix theory lacked 
dynamical content. Heisenberg and the other S-matrix students of 
that period eventually lost interest when they realized they had 
no way to compute interparticle forces, and more than a decade 
elapsed before the S-matrix was resurrected as a competitor with 
quantum field theory.ll 
When this crucial 'analyticity' postulate was added to the principles already 
taken to govern the S-matrix, however, a qualitatively new theory, Analytic 
9Heisenberg grew to deplore his attempt as at best a substitute or proxy for 
a genuine theory, eventually holding that 'the S-matrix is an important but very 
complicated mathematical quantity that should be derived from the fundamental 
field equations; but it can scarcely serve for formulating these equations' (Heisenberg 
[1957], p270). 
lOThis was Heisenberg's 'unified field theory', in which it was taken that a single 
field described all matter and all forces. The more specialized field theories, such 
as QED, were conceived of as low-energy approximations to this theory. It has a 
superficial similarity to S-matrix theory in that there is no distinction between matter 
and force fields, but was intended as much wider in scope. It did not make much 
traction with mainstream physics, though it was pursued at length by H.P. Dun: See 
Chew [1962], p4 for a brief discussion of this and Cassidy (1991], pp539-543 for an 
outline of the theory and its reception. 
llChew [1966], p.4; also Chew [1968a], p.65. 
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S-matrix theory, came into its own. This theory may, moreover, be argued to 
contain deep within it some radical anti-fundamentalist implications, and in 
this chapter I will discuss why that is. My strategy will be as follows. In the 
next two sections, I will give an outline of the basic framework of S-matrix 
theory. The first section introduces some of the mathematical apparatus, 
while the second introduces the axioms of the theory and sketches how they 
delivered the detailed dynamical picture that Heisenberg missed out on. With 
this in place, I will then discuss the arguments as to why S-matrix theory 
can be interpreted to preclude fundamentality. The discussion that follows 
draws throughout on material that is covered in more detail in the flagged-
up sections of the Appendix that may be found at the end of this thesis. 
The basic dialectical moves will nonetheless all be elucidated here in the 
chapter. To be clear, however, any equation that is referred to without being 
explicitly presented here in the chapter may be found in that Appendix, and 
the numbering used in this chapter will follow the numbering that is used 
there. 
5.2 The Structure of the Analytic S-Matrix 1: The 
Mathematical Framework 
As already noted, the basic theoretical object in play in this theory is the 
scattering matrix, whose individual elements Sij encode the probability of 
obtaining a state j from a scattering event given that a state i was fed into the 
reaction. The states related are the states offree particles. Any such state is 
described by giving the 4-momentum and the type of each particle in the state. 
The type of particle is specified by the relevant set of good quantum numbers, 
and the quantum number corresponding to any state is given by the sum of 
the quantum numbers of all the particles in the state. The 4-momentum of the 
state as a whole is likewise given by the sum of the momenta of the particles 
involved. 
Since the states are partly characterized in terms of their precise values of 
4-momentum, it follows from Heisenberg's principle that these states cannot 
be regarded as being in familiar 4-space.12 While obviously counter-intuitive, 
12'Not only conventional Dirac quantum mechanics but even a meaning for micro-
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there are very good formal reasons for preferring to work in momentum space 
- the most salient being that it permits the exploitation of conservation laws. 
It does, however, mean that we cannot think of the states as undergoing 
evolution in space and time. This might suggest that the comparatively 
abstract Heisenberg picture of quantum mechanics is employed here, but 
in fact the S-matrix formalism is more pared down even than that. This is 
because the only operator to be found in S-matrix theory is the S-matrix 
itself. 
S-matrix theory does not employ the full apparatus of quantum 
mechanics, maintaining only the superposition principle. There 
is neither a Hamiltonian nor any other operafor and there are no 
state vectors that evolve in time. 13 
With no Hamiltonian, there is no equation of motion and hence no superposed 
solutions to it. In fact, the incorporation of the superposition principle in this 
theory amounts to little more than that the S-matrix is a linear operator, as 
very little use or mention is made of superposed states. Protagonists of S-
matrix theory were in fact deeply suspicious about the validity of the concept 
of the quantum state in relativistic regimes.14 It was therefore seemingly a 
quantum theory of strongly interacting particles without being one that took 
seriously the quantum state. 
Since the S-matrix theory was explicitly predicated on observable quantities, 
namely the scattering matrix and the principles that governed it, the theory 
was vulnerable to objections that it was merely "'sophisticated phenomenol-
ogy" without real content'. 15 While advocates held that this accusation was 
dispelled once the existence of forces could be argued to emerge from the 
analysis (on which more below), it is nevertheless clear that many of the 
traditional metaphysical issues embedded in conventional quantum mechan-
scopic space-time is abandoned in describing interactions between hadrons' (Chew 
[1968b], p763). 
13Chew[1966], pS. 
14This is disclosed by the following footnote: 'We share the point of view of Stapp ... 
that the state vector concept is to be understood as a non-r~lativistic approximation, 
not as the basic vehicle for expressing quantum superposition. We take the descrip-
tion of the quantum world to be realized through scattering ampJitudes between 
asymptotic states' (Chew [1971a], footnote 4). 
lsChew [1966], p99. 
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ics will simply fail to be issues here.16 And without operators, there are no 
state-dependent properties (beyond their momentum properties) to predicate 
of the particles: all the particles have are their state-independent properties, 
encoded in the global SU(3} flavour algebra that was developing in parallel 
at the time.17 Furthermore, the permutation symmetries of the states them-
selves play no essential role; there is seemingly no fundamental distinction 
between bosons and fermions, and particles of either kind play identical roles 
(most saliently, both bosons and fermions mediate forces here). Given that 
one highly influential approach to quantum individuality presupposes such 
a fundamental distinction, it is obvious that the issue of particle identity in 
S-matrix theory cannot be handled in a familiar manner. IS But since there is 
no spatio-temporal framework and hence no hope of individuating particles 
by their trajectories, and given that all particles of a given type have all and 
only their state-dependent properties common to every token of a given type, 
it is entirely unclear what the alternative analysis of identity appropriate to 
this context would be. Rather than throw in the towel regarding the existence 
of distinct particles at this point, however, in what follows I shall simply take 
the existence of numerically distinct particles of a given type as given; that 
is, I will offer no analysis or principle of individuation of different tokens 
of a given type, and simply take it as primitive.19 I will therefore assume 
throughout the existence of numerically distinct hadrons. 
With these various differences between this theory and familiar quantum 
mechanics, and the above disclaimer, in place, I now turn to the positive 
theses of S-matrix theory. 
16For example, since it deals explicitly only with free particles, the characteristic 
quantum feature of entanglement, and the associated non-supervenience, is therefore 
nowhere to be found here. 
17This episode will be discussed in Chapter 8. 
18See Saunders [2003]. 
19In this I resemble Morganti [2007]. 
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5.3 The Structure of the Analytic S-Matrix 2: Ax-
ioms 
The basic idea behind S-matrix theory is that certain constraints on the 
scattering matrix suffice to determine it uniquely. As already pointed out, 
such a method of determination could be taken to constitute a complete 
quantum theory, and thus these principles may be taken to function as the 
axioms of the theory. Though more fully spelled out in the Appendix, the 
axioms of the early phase of S-matrix theory are the following. 
1. Strong interaction forces are short range. 
2. Superposition. 
3. Lorentz invariance. 
4. Unitarit;Y. 
5. Maximal analyticit;Y of the first kind - that is, the principle that the am-
plitudes should be analytic functions of the linear momentum variables. 
Postulates 1-4 have obviously physical underpinnings. The short-range postu-
late is empirically evidenced and means that we can treat the states related 
by the S-matrix as essentially free. 20 The second is a fundamental postulate of 
quantum mechanics. The third is necessary insofar as the goal is to construct 
a relativistic theory of quantum mechanics - though note that here we have 
no choice but to construct a relativistic theory, since the binding energies in 
strong interactions are comparable to the rest-mass energies of the constituent 
particles.21 The fourth ensures the conservation of probability. 
The fifth, however, may seem rather out of place: given that it postulates 
that the amplitude is an analytic function, it seems wholly mathematical 
in character, and thus what it is doing as an axiom of physical theory is, 
as it stands, unclear. And although there is a well-known connection with 
analyticity and 'causality', it is inapplicable here.22 Chew himself was rather 
2°Collins and Squires [1968], p7. 
21Chew [1971b], pHI. 
22There is a well-known classical connection between analyticity and 'the principle 
of causality' - that is, the idea that scattered processes cannot happen before the 
particles are initially brought together. However, the problem with the derivation 
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open about the fact that the principle of maximal analyticity of the first kind 
was simply a postulate, admitting of no conclusive physical motivation. But 
in his eyes, the burden of proof was rather on those who would question 
its presence in the theory. As Chew argued, physicists tend to assume that 
natural laws are smooth functions of their arguments, and this is at least 
suggestive of analyticity: 
I assert that it is natural for an 5-matrix element to vary smoothly 
as energies and angles are changed, and that a natural mathe-
matical definition of physical smoothness lies in the concept of 
analyticity. The fundamental principle therefore might be one of 
maximum smoothness ... 23 
Furthermore, physicists' practice of expanding functions in power series 
suggest that analyticity is an unmentioned but essential part of the physicists 
toolkit . 
... Physicists tend to forget the exceptional status of analytic func-
tions in mathematics. Fermi used to say: 'When in doubt, expand 
in a power series.' This statement reflects the belief, shared by 
most of us, I am sure, that natural laws are likely to depend ana-
lytically on any physical parameter which is continuously varied.24 
Note that, though analytic functions of any type are (by definition) expandable 
as power series, the assimilation of smoothness with analyticity implies that 
the functions involved here must be complex.2S 50 while the assumption 
of analyticity is justified if it is necessary that all functions in physics are 
expressible as power series - surely itself a contentious assumption - we can 
only use smoothness to justify the principle if we are willing to claim that the 
of this relationship is that it must both assume that the wave packets that represent 
quantum particles are localized and exploit precise values for their energy and 
momentum. It can therefore do little more than establish the need for causality in 
the classiCal limit; see for example Collins [1977], pll-12. 
23Chew [1962], p3. 
24Chew [1966], pI. 
2S Analytic functions, either real or complex, are defined as those given by a locally 
convergent power series. It can be shown that if a complex function has a power series 
then all derivatives of the function exist; hence all complex analytic functions are 
'smooth'. The converse is true also, so that the complex smooth functions are identical 
with the complex analytic functions. There are however smooth real functions that 
are not analytic; see, e.g., Stewart and Tall [1983], pp177·183. 
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only functions that physics can truck with are functions of a complex variable. 
But however the principle is justified ab initio, it certainly earns its keep - for 
it turns out to be this which elevates the S-matrix to what one may claim to 
be a genuine physical theory. The reasons for this are spelled out more fully 
in the Appendix, in particular Sections A1.5 to A3, but I will survey them 
briefly here. 
The assumption that the S-matrix is analytic means, at least in this context, 
that it has only isolated singularities.26 As shown in the Appendix, this 
property permits, via Cauchy's theorem, the expression of the amplitude 
in terms of its singularities. It can furthermore be shown that at a fixed 
centre of mass energy for the 'direct channel' - that is, at a fixed energy 
for the collision we are directly perfonning - the amplitude can be partly 
expressed in terms of the singularities corresponding to particles produced 
in the 'crossed' channels - that is, those obtained from the direct channel 
by interchanging an output particle for an input anti-particle. (What all this 
means will become clearer below.) That is, with s standing for the square of 
the direct channel 4-momentum, t as one of the crossed channels and u as 
the other, and with u fixed at some value Un, we can derive the Mandelstam 
representation of the amplitude (see Appendix, Section A3): 
A(s, t, uo) = g'; + g't +!.1°O JmA(s', t, Un) ds'+.!.l°O JmA(s, t', uo) dt' 
m2 - s m2 - s 7r S' - S 7r t t' - t S t Sb b (A3a) 
Here, the first two terms on the RHS correspond to pole singularties, and 
the third and fourth terms to branch-cut singularities. But these terms may 
be shown to give contributions to the amplitude of the same fonn as those 
found in QFT, in the Born approximation, to be due to one-particle and 
superposed Yukawa potentials respectively (see Appendix, Section A4.1). And 
since Yukawa interactions are taken to be manifested by particle exchange 
processes, it can with some justification be maintained in this theory that it 
is the exchange of the particles produced in the cross-channel reactions that 
26That is, the functions are assumed to be meromorphic, not holomorphic. But 
since meromorphic functions can be expressed as ratios of ho}omorphic functions 
they behave just like their 'properly' analytic counterparts at every non-singular point. 
See ibid., p208. 
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supplies the forces to bind the particles produced in the direct channel. 27 It is 
the seemingly purely mathematical property of analyticity, then, that may be 
argued to deliver the forces required to form new particles and thus to give 
us back dynamics. 28 
Now, as also explained in the Appendix (Sections A2 to A4), the symmetry 
between the variables in the Mandelstam representation implies that the 
role of the intermediate particles produced in the direct channel, and the . 
role of the force-generating particle produced in the crossed channel driving 
the generation of the direct-channel particle, can be interchanged with one 
another. This situation gives rise to what Chew calls the 'reciprocal bootstrap': 
the principle that the types of particles that generate a given type of particle 
are in tum generated by it. 
By considering all three channels on this basis we have a self-
determining situation. One channel provides forces for the other 
two - which in tum generate the first.29 
To make things a little more concrete, let me take a simple example and 
show what is going on diagrammatically (a method Chew often used in his 
expositions).30 I will stick for now to a low-energy approximation in which 
only one one-particle intermediate state can be produced in each channel, 
and suppose the direct channel is the reaction 
(tT) 
27'The forces producing a certain reaction are due to the intennediate states that 
occur in the two "crossed" reactions belonging to the same diagram. The range of a 
given part of the force is detennined by the mass of the intermediate state producing 
it, and the strength of the force by the matrix elements connecting that state to the 
initial and final states of the crossed reaction' (Chew [1962], p32). 
28Note that this improvement on Heisenberg's original S-matrix theory is pred-
icated on an explicit formal analogy with a result from the rival QFT programme 
(in tenns of which both the Born approximation and the Yukawa interaction were 
originally formulated). Given that S-matrix theory was advertised as an alternative 
to QFf, this is of course somewhat ironic. 
29Chew [1962], p32. 
3OPor a discussion of the use of diagrams in S-matrix theory, see Kaiser [2005], 
Chapter 9. 
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which I will call 'Reaction CT'. Suppose too that the single-particle intermediate 
state produced in Reaction u is particle ~. We can represent this as in Figure 
5.1. 
Figure 5.1: Direct channel process (Reaction u). 
A crossed channel reaction corresponding to this process then would then 
be 
(T) 
which I will call 'Reaction T', and which we can represent as in Figure 
5.2. 
a 
T 
y 
Figure 5.2: Crossed channel process (Reaction T) 
According to the S-matrix theory, and specifically the interpretation of the 
Mandelstam representation according to which the singularities correspond to 
Yukawa-type exchanges, the force required to bind E from the input particles 
is provided, in part, by the exchange of the particle T between a and /3, and 
'Y and 6. This is represented in Figure 5.3. 
Moreover, if we now assume that it is in fact Reaction T that is the reaction 
we are performing, so that Reaction u is now a 'crossed' channel, then we can 
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a 
Figure 5.3: Particle exchange in the direct channel 
play the same game with the generation of particle T. When we do so, we 
will find grounds for saying that it is the exchange of the particle ~ that is 
responsible for 1"s generation. This is the basic idea that underpins Chew's 
'reciprocal bootstrap' concept. 
One-particle states produced in the sort of scattering events central to S-matrix 
theory are called 'resonances', and their existence is inferred from a sharp 
peak in the cross-section of a scattering reaction. Observing such a peak 
is taken to be evidence of the existence of a composite particle - that is, a 
particle that has its origin in an interaction in which the inter-particle forces 
become strongly attractive. In fact, there are two types of composite particles -
namely, bound states and resonances - that are recognized by particle physics. 
The difference between the two is that resonances have a mass greater than 
or equal to the total mass of the particles which go into the reaction from 
which the particle arises, and bound states have a mass that is strictly less. 
This entails an important practical difference between the two, since only 
resonances can be observed in scattering processes such as the one sketched 
above.31 But since the distinction is only one of stability, it is in general not 
considered to be a fundamental one: stable particles are simply those whose 
lifetimes are much longer than those of the resonances.32 In keeping with 
Chews usage, then, I shall subsume both types of composite particles under 
the banner of 'bound states'. To stick to more of Chew's terminology, a particle 
31 Note that the bound state contribution to the observed amplitude can neverthe-
less be detected: see Chew [1966], p99, for references. 
32For example, Martin and Spearman state 'The distinction between particles [i.e 
bound states] and resonances is simply one of stability and should probably not be 
regarded as a fundamental difference' ([1970] pS); likewise, see Heisenberg [1966], 
p3. 
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that is not composite, and hence that does not have its origin in an interaction, 
is an 'elementary particle'. Not being composed of anything else, these we 
may consider to be fundamental particles, and - as I have already disclosed -
S-matrix theory protagonists took the theory to imply that none exist. 33 
Before I can examine why it was that S-matrix theorists believed that this 
was the case, howeve~ the question that must of course be addressed is what 
these 'composite particles' are 'composed' of. A natural answer in the case of 
the intermediate state I: above is that its constituents are simply the input 
particles a and {3; this, after all, is what I: was 'created' from (though one 
must not forget the role of the binding particles). But it might be felt that 
this obvious choice is compromised by the fact that I: does not decay back 
into a and (3 (the reaction is inelastic). This brings us to Chew's concept of a 
composite. 
5.4 The Concept of a Composite in S-Matrix The-
ory 
Chew is unambiguous in his statement of what a composite particle is: a 
composite particle in S-matrix theory is 'a bound state of those channels with 
which it communicates', where a channel is 'any collection of more than one 
particle', and '"communicating" channels are nuclear states that possess all 
the same quantum numbers as a particular particle'.34 
Particles of any given type, then, are taken to be composed of collections of 
particles such that they, in the aggregate, have the quantum numbers of the 
particle. Note that since the definition of a channel concerns only the sum of 
the quantum numbers of the particles involved, the property of being a certain 
channel is closed under the addition of particle - anti-particle pairs. It follows 
that particles of anyone type can feature as constituents of a particle of any 
33More precisely, no fundamental strongly interacting particles: it has nothing at 
all to say regarding other particles. Nonetheless, as mentioned in the last chapter, 
the existence of even a proper subset of objects in a world that lack any fundamental 
parts will be enough to entail that that world lacks a fundamental mereologicallevel. 
34A discussion of the S-matrix concept of composite particles from a metaphysical 
point of view, and with an eye on the parallels with Leibniz, may be found in Gale 
[1974]. 
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other type (provided, of course, that the latter is indeed composite). 35 In other 
words, bound states of any given hadron type T may contain constituents 
drawn from any hadron type whatsoever - including T itself. 
Returning to our question, then, of what exactly ~ consists, it is clear that 
there is no unique answer - for any decomposition with the right quantum 
numbers will do. Now, one might initially feel dissatisfied by this statement; 
one might be tempted to think that if there are objectively existing composite 
particles, then there must be a unique objective fact regarding what a given 
particle - say our particle ~ - consists of. But this would be mistaken, for quite 
generally, and as Lewis states, 'a whole divides exhaustively into parts in many 
different ways'. 36 For example, simple combinatorics tells us that a mundane 
object of experience, with (something of the order of) Avagadro's number 
of molecules, will admit an enormous number of possible decompositions. 
As Lewis points out, the best that one might hope for in such cases is that, 
'if we distinguish some parts of a fusion as "nice" parts, then a fusion will 
have a unique decomposition into nice parts'. 37 And as an example of what 
Lewis means by 'nice' parts, he cites the mereological atoms of the object 
concerned, so that one might hope that an ordinary object at least divides 
up into 'elementary particles' in some unique way. But the reason we are 
interested in S-matrix theory, of course, is precisely because it was taken 
to imply that no strongly interacting particle is mereologicallyatomic, and 
hence this cannot be appealed to here. Nor - and to quote more Lewisian 
terminology - can we distinguish various parts as 'more natural' than others 
in this picture. The reason for this is that since all hadrons ar~ taken to be 
composed of hadrons of evelY other type, all hadrons - from the pion to the 
uranium nucleus - are regarded as being on the same ontological footing and 
hence presumably are all equally 'natural'. I therefore think that we must 
simply rest content with the reality of the enormous variety of decompositions 
on offer. It is, after all, not clear what exactly is offensive about it; as already 
pointed out, it is in many ways nothing unusual, and in the absence of 
fundamental or otherwise privileged parts it seemingly cannot in any case be 
avoided. It is, however, crucial to note that a composite particle is not simply 
3SThis assumes that the energies available for binding are limitless - an assumption 
reflected in the ranges of the integrals in (A3a). 
36Lewis [1991], pS. 
37Ibid., p22. 
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a 'fusion' of its constituents (to quote a term by which composition is often 
described in analytic metaphysics). The constituents must be interacting with 
one another by means of particle exchange in order for a bound state to form, 
for otherwise we have only a state of free particles. The bound state exists for 
only so long as these interactions take place. 
We are now in a position to sketch a definition of 'parthood' appropriate to 
S-matrix theory and show that it partially orders the set of hadrons. From 
the definition of a hadron as 'a bound state of those channels with which it 
communicates', we know that there are two necessary conditions on being a 
constituent of a token composite particle. We may say that x is a composite 
(Le. a bound state) of particles YI"'Yn, where n 2': 2, just if the following 
conditions are satisfied: 
n 
1. L: QN(Yi) = QN(x), where 'QN(x)' denotes 'the quantum numbers of 
i 
particle x', etc.; and 
2. The YI. "Yn are interacting to give a net strongly attractive force. 
I will write 'x is a composite of particles Yl ... Yn' as 'x = B(YI ... Yn)' where 'B' 
denotes 'in a bound state'. Since a composite object is a composite of all of 
its components, we should impose that the decomposition into the object's 
constituents is maximal (i.e exhaustive): 
These three conditions are all necessary. But they do not yet seem to be suffi-
cient, for the above conditions do not ensure that they are the parts of particle 
x of hadron type T and not of some x' =I x also of type T. However, the ability 
to specify a further condition that delineated the analysis of composition to 
the level of distinct tokens of the same type clearly presupposes an analysis 
of the distinctness of two tokens of the same type. Since my primary purpose 
here is not with the issue of quantum individuation but to make contact 
with philosophical arguments against the existence of fundamental entities, I 
will here (as mentioned in Section 2) simply take the distinctness of tokens 
as primitive and leave the analysis of this distinctness to another occasion 
(assuming that there can indeed be one that is appropriate to this theory). So 
to ensure that the compositional analysis applies to these (by assumption) 
distinct tokens, I will just put in by hand the uniqueness of composition: 
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4. If x = B(Yl"'Yn), then for no x' =1= x is x' = B(ZI ... Zn) if {Zl."Zn} = 
{Yl···Yn}' 
These four necessary conditio~ now seem to be jointly sufficient. 
From this analysis of a composite, we may define what it is for Y to be a 
constituent, or proper part, of a particle x, or yPx: 
yPx if and only if x = B(YI"'Yn) and Y E {Yl ... Yn}' 
With this in place, it is now easy to show that the parthood relations ap-
propriate to S-matrix theory fonn partial orderings. The crucial ingredient 
is the observation that the existence of the composite implies the existence 
of its parts, but not vice versa. For if x = B(YI ... Yn), then (since they are 
identical) the existence of x implies the existence of B(YI ... Yn), and by the 
'adjective drop' inference, the existence of the Yb ... , Yn in a bound state im-
plies the existence of the YI ... Yn; hence every Yi E {YI'" Yn}. 38 Therefore the 
existence of a composite particle implies the existence of all of its parts. The 
converse however is not true: the existence of the Yl' "Yn is not sufficient for 
x, since the particles in the set may be free, violating condition 2, and so no 
Yi E {Yb ... , Yn} is sufficient for x either. Let us call this asymmetry between 
parts and wholes 'the asymmetry of existence'. 
Given the asymmetry of existence, it follows immediately that parthood 
relations are asymmetric. For assume otherwise: that is, assume that we have 
that x = B(YI ... Yn), and that, for some Yi E Yl"'Yn, we also have Yi = B(x, z) 
for some z. Then we have that (i) YiPX and that (li) XPYi, so that parthood is 
symmetric. So by (i) and the asymmetry of existence, x implies Yi and Yi does 
not imply x; and by (li) Yi implies x. But this is contradictory. 
Irreflexivity follows similarly. For assume that x = B(x, z) for some z, so that 
xPx and parthood is reflexive. Then again via the 'adjective drop' inference we 
have that x qua composite implies x qua part; but then given the asymmetry 
of existence x qua part does not imply x qua composite. But this is once again 
contradictory. 
To establish transitivity, what we must show is that, if yPx and zPy, then 
zPx. By the definition of 'is a part of', this is equivalent to if x = B(y, YI"'Yn), 
38For a discussion of the limitations of applicability of the adjective drop inference, 
see Schaffer [2009], p356. 
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for some Yl'''Yn (n ~ 1), and Y = B(z, Zl ... Zm) for some Zl",Zm (m ~ 1), 
then x = B(z, Zl",Zm, y, Yl ... Yn)' But the definitions of x and Y mean that 
x = B(B(z, Zl ... Zm), Yl"'Yn), and by utilizing the adjective drop inference 
once again we have x = B(z, Zl ... Zm, Yl ... Yn), as required. 
What this shows is that the parthood relations appropriate to S-matrix theory 
partially order the constituents of hadrons. Contact has thus been made with 
the sort of mereological ordering that Schaffer alludes to, though on wholly 
internal (and not on a priori) grounds: If we are now to argue that these 
partial orders are non-well-founded, what must be shown is that the theory 
implies that there are no particles in this theory that do not themselves have 
parts. That such non-well-foundedness indeed held sway among the hadrons 
was certainly the opinion of the theory's founder. In his opinion, hadrons are 
citizens in 
a democracy governed by Yukawa forces. Each strongly interacting 
particle is conjectured to be a bound state of those channels with 
which it communicates, owing its existence entirely to forces 
associated with the exchange of particles that communicate with 
'crossed' channels. Each of these latter particles in turn owes its 
. existence to a set of forces to which the original particle makes a 
contribution. In other words, each particle helps to genera~e other 
particles, which in tum generate it. 39 
Here we meet Chew's colourful neologism of 'particle democracy'. A transla-
tion might be in order: 
If one wishes to relate this idea of particle democracy to the older 
language of bound states or composite particles, it amounts to 
saying that each particle is a composite of all the others. 40 
But of course, nothing in the above description of what it is to be a composite 
particle in S-matrix theory implies that all such particles are in fact composite. 
What I therefore want to do now is tum to the arguments as to why S-matrix 
principles were taken to imply precisely this, and hence why it is that the 
S-matrix theory may be taken to provide us with a robust example of an 
39Chew [1964a], p34 (though this quote is repeated verbatim in countless other 
places). 
40Martin and Spearman [1970], p8. 
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internal argument against fundamentality. 
5.5 S-Matrix Arguments Against Fundamentality 
A variety of arguments against fundamentaIity can be found circulating in 
the S-matrix literature, and in what follows I shall look at three of them. In 
increasing order of sophistication, they are the argument from superfluousness, 
the argument from holism and the argument from analyticity. It will help to 
take these in order, so I begin with the first. 
5.5.1 The Argument from Superfluousness 
The first major reason for the disavowal for elementary particles is that the 
structure of the theory does not a priori require them. While this may sound 
like a weak motivation, it is nevertheless the case that S-matrix is rather 
unusual in being a theory of particle dynamics that does not require an a 
priori specification of the properties of certain particles. Consider for example 
how one would approach hadron dynamics from the Lagrangian perspective -
say the dynamics of pion-nucleon scattering. The only relativistic Lagrangian 
which leads to consistent results in this case is 
where £0 gives the free Lagrangian.41 Here 9 is a coupling constant associated 
with the nucleon and >. that associated with the pion. The nucleon field 
and the pion field each come as a package complete with their spins and 
masses; the handle on this equation will then be turned to arrive at all the 
composite structures that the pion-nucleon reaction may give rise to. But since 
this Lagrangian is the basis of all deductions in the theory, these properties 
cannot derive from anywhere else in the theory. Hence Lagrangians by design 
require 'arbitrarily assignable components in a theory', or, in Chews words, 
41See Cushing [1990] p132. 
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'fundamentons'.42 And elementary particles, in contrast to bound states, 
would count amongst the fundamentons. 
If a particle appears only when the forces become strongly at-
tractive [i.e. if it is composite], then its mass and couplings are 
calculable... It is also possible to introduce particles into the S-
matrix which are present independently of the strength or sign 
of the forces. The masses and couplings of these particles can-
not be calculated - just as masses and couplings inserted into a 
Lagrangian are arbitrary - and we choose to call such particles 
elementary since we cannot explain them. 43 
To adopt a Lagrangian-based approach is therefore to concede there are 
physical facts of central importance that cannot be explained by the theory, 
and hence should properly be regarded as 'arbitrary' (from the perspective of 
that theory at least). 
Contrast this picture with that of the S-matrix. While there is no funda-
mental dynamical equation here in the sense of an equation of motion, 
there is a methodologically central equation, namely the unitarity equation 
(A1.4a):44 
23mAij = L AnAnj (1.4a) 
n 
However, this is better viewed as a schema for equations than an individual 
equation, since any particle whatsoever - including those that are incontro-
vertibly non-fundamental- can feature in the states i and j in just the same 
way. So this equation, although in some ways the most analogous to the 
Lagrangian above in terms of the function it performs, does not privilege 
particles in the way the latter does. 
This is not to say, however, that nothing counts as a 'fundamenton' in this 
42Chew [1971a], p2334; Likewise Chew writes of electromagnetism: 'Whether one 
speaks of the photon or of the electromagnetic field, there exists an a priori central 
component of the theol)' whose existence is accepted as given - not explained as a 
necessal)' consequence of general principles.' 
43Frautschi [1963J, p2. 
44Veneziano calls unitarity 'the fundamental dynamical condition' (Veneziano 
[1969], p35). 
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theory, for the origins of the axioms themselves are left largely unexplained. 
Chew concedes for example that 
the superposition principle is accepted on an a priori basis and not 
explained. In other words, we take for granted the existence of a 
quantum world.45 
Thus certain things are treated as fundamental in the context of this theory, 
but they are principles, not particles. And of course. if the structure of the 
theory does not require fundamental particles in the way that other theories 
might, then a simplicity principle can be brought to bear to argue against their 
inclusion. It was with the above observations in mind that Chew felt 
the aesthetic principle of the 'lack of sufficient reason' may be 
invoked. There is no 'need' for elementary hadrons.46 
The thought here seems to be that whatever is superfluous to a theory should 
not be countenanced by it. However. this seems to be more than just an 
'aesthetic' principle - for we may view it as a sound methodological one. In 
any case. it was a principle that inspired Chew a great deal.47 
S-matrix theory therefore had good methodological grounds not to counte-
nance the existence of fundamental particles. However, given that what is 
at stake is so central a supposition of so much modem scientific and philo-
sophical thinking, one would ideally like a rather stronger motivation for 
dissenting on fundamentality. Methodological considerations in general, after 
all. can only carry so much ontological weight, and indeed many (myself 
included) would take the even-handedness between composite and putatively 
fundamental particles outlined above to recommend at best agnosticism. not 
atheism, when it comes to the existence of fundamental particles. Chew 
himself in fact conceded that the above sorts of considerations implied that 
'elementary hadrons were no longer essential to the dynamics, but they were 
not excluded', and hence the argument outlined in this section cannot itself 
45Chew [1971a], p2331. Likewise see Chew [1966], p2 for a statement that 'it is 
pointless to seek the origin' of why useful functions usually tum out the be analytic. 
46Chew [I971b], p14.3 
47 As he put it, 'The possibility seemed dazzlingly attractive that, in the hadronic 
domain, already identified S-matrix principles might render unnecessary the very 
idea of elementarity. To me at least this possibility was, and is, irresistible' (ibid.). 
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be regarded as a conclusive argument against fundamentality.48 Rather, it 
should be seen as a feature that suggests it may be worth looking for such an 
argument. Fortunately for S-matrix theorists, however, two further arguments 
were ready to be deployed that suggested that the theory was not only com-
patible with the absence of fundamental entities, but such that it positively 
prohibits them. The first of these I will call 'the argument from holism'. 
5.5.2 The Argument from Holism 
It is not only the schematic and non-privileging nature of the unitarity equa-
tion that suggests it may be inhospitable to the fundamentalist. It is also the 
highly holistic implications of this equation that could be taken to suggest 
democracy. 
To see why this is, we must recall Chew's association of fundamentality and 
arbitrariness: 
By definition, a fundamental component is one that is arbitrarily 
assignable.49 
What this amounts to in this context is that the mass of a particle and its 
couplings to other particles are arbitrarily assignable, since these properties 
are functions of the binding energy and hence can in principle be deduced 
from the S-matrix dynamics. 50 Now, for any theory of particle physics that 
aspires to describe composite structures, it is clear that not all of the properties 
it ascribes to particles could be 'arbitrarily assignable' in this sense. S-matrix 
theory is no different in this respect. Having already alluded to the 'pole-
particle correspondence' relating pole singularities and particles, here is how 
one of the textbooks puts the matter. 
It would be surprising if all the poles could be specified arbitrarily. 
For instance suppose we include the neutron and proton poles 
in the S-matrix. We would then expect the deuteron pole to be 
generated by the 'force' between these two particles, so there 
48Chew [1968a], p67. 
49Chew [1970], p23. 
s°As mentioned in the Appendix, Section Al.3, the state-independent properties of 
the particle encoded in the SU(3) symmetry are not explained in this theory. 
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should be no need to put it in beforehand. Our expectation about 
this is clearly based on the feeling that the deuteron is a composite 
particle, and that composites should be consequences of the theory, 
not part of the postulates. In quantum-electrodynamics one has 
to specify the masses and charges of the electron and positron, 
but not those of positronium, which can be calculated. To add to 
the theory the requirement that the positronium mass take some 
particular value other than the experimental one would certainly 
be inconsistent. A theory of strong interactions which enables one 
to specify the masses and couplings of all the particles arbitrarily 
is almost certainly similarly contradictory.51 
It is here that we meet the connection between fundamentality and consistency. 
Where we have composite particles described in a theory, their properties 
ought to be deducible in that theory; stipulating some value for them and 
putting it in by hand is then very likely to result in inconsistency. The 
suggestion here is that the number of composite particles and the number 
of arbitrary parameters should be (in some sense) 'inversely proportional' 
to one another: in the limiting case in which all particles are composite, as 
was Chew's belief, the inference was that no parameters should be arbitrary 
and thus that all should be derivable from the others in a self-consistent or 
'bootstrapping' way. As one textbook put it, 
Intuitively, it seems clear that if all the hadrons are to be compos-
ites of each other, and all the forces are due to the exchange of 
particles, then some form of self consistency is necessaty[.]S2 
But if any theory feasibly provides the requisite degree of self-consistency, 
then it seems that the S-matrix theory does. The reason for this is that the 
structure of the S-matrix, and in particular the central role of the unitarity 
equation, puts enormous self-consistency requirements on the theory. I will 
now try to explain why this is. 
As we know, the purpose of S-matrix theory is to compute the scattering 
amplitude for all strong-interaction processes. The imaginary part of this 
amplitude (in the physically possible regions of the momentum variables) is 
slCollins and Squires (1968) p33, italics added. 
52Collins [1977], p73. 
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given by the unitarity equation. Looking at this equation (which I repeat here 
for convenience), 
2lmAii = L AinAni (A 1. 4a) 
n 
it is immediately obvious that the amplitude governing anyone process is a 
function of all the amplitudes for all transitions to which the external particles 
may be connected consistently with the various conservation laws. Thus, 
as energy increases, anyone transition is a function of all possible processes 
with the same quantum numbers that are permitted by energy-momentum 
conservation. 
But in fact things are even worse than this. Consider again the Mandelstam 
representation of the scattering amplitude (A3a): 
A( t) g; g; l1°OlmA(s',t'UO)d,l1.oolmA(s,t"UO)d' S, ,Uo = + +- 8 +- t m~ - 8 m~ - s 1r Sb S' - S 1r tb t' - t 
(A3a) 
As explained in the Appendix, Section A4.l, the amplitude for any reaction 
is a function not just of the singularities in the direct channel (s) but also of 
those (such as t) that are obtained by 'crossing' from the direct channel (see 
Appendix, Section A2 for discussion of crossing). To see just how complicated 
matters can get here, consider first of all the pole singularities. Their posi-
tions are given by the masses of the direct- and cross-channel one-particle 
intermediate states, and their residues are identified with their couplings 
to the input and output channels (the form of which is given in (A1.5c)). 
Consider now the branch-cut singularities. These singularities contribute to 
the amplitude a function of the discontinuity across the cuts, each of which, in 
physical regions of the Mandelstam plane, is equal to the imaginaty part of the 
direct- and crossed-channel scattering amplitude respectively (see Appendix 
Section A3). But this in tum is given by the unitarity equation for the direct-
and crossed-channel amplitudes, and hence (for the reasons given in the 
paragraph above) in terms of all those states that can be connected to these 
channels consistently with the conservation laws. Looking at the 8-functions 
in (A1.4b) and (AlAe), and generalizing to a n-partic1e intermediate state, 
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we see that the singularities - which are 'related to the 6-functions via (Al.Sb) 
- are fixed by the masses of the particles appearing in these intermediate 
states. 53 But because we know that the quantum numbers of a given channel 
are closed under the addition of particle-anti-particle pairs, then as the direct-
and cross-channel energies increase to infinity (as the integrals prescribe), 
eventually a singularity from every type of particle will appear. 
The net result of all this is that a calculation of the amplitude for anyone, 
general reaction incorporates (1) the scattering amplitudes for all reactions 
with the same quantum numbers as the reaction in question; (2) the scatter-
ing amplitudes for reactions obtained by crossing from the reaction under 
consideration; (3) the coupling constants of all particles with the quantum 
numbers of the direct and crossed channels, and (4) the masses of all the 
strongly interacting particles. This means that even in the case of the simplest 
reaction, pion-pion elastic scattering, 
The end result is that a full knowledge of the forces governing 
pion-pion scattering amplitude involves a knowledge not only of 
the pion-pion scattering amplitude, but also of practically every 
other strong interaction. Thus, what we actually have is not a self-
consistency condition on the the pion-pion amplitude by itself, but 
a set of very complicated consistency conditions inter-connecting 
all strong-interaction amplitudes.54 
In other words, to understand one particle, one essentially has to understand 
all. In Chew's words, 
A 'bootstrapped' S-matrix contains an infinite number of poles and 
no single one can be completely understood without an under-
standing of all the others. 55 
The principal significance of this feature for our purposes is simply that, given 
that the number of free parameters and the self-consistency of a theory are 
plausibly 'inversely proportional', the very high self-consistency requirements 
on S-matrix theory suggests there may be no particles permitted by this theory 
53The precise form of this generalization was given by Cutkosky and can be found 
in Collins [1977], pIS. 
S40mnes [1971], p300. This reaction is particularly simple because it is 'closed 
under crossing', i.e. all channels obtained by crossing are identical. 
55 Chew [1968b], p76S. 
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with 'arbitrarily assignable' properties, and hence no fundamental panicles. 
As Chew puts it, 
in this circular and violently non-linear situation it is possible to 
imagine that no free parameters appear and that the only self-
consistent set of particles is the one we find in nature. 56 
However, the high degree of holism has other theoretical and empirical 
consequences. The first and most obvious of these concerns the intimidating 
prospect of actually solving the S-matrix equations - for it is clear that no exact 
solution is humanly possible in the general case. While the imaginary pan 
of the amplitude, and hence the solution of the equations, could be directly 
measured in special cases (such as forward-scattering in elastic processes; see 
Appendix Section A3 and references therein), in the general case 
[s]olution of the unitarity equations involves solution of infinite 
sets of coupled, non-linear, singular, integral equations... one 
would have to solve the entire strong interaction problem in one 
fell swoop. 57 
The sheer intractability of these equations was enough to put many people 
off. 58 Clearly, the only way to tackle the problem in the general case was by 
making some approximations, but pending any idea of what the exact solu-
tions were supposed to look like, it was not in general possible to formulate 
in a principled way hypotheses regarding which processes might be approxi-
mately decoupled from the rest and where truncations could be imposed. ~9 
One could therefore never be sure that a given piece of evidence really did 
confirm the theory. Nonetheless, the successes that were obtained under these 
approximation schemes, together with the successes obtained in the special 
(elastic) cases, meant that there was reason for optimism that the theory was 
56 Chew [1964a], p34 
57Collins and Squires [1968], p140. 
58'[A] reason for dislike by some of a dynamically governed democratic structure 
for nuclear society, with no elementary particles, is that it makes life exceedingly 
difficult for physicists. We must await the invention of entirely new techniques of 
analysis before such a situation can be thoroughly comprehended' (Chew [1966], 
p97). 
59'The difficulty is that one can never be sure just how bad an approximation one 
is making, since a priori the corrections might tum out to be larger than the effects 
included' (Collins and Squires [1968], p139). 
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on the right track. 60 
In any case, with no prospect for either an exact solution of the equations 
in the general case, or a decisive test of the relations between the various 
parameters, the intuition that there could be no arbitrary parameters in 
the S-matrix could neither be theoretically demonstrated nor conclusively 
empirically tested. And of course, there was always the prospect that the high 
degree of self-consistency required is not met in the first place, and thus that 
the S-matrix equations as they stand in fact admit of no solution.61 Recalling 
the idea of Heisenberg that the S-matrix postulates are insufficient to capture 
dynamics, Chew noted that 
the constraints are so severe that no calculation has come close 
to satisfying all at the same time. Far from fearing that Lorentz 
invariance, unitarity and maximal analyticity are insufficient to de-
fine a complete dynamical theory, I worry that these requirements 
may be too much for any S-matrix.62 
The idea that the high degree of holism inherent in the S-matrix formalism 
prohibits fundamentality therefore remains, at this point, a hunch and a 
hope. But it can in fact be demonstrated that, under very general conditions 
and in the absence of any further postulates, the relation can not in general 
be asserted to hold. The reason is that the Mandelstam expression for the 
amplitude given in (A3a) - and which I have argued is highly holistic in 
character - was obtained under the assumption that the amplitude disappears 
asymptotically (see Appendix Section A3). But this turns out to not be a real-
istic assumption, for what is generally found is that the asymptotic behaviour 
is only power-bound. As shown in the Appendix, Section AS.2, this means 
that, where N is this power, terms containing N - 1 undetennined subtraction 
constants will have to be added to the amplitude to restore convergence. But 
the presence of these undetermined constants means that the amplitude is not 
60As one textbook put it, 'With so many approximations, no test can ever be crucial, 
but a sufficiently large number of partial successes have been achieved to make the 
more optimistic feel that the hypothesis may be true' (Collins and Squires [1968], 
pl40). 
61Streater ([2007], p120) states that Claude Lovelace showed that the bootstrap 
equations in fact have no solution, but no details are given. 
62Chew [1968a], p67. 
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in general determined by the unitarity equations.63 Thus in spite of the intu-
ition that the highly holistic character of the S-matrix prohibits undetermined 
parameters - and hence may exclude elementary particles - the asymptotic 
behaviour introduces an ambiguity in the representation that suggests this 
may not be the case after all. 
Fortunately for the Chewians, however, this ambiguity in the representation 
of the amplitude can be effaced with the extension of the analyticity postulate 
- an extension that is desirable on a number of independent grounds. It is 
here that the Analytic S-matrix theory reaches its apogee, and where it finally 
manages to translate intuitions concerning the absence of fundamentality into 
precise empirical predictions. 
5.5.3 The Argument from Maximal Analyticity 
The absence of any mention of angular momentum in the initial five pos-
tulates of the Analytic S-matrix theory was a conspicuous one. After all, 
the decomposition of total amplitudes into their partial wave counterparts -
amplitudes for specific values of angular momenta - was already an essential 
part of the toolkit in non-relativistic scattering theory; given that S-matrix 
theory is about scattering through and through, it was therefore 'inevitable 
that the angular momentum decomposition should receive major attention' in 
this theory. 64 
Not only does the use of partial wave analysis permit individual waves to be 
scrutinized, it also permits partial diagonalization of the unitarity formulae. 
Hence it in principle offers a great deal of simplification of the 'baffling' 
unitarity equations. But while the motivations for deploying partial wave 
analysis in this context were clear, and as explained in the Appendix, Section 
AS.1, it was obvious that the standard wave decomposition of the amplitude 
would not do. This was because the standard decomposition fails to produce 
63'Requiring that the amplitude satify maximal analyticity of the first kind, with all 
the singularities given by the Landau-Cutkosky equations, is not necessarily sufficient 
to determine it completely. It would be sufficient if it were known to vanish suitably 
at infinity, but otherwise subtractions, which may introduce arbitrary parameters, are 
needed' (Collins and Squires [1968], p30). 
64Chew [1966], p40. 
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amplitudes that are compatible with crossing symmetry - a central plank in 
the S-matrix dynamical scheme. Fortunately, it was known that that problem 
could be resolved by extending angular momenta to complex values, as 
Thllio Regge had done in the context of non-relativistic quantum mechanics 
only a few years before.65 What Regge showed in that context was that the 
partial wave amplitudes had singularities in the complex angular momentum 
plane at physical (integral or half-integral) values, and that such poles were 
'moving' poles - that is, functions of the energy. The angular momenta of the 
bound-state solutions of the Schrodinger equation were thereby shown to 
be connected by smooth functions or'Regge trajectories', denoted by o:(E). 
Unlike in the non-relativistic case, however, the applicability of'Regge theory' 
- that is, the incorporation of complex angular momenta into scattering theory 
- was essentially a conjecture in this context, as there was no equation of 
motion whose analyticity properties could be explicitly studied. But the 
conjecture that the amplitudes were to be continued to complex functions 
helped to solve in an elegant way a number of theoretical difficulties and, most 
importantly, was sustained by a rich edifice of phenomenological evidence.66 
Furthermore, it was with its assimilation that the companion notions of 
arbitrariness, compositeness and analyticity finally assumed a well-articulated 
form. 
The that the amplitudes should admit of complex continuation in angular 
momentum (f) presupposes that the amplitudes should be maximally analytic 
functions of f. 'Maximal analyticity' is understood in the case of angular 
momentum perfectly analogously to the case of linear momentum (discussed 
in the Appendix, Section A1.S), in that it is taken to mean that the amplitude 
should admit continuation to complex i-values with only such singularities as 
are demanded by unitarity. This postulate of maximal analyticity of the second 
kind, that is, in the angular momentum variables, was therefore a natural 
extension of a key postulate already present, and its inclusion completed the 
architecture of the S-matrix. 
The story which asks to be told here is rather long and detailed, but I shall re-
count just the crucial steps in the reasoning that surrounded the incorporation 
of the postulate and the subsequent empirical and metaphysical implications; 
6SSee Regge [1959], [1960]. 
66Barone and Predazzi [2002], p84. 
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more (but by no means all of the relevant) detail may be found in the Ap-
pendix, Section AS. The postulate of maximal analyticity hypothesizes that 
the partial wave amplitudes can be analytically continued to complex £ for 
all physical (real and integral or half-integral) £. It can be demonstrated that 
an analytic function for the partial wave amplitudes exists for all i greater 
than the power of the divergence of the Mandelstam representation (men-
tioned at the end of the last section and discussed in the Appendix, Section 
AS.2), where this function is given by the Froissart-Gribov representation (see 
Appendix, Section AS.3). The validity of the extended analyticity postulate, 
which postulates continuation for all i, was therefore tightly bound up with 
the power of this divergence. It was then proved (see Appendix, Section AS.4) 
that unitarity demanded that this power, in the region of the amplitude in 
which the centre of mass energy in a given channel lay below zero, could be 
no greater than one. The existence of this Froissart bound on the power of 
the divergence therefore established that the possibility of the invalidity of 
the postulate was highly constrained, since a unique analytic continuation 
of the amplitude to complex values of i, for all vtt( i) > 1, was demonstrably 
possible. 
The deep significance of this was that the singularities of those partial waves 
that did admit of analytic continuation - the 'Regge poles' - occurred at 
physical £ values and had a Breit-Wigner form (cf. (AS.Ba)). But this is the 
form, familiar from the earliest days of nuclear physics, that corresponds 
to bound states and scattering resonances - in other words, to composite 
particles. The particles corresponding to Regge poles - and thus those lying 
on Regge trajectories - were thereby established as composite. Appearing as 
a Regge pole in the appropriate partial wave amplitudes was therefore put 
forward as an operational definition of a non-elementary particle in relativistic 
theory. 67 
An immediate consequence of all this was that there could be no elementary 
particle with spin greater than one (on account of the Froissart bound). Thus 
analyticity m £ placed stringent constraints on the properties that any putative 
67'The [original] pole-particle correspondence fails to distinguish between 'ele-
mentary' and composite' particles, but... Fraustchi and I conjectured that Regge 
asymptotic behaviour might be used in the relativistic hadron S-matrix to define 
"compositeness"' (Chew [1970], p764, italics added; see also Gribov [2003], p54). 
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fundamental particle may have. Nevertheless, and this highly significant 
achievement in constraining fundamentality notwithstanding, it remained 
that the status of particles with spins of e = 0, e = 1/2 and f = 1 were left 
hanging by the existence of the bound.68 Since the constraints on fundamen-
tality would have to be extended into the region of these low values if 'nuclear 
democracy' was to be sustained, demonstrating that analytic continuation 
into the lowest partial waves was possible became a pivotal problem for the 
theory.69 However, no general method for doing so was established.7o That 
the amplitude was an analytic function for all f therefore entered, and re-
mained, as a postulate.71 It was thus this hypothesis regarding the singularity 
structure in the complex e plane that became the mathematical correlate of 
the metaphysical hypothesis that no particle was fundamental. 
Let us postulate that the Froissart-Gribov amplitude can be con-
tinued to all physical [l] values ... and that the actual physical 
amplitudes are thereby always achieved. This conjecture... we 
shall designate as maximal analyticity of the second degree. It is 
equivalent to the concept of nuclear democracy. .. 72 
One consequence of the postulate that the amplitude was an analytic function 
of l for all l was that the undetermined polynomial in the Mandelstam 
representation disappeared (see Appendix Section AS.S). Since it was the 
presence of this polynomial that undermined the intuition that the holism of 
the S-matrix precluded fundamental particles, the plausibility of the intuition 
was in this way restored. But this intuition was no more than that; barring 
681n the Appendix, 1 restrict my attention to the case of integral momentum for 
simplicity. 
69'The key problem of bootstrap dynamics is to find a technique of continuing 
that Froissart-Gribov formula down to values of angular momentum for which poles 
appear. Not general technique has yet been developed.' (Chew [1966], p60). 
70Some progress on this issue was made, but the argument was long and compli-
cated, and in any case only applied to elastic processes. See the discussion of Martin's 
proof in Collins and Squires [1968], p141. 
71~suming analyticity in s, the Froissart limit evidently precludes such a special 
status for any physical [l] larger than 1, but to date the general principles [so 
far introduced] have not been shown to ensure that these three lowest [fJ values 
must be ordinary citizens in a nuclear democracy ... It may eventually develop that 
complete democracy is the only way to achieve maximal analyticity of the first degree. 
Currently, however, it seems necessary to invoke an additional postulate.' (Chew 
[1966], p54). 
72Ibid., p55. 
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a solution of the equations or a precise empirical test of the amplitudes -
neither of which were forthcoming in the general case - this disappearance of 
the polynomial was, though interesting, in itself inconclusive. The much more 
important implication of the postulate was that all particle poles, including 
those corresponding to the lowest partial waves, were Regge poles. The 
reason that this is a more important consequence of the postulate is that not 
only does it give a precise formal meaning to the idea that all particles are 
composite, it also renders it empirically testable. 
That this empirical handle on the fundamentality of particles exists may be 
deduced as follows. As already pointed out, maximal analyticity implies that 
angular momentum is a continuous function, and it is in fact a function of the 
energy. As the energy increases, a pole at a given value of e moves along on its 
trajectory a( E) to its new value f'. As a result of this, poles which contribute 
to one wave are functionally related to poles in others. This gives rise to the 
asymptotic behaviour that is shown in (AS.7e). On the other hand, as shown 
in Appendix Section AS.7, poles that contribute to only one partial wave 
give rise to <5-function type singularities and the behaviour of (AS.7f). Being 
non-Regge, these poles can be taken as candidates for those corresponding 
to elementary particles. Crucially, these two types of poles produce not only 
distinct but detectably distinct asymptotic behaviours. It may therefore be said 
that 
since bound states clearly lie on Regge trajectories whilst CDD 
[i.e. non-Regge] poles, in particular partial waves, give rise to 
Kronecker delta singularities in [the partial wave amplitudes], 
Regge theory offers a precise way of distinguishing between com-
posite and elementary particles, and therefore of testing the idea 
of nuclear democracy that there are no elementary particles. 73 
It is therefore the postulate of maximal analyticity, upon which Regge theory 
rests, that results in the empirical testability of nuclear democracy. And it 
seems that Chew in fact placed his entire anti-fundamentalist capital on the 
hope that the Regge asymptotic prediction would prevail over that of the rival 
fundamentalist 8-function. 
Thus there exists at least one possible path for experimental de-
73Squires [1971], p74. 
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molition of the hadronic bootstrap: the discovery of non-Regge 
poles among hadrons.74 
Moreover, not only was empirical support for the democracy thesis possible, 
a great deal of empirical support was initially forthcoming. Perhaps most 
significant of it all was that fact that the nucleon was shown to lie on a Regge 
trajectory, which was significant for at least two reasons.7S First of all, it 
had spin 1/2, and hence lay within the contentious region (i.e. within the 
'Froissart bound'), lending support to the idea that other particles in this 
region would be 'Reggeizable' too. But secondly, the nucleon was at the time 
thought to be an elementary particle. The undoing of this assumption through 
Regge theory made the latter's revolutionary potential immediately manifest, 
and that there were in fact no fundamental particles was suddenly a very real 
possibility. Jacob and Chew describe the shift in attitudes as follows. 
From the time of their discovery the nucleon and the pion were 
accorded a status parallel to that of the photon and the electron, 
respectively. It was taken for granted that the 7r and the n masses 
and other properties could not be calculated but must be accepted 
as fundamental constants of nature. 
When the possibility of Regge particles families sharing all quan-
tum numbers except spin was proposed, however, it was imme-
diately noticed that the nucleon (spin 1/2) could be associated 
Regge-wise with a spin 5/2 particle that clearly was not elementary. 
This discovery broke the spell, and attempts were then made to 
compute nucleon properties on a dynamical basis. The results have 
been sufficiently successful to convince many physicists that the 
nucleon is a composite state in the same sense as the deuteron.76 
It was the asymptotic Regge behaviour that tendered maximal analyticity of 
the second kind, and hence nuclear democracy, falsifiable; and falsified it was. 
Despite much hope that it was down to experimental error, the (spin-zero) 
pion consistently refused to exhibit Regge behaviour.77 Since, as already 
pointed out, Chew apparently staked his entire anti-fundamentalist capital on 
74Chew [1968b], p764. . 
7SSee Cushing [1990], p145, and Chew [1964b], p6. 
76Jacob and Chew [1964a], p127. 
77See Chew [1967], p189; also Cushing [1990], p164. 
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the absence of deviations from Regge behaviour, it seems that we can say that 
the idea of nuclear democracy was thereby falsified. 78 
5.6 Conclusions 
Having now examined the grounds upon which S-matrix theorists justified 
their claim that there are no fundamental hadrons, let me briefly retrace my 
steps. I noted in Chapter 1 that contemporary metaphysics is pervaded by 
the assumption that chains of dependence relations must terminate. I then 
marshalled the S-matrix theory in the service of demonstrating that one could 
conceivably find oneself in the position of denying this on naturalistic grounds. 
From there I described a composite, or bound state, in S-matrix theory and 
showed that the compositional relations applicable there form partial orders. 
Three increasingly compelling arguments as to why this compositional or-
dering should be regarded as non-well-founded were then advanced. The 
argument from superfluousness maintained that elementary particles may be 
eschewed on the grounds that they are not demanded by the formalism. But 
of course, that there is no need for elementary particles does not in itself pre-
clude them. The argument from holism then suggested that such particles are 
indeed positively forbidden. But in lieu of an exact solution to the equations, 
there could be no demonstration of this, and indeed the need to deal with the 
divergence of the Mandelstam amplitude under more realistic assumptions 
positively suggested against it. However, the argument from analyticity was 
able to place stringent limits on this divergence, and in so doing translate 
780f course, in reality experiments are ever regarded as so crucial. Cushing's 
interpretation of the demise of the 'autonomous S-matrix programme' is that it was 
due to 'degenerating Regge phenomenology' and that it exemplifies a 'degenerating 
research programme in Lakatos' sense of that word' (Cushing [1990,] pls4). Like-
wise, according to Redhead 'the bootstrap programme was not so much refuted as 
overtaken by the new fundamentalist approach involving truly basic constituents like 
quarks and gluons' ([2005], pS73). While these are no doubt accurate assessments of 
the history, given Chew's insistence that non-Regge poles represented the 'demolition' 
of the theory and the argument underpinning it, I think we can hazard that these 
experiments may be taken to have a far more destructive significance for the claims 
of the programme than they perhaps did in practice. (Note that other avenues of 
refutation were also envisaged as possible, such as the violation of the Levinson 
theorem regarding the high-energy phase shifts; see Collins and Squires [1968], 
p14s, and Jacob and Chew [1964a], p127.) 
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the S-matrix's flagship claim into a precise conditional: if the postulate of 
maximal analyticity of the second kind is true, then there are no fundamental 
hadrons. This postulate was motivated on a variety of independent grounds, 
and admitted of a precise empirical test. The failure of this test tells us that the 
picture S-matrix theory offers - of hadrons being composed of other hadrons 
without end - is after all not true of this world. 79 
As an example of an internal argument against fundamentality, the above 
study demonstrates a number of things. 
1. Fundamentality questions can be empirical questions. We need not view 
questions of whether it is necessary or otherwise that 'chains of de-
pendence must terminate' as the exclusive purview of armchair spec-
ulation. Now, given that S-matrix theory is so closely connected with 
phenomenology -: its central theoretical component is, after all, the 
S-matrix's compendium of observable results - I would hazard that such 
a high degree of direct empirical contact with fundamentality-related 
propositions is not something that we should expect to be a general 
feature of internal arguments against fundamentality. Nevertheless, 
S-matrix theory does furnish an example of the attempt to frame what 
many would take to be a quintessentially metaphysical hypothesis - the 
infinite divisibility of (a certain kind of) matter and hence the existence 
of 'gunk' - in thoroughly empirical terms. 
2. Arguments against fundamentality need not be meta-inductions. The S-
matrix argument against fundamentality proceeded entirely from within 
its own deductive system. It has thus been demonstrated that it can 
be the internal logic of a physical theory - the implications of its sys-
tem of physical postulates - that furnishes us with a means to deny 
the existence of fundamental entities. It follows from that, of course, 
that arguments against fundamentality need not trade in speculative 
assumptions regarding the progress of future physics. (It may also be 
inferred from the fact that the anti-fundamentalist hypothesis became 
equated with a postulate concerning the extension of angular momen-
790f course, today we do believe that all hadrons are composite (indeed now 
'hadrons' are now usually defined as those particles that are composed of quarks). 
But this of course is compatible with the falsity of the S-matrix proposition that all 
hadrons are composites of other hadrons. 
102 
Chapter 5. The Analytic S-Matrix 
tum functions to complex values that there may be nothing a priori 
obvious about the guise in which an anti-fundamentality hypothesis 
might appear in!) The above discussion also makes salient something 
that is implicit in the very concept of an internal argument against 
fundamentality. That is that the anti-fundamentalist must in all cases 
be eommitted to something that is at least dialectically fundamental to 
their argument - namely, the· set of physical principles from which their 
ontologically anti-fundamentalist conclusions follow. As mentioned, for 
example, Chew was very open about the fact that the superposition 
postulate was simply taken as an axiom, ultimately being regarded to 
issue from no more fundamental source. This defining aspect of the 
internal approach has another important consequence. 
3. Internal arguments against fundamentality are limited. By definition, 
internal arguments proceed from a set of postulates, formulated by 
means of a finite set of predicates. As such, there is only a certain 
amount of qualitative variation permitted in the descending ontologies 
they are capable of describing. Those who were hoping that we could 
have naturalistic grounds for thinking that the world unfolds into sto-
ries as different as classical and quantum mechanics again and again 
ad infinitum as we descend more deeply into matter are likely to be 
disappointed.80 The picture that S-matrix theory presents us with, for 
example, is one in which compositional chains go on forever, but also in 
which the types of particles that feature in these chains recur ad infini-
tum.81 Although it is not clear to me at this point how best to define the 
fundamentality of properties, it seems at least intuitively plausible that 
S-matrix theory implies fundamental properties even though it precludes 
fundamental particles. Schaffer refers to worlds such as this - worlds 
in which the property structure repeats itself indefinitely as we plunge 
deeper down chains of priority - as 'boring worlds'.82 Although the 
degree of homogeneity in the descending sequence need not be quite so 
8°Such a world is conjectured and described by David Bohm ([1957], Chapter 5 
(ef. Chapter 4, Section 1 above). 
81 As Veneziano puts it, 'It could be that we have an infinite variety of particles that 
interact with each other in a small region of space ... in such a way as to form bound 
(or resonating) states that possess again the properties of the constituents' ([1969], 
p36; quoted in Gale [1974]). 
82Schaffer [2003], p50S. 
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dramatic as this in general, the kind of anti-fundamentality that we can 
hope to establish through the internal approach can only ever be a sort 
of 'half-way house' in which the theoretical framework stays the same, 
even as the dependence structure never ends. 
In spite of the limitations and lacunae outlined above, what the argument just 
adduced demonstrates is that that the intuition that 'chains of dependence 
must terminate' is not one that the naturalized metaphysician need share. 
While there remains a great deal to say on the relation between the frame-
works that internal arguments must take as fundamental and the ontological 
notion of fundamentality - topics that will be discussed in later chapters -
I believe that that conclusion represents a philosophical accomplishment in 
itself. 
104 
bh~rer() __________________________ ~ 
Arguing Against Fundamentality II: 
Effective Quantum Field Theories 
6.1 Introduction 
The question that concerns me in Part 1 of this thesis is that of whether 
we might deny the existence of a fundamental basis to the actual world 
on naturalistic grounds. I have argued that the best approach to adopt 
in any attempt to do so is the internal approach, in which fundamentality 
questions are addressed through the lens of extant physical theory. So far I 
have looked at one theory, the Analytic 5-matrix theory, that shows that the 
internal approach can provide us with grounds to deny the existence of a 
mereologically fundamental basis. That theory, however, is unquestionably 
as dead as a dodo, and it would be nice to be able to discuss an example 
of a theory with potential anti-fundamentalist implications that represents a 
live theoretical possibility. But there is indeed such an example, and this is 
quantum field theory (QFT). For reasons that will become clear later on - if 
they are not already - QFT is better referred to as a 'framework' for physical 
theories than a theory per se, and it is a particular approach to it - namely, 
the 'effective interpretation' of the theories formulated within its framework 
- that has been claimed to have radically anti-fundamentalist implications. 1 
Indeed, as already mentioned in Chapter 4, Callender has pointed out in reply 
IOn the notion of a 'framework' for theories, see Shimony op. cit., p209. 
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to Schaffer that the debate concerning effective field theories is perhaps 'the 
best support [Schaffer] has in science' for drawing an anti-fundamentalist 
conclusion, and thus it is almost inevitable that some discussion of this debate 
would feature in the course of this work. 2 
The debate that Callender refers to - at least insofar as it is played out in 
the philosophy literature - revolves around the 1993 paper by the histori-
ans and philosophers of physics Tian Cao and Silvan Schweber.3 Cao and 
Schweber have probably gone further than anyone in advocating the idea that 
the shift to the effective paradigm in QFr has radically anti-fundamentalist 
implications, and their paper on the subject has received a good deal of 
attention.4 In that paper, they argued that the possibility of using effective 
quantum field theories in particle physics heralded 'a pluralism in theoretical 
ontology, an antifoundationalism in epistemology, and an antireductionism in 
methodology', where the latter is taken to involve a commitment to nomic 
anti-fundamentalism.5 Unfortunately, however, their argument for the idea 
that QIT supports the non-existence of fundamental laws has been subject to 
a great deal of criticism. Amongst other problems, both technical and philo-
sophical, that have been raised against their argument, it has been claimed 
that while QIT might be consistent with anti-fundamentalism about laws, it 
certainly does not entail it - contrary to what Cao and Schweber suggest in 
their paper. 6 
Seminal although it may have been, I will therefore not begin by providing 
an exegesis of Cao and Schweber's discu~sion. Rather, I will discuss whether 
we can use QFf to argue against fundamentality by taking a different route 
than they. Specifically, rather than focussing, as they do, on the details of 
the renormalization procedure, I will focus more directly on the renormaliz-
ability principle C'RP') and the changing perception of it (though I will make 
parenthetical, and mostly critical, references to their work where especially 
relevant). Nevertheless, this route will- as perhaps all routes must - converge 
2Callender [2001]. 
3eaO and Schweber [1993J. 
4See for example Hartmann [2001], Castellani [2002] and Huggett and Weingard 
[1995]. 
SOp. cit. p69. Exactly what these 'effective' theories consist of will be introduced 
below. 
6See e.g. Huggett and Weingard op. cit., p187; Castellani op. cit. p.264. 
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on the same underdetermination regarding fundamentality that was noted 
in response to Cao and Schweber. However, rather than simply registering 
that underdetermination yet again, I will put it a little more under the spot-
light than it has been hitherto. In particular, by drawing on themes regarding 
fundamentality as it is conceived of in both physics and metaphysics, I will con-
sider whether anything might motivate vouching for the anti-fundamentalist 
interpretation, given that the debate revolves around the standing of this 
principle. 
Before I get to that point, however, there is a fair bit of ground to cover 
in describing the relevant aspects of QFT and motivating the effective in-
terpretation of the theories formulated within it. In what follows, I will 
begin with the briefest of discussions of the QFT formalism, and indicate 
the problem of divergences inherent within it that ultimately gives rise to the 
anti-fundamentalist claims made on behalf of it. This will be followed by a 
summary of the method of dealing with these divergences - namely; the ugly 
and arduous procedure of renormalization - but this material is sufficiently 
involved to justify requesting the uninitiated to defer to the textbooks for 
more detail. This will then be followed by a brief discussion of why this 
process, and the renormalization principle that is intimately associated with 
it, have been regarded with suspicion. From there I will describe the fea-
tures of so-called 'effective field theories', or 'EFTs', which although quantum 
field-theoretic fail to satisfy this principle, and furthermore motivate the ac-
ceptance of them as legitimate QFTs. With all that in place, I will in Section 
8 introduce the underdetermination regarding fundamentality that QFT is 
taken to involve, and consider some strategies for defending the idea that the 
best response in the face of it is to say that there are no fundamental laws. 
(Those familiar with the concept of EFTh and their historical emergence may 
wish to skim the material until this section.) As something of a coda, I will 
end by gesturing toward an additional layer of complexity that I will have up 
until that point neglected (though flagged up) - namely; the phenomenon 
of asymptotic safety - and discuss how this additional but thus far neglected 
aspect may significantly qualify the conclusions drawn directly before, but 
nonetheless offer additional insights into the features of internal arguments 
against fundamentality. (Hopefully why I have adopted this seemingly rather 
back-to-front strategy should be at least understandable by the end.) 
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With so much ground to cover, let me therefore tum to the basics of the QFf 
framework and the problem of the divergences to which it inevitably gives 
rise. 
6.2 The QFr Framework and its Problems 
Quantum field theory is the physical theory of relativistic quantum systems. It 
is the theory that solves the problems of negative energy solutions and the 
failure of probability densities to be positive definite that were inherent in 
the earlier quantum relativistic particle mechanics. It is regarded as the most 
fundamental framework for physics that we can currently submit to test, and 
is taken to have facilitated the most accurate quantitative predictions ever 
made. 
QFT arguably also has a claim to being a highly natural theory of relativistic 
quantum physics. In the first volume of his magisterial series of textbooks, for 
example, Weinberg argues that QFf is - modulo some caveats and qualifica-
tions of various sorts - the unique framework that is implied by the principles 
of quantum mechanics and relativity. More specifically, he argues that 'the 
whole formalism of fields, particles, and antiparticles seems to be an inevitable 
consequence of Lorentz invariance, quantum mechanics, and cluster decompo-
sition' - or more succinctly 'that quantum mechanics plus Lorentz invariance 
plus cluster decomposition implies quantum field theory'. 7 To impose the 
condition of Lorentz invariance upon the dynamics is of course just to require 
that the dynamics be relativistic. By 'the principles of quantum mechanics', 
Weinberg intends the principles that (i) states are to be represented as rays in 
a Hilbert space (and thus respect the principle of superposition), (ii) physical 
operators are Hermitian, and (iii) probabilities are given by the Born rule 
and sum to 1 - hence that the dynamics is unitary.8 'Cluster decomposition' 
is taken to be an uncontroversial requirement on any empirical theory, com-
prising a condition on the factorization of the S-matrix that amounts to the 
demand - which Weinberg takes to be a basic precondition of any experi-
7Weinberg [1997a], pp.6-7. This paper provides a succinct description of We in-
berg's QFT programme, described more fully in his textbooks. 
8See Chapter 2 of Weinberg [199Sb]. 
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mental science - that distant experiments yield uncorrelated results.9 Now, I 
should note that Weinberg does not prove this claim that QFf is the unique 
framework suited to describing quantum relativistic systems, but rather calls 
it a 'not-yet-formulated theorem' - though one that he admits already has a 
counter-example of sorts in the shape of string theory.lO But his presentation 
of how the structure of QFI' dynamics, and its field-theoretic ontology, may 
be deduced from certain assumed physical and empirical principles should 
certainly remind us of S-matrix theory, in that in each case both the dynamics 
and the associated ontology are deduced from the principles that are taken to 
govern the dynamics (and thus the corresponding S-matrix). 
Compared with S-matrix theory, however, QFf is of course far more gen-
eral: none of the principles adduced above demand that the dynamics is 
shoTt-range, for example, and as such QFf is able to accommodate all of the 
fundamental interactions that we currently know of, barring (for the moment 
at least) gravity. It is in virtue of the fact that QFT can accommodate the theo-
ries of all these various interactions that it is best thought of not as a theory, 
but rather as aframework within which different theories can be formulated. ll 
Like S-matrix theory, however, empirical contact with the dynamics is made 
via the scattering matrix, and thus an essential aspect of QFf practice consists 
in working out S-matrix elements. Most workaday physicists compute these 
integrals by means of a perturbation series - namely, the Peynman-Dyson 
series, or 'sum over Feynman diagrams'. Since the perturbative expansion 
is made about the relevant interaction coupling, this diagrammatic method 
requires that these couplings be small if we are to be able to use it to calculate 
the relevant matrix elements. As was mentioned in the last chapter, this is why 
9See Chapter 4 of Weinberg [199Sb]. Note that this is not simply to say that 
distant measurements yield uncorrelated results - something clearly incompatible 
with quantum mechanics. 
lOWeinberg [I997a], pS. How Weinberg's claim relates to the existence of ax-
iomatic quantum field theory is not something I will discuss here. 
11 Note that this approach to QFT that Weinberg works with - and that J will 
present - is that which is used by almost all working physicists and taught in almost 
all graduate physics courses; it is the version that Wallace calls 'naive', 'conventional' 
or 'Lagrangian' QFf (see Wallace [2006]; [2011]). It is not the much more rigorously 
formulated axiomatic version of QFf developed by Wightman and co-workers in the 
196Os. The latter has received precious little in the way of empirical support, and I 
will have nothing to say about it here; see nonetheless Fraser [2009] for a defence of 
it. 
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one must make recourse to essentially different methods when calculating 
amplitudes in hadron physics, and it is for this reason that hadronic calcu-
lations are notoriously difficult in spite of the mathematical elegance of the 
QeD Lagrangian. The situation with hadrons is far from hopeless, however, 
for although fully general non-perturbative techniques as present elude us, 
techniques do exist in some cases and developing them represents an active 
area of current research. But in any case, perturbative methods of solution 
serve us very well in a great many instances, and to begin this discussion 
of QFf and its implications for fundamentality I will discuss how it is that 
S-matrix elements are typically calculated by means of such methods. 
6.2.1 The Problem of Divergences 
The substance of my discussion of QFf and its metaphysical implications 
clearly has to start somewhere, and I will begin with an expression for the 
scattering amplitude.12 Let us restrict ourselves to considering neutral scalar 
fields of mass m. Writing S = 1 + iA, where A represents the non-trivial part 
of the scattering amplitude, and where the momenta ki pertain to the ingoing 
and Pi the outgoing particles, we have for m -+ n scattering 
(6.1) 
where Z¢ is a wave function renormalization and T is the time-ordering operator. 
The ~(x) are local field operators, which are expressed as a sum of creation 
and annihilation operators for particles at spacetime point x. This expression 
constitutes the LSZ reduction formula, which relates generic S-matrix elements 
to the time-ordered product of local field operators acting on the vacuum. 
The fields that appear in this correspond to the asymptotic states - that is, the 
fields we feed into and subsequently extract from scattering experiments -
where I have distinguished their coordinates by Xi and Yj above for ease of 
12In producing the following I used a number of texts, primarily Peskin and 
Schroeder [1995J, Ryder [1996J, Maggiore [2oo5J, Das [2008J and Weinberg 
[1995b]. Any of these may be consulted to derive this equation. 
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interpretation; from now on, I will relax this distinction by representing all 
spacetime coordinates by Xi. The empirical task that QfT poses is to compute 
this object, and I will deploy the path integral formalism to this end.13 In this 
formalism we can deduce 
where S = ! J d4xC is the action, D¢> represents the integration over all 
field configurations that are created from and ultimately end up back in the 
vacuum, and the ¢>(x) are such configurations. The time-ordered product on 
the illS of this equation is identified with, and defines, the 'n-point Green's 
function' Gn(Xl"'Xn ), 
In the case of the free theory, which for a scalar field ¢> corresponds to an 
action given by Sjree = ~ J d 4x({)P¢>fJ,..¢> - m 2¢>2), the integrals on the RHS 
correspond to Gaussian integrals that may be solved exactly. In solving for 
the n-point Green's function for the free theory (and also, as it turns out, 
for a completely generic theory) it is expedient to introduce the Feynman 
propagator. defined as the 2-point Green's function for the free action: 
(6.3) 
Roughly speaking, the Feynman propagator encodes the probability of a 
free particle created at Xl to propagate to X2. The reason this object is so 
useful in general is due to Wick's theorem, which relates a generic n-point 
Green's function for the free theory to sums of pairwise products of Feynman 
propagators.14 The time-ordered products we are generally interested in 
calculating, however, describe not free but interacting fields and we therefore 
13The alternative is to compute the n-point Green's function via the 'canonical 
quantization' approach, which proceeds purely in terms of Hamiltonian operators. 
However, I choose to represent the solution to the problem posed by (6.1) in terms 
of the path integral approach (where (6.2)' is the equation that connects the two 
formalisms) because this, unlike canonical quantization, produces a representation of 
interacting field theories that is in principle independent of perturbation theory (see 
Maggiore [2005], p219). Since the possibility of a field theory that is conceptually 
independent of perturbative solutions will be important for the final conclusions I 
will draw, I want to make clear at the beginning that a perturbation-independent 
notion of field theory in principle exists. 
14See Peskin and Schroeder [1995] pp88-90 for the proof by induction. 
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have to consider the corresponding interaction Lagrangians. To keep things 
as simple as possible, I will suppose that we are working with ~ theory 
featuring a spin-O scalar field interacting with itself, for which the Lagrangian 
iSIS 
(6.4) 
Here m is assumed to correspond to the mass of the field and A the (self-
interaction) coupling. Slotting this into the formula (6.2) gives us the RHS of 
the LSZ reduction formula (6.1), thus furnishing the relationship between the 
fj} scalar interaction and S-matrix elements that we are looking for. Since this 
expression relates (at least formally) a set of empirical results with a given 
set of fields and the interaction between them, we may say that a physical 
theory of a certain set of fields undergoing a certain interaction formulated 
within the QFf framework is defined by a Lagrangian, and thus by a law of 
nature. However, it is easy to see that when we slot this Lagrangian into (6.2), 
what we get on the RHS is a non-Gaussian integral that cannot be performed 
exactly on account of the interaction term. Nonetheless, if the coupling A 
attached to the interaction is sufficiently small, we can tackle the problem of 
computing the S-matrix elements by means of a perturbation series. In such a 
case, the powers of ¢4 that feature in the exponent can be 'pulled down' out 
of the exponential and into the enveloping integral, where we know how to 
treat them (via 'Wick contraction' methods). The problem of interacting fields 
- so long as the coupling is sufficiently weak - is now essentially reduced to 
computing a variant of the free theory (so that the Feynman propagator (6.3) 
is extremely useful in generic scattering processes even though it ostensibly 
describes 1 - 1 scattering only). If, on the other hand, the coupling is not 
small then in general we do not know what to hit this expression with -
though as mentioned, non-perturbative methods prove workable in some 
cases, and produce good results. 
On the assumption that the coupling is sufficiently small, we can expand the 
amplitudes into a series, where each of the terms in this series comes with its 
own Feynman diagram. The series as a whole is arranged by the number of 
intemalloops in these diagrams, so that the higher the order of perturbation 
lSThe ¢J4 is the simplest non-trivial QFf. The Higgs field is such a field, but since 
in reality the Higgs field is coupled to the electroweak force this Lagrangian does not 
fully describe it. 
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theory and hence the higher the power of the coupling involved, the higher 
the number of internal loops. If we take the trouble to work out the LHS of 
the LSZ reduction formula for ¢>4 theory by means of a perturbative expansion 
about ..\, then if it is 2 -t 2 scattering that is of interest we must compute 
the appropriate '4-point functions' (where the '4' refers to the number of 
external particles involved and hence the number of 'external legs' on the 
corresponding Feynman diagrams). 'These can be straightforwardly related 
via Wick's theorem to products of 2-point functions, and by following the 
analysis through we find the following contributions to the S-matrix. 
1. Zeroth order in .A. Here we find no contribution, which is as expected 
since there is no interaction and we are here considering the non-trivial 
part of the amplitude iA (d. equation (6.1)). 
2. First order in..\. Non-zero terms are obtained only when each of the 
four ¢>(Xi) are contracted with one of the four ¢>(x) coming from the 
interaction term. This produces an amplitude 
(PlP2liAlk~k~)) = i"\(21l")4t54(PI + P2 - kI - k2) 
and a 'tree' diagram shown in Figure 6.1(a). 
x Q 
(a) 'Iree (b) Loop (c) Tadpole 
Figure 6.1: Feynman diagrams for 4- and 2-point functions to one loop 
3. Second order in .A. In this case the RHS of the LSZ equation gives 
where P = PI + P2 and k is the undetermined loop momentum, corre-
sponding to the 'loop' diagram in Figure 6.1(b). But it seems that here 
we encounter a serious problem, for this expression is logarithmically 
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divergent. Since probability functions are, of course, necessarily finite, 
it is clear that something has gone badly wrong. 
Likewise, if we consider the amplitude in the two-point function (correspond-
ing to 1 -4 1 scattering), we again find divergent quantities at the one-loop 
level (which is order A in this case). This is associated with the 'tadpole' 
diagram shown in Figure 6.l(c), which contributes to the amplitude 
(6.6) 
But this term is quadratically divergent. 
It is in general the case that it is the internal loops that cause the divergence 
problems, such as these, in arbitrary QFf amplitudes. But since such loops -
and hence these divergences - arise in all interacting QFfs in four dimensions, 
not just <jJ4, it appears that there is a fundamental problem residing deep 
within the QFf formalism. QFf, after all, postulates that the dynamics is 
unitary, not that its amplitudes shoot up to infinity and become meaningless. 
Something must therefore be done to repair the situation if QFf is to be 
regarded as a self-consistent description of nature. 
6.2.2 Patching things up 
What has just been shown is that the amplitudes of our ¢J4 theory - at least 
as they are revealed to us perturbatively - contain infinite divergences, thus 
violating unitarity and apparently reducing the scattering matrix, and with 
it the theory's empirical predictions, to physical and mathematical nonsense. 
To restore our theory to some kind of sense, the solution is to subject it to 
the complicated process of renormalization. This may be thought of as a 
three-step process. Step 1 is that of regularizing the theory to isolate the 
divergences. This involves the temporary use of a regulator to render the 
problematic integrals finite in order that the details of their divergences 
structure can be scrutinized. Step 2 is revising the Lagrangian so as to cancel 
the divergences that would otherwise recur when the regulator is removed to 
infinity. And step 3 is to register any arbitrariness that has been introduced 
into the theory through the removal of divergences by producing a statement 
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of the invariance of the physics under variations of these changes to the 
Lagrangian. To give a flavour of what exactly this process involves, I will 
here simply summarize the essentials of what is described in full detail in the 
textbooks. 
Step 1: Regulate 
As noted, the essential purpose of the renormalization procedure is to remove 
the divergences that are endemic to any realistic quantum field theory. The 
first step is to move beyond the unhelpful statement that 'the integrals are 
infinite' and uncover exa<;tly the form that the divergences take. This requires 
the use of a regulator, which temporarily renders the integrals finite. The two 
techniques most often discussed that can be deployed to this end are hard 
cut-off and dimensional regularization. The first of these is by far the most 
intuitive and simply consists of imposing a finite upper bound on the range 
of integration. This method, however. suffers the disadvantage of violating 
Lorentz (and other) symmetries and is almost never used in practice. Much 
more popular is the more abstract dimensional regularization method, which 
exploits the fact that the divergence of the integrals such as (6.5) and (6.6) is 
sensitive to the number of spacetime dimensions over which the integration 
is performed. By treating this number as a free parameter and analytically 
continuing away from 4 spacetime dimensions to 4 - f, the structure of 
the divergences in the limit is revealed. Either of these methods allows 
the integrals to be temporarily well-behaved, so that what must be done to 
temper them in the infinite-momentum limit can be deduced. Quantities in 
the regulated theory will in general be dependent on (i.e. functions of) the 
regulator. 
Step 2: Revise the Lagrangian 
A study of the divergence structure of the problematic integrals revealed via 
the regularization procedure shows that there are two ways of removing these 
divergences. The first of these is Feynman's original procedure, developed for 
QED, of reparameterizing the constants. In this approach, we drop the original 
assumption that the mass(es) and coupling(s) that appear in the original 
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Lagrangian represent finite, measureable quantities, and replace it with the 
idea that they are in fact infinite quantities. These quantities are taken to 
correspond to properties of 'bare' particles - that is, particles considered in 
the absence of any interaction (including self-interaction). But since such 
interactions are always present, these are highly abstracted quantities that -
from an empirical point of view at least - we are free to redefine as we see 
fit. By taking these quantitites to be functions of the regulator, it can then be 
shown that we can do so in such a way that the divergences of the integrals 
are absorbed into the redefined parameters, producing expressions for the 
amplitudes that are finite (to this one-loop order) and independent of the 
regulator. 16 On the other hand, and more commonly in practice, we may 
choose to infer from the divergences not that the parameters that feature in 
the original Lagrangian are unphysical, infinite quantities, but rather that this 
Lagrangian misrepresents the structure of the interactions that are in play. As 
such, we can add to the Lagrangian regulator-dependent 'counterterms' whose 
forms are carefully chosen so that the divergences, and also the regulator 
dependence, disappear in the limit. In the case of the two-point function 
for </14 theory, for example, we have to add a term of the form c2¢2, with C2 
constant. Similarly in the case of the four-point function, a term of the form 
C4¢4 must be added.17 Whatever new constants are added, however, their 
values cannot be deduced from the theory. We must therefore determine them 
via experiment. 
Register the Arbitrariness 
As a result of the procedure outlined above, the amplitudes for ¢4 theory at 
one-loop level - at least insofar as we are interested in 2 -+ 2 and 1 -+ 1 
scattering only - can be restored to health. However, attending to the de-
tails of how this procedure is actually implemented makes clear that certain 
arbitrary choices must inevitably be made if we are to define the renormal-
ized quantities - choices which amount to a choice of the 'renormalization 
161n fact, this method only works in the case of so-called 'renormalizable' theories 
such as ¢4: otherwise the method of counterterms must be used. More on this below. 
17See e.g. Maggiore [2005], section 5.6 
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scale'.18 Since the physics cannot vary with the choices that we make - just 
as it cannot depend on what coordinate system we choose in which to write 
down the equations - we then demand that the S-matrix, which represents 
all the observable quantities associated with the theory, is invariant under 
the transformations between each possible reparameterization. Such transfor-
mations form the renormalization group. Demanding this invariance under 
reparameterizations gives rise to the Callen-Symanzik equation, which ex-
presses the invariance of the renormalized vertex functions (and hence of 
the S-matrix) under variations of the scale relating different renormalization 
prescriptions. I9 In this equation, the theory's .B-function plays a role, which 
for a singly-coupled theory is defined by 
t a~t) = .B(>', t). (6.7) 
This function thus describes how the coupling>. varies as the renormalization 
scale is ramped up by a factor t. For a theory with more than one coupling, 
the .B-function for the ith coupling will in general be a function of all the 
couplings in the theory; so that we have 
(6.8) 
It can be easily shown, moreover, that these equations can be interpreted to 
describe not just how the couplings change as the renormalization scale is 
changed, but also as the interaction energy is ramped up. As such, they po-
tentially contain a great deal of information about the high-energy behaviour 
of the theory. This will be important later on. 
l8For example, when defining the renormalized quantities in the dimensional 
regularization scheme, certain finite parts mayor may not be subtracted in addition 
to the divergent pole part in f (thus defining the minimal subtraction scheme MS 
and the alternative MS). As Collins puts it, 'The infinite parts of the counterterms 
are determined by the requirement that they cancel the divergences, but the finite 
part is not so determined. In fact, the partition of a bare coupling into the sum of 
a finite renormalized coupling gR and a singular counterterm 8g is arbitrary. One 
can parameterize a theory by transforming a finite amount from gR to 8g without 
changing the physics' (Collins [1984] p2). The renormalizaton group equations are 
designed to express the invariance of the predictions of this theory under variations 
in these prescriptions. 
19See e.g. Ryder [1996], p325. 
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For now, however, the process just described is how the ¢4 theory of 1 ........ 1 
and 2 ........ 2 scattering is patched up to one-loop order in perturbation theory, 
and the same sort of procedure applies to any quantum field theory (to one 
loop). However, since going up order by order in the perturbation series is 
equivalent to going up in the number of loops, there are in principle infinitely 
many loops to consider, and also infinitely many m ........ n reactions that have 
a slot in the S-matrix. There should therefore be a nagging suspicion at this 
point that the steps just described represent only the tip of the iceberg of 
the work that we have to do if we want to restore the ¢>4 theory to sense _ 
not just a few elements of its S-matrix to some low order of perturbation 
theory. Whether that worry is justified is what I will now discuss, and that will 
lead straight into the principle that lies at the heart of QFI"s fundamentality 
dialectic. 
6.3 The Renormalizability Principle: A New Prin-
ciple of Theory Assessment 
The worry that the work so far done is nowhere near enough to patch up ¢>4 
theory is certainly a legitimate one. The first concern we should have is that, 
since we have repaired only the one-loop level of these two contributions 
to the amplitude (i.e. the 2- and 4-point Green's functions), we have only 
patched up each amplitude to a certain Oow) order of perturbation theory, 
and that this will not itself suffice. After all, each new term in the perturbation 
series brings with it a new loop, and it is the loops that are at the root of 
all the problems. It is thus reasonable to suspect that the terms of the series 
will diverge at every order, and thus that the theory cannot be rendered 
self-consistent without an infinite amount of work. The second worry is that, 
even if it turns out that we do have to do a finite amount of work in patching 
up the diagrams of the 2- and 4-point functions, it may be that each n-point 
function for n > 4 will need to be patched up separately. If that were the 
case, then for each amplitude we will need to add a new counterterm with 
a new parameter to be matched to experiment. But if that were the case it 
would apparently be disastrous, since each of these terms brings in its wake 
a new (and undetermined) constant. Since we cannot deduce quantitative 
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predictions from a theory until its parameters are set, it seems that we would 
again have to do an infinite amount of work before we were able to use the 
theory to make any testable predictions. As such, even if Nature were to turn 
out to be described by such a theory, it seems that we would never be in a 
position to believe it. 
Ascertaining which diagrams in an expansion of the amplitude need to be 
separately renormalized is therefore of paramount importance in assessing any 
QFI'. But in spite of the complex and confusing nature of the renormalization 
procedure, the recipe for discovering which diagrams can be cured by curing 
lower-order diagrams turns out to be mercifully simple. It can be deduced very 
easily that, if the dimension of ~e spacetime is 4, then if the mass dimension 
of the coupling associated with an interaction is non-negative then there is 
an upper bound on the number of processes that can produce independent 
divergences.2o To see this, note that the superficial degree of divergence in four 
dimensions is defined as 
D == (N - 4)V + 4 - n, (6.9) 
where N is the power of the coupling in ).¢N, V is the number of vertices in a 
diagram and n is the number of external legs (i.e. the number of asymptotic 
states involved in the process).21 The point of this expression is, as the 
name suggests, to codify the degree of divergence associated with a given 
Feynman diagram (and hence its contribution to the amplitude): whenever 
this expression is positive the integral will be divergent, and the more positive 
it is, the greater the divergence. It can be immediately inferred from this 
formula that the degree of divergence for any n-point function will increase 
with the number of vertices (and hence loops) if N > 4, and that a divergence 
will afflict every n-point function eventually. One can also see that the greater 
the number of external particles involved, and thus the higher the n, the 
20See Weinberg [199Sb). Section 12.1 for a description of how to compute the 
mass dimension of any coupling from its free Lagrangian. But basically the idea is 
just that if a coupling has dimensions of liMN for some N, then it is said to have 
negative mass dimension. 
21See Maggiore [2005] pl40 for an intuitive explanation of why this formula 
holds. As the name 'superficial' suggests, the superficial degree of divergence is 
not necessarily all there is to know about the contribution of an arbitrary Feynman 
diagram - notably in gauge theories. I will ignore these complications here, but see 
Das [2008], p721 for more details. 
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higher the order in perturbation theory it will be that a new divergence 
emerges. Since the action - which contains a d:'x term - is required to be 
dimensionless, this is equivalent to saying that the divergence of any n-point 
function will increase as we go up through perturbation theory (and hence the 
number of vertices involved) if the mass dimension of the coupling is strictly 
less than zero. We thus say that interactions with negative mass dimension 
are nonrenormalizable, because new corrections to the parameters have to be 
made every time we go up an order in the perturbative expansion. The task 
of removing the associated theory's divergences therefore seems to require an 
infinite amount of work. 
On the other hand, if N < 4 and thus if the coupling has a positive mass 
dimension, it may be seen that after some n there will be no new divergences 
in the n-point functions, and for m < n, only finitely many terms in the 
pertUrbation series will need to be attended to. Finally, if N = 4 and hence 
the coupling has zero mass dimension, only the 2-,3-, and 4-point functions 
will need to be patched up, and the degree of divergence will moreover be 
independent of the number of vertices and hence the order of pertUrbation 
theory. 22 As such, we call interactions that conform to either of these latter two 
conditions renormalizable. Otherwise, they are said to be nonrenormalizable. 
These observations can in fact be generalized outside of scalar field theory, 
and we can say quite generally that 
terms in the Lagrangian whose couplings have either a positive mass 
dimension or are dimensionless are renormalizable. Terms with 
negative mass dimension are nonrenormalizable. 23 
Ukewise, theories in which all interactions are renormalizable are also said to 
be renormalizable. In such theories, there are only a finite number of diver-
gences that need to be patched up and hence a finite number of counterterms . 
added, or parameters redefined, to restore them to some kind of sense. 
With all that in place, it is now easy to see that we have done all the work we 
need to do to patch up our 4J4 theory. Here, N = 4, and we have already dealt 
with the 2- and 4-point functions; the 3-point function turns out to be forbid-
22Couplings with positive mass dimension are often called 'super-renormalizable', 
but such couplings tum out to be pathological in QFf (see I.e Bellae [1992], p204). 
23Maggiore [2005], pl40. 
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den on spacetime symmetry grounds. This feature that only a finite number 
of divergences need to be repaired in order to repair the full perturbative 
expansion is the definitive feature of renormalizable theories. 
Nonrenormalizable theories, on the other hand, naturally lack this feature: 
in these cases qualitatively new divergences will show up as we consider 
diagrams with more and more external legs, at some order of perturbation 
theory at least. But it is crucial to be clear that the divergences produced in 
nonrenormalizable theories can also be cancelled, in principle, by the addition 
of counterterms, just as the divergences that appear in renormalizable theories 
can. The difference consists in the fact that infinitely many counterterms need 
to be added in the case of nonren.ormalizable theories. 24 It can indeed 
be shown that for the renormalization process to work in the case of such 
theories, then barring special cancellations it is essential that every possible 
interaction term consistent with the symmetries 0/ the theory is included. It is 
also easy to deduce that, for any given set of fields and any given symmetry, 
there are infinitely many terms containing those fields that respect that 
symmetry.25 
Given, then, that the divergences in nonrenormalizable theories can in princi-
ple be removed, but only by the addition of infinitely many new terms, each 
of which must be matched to experiment, the perceived problem with such 
theories is not so much their divergence as their lack o/predictive power.26 After 
all, the full renormalized Lagrangians for these theories, if they are to be 
regarded as internally consistent, must contain an infinite number of terms 
each of which contains a constant to be matched to experiment - something 
that seems to make it impossible in practice to ever extract any predictions 
from such theories. And since it is of course primarily predictive power that 
separates physics from purely metaphysical speculation about the structure 
of reality, predictivity is a non-negotiable property of acceptable physical 
theories. Thus it seems that nonrenormalizable theories are wholly unac-
ceptable as theories of physics - and thus also unacceptable as candidates of 
theories that could be used to deny fundamentality on naturalistic grounds. 
As Schweber puts the matter, 
24Weinberg [1995b], p506; see also Lepage [1989]. 
25More on all this may be found in Weinberg [1995b], Chapter 12. 
26Weinberg [1995b], p500. 
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since the aim of foundational physics is to formulate theories with 
considerable predictive power, 'fundamental laws' must contain 
only a finite number of parameters. Only renormalizable theories 
are consistent with this requirement. 27 
It was for these reasons that it was laid down as a condition on quantum 
field theories that they could feature only renormalizable terms - that is, 
terms whose couplings have non-negative mass dimension. This constraint 
on theories was denoted the renormalizability principle (,RP'). Since it turns 
out (and as is easily shown) that, for any given set of fields and any given 
symmetry, there are very few interaction types that are renormalizable -
indeed sometimes none at all - but always infinitely many that are not, to 
require that a theory is renormalizable is to place an extremely stringent 
constraint on it.28 A famous restriction that the RP placed on QED was its 
forbidding of the presence of the Pauli tenn that would otherwise have been 
permitted if only Lorentz and U(1) gauge invariance were required. The 
presence of this term would have made the magnetic moment of the electron 
an adjustable parameter, but its exclusion meant that this property was 
precisely determined - which in tum facilitated one of the most impressive 
predictions ever produced by science.29 While it was already taken as read 
that conformance with the RP was necessary for theories to even qualify as 
empirical, this success was viewed as a compelling empiricalllalidation of the 
fact of that conformance. 30 
Through these considerations, the RP was elevated to fundamental status in 
particle physics. Indeed, it was sometimes even presented as being on a par 
with symmetry principles. For example, speaking in 1979 and thus arguably 
at the zenith of the Standard Model, Weinberg declared that 
To a remarkable degree, our present detailed theories of elemen-
tary particle interactions can be understood deductively, as conse-
quences of symmetry principles and of the principle of renormaliz-
ability which is invoked to deal with the infinities.31 
27Schweber [1993], p147. 
28Weinberg [199Sb], pS17. 
29See ibid. and references therein. 
3OIbid. 
31Weinberg [1980a], pSIS. 
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Insofar as it was regarded to be of similar standing to symmetry principles with 
respect to its deductive role, the RP had a claim to being not just a sine qua non 
of any empirical theory of quantum relativistic regimes, but as a fundamental 
principle of nature.32 In spite of the RP's seemingly non-negotiable character, 
however, not all physicists were comfortable with presenting things in this 
way. Perhaps the principal reason why physicists' were so suspicious of 
the renormalizability principle was because the renormalization procedure 
was also regarded with a great deal of suspicion. The latter was in fact 
predominandy viewed as an ad hoc act of mathematical hocus-pocus and 
something of an embarrassment until at least the 1980s - even by the pioneers 
of renormalization theory themselves.33 But since the RP only has meaning 
against the backdrop of this procedure; many physicists did not share the 
confidence that Weinberg apparendy voiced regarding its foundational status. 
Somewhat ironically, however, it was in fact the eventual tempering of the 
worries about the renormalization procedure that contributed to the eventual 
displacement of the RP as a mandatory constraint on theories. This in turn 
opened the door to the possibility that QFI' might contain radically anti-
fundamentalist implications, as I will now begin to try to explain. 
6.4 Disaffection with the Renormalizability Prin-
ciple 
Arguably the principal reason that the renormalization procedure was re-
garded with such scepticism is that the divergences in QFI' seem to indicate 
something fundamentally wrong in the foundations of the theory. While 
it seems as though the renormalization process restores the amplitudes to 
some kind of sense, it is hard to not get the feeling that to simply doctor 
the infinite quantities by hand, as opposed to prevent them arising in the 
32As Zinn-Justin puts it, 'Demanding that Fundamental Interactions should be 
described by renormalizable Quantum Field Theories had been the guiding principle 
for the construction of the Standard Model. From the success of the program it could 
have been inferred that the principle of renonnalizabiIity was a new law of nature.' 
([1998], p9). 
33See for example Dirac [1969], [1987] and [1978], p36; Feynman [1965]; also 
references to Tomonaga and Schwinger in Cao [1998], Chapter 7. 
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first place, is to merely put a plaster on the problem. This is what Feynman 
had in mind when he spoke of the problems in QFf being 'swept under the 
rug' by his procedure.34 A second and related source of distrust with the 
process was that, even while the above process of subtracting out infinities 
seems at least to work, it remained deeply un intuitive that it should in fact 
do so. ~uring the renormalization process, we tune the couplings and / or 
add counterterms in such a way as that the divergences disappear in the limit. 
In the case of renormalizable theories, the contribution of the high-energy 
processes can be modelled either in terms of a modification of the theory's 
original parameters or the addition of new terms with the same form as the 
original terms.35 But since the high-energy processes presumably make the 
most important contributions to the amplitude, it is very counter-intuitive 
that their contribution could be modelled in such a simple way. As Peskin and 
Schroeder put it, 
the cancellation of ultraviolet divergences is essential if a theory 
is to yield quantitative physical predictions. But, at a deep level, 
the fact that high-momentum virtual quanta can have so little 
effect on a theory is quite surprising ... It is not easy to understand 
how the quantum flunctuations associated with extremely short 
distances can be so innocuous as to affect a theory only through 
the values of a few of its parameters.36 
It therefore appears that, in section of the physics community, one could find 
both embarrassment about the superficial-looking nature of the renormaliza-
tion procedure and bewilderment as to why it should even work at all.37 But 
since the significance of the RP was framed entirely in terms of this process, 
many physicists rightly felt uncomfortable about insisting on renormalizability 
as a fundamental constraint on laws. While it was regarded as (in some sense) 
a priori necessary that any empirically acceptable physical theory had to COD-
34Peynman op. cit. 
351n the case of nonrenormalizable theories, infinitely many terms must be added, 
the vast majority of which will not have the same form as the originals. 
36Peskin and Schroeder [1995], p19. 
37There were other reasons to be puzzled about the significance of the renormal-
izability principle in the wake of 'beyond the Standard Model' speculations, which 
were encouraged by the SueS) theory of Georgi, Glashow and Weinberg, and also 
the fact that a putative quantum theory of gravity would never be renormalizable. 
But I will not discuss these here. 
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form to the RP, not much could be offered by way of physical grounds for 
why any such theory should infact be expected to conform. One high-energy 
physicist, John Donoghue, registers his misgivings about imposing satisfaction 
of the RP in the pedagogical context as follows. 
When we teach a course in quantum field theory, we typically give 
the following rules for building and applying a theory: 
(1) Construct an action which is invariant under the desired 
symmetries. In the archetypical case of QED, the Lagrange 
density must be a Lorentz scalar, invariant under U(1) gauge 
invariance. 
(2) Keep only renormalizable interactions. This restricts the 
Lagrangian to terms of canonical dimension less than or 
equal to four. 38 In the QED example, one drops Lorentz and 
gauge invariant terms such as FI-'IIFI-'1I2, 1jjaf.tIl'!jJFf.tv' 
(3) Quantize the theory and calculate scattering processes. When 
using perturbation theory, this consists of the calculation of 
tree and loop diagrams. 
(4) Determine the physical parameters from experiment and 
express the predictions in terms of the physical parameters. 
One must measure the charge and masses of the theory, and 
the predictions of QED amount to relations between many 
experiments, all parameterized in terms of the physical scale 
(e,m). 
Of these ingredients, #1, 3, 4 seem to be logically necessary, and 
one cannot imagine modifying these steps. However the issue of 
renormalizability is less obvious, and almost seems to be inserted 
more for the convenience of the physicist doing the calculation.39 
This expression of the feeling that the RP lacks the physical intuitiveness of 
the other principles governing the construction of laws in QFT, and instead 
looks rather 'inserted' without a clear physical mandate, may be found echoed 
38That is to say, in four space dimensions, to terms whose couplings have non-
negative mass dimension. 
39Donoghue [1991], p3. 
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elsewhere.4O In lieu of any compelling physical story about what was going 
on in the renormalization process, this perceived lack of foundation could 
be viewed simply as consequence of the poor understanding of that which 
motivated the principle in the first place. But as things were to tum out, even 
when some insight was given into the physical nature of that process, it failed 
to simultaneously provide a rationale for insisting on the RP as a mandatory 
constraint on theories. This played a major part in instigating a fundamental 
re-assessment of the role of the renormalizability principle. 
6.5 Dispensing with the Renormalizability Prin-
ciple 
The work of the condensed matter physicist Kenneth Wilson is widely (though 
not universally) taken to at last have given a coherent physical explanation 
of what is going on in the process of renormalization, beyond a mysterious 
'cancellation of infinities'. 41 What Wilson realized was that if we are to 
understand what is going on in in the process of renormalization, we have 
to explain why the high-energy contributions of the theory can be modelled 
as they are in that process. In order to explain that, we need to understand 
the effects that the short-distance degrees of freedom have on the interaction 
amplitudes (and other observable quantities). Wilson's idea was to study 
the contribution of these high-energy flunctuations appearing in the relevant 
integrals by directly integrating out the short-distance degrees of freedom, so 
<!OSee e.g. Peskin and Schroeder [1995], p402, 406, and 81; also Lepage [1989], 
pI, and Zinn-Justin [1998], p9. 
41 An approachable introduction to Wilson's work may be found in Wilson [1983] 
and [1979]. Huggett and Weingard [1995] and Huggett [2002] both argue that 
Wilson's work lays to rest fears about the legitimacy of renormalization; Fraser [2009], 
p55l, on the other hand, expresses doubt that this is in fact the case. Indeed, Fraser 
[unpublished] is sceptical that Wilson's work can legimately be transplated from its 
original context into high-energy QFfs in order to explain renormalization in the 
latter at all, since Wilson's analysis of high-energy contributions is always formulated 
relative to a finite cut-off which destroys Lorentz invariance (on which more anon). 
All that I rely on for present purposes, however, is that Wilson's work has some 
non-trivial contribution to make to the explication of the renormalization procedure, 
and that that contribution invited a positive re-assessment of nonrenormalizable 
theories. 
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that the influence of high-energy field modes on the predictions of the theory 
could be studied by comparing the results with the original integrals.42 In 
this picture, 'high' is defined relative to an arbitrarily high but nonetheless 
finite hard momentum cut-off; this cut-off is then lowered, and what we are 
comparing in this analysis is therefore the effect of integrating out the field 
states between two finite cut-offs. What he found was that this removal of 
high-energy states could be compensated for, at (relatively) low energies, 
by a modification of the parameters in the original action and the addition 
of new terms in the low-energy fields - and all in such a way as to remove 
the dependence on the cut-off in all observable quantities. Thus he showed, 
amongst other things, that high-energy effects could to a good approximation 
be 'mocked-up' at low energies by the modification of parameters, and the 
addition of new local interactions amongst the low-energy fields.43 
These effects that Wilson demonstrated to follow from integrating out 'shells' 
of high-momentum field space is widely taken to give physical insight into 
why the contribution of (relatively) high-energy states can be compensated 
for in the renormalization procedure by a change in the parameters of the 
pre-existing interactions and / or the addition of new interaction terms, 
since it is precisely these effects that were shown to accompany changes 
in the available energy space.44 In this way, a partial explanation of the 
change in QFT Lagrangians as the regulator is removed was regarded, by 
swathes of the physics community, as having been provided at last.4s However, 
the resultant Wilson action' featuring only the low energy modes contains, 
strictly speaking, an infinite string of new local interactions featuring the 
low-energy fields in which every term consistent with the symmetries of the 
theory eventually appears.46 A$ discussed in Section 3, this implies that every 
nonrenormalizable as well as renormalizable term is ultimately included in 
the action generated. Now, in the renormalization story that I told above. it 
was only in the case of so-called nonrenormalizable theories that all these 
infinitely-many terms must be included as counterterms.47 It follows that 
42Cf. Peskin and Schroeder [1995], p394. 
43For proof of the locality of these tenns, see Collins [1984], p125. 
44Burgess [2007], p22-3. 
45See for example Wallace [2006]; Rivasseau [2002]; Peskin and Schroeder [1995], 
Chapter 12; and Huggett and Weingard [1996] (see also references on page 5163). 
46See, e.g. Peskin and Schroeder [19951 p399, Weinberg [1995b], Section 12.4. 
471n fact, when stated in the language of counterterms, a theory is said to be 
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if we take the introduction of terms through Wilson's procedure to explain 
what is going on in the renormalization process, and thus to explain the 
appearance of counterterms in modelling high-energy effects, then it seems 
that we cannot regard the original Lagrangian we are in the process of 
renormalizing to contain only renormalizable terms. But the paradox implicit 
in that, of course, is that we used facts about the renormalization process 
to disqualify Lagrangians containing nonrenormalizable interactions from 
serving as acceptable physical theories in the first place. How, then, can we 
regard WIlson's insights as furnishing a physically acceptable story of what is 
going on in renormalization?48 
The way out of this seeming paradox begins with the realization that the 
empirical argument that I - and indeed the physics community in the 1960s 
and 70s - put forward in favour of the RP in fact yields too strong a conclusion, 
for it is not the case that nonrenormalizable theories necessarily lack predictive 
power. The reason for this turns out to be disarmingly simple, since one can 
renormalizable iff the counterterms are of the same form as those appearing in the 
original Lagrangian; see Das [2008] p.682. (There are some exceptions to this 
rule, however: see Le Bellac [1992], p213. In such cases, we say that the theory is 
regarded as renormalizable if the number of counterterms is finite. But I ignore such 
complications for now.) 
480ne may find statements in the literature to the effect that Wilson's insights 
make it 'irresistable' to regard aU QITs as inherently nonrenormalizable (see e.g. 
Burgess [2007], p22). But it seems that any such argument has yet to be rigorously 
made out. For one thing, the above results concern field contributions evaluated 
between two finite cut-offs. But as we will see, finite cut-offs in energy space are 
associated with merely effective, hence nonrenormalizable, field theories. Therefore 
to unqualifiedly claim that the above analysis 'explains' renormalization seems to 
presuppose that we are dealing with nonrenormalizable theories, and thus cannot be 
used to argue that QITs are universally nonrenormalizable. (Mer all, to give a full 
explanation of the renormalization procedure in the case of fundamental- hence as 
we will see renormalizable - theories, we must look at the contributions in the infinite 
energy limit.) Furthermore, as we will see, there are physicists who are motivated 
by Wilson's work but also regard the existence of a fundamental renormalizable 
theory as a coherent possibility, which should be enough to convey that this analysis 
does notforce upon us the idea that all QITs are nonrenormalizable (regardless of 
how nice that may tum out to be for the naturalistic anti-fundamentalist). I in any 
case do not need Wilson's analysis to foist upon us any such belief; all I will require 
for my purposes is that (i) his analysis gives at least some physical insight into the 
renormalization procedure (since the contributions between two finite cut-offs are 
clearly at least relevant to the issue), but that (li) those insights do not after all 
furnish us with a physical rationale for insisting on the RP, as might initially have 
been hoped. 
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in fact view it as a consequence of some straightforward dimensional analysis 
applied to nonrenormalizable theories. Recall that the RP was introduced 
to rule out theories that produce independent divergences at every order. 
Recall too that the divergences in nonrenormalizable theories are just as 
remediable as those in renormalizable ones if - but only if - infinitely many 
new countertenns are added to mop them up. Since each such tenn is 
accompanied by a coupling that needs to be fitted to experiment, the apparent 
problem with such theories is therefore their predictive power, and not their 
divergences per se. Now, to make things concrete, suppose that an interaction 
coupling has negative mass dimension - so that it has the dimensions ~ say, 
as the cp6 theory's coupling would - and thus is classified as nonrenormalizable. 
We can then write a perturbative expansion for the m-point function to order 
(~)n as 
W E4 E2n) 
Am(E) = A~(E) (1 + il M2 + h M4 + ... + in M2n + ... , (6.10) 
where the ii are dimensionless contributions that encode the Peynman dia-
gram structure and E is the interaction energy.49 As mentioned in Section 3, 
the hallmark of a nonrenonnalizable theory is that the amplitudes for any 
m - that is, for reactions involving m external particles - are not adequately 
dealt with by patching up the amplitudes for m' < m, since a new divergence 
at some order of perturbation theory is guaranteed to appear in the m-point 
function. Because of the new divergence at that order, call it n', a new in-
teraction term with a new undetermined coupling d,., must be added to the 
Lagrangian to mop up the divergence in inl. This, of course, is the source for 
the loss of predictivity associated with nonrenonnalizable theories that the 
RP was introduced to avoid. 
However, it is clear by inspection that if we are in a low-energy regime in 
which E < < M, then this loss of predictivity on the c'n is in fact completely 
irrelevant, because it will always appear in observables multiplied by the 
very small quantity (E / M)2n .50 In this sense, nonrenonnalizable theories at 
sufficiently low energies can be used exactly as renonnalizable ones, since 
(i) only finitely many of the problematic terms containing the undetermined 
49See Maggiore [2005], pp.144-45. 
5°1 am glossing over some subtleties in the choice of regularization scheme here; 
see Kaplan [1995], pp30-31. 
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parameters in any m-point function need to be considered (since, as just 
discussed, they become ever more vanishingly small as we increase the order 
of perturbation theory), and (li) as we increase m, the new divergences appear 
ever higher up in the perturbation series, so that the divergences there need 
not be taken into account either (for essentially the same reason). Therefore 
in such low-energy regimes, if we want to make predictions within a given 
accuracy - as we inevitably do - then just as in the case of renonnalizable 
theories, we need only measure a finite number of parameters in order to 
generate real predictions. Thus nonrenormalizable theories, if confined to low 
energies, can be as predictive as renormalizable theories - and this is so in 
spite of the fact that self-consistency requires that they contain infinitely many 
constants. S1 
The work of Wilson therefore invited a re-appraisal of nonrenormalizable 
theories, and simple dimensional considerations revealed that such theories 
could after all be regarded as empirical despite their failure to satify the RP. 
However, that principle can only be dispensed with as a constraint on theories 
if the apparent empirical fruitfulness - a fruitfulness seemingly testified to in 
the case of the Pauli term - of demanding its satisfaction can be accounted 
for. But it is immediately obvious that the same simple dimensional analysis 
of (6.10) again contains the seeds of an anwer. To quote Weinberg once 
again, 
if renormalizability is not a fundamental principle, then how do 
we explain the success of renonnalizable theories like quantum 
electrodynamics and the standard model? ... The success of theo-
ries of the electroweak and strong interactions shows only that M 
[the mass scale associated with an interaction] is very much larger 
than the energy scale at which these theories have been tested. 52 
In other words, the significance of renormalizability and its origins is simply 
that low-energy approximations to arbitrarily high-energy dynamics can be 
51Given that nonrenormalizable theories had been on the table since Fermi's work 
on the weak interaction in the 1930s, and it was not until the late 1970s that this 
was pointed out, it is fair to say that this realization came conspicuously late (see 
Weinberg [l997b], p42). In retrospect, it seems almost baffling that such a simple 
point could have been missed for so long (Rothstein [2004], p6). Nonetheless, for 
present purposes this need not be regarded as anything more than a curiosity. 
52Weinberg [l99Sb], pS19. 
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fonnulated in terms of renonnalizable interactions, since the nonrenonnaliz-
able interactions would be suppressed by powers of 1/ M, and thus in such a 
way that we can expect the theory to look renonnalizable. 
In light of this very simple observation, the supposed triumphs of the renor-
malizability principle may be seen to be quite overstated. In may be shown, 
for example, that the famed prediction of the magnetic moment of the elec-
tron in QED to 12 places of decimal entails only that the energy scale at which 
new interactions might come into play and render this parameter adjustable 
must be larger than 1012eV.53 Why the RP might nonetheless have been a 
fruitful heuristic can also be explained from this new point of view, however, 
since imposing it encourages us to take into account o~y those interactions 
that are not highly supressed at accessible energies. 54 
For all these reasons, satisfaction of the RP was no longer seen as sine qua 
non of workable field theories. As a result, Weinberg's earlier statement to the 
effect that the principle was of fundamental significance, needed alongside 
symmetry principles in order to explain the Standard Model's success, seemed 
to constitute an overstatement. Whether there are nonetheless grounds for 
considering the RP to be a fundamental principle of nature is something that 
I will discuss shortly. For now, however, a little more detail on the properties 
of nonrenormalizable theories, and their relationship to fundamentality, is 
required. 
6.6 The Concept of a Merely 'Effective' Field The-
ory 
As I have just argued, it was simple dimensional considerations that played 
a pivotal role in both casting doubt on the RP as a fundamental principle of 
53See Lepage [1989]. p13; also Weinberg [1995b] p520. 
54As Burgess ([2007], p34) puts it: 'RenormaIizable theories represent the special 
case for which it suffices to work to only zeroth order in the ratio pi M. This can be 
thought of as the reason why renormaIizable theories play such an important role 
in physics.' Note that this does not mean that we can only detect renormalizable 
interactions, since symmetry breaking and other 'exotic' effects can make certain 
otherwise highly suppressed processes detectable. See e.g. Weinberg [1980b]. 
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nature and explaining its practical usefulness. However, those same dimen-
sional considerations that make clear that nonrenormalizable theories are 
workable at relatively low energy also make clear that they inevitably lose 
all predictive power at the order of the mass scale M that characterizes its 
leading coupling (cf. equation (6.10)), as then we are into the regime in 
which the features that initially caused the aversion to nonrenormalizable 
theories begin to surface again. Furthermore, 'were we to take the expan-
sions literally' when the energy exceeds that value, 'the results for S-matrix 
elements would violate unitarity bounds' demanded by quantum mechanics, 
since the terms now grow successively (and rapidly) larger. 55 To put things a 
little more precisely, there seem to be just two possibilities for what happens 
at such energies. One is the seemingly magic circumstance that the 'growing 
strength of the effects of the nonrenormalizable interactions somehow satu-
rates, avoiding any conflict with Unitarity'. 56 The other is that unitarity, and 
hence the consistency of the theory as a description of quantum systems, does 
indeed break down at the scale M, signifying that 'new physics of some sort 
enters' at that scale. 57 
The first possibility just mentioned is expressed by saying that the theory is 
'asymptotically safe'. That such a conspiracy of couplings is possible might 
initially strike one as implausible, and indeed there are reasons to expect it to 
be an extremely rare property of theories. While I will have at least something 
more to say on it towards the end, for now I will put this possibility to one 
side. The reason I do this is that the entire discussion of renormalizable and 
effective quantum field theories that I have engaged in so far has assumed 
perturbative analysis. For example, these two classes of theories have been 
defined in terms of the dimension of their couplings via the superficial degree 
of divergence; but the latter was computed via considerations based on the 
structure of Feynman diagrams, which are in tum expressive of the structure 
of the terms that appear in a perturbative expansion. But the relevance of 
this to the phenomenon of asymptotic safety is that, insofar as we conceive of 
QFT in perturbative terms, and for reasons that will be gestured at in Section 
10, renormalizability is a necessary condition of asymptotic safety. I therefore 
cannot discuss the possibility of the asymptotic safety of a nonrenonnalizable 
55 Weinberg [1995b], p523. 
S6See Weinberg [1995b], p523, footnote 15. 
57Weinberg [l995b], p523. 
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theory without essentially abandoning everything I have presented so far. 
Moreover, while there are at present some QFTs (such as lattice QeD) that 
are amenable, at least to an impressive degree, to workable non-perturbative 
techniques, there is no known non-perturbative method that works for QFTs in 
general - making an appropriately general discussion of non-perturbative QFT 
all but impossible at this time. 58 This remainder of this chapter will therefore 
primarily investigate the fundamentality implications of QFT through the 
lens of perturbation theory; I will, however, consider the effect of lifting the 
perturbative assumption at the end of the chapter. 
For now, therefore, I focus just on the second possibility, namely that the 
consistency of effective theories does indeed break down at some high but 
nonetheless finite energy scale. Since such theories cannot be regarded as 
fundamental theories, owing to their breakdown at some high but finite 
energy, nonrenormalizable theories are thus alternatively denoted effective 
field theories ('EFTs'). They are 'field theories' in that one employs the full 
field-theoretic formalism in constructing them, but 'effective' betokens the 
fact that they do the duty for a more fundamental theory that must take 
over when the energy gets high enough - where 'high enough' is indicated by 
the mass scale associated with the nonrenormalizable couplings that they by 
definition contain. 59 
These EFTs can with justification be regarded as highly novel entrants into 
physics. The reason for this is that - modulo the above disclaimer regarding 
asymptotic safety - any such theory may be said to 'contain the seeds of its 
own destruction' within its very structure, and indeed to wear this fact upon 
its sleeve.6O As Zinn-Justin put it, 
the main difference between [effective] quantum field theory and 
non-relativistic quantum mechanics or Newtonian mechanics [is 
S80f course, one could say something at least similar for perturbative QFI', since 
that method only works for regimes in which the theory's couplings are small. The 
relevant difference, however, is that all theories with small couplings may be treated 
the same way, viz. by perturbation theory; by contrast, theories that cannot be treated 
perturbativeIy will in general require different techniques and treatments in different 
cases. 
S9See Manohar [1996] for a very nice introduction to the concept of effective field 
theories. 
6OCollins op. cit, p123. 
133 
Chapter 6. Effective Quantum Field Theories 
that in the latter] the mathematics doesn't tell you that it is just an 
approximation. Mathematically it is a fine theory. You know just 
from empirical evidence that it is an approximation.61 
Such a theory is to be contrasted with a renormalizable theory, the hallmark 
of which is that it claims to be 'complete in itself', containing 'no direct 
indications of whether it is part of a larger and more complete theory. >62 
But now that the RP has been dropped as a requirement on theories in 
general, and given that any putatively renormalizable theory can consistently 
be regarded as at root nonrenormalizable but with the nonrenormalizable 
effects sufficiently suppressed, whether we ought to regard any theory as in 
fact possessing this property must be regarded as in doubt. Indeed, today 
even our most fundamental theory, the Standard Model, is regarded as at best 
effective on account of its many perceived imperfections, even though we 
standardly present the equations as containing only renorma1izable terms. As 
Weinberg puts it, 
We now think the field equations of the Standard Model are not of 
the very simple type that would be renormalizable but that they 
actually contain every conceivable term that is consistent with the 
symmetries of the theory. 63 
It is at this juncture that we begin to glimpse how the internal structure 
of QFT may have direct implications for the debate over the existence of a 
fundamental level. After all, if a theory fails to satisfy the RP, it cannot be a 
fundamental theory (from the perspective of perturbation theory at least), but 
what grounds there are for regarding any theory as satisfying this principle 
are, by this point, very unclear. Before I develop that thought regarding 
QFf's fundamentality dialectic, however, I need to establish the sort of levels 
structure that we may take EFTs to define. 
61 Zinn-Justin [2009]. 
62Collins [1984], p123. 
63Weinberg [1993], p165; see also Weinberg [2009a], p13. 
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6.7 The Construction of an EFT 
To convey the relationships that successive EFTs stand in, I will work within 
the dimensional regularization scheme and begin with the case in which a 
higher-energy theory is assumed to be known, but one nonetheless wishes 
to work with an 'effective' counterpart that suffices to capture its low-energy 
phenomena. Considering EFTs subject to this assumption will help to give 
a sense of the principles through which a sequence of EFTs is structured, 
independently of whether we are in fact in possession of such a theory. 64 
In order to obtain a low-energy EFT from a higher-energy theory, an intuitive 
set of steps, with their intellectual origin in the work of Wilson, must be 
undertaken. These are as follows.65 
(i) The degrees of freedom appropriate at a given high-energy scale J.l must 
be chosen. Only these will be explicitly taken into account. 
(ii) The Lagrangian of the full theory at J.l is given by Lo (cp, 4», where the 4> 
denote the light fields with m < < J.l and 4> the heavy fields with heaviest 
mass M ~ J.l. This is then divided into two pieces: Lo = L(cp) + L(cp, 4». 
(iii) The Callen-Symanzik ('renonnalization group') equation (see Section 2) 
is then used to scale the theory's parameters and amplitudes down to 
J.l = M. To proceed further down in energy, one integrates out the heavy 
fields from the action. 
(iv) One obtains in this way a Lagrangian of the fonn L(cp) + l5L(cp), where 
l5L( cp) is a string of nonrenormalizable interactions among the light fields 
that can be organized as an expansion in powers of 11M. Non-local 
heavy particle exchanges are in so doing replaced by a tower of local 
(nonrenonnalizable) interactions among the light particles.66 Note that 
this act of integrating out preserves symmetries. 67 
64It is a primary pragmatic virtue of such 'top-down' EFTs that they facilitate the 
study of low-energy phenomena associated with some interaction without us having 
to take into account phenomena that may not be relevant at such low energies. 
6SThe following is adapted from Pich [1998] p13; p34-S. 
66See Burgess [2007], p14. 
67Note that although the process of 'integrating out' preserves symmetries, at 
sufficiently low energy the EFT may appear to have more symmetries than the 
underlying theory: that is, the Lagrangian consisting only of terms that are non-
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(v) The coefficients that are going to be relevant to a given accuracy can 
be read off directly from the resultant Lagrangian.68 Those that are 
not relevant can be ignored. These parameters are then subject to 
minimal subtraction (meaning that only the pole part f - where € is 
the parameter which analytically continues the dimension of spacetime 
- is removed in order to define the renormalized coupling), and the 
resultant renormalized quantities are determined by matching the high 
and low energy theories at the scale J.l = M: that is, by demanding that 
the two theories produce the same S-matrix elements at that scale. The 
information on the heavier degrees of freedom is then contained in the 
couplings of the resulting low-energy Lagrangian and the suppressed 
nonrenormalizable interactions. The parameters of L(cjJ) are not the 
same in the high- and low-energy theories; the differences are also given 
by the matching conditions.69 
(vi) This procedure can then be iterated as the renonnalization scale passes 
through another particle mass, if any. 
The EFT so constructed describes the low-energy physics, to a given accuracy 
f, in terms of a finite set of parameters. It has the same infra-red (but, of 
course, different ultra-violet) behaviour from the underlying theory, and the 
only remnants of the high-energy dynamics are in the low-energy couplings 
and the symmetries of the EFf. It is clear that this process can be repeated 
to scale down to the next effective theory with some medium-mass particles 
omitted, and so on, obtaining a 'descending sequence of effective theories', 
each one with fewer fields and more interaction terms than the last. 70 
The above steps describe the construction of an EFT when a more complete 
theory is known. But they should nonetheless suffice to convey the relations 
that EFfs stand in independently of our knowledge of the relevant high-
energy theory. Since the process of 'integrating out' that relates each pair 
of neighouring EFTs is irreversible; it is clear that one cannot simply run 
negligible at low energy may possess symmetries which are absent from the full 
Lagrangian. See, e.g., Brading and Castellani [2008], Section 4.1. 
68 At least assuming the dimensionally regularized framework: see Manohar [1996], 
p18. 
69See Pich [1998], Section 3.3. 
7OGeorgi [1993], p6. 
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it backwards and recover a more complete theory from a given EFT.71 In 
this effective picture, then, we apparently obtain a sequence of EFTs, each 
occupying a portion of energy space with boundaries set by particle masses, 
and such that a given (relatively) low-energy theory may be deduced from a 
high-energy theory but not vice versa. The claim regarding portions of energy 
space is, howeve~ unfortunately a little hasty, because there remain certain 
technical obstacles that must be overcome if we are to sustain this picture of 
neatly-parceled out regions of energy space in which successive theories reign. 
The reason for this is predicated on the fact that EFTs are QFTs, and as such are 
not well-defined until a renormalization prescription has been given - at least 
for those terms that are regarded as non-negligible at the energy in question. 72 
But the relationships between the various renormalization prescriptions are 
more complicated in the case of EFTs, and if not chosen correctly the intuitive 
and most distinctive feature of them - that they describe finite, parcelled-out 
regions of energy space - is threatened, since any such EFT will apparently 
receive contributions from all over energy space. Nonetheless, it appears that 
the problem may be resolved through the process of 'decoupling subtraction', 
though I will refer only to the literature on this issue here. 73 
Given that decoupling subtraction apparently succeeds in delimiting the 
energy range appropriate to each theory, the domains of the successive EFTs 
can after all be viewed as 'stacking up' into well-delineated layers. In doing so, 
they provide a levels structure formulated within the conceptual framework 
of QFf, and as such a levels structure that may be deduced with recourse 
only to an extant physical theory (or 'framework')/4 Moreover, since a 
111t is the irreversiblilty of the integration, on account of the decrease in variables 
at each iteration of the process, that makes the Wilsonian 'renormalization group' 
not a group but at best a semi-group (d. Peskin and Schroeder p401; Fisher [1998]). 
72Manohar [1996] p.17: 'To use the effective Lagrangian beyond tree level, it is 
necessary to give a renormalization scheme as part of the definition of the effective 
field theory. Without this additional information, the effective Lagrangian is meaning-
less.' (Huggett and Weingard [1995] note that this undermines Cao and Schweber's 
argument for EFfS and anti-fundamentalism, which is largely predicated on their 
discomfiture with the renormalization procedure.) 
73See e.g. Manohar [1996]; Kaplan [1995]; Burgess [2007]; Polchinski [2009]. 
74This has already been pointed out by Castellani, who writes: 'The EFf approach 
provides a level structure of theories ... The basic question concerning the inter-level 
relationships ... can here be addressed in a concrete and definite manner: we have 
formal and substantial tools for determining how successive effective theories are 
related to each other. Moreover. it is particularly advantageous from the viewpoint 
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lower-energy theory may be obtained from a higher-energy theory by a 
process that is in general irreversible, these relations of nomic derivation 
that relate neighbouring theories have an asymmetric structure. Putting all 
this together, and recalling the list of possible priority relations discussed in 
Chapter 2, we may say that theories that are related in this way stand in well-
defined, asymmetric relations of relative fundamentality. Now, the Lorentz 
invariance assumed by QFf obviously implies the continuity of spacetime; 
the inhomogeneous Lorentz group, after all, is a Lie group, and this assumes 
that its parameters are continuous. Moreover, the Heisenberg uncertainty 
relations are also encoded in the formalism via the canonical commutation 
relations.75 Putting these two together we then know - as is any case evident 
from the upper limits on the S-matrix integrals, such as (6.S) and (6.6), that 
these basic assumptions imply - that QFf implies the existence of an infinite 
energy range. We may therefore state with confidence that the energy range 
against which successive QFfs stack up must likewise be infinite. Whether 
that involves infinitely many theories, such that there is no one distinguished 
theory lying at the top of the hierarchy, is the crucial question to which I at 
long last turn. 76 
6.8 Where will it all end? 
The preceding discussion has recounted how the renormalization principle 
underwent a radical change in status between the early days of QFf and today. 
It began by being viewed as a sine qua non of any empirical theory, and even at 
times as a fundamental principle of nature on a par with symmetry principles. 
of the philosophical discussion that the conceptual framework always remains the 
same. All the theories are fonnulated in the same QFf language, thus allowing us 
to avoid the typical translation problems arising when discussing "heterogeneous" 
inter-theoretical relationships' (Castellani [2002], pp263-4). 
75See e.g. Weinberg [I995b], p19. 
761t is worth noting here that Cao and Schweber, in formulating their 'infinite 
tower interpretation of QFf, disparage the method of dimensional regularization on 
the grounds that it is 'untenably formalistic' (d. Huggett and Weingard [I995]) and 
thus favour the WIlsonian hard cut-off approach. But I do not see how we can deduce 
the fact - which is necessary for the interpretation they defend - that the energy 
range available for theories to stack up against is infinite without the assumption of 
Lorentz invariance, which the hard-cut off approach contradicts. 
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But that it need not after all be seen as a necessary requirement on empirical 
QFfS was revealed through simple dimensional analysis; whether it can still 
have a claim to nonetheless being a fundamental principle is something that I 
will consider presently. But in order to do so, it is crucial to recall that the same 
dimensional considerations that underwrite the empirical efficacy of theories 
that fail to satify the RP also imply the non-fundamental status of those 
theories. As we have seen, any EFf can be used consistently and predictively 
until the energy of the processes under study approaches the theory's cut-
off, at which point the theory blows up, falls foul of unitarity, ceases to be 
consistent with the basic principles of quantum theory and must therefore by 
supplanted. 77 But this predicament that EFTs are inescapably enmeshed in 
naturally invites the question of what it is that happens then, since the train 
of thought that led us to this point has a distinctly regressive character. If we 
regard the new theory as an EFT, then it too must eventually be supplanted, 
and we are back with the question with which we started; but if, on the 
other hand, we regard the new theory as containing only renormalizable 
interactions, then one must ask why the reasons so far given as to why some 
ostensibly renormalizable theories ought in fact to be regarded as just the low-
energy 'surfaces' of EFTs fail to apply in this case. It is this regress inherent 
within the EFf concept that has prompted claims that contemporary high-
energy physics demands a radical revision of standard assumptions concerning 
the existence of a fundamental level, and that prompts a full discussion of the 
issue in this work. 
In the absence of further arguments. howeve~ such anti-fundamentalist claims 
on behalf of QFT are too quick - for there are in fact a variety of forks 
in the road currently lying before US. 78 In an oft-quoted passage in the 
literature on EFI's and their implications for fundamentality, the effective field 
77To repeat, there is a theoretical possibility that a given EFf might 'saturate' 
through the phenomenon of asymptotic safety and avoid the conflict with unitarity / 
But since in the main body of this chapter I assume a perturbative treatment of QFf, 
this isn't one that I will countenance here. I will however consider this issue briefly 
in Section 10. 
78As Huggett and Weinbard have noted, it is too quick to move, as Cao and 
Schweber do, from the regressive situation outlined above to the idea that there is 
no fundamental theory but only a 'tower' of ever-more fundamental ones, for 'an 
EFfer cannot infer from the possibility of a tower of theories that the alternatives 
are logically or physically untenable' (Huggett and Weingard [1995], p187; italics 
added). 
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theorist Georgi lays out the possible alternatives that present themselves at 
this juncture. 
One can imagine, I suppose, that this tower of effective theories 
goes up to arbitrarily high energies in a kind of infinite regression. 
This is a peculiar scenario in which there is really no complete 
theory of physics, just a series of layers without end. More likely, 
the series does terminate, either because eventually we come to 
the final renormalizable theory of the world, or (most plausible) 
because at some very large energy (the Planck mass?) the laws 
of relativistic quantum field theory break down and an effective 
quantum field theory is no longer adequate to describe physics. 79 
There are thus three possibile states of affairs at sufficiently high energies, one 
and at most one of which must obtain. The first of these is 
(i) the breakdown of the quantum field theoretical framework altogether, 
to be replaced by another framework of a qualitatively different sort, 
such as a string theory, most plausibly at the Planck scale.so 
The other two, however, are each compatible with QFf. They are 
(ii) the retention of a quantum field theoretical framework and its culmina-
tion in a final, perhaps unified, but in any case renormalizable theory;81 
and 
(iii) an infinite tower of EFfs - that is, an infinite tower of theories each of 
which is superceded at some finite energy by a higher-energy theory ad 
infinitum. 
While the existence of these three mutually exclusive possibilities has been 
noted in many places, not a great deal has been said on whether anyone 
of them can be regarded as a better-supported resolution of the apparent 
regress than any of the others. By drawing on various themes surrounding 
the concept of fundamentality as understood in contemporary physics and 
79Georgi [2009], p138; see also Georgi [1993], p6 and Georgi [1992], p456. 
80There is in fact a sense in which string theory is a kind of quantum field theory, 
but not in 4 dimensions: see Weinberg [1997a]. 
SlGeorgi [1993] states that he regards this as in fact unlikely, given the difficulty 
with gravity, but there are now models of gravity which, though nonrenormalizable, 
show promise of being asymptotically safe. I will return to this again in Section 10. 
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metaphysics, and by considering the demands of the internal approach to 
fundamentality questions, I will now consider whether we have any reasons 
to favour anyone of these possibilities over each of the others. I begin with 
the first possiblity on Georgi's list: the overthrow of QFT. 
6.8.1 The OVerthrow of QFf 
Of all of these options, it is probably fair to say that this is the possibility 
favoured by most physicists. As Georgi suggests, it is perceived as very likely 
that attempts to quantize gravity will have to confront the prospect of a funda-
mental length as part of the structure of spacetime at the Planck scale defined 
by the three units G, h, c. If that is the case, then the idea that spacetime is 
continuous will presumably have to be jettisoned, which in tum implies that 
Lorentz invariance will likewise have to go by the wayside - not to mention 
the entire local operator formalism of QFf.82 Planck-scale considerations 
therefore seem to portend the downfall of QFT, and it is common to find 
such considerations motivating interpretations of both the ultimate outcome 
of the regress mentioned a moment ago and the renormalization process 
itself.83 
In spite of its seeming popularity, however, the idea that we can legitimately 
use Planck-scale considerations to settle issues posed within the framework 
of QFT has been questioned by Fraser. She objects that 'gravitational con-
siderations are external to QFf', and that as such that the Planck length 
cannot be marshalled in settling the outcome of the regress of theories that 
QFT presents.84 The 'externality' of Planck-scale considerations to QFT is 
reflected in the fact that the former are taken to involve a discrete structure 
to spacetime that conflicts with Lorentz invariance, and as such theories 
involving the Planck length may be taken to commit to 'different sets of the-
oretical principles' than QFf.85 Now, as Wallace has pointed out, in general 
it is 'perfectly reasonable (and not at all ad hoc) to be motivated to believe 
in a discrete structure to spacetime because it is independently motivated by 
82& Georgi puts it, cut-offs 'require giving up one or more of the cherished 
principles which led to local interaction in the first place' (Georgi [1992], p449). 
83See e.g. Wallace [2011], Peskin and Schroeder [1995], Chapter 12. 
84Fraser [2009], p552. 
85See Fraser [2009], p561. 
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various strands in theoretical physics,' even if QFr isn't one of them, and to 
use that to motivate a view as to the high-energy fate of QFI'.86 Moreover; that 
is so in spite of the fact that it has the prima facie conspicuous consequence 
that QFf itself must break down. Wallace himself chooses to adopt precisely 
this line on the fate of QFf, and in support of his view he notes that this 
position is 'pretty commonly taken by particle physicists' - and indeed Georgi 
seems to be one of them.87 
But two points cry out to be made regarding this strategy of using Planck-scale 
considerations to motivate a stance on the high-energy behaviour of QFr. The 
first of these points is of general significance and the second more apropos 
to the specific task in hand. The first of these points is that the significance 
of the Planck units to a future of theory of spacetime remains a 'worryingly 
unchallenged assumption' that is by no means certain.88 While it is often 
simply taken for granted that the Planck length represents a physical joint 
in nature, it must be realized that this idea deserves to be met with a more 
critical attitude than is often the case. As Meschini reminds us, the Planck 
units were introduced simply to provide a less anthropocentric set of units 
than had been used hitherto, and one must provide reasons as to why they 
are of any greater significance than that. After all, 'the chances are that any 
combination of three dimensional constants chosen at random would allow 
the same procedure' of defining new dimensional scales, and we presumably 
do not think that a physical scale set by an arbitrary combination of constants 
necessarily indicates some physical joint in the world.89 What is presumably 
needed before any significance can be assigned to scales defined in this way, 
such as the Planck length, is an overarching theory in which those constants 
appear - some equations whose other terms already have some appreciable 
physical meaning - which can be used to infer what, if anything, of physical 
significance it is that these newly-defined scales pick out. But it is precisely 
this that is lacking in the case of a quantum theory of gravity. 90 Meschini also 
argues, citing Baez, that inferring features of the short-distance structure of 
spacetime through considerations of these constants 'presupposes that in a 
86Wallace [2011], p122. 
87Jbid. 
88Meschini [2007], pI. 
89Bridgman [1963], plO1; quoted in Meschini ibid., p12. . 
90Meschini makes this point with reference to the Compton wavelength m the 
context of atomic physics; see ibid., Section 3. 
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future theory of spacetime, and any observations related to it, the combination 
of already known physics - and nothing else - will prove to be signficant'.91 
But he uses an example involving atomic theory prior to Planck's resolution 
of the black-body problem to show that neglecting then-unknown constants 
in trying to define the scales relevant to atomic physics can generate wildly 
wrong results. Furthermore, he argues that there are reasons to be sceptical 
that all of the constants that define the Planck length will in fact be relevant 
in a quantum theory of gravity - as they must be if the Planck length is to be 
significant there.92 For all these reasons, the idea that the fact that the Planck 
length can be defined provides compelling support for the idea that QFT must 
ultimately break down, as Georgi and Wallace apparently believe, must be 
taken with a large pinch of salt. 93 
That first point invites the second, which is that Georgi and Wallace's preferred 
stance on the high-energy fate of QFf does not issue from QFT itself, but from 
QFT conjoined with another theory - and one that, moreover, remains highly 
speculative at present. But what I am interested in in Part 1 of this thesis 
is whether robust internal arguments against fundamentality are possible 
- that is, whether arguments against fundamentality can be framed from 
within the persective of extant physical theories - and in particular, in this 
chapter, with whether QFf furnishes us with an example of one. Adopting the 
option outlined here, however, amounts to (1) giving up on investigating the 
fundamentality conclusions that may be drawn from within QFr, and instead 
(2) investigating the fundamentality conclusions that may be drawn from QFT 
91Ibid., pS. 
92As he descusses, there are at least conjectural models in which quantum effects 
reside in the manifold 'before' the metric field is laid on, thus rendering G and c 
redundant to the fundamental theoly. 
93This is not of course to say that the Planck length, and the way in which the 
notion was arrived at, might not represent a useful heuristic when it comes to 
attempting to construct a quantum theory of gravity (a point on which Meschini 
concurs: see ibid., p8). But it must be remembered that the Planck length is just that: 
a potential heuristic, and not by any means an established fact (on which Meschini 
likewise concurs; see ibid.). I should perhaps say, however, that I am unclear on 
whether the Planck length can be usefully regarded as a potential 'footprint', in Post's 
sense, of a future theory in a past theory, in the sense that the numerical equivalence 
of inertial and gravitional mass in Newton's theory may have been (cf. Post [1971], 
Section II (2)). Whether we can indeed regard it as such is clearly going to be a 
function of whether we in fact have what can be regarded as a working theory that 
contains all of these constants, but that does not seem to be the case here; see below. 
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conjoined with an as-yet unknown theory. 94 Citing the notion of the Planck 
length to settle the question of how the tower of QFI's ends is thus doubly 
objectionable from the present point of view. The internal arguments against 
fundamentality that I consider here must therefore be those that leave the 
basic principles of QFr intact, and I tum now to investigating those remaining 
two possibilities. 
6.8.2 A Final Renormalizable Theory 
The two remaining options constitute the dichotomy that the QFr framework 
- so far at least - apparently underdetermines, and what I want to do now 
is consider what support, if any, can be provided for breaking the underde-
termination one way or the other. I will start off by considering what could 
motivate favouring the view that there exists a final, hence renormalizable 
quantum field theory lying atop the tower.9S 
In the earlier sections of this chapter, I described and defended the consistency 
of merely effective theories. I argued that EFfs are perfectly workable as low-
94As Wallace puts it, 'we have only the sketchiest idea of what X [the unknown 
quantum theory of gravity] will tum out to be' (Wallace [2006], p46.). Now, while 
theories may not, of course, have precisely defined boundaries - witness for example 
the debate over whether Gibb's paradox tells us something novel about classical 
particles or rather indicates that classical mechanics is simply inadequate to describe 
the relevant thermodynamic phenomena (cf. French and Krause [2006], Section 
2.5) - I take it that is uncontroversial that we can regard QFr and this unknown 
theory as distinct. (After all, if we had reason not to regard this theory as distinct 
from the QFr that we already have to hand, we would presumably have more than 
'the sketchiest idea' of what this theory in fact is!) I note finally that none of this 
implies that any eventual theory of quantum gravity may not itself have interesting 
anti-fundamentalist interpretations; any such implications are, however, completely 
beside the point for present purposes. 
9S At least one bad reason has been given, and it is that prof erred by Cao and 
Schweber in favour of the anti-fundamentalist interpretation. As Huggett and Wein-
berg point out, 'the only positive argument [in cao and Schwebel's paper] is the 
suggesion that the renormalization involved in the GUf [i.e. final renormalizable 
theory] approach is untenably formalistic' (Huggett and Weingard [1995], pI87). But 
even putting aside their claim that renormalization is reasonably well-understood, as 
pointed out in Section 7 the friend of Errs must likewise renormalize their theories. 
Thus fresh reasons must be sought for defending the anti-fundamentalist hom of the 
dilemma, and I will consider some possible avenues that may lead to this end in the 
next section. 
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energy theories, so that it is consistent to regard our current theories, such as 
those of the Standard Model, as counting amongst them; I also pointed out 
that it is usual among contemporary physicists to in fact so regard them. But 
clearly none of these points have any bite in this context: all they show, after 
all, is that renormalizability is not a necessary property of theories at currently 
accessible energies. Here, however, I am considering whether there exists an 
(as-yet unknown) fundamental theory; since it remains that a final theory 
must be valid to arbitrarily high energies, that entails, against the backdrop 
of our perturbative assumptions, that it must be renormalizable. Therefore, 
since we do not regard our current theories as the end of the story; whatever 
justification we may have for assuming that they can be regarded as EFTs is 
not to the point here. 96 
I have, however, raised a point that could be invoked in this context, and that 
is the perceived lack of foundation for the satisfaction of the RP. Recall from 
Section 4 that physicists have mooted that there does not seem to be any clear 
physical reason why any law of nature should be found to respect the RP in 
addition to the other principles that must govern a Lagrangian in QFT and that 
one 'cannot imagine modifying' - namely, that they should respect the basic 
QFT principles and any symmetries that are assumed to govern the relevant 
in,teraction. Given the perception amongst sections of the QFT community 
that it is unclear why a theory should conform to the RP, we can legitimately 
ask whether we should expect any theory to in fact do so. We know that 
renormalizability is a necessary condition for a fundamental theory within 
(perturbative) QFT; but why should we think it is in fact ever satisfied? In 
other words, what would explain the existence of a theory; towering above all 
others, which happened to respect this otherwise inexplicated principle? 
An obvious gambit at this point would be to say that, even though we might 
ordinarily feel under pressure to explain features of theories that are judged 
to be otherwise surprising, the need to explain the satisfaction of the RP 
by a fundamental theory is simply obviated by the fact that that theory is 
fundamental. Since the satisfaction of the principle in such a case would be an 
aspect of the fundamental basis, we might be happy to view it simply as part 
of the metaphysical bedrock of the world and, as such, not the sort of thing 
that could admit of explanation. Indeed, priority relations are often taken 
96This point is also made in Castellani [2002], p264. 
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to map onto relations of explanation, so that the fundamental is frequently 
presented in metaphysics as that which is brute, primitive, and resistant 
to explanation.97 Given that, it might therefore seem that we can relegate 
the satisfaction of the RP by a fundamental law to brute and inexplicable 
fact. 
While that line of argument is a tempting one, I think we should in fact be 
hesitant about adopting it. While it may be very common in metaphysics to 
take the fundamental as by definition brute and inexplicable, it is increasingly 
less common for physicists to adopt this attitude. It seems, in fact, that 
physicists in the 20th century have grown increasingly uncomfortable with 
taking anything as brute and inexplicable - something testified to by the fact 
that there have by now been numerous attempts to explain things that physics 
was previously presumed to necessarily take for granted, such as that the 
universe appears ordered, had the initial conditions that it did or even that it 
exists at all.98 Weinberg reflects on this broad change in oudook regarding 
the fundamental by reporting that, at present, 'the aim of physics at its most 
fundamental level is not just to describe the world, but to explain why it is 
the way it is'. 99 But if that is the aim when it comes to the physics of the 
fundamental level - should it exist - then merely citing that something is 
fundamental need not obviate the demand that some explanation be given of 
it. Indeed, one need only think of physicists' efforts to explain the values of 
the fundamental constants, which appear in the most fundamental laws of 
nature that we know of, in order to grasp the point. And while the idea that 
we might be able to explain the fundamental is, in itself, just a stated view 
from physics, we may note that Nozick has explicidy defended the logical and 
philosophical coherence of the idea that the fundamental may be amenable to 
explanation.100 This should compound our unease about the idea that we are 
a priori licensed to take features of an assumed fundamental basis as simply 
97See for example Jenkins [2011J, deRossett [2010J. I have not explicitly discussed 
the relationship between fundamentality and explanation here, pardy due to the 
complexity of the subject of explanation. Bringing explanation more explicitly into 
the fold thus represents a further avenue for development of this project. 
98Conceming the explanation of why the universe appears ordered, see Wheeler 
[1983J. For an introduction to speculative cosmological explanations of why the 
universe exists at all and has the initial conditions that it has, see Davies [1996]. 
99Weinberg [1993], p175; italics added. 
lOOSee Nozick [1981], Chapter 2. "Ibis defence draws heavily on Kripke's theory of 
truth, a theory that - unlike Tarski's - permits reflexive truthmaking relations. 
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brute, and that in turn should discourage us from shrugging off the need to 
explain why any law should satisfy the RP. 
One may put things in still stronger terms, however, since one may argue 
that the very fact that the satisfaction of this principle has been regarded by 
physicists as ultimately perplexing positively counts against the idea that any 
fundamental theory does in fact satisfy it. This is because it is often asserted 
- once again, at least within physics - that the mark of a truly fundamental 
principle of nature is that it somehow invokes in us the sense that nature 
could not but have satisfied it: it should present itself to us with a clarity and 
inevitability that makes it hard to understand how we failed to recognize 
previously that such a principle had to be satisfied. This sentiment that the 
fundamental will present itself to us as inevitable and natural may for example 
be found in Wigner, who notes that 
It is often said that the objective of physics is the explanation of 
nature, or at least of inanimate nature. What do we mean by 
explanation? It is the establishment of a few simple principles 
which describe the properties of what is to be explained. If we 
understand something, its behavior, that is the events which it 
presents, should not produce any surprises for us. We should 
always have the impression that it could not be otherwise. 101 
But if some quarters of the physics community regard it as the mark of a 
fundamental principle that it leaves us with the impression that somehow 
nature 'could not be otherwise' than respectful of it, the very fact that the 
satisfaction of the RP has been regarded as so physically unintuitive seems 
to make it a bad candidate for one. And of course, if we do reject on these 
grounds that fundamental nature in fact obeys this principle, then it follows -
modulo our perturbative assumptions - that there is no Jundamentallaw. 
These considerations concerning how the fundamental is conceived of in 
physics - specifically, the ideas that it (i) may be explicable and (ii) ought 
to strike us as natural and inevitiable - have thus failed to furnish a defence 
101Wigner [1963], italics added. I note that I am not defending the idea that 
the fundamental will in fact have this impact upon our psychology, merely at this 
point reporting that this view is held amongst influential members of the physics 
community. (Nor do I intend to convey that the notion of 'simplicity' of principles 
that Wigner cites here has any clear and unproblematic meaning.) 
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of fundamentalism in QFf. Indeed, they seem rather to have steered us 
more in the direction of the anti-fundamentalist hom. It is moreover unclear 
what other non-question-begging grounds we could adduce in support of 
fundamentalism. Certainly, if the only reason for holding that there exists 
a theory which satisfies the RP is to secure the existence of a fundamental 
basis, then that clearly cannot be appealed to in this context. Nonetheless, 
and as should be abundantly clear by this point, to say that the considerations 
I have just adduced in any way suffice for the anti-fundamentalist to declare 
a victory over her rival would be stretching things beyond breaking point. 
The arguments, after all, revolved around the properties that physicists think, 
or would like, the fundamental to have, but that does not in any way imply 
that the fundamental will in fact have any of these properties. Indeed, the 
anti-fundamentalist cannot herself consistently deny this: physicists often 
state, for example, that they aim, and thus hope, to discover the 'fundamental 
building blocks of nature', but the anti-fundamentalist will of course not take 
that to entail that there are in fact any out there to be discovered. Thus, while 
the above considerations certainly problematize the uncritical assumption that 
there is a fundamental theory, and should give the fundamentalist pause, I 
have not found any reason to rule out the existence of such a theory - a theory 
that, although otherwise unmotivated, after all seems perfectly consistent 
with the basic principles of QFf. 
At the moment, then, we seem to lack a clear reason for either adopting the 
fundamentalist stance on QFf or for ruling it out. What I want to do now 
is see if any positive arguments can be given for the opposing point of view, 
and thus consider further whether QFI' may be said to positively support - as 
opposed to merely permit - anti-fundamentalism about laws. 
6.8.3 An Infinite Tower of Theories 
It remains, so far, that QFT underdetermines whether there exists a funda-
mentaIlaw of nature or not. As discussed in Chapter 3, the virtuous features 
often cited in the face of underdetermination can in general only be taken 
to constitute rational grounds for making differential commitments if they 
constitute good episttmic grounds for doing so. And as I also argued there, 
one obvious way in which we can infer that one theory is less likely than 
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another is if the former places more constraints on a given ontology than the 
latter does. After all, this would mean that it could be represented as the latter 
theory conjoined with some extra propositions expressing those constraints, 
and hence mean that it is is more difficult to satisfy. 
But one may well wonder whether this observation might be of interest to 
those who want to defend anti-fundamentalism about QIT. The reason for 
this, of course, is that renormalizable theories must satisfy all the constraints 
imposed on effective theories, as well as conform to the RP. That is, while the 
only criteria governing whether a term ought to be included in an effective 
Lagrangian - recalling Donogue's list above - is that the resultant law (i) 
respects the principles of relativistic quantum mechanics, such as Lorentz 
invariance and unitarity, and (li) respects any other symmetries of the domain 
in question, renormalizable theories must obey the additional - and highly 
stringent - constraint that they feature only renormalizable terms. One 
may therefore legitimately claim that anti-fundamentalist worlds have fewer 
primitive constraints governing their stock of laws than fundamentalist worlds 
do. The anti-fundamentalist might therefore be tempted to infer that the 
theories of anti-fundamentalist quantum field-theoretic worlds are therefore 
more likely to be true than the theories of fundamentalist worlds, since the 
former place fewer demands on their (nomic) ontology than the latter do. If 
that were correct, it seems that they would be vindicated in vouching for an 
anti-fundamentalist interpretation of this quantum field-theoretic world as a 
consequence. 
Given that observation regarding the relative parsimony of primitive prin-
ciples in anti-fundamentalist worlds, can we therefore say that the anti-
fundamentalist interpretation of QIT is the one which is more likely to be 
true? Unfortunate as it may be from the anti-fundamentalist's perspective, I 
do not think that any such conclusion would be justified. In fact, I do not think 
that we can move from this son of claim regarding parsimony of primitive 
principles to anti-fundamentalism about laws for the same son of reasons 
that Sider's appeal to parsimony of primitive predicates failed to warrant 
fundamentalism about objects. The reason for this, of course, is that just as 
'is a pan of' is a predicate with ontological implications when it comes to 
objects, so is 'satisfies the RP' when it comes to quantum field-theoretic laws 
of nature. That is, just as two worlds cannot differ with respect to whether 
149 
Chapter 6. Effective Quantum Field Theories 
the parthood predicate is required to adequately describe their (objecmal) 
ontologies without thereby also differing with respect to those ontologies, so 
two worlds cannot differ with respect to whether the RP must be satisfied by 
some element of their (nomic) ontologies without thereby also differing with 
respect to those ontologies. 102 Thus, just as in Sider's case, we do not have 
two different theories about a shared ontology - the contents of a world - one 
of which places additional demands on that ontology relative to the other; 
and as such is less likely to be true. Rather; we have two different theories 
describing two different ontologies, so that the extra constraint involved in the 
theory T( wI) of the fundamentalist world WI cannot be represented simply by 
means of a proposition conjoined onto the anti-fundamentalist theory T( wa ) 
of an anti-fundamentalist world wa. But if the additional principle that must 
be respected in fundamentalist worlds cannot be represented as an additional 
demand on the ontology of an anti-fundamentalist world, then it is not at all 
clear how the anti-fundamentalist could exploit their relative parsimony of 
principles to their advantage - at least not in probabilistic terms. And without 
any obvious alternative means of exploiting it, it seems that we cannot say 
that the theories of worlds bereft of laws that are required to satisfy the RP 
are more likely to be true than their fundamentalist counterparts - or at least 
not on these sorts of simple logical grounds. 
The fact that anti-fundamentalist QFf worlds require fewer in the way of 
fundamental principles thus does not seem to deliver - at least not in any 
obvious way - the conclusion that the actual world is more likely to be one. 
And since, as I have repeatedly insisted, realists may appeal to virtues such as 
parsimony to ground theory choice only if they can show that those virtues 
enjoy suitable epistemic support, it is not clear that there is anywhere else for 
this observation regarding parsimony of principles to go. 
But it may be worth taking one more kick at the can. Recall that in Chapter 3, 
when discussing Cameron, I pointed out that some scientific realists believe 
that if one can show that appeals to virtues such as simplicity in theory 
construction have resulted in more empirically successful theories, then such 
appeals may sanction differential commitments among empirically equivalent 
theories after all. I pointed out too that if this a posteriori strategy can 
l02This point will be revised at the at the end, once the concept of asymptotic safety 
is brought back into the fold. 
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succeed in epistemically differentiating theories, it can do so only in the case 
of theories that themselves admit of confirmation (for otherwise there is no 
justification for invoking the strategy at all). Here, however, we are dealing 
with quantum field theory, which frames the best-confirmed theories of all 
time; if historical appeals to virtues such as simplicity or parsimony have a 
hope of being warranted anywhere, then, it seems that they should do so 
here. 
Let us therefore consider whether the anti-fundamentalist can exploit this a 
posteriori strategy to their advantage. What needs to be established if this 
strategy is to work is that theories that have posited fewer in the way of fun-
damental principles have historically tended to do better than those theories 
that have posited more; that is, that theories that are more parsimonious 
when it comes to fundamental principles have been shown to ultimately be 
better confirmed. But unfortunately for the anti-fundamentalist, the idea that 
parsimony about principles has been confirmed by the history of science is 
plainly untenable. In fact, we need look no further than QFf itself to see that 
this is the case, since it is palpably obvious that our theories of high-energy 
processes are more successful given that they respect, say, the unitarity princi-
ple in addition to the other principles that QFf respects than they would be if 
they did not do so. Musgrave's strategy thus leads straight into a dead end 
here, and is therefore of no use in breaking the underdetennination in the 
anti-fundamentalist's favour. 
By way of a last-ditch attempt to salvage things, the anti-fundamentalist 
might object that there is clearly a difference between principles such as the 
unitarity principle and the RP, since the former is empirically fecund while 
the latter, it may be claimed, is empirically superfluous. The reason that 
the RP can be claimed to be empirically superfluous is that, as we already 
know, at any finite energy one can find an EFT that is just as consistent and 
predictive a theory as a renonnalizable theory at that energy, for one can 
consider any renormaIizable theory to be an EFf with the non-renormalizable 
terms sufficiently suppressed. At any finite energy, then, we need not assume 
that our theory satisfies the RP in order to make all the predictions that a 
renormalizable theory can. But since any of our predictions will inevitably 
concern phenomena that are measured at a finite energy, that means that we 
need never assume that the RP is satisfied to have a well-confirmed description 
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of reality, and hence that the latter can be regarded as empirically redundant. 
There is thus a marked distinction between it and the unitarity principle, 
and one that the anti-fundamentalist might be tempted to exploit. But while 
the distinction between the two principles is clear, it is equally clear that it 
is not a useful one for the task currently at hand. The reason for that. of 
course, is that if two theories differ only in that one adopts an empirically 
superfluous principle that the other does not, then neither theory will prove to 
be better confirmed than the other - with the result that Musgrave's strategy 
cannot even be invoked. And while there may be good methodological reasons 
to either favour parsimony about principles in general. or to banish non-
empirical elements of whatever sort from our theories wherever we can - the 
latter, after all, is arguably simply a statement of 'Einstein's razor' (d. Chapter 
3) - it is the very fact that purely methodological considerations do not suffice 
for grounding theory choice that motivated the use of Musgrave's strategy in 
the first place. 
It therefore appears that the a posteriori method of epistemica11y privileging 
one of a pair of underdetermined theories cannot be exploited here. But it 
may be worth flagging up that we should perhaps have reservations about 
the viability of Musgrave's strategy, quite independently of whether it does 
the work the anti-fundamentalist wants it to do here. After all, this strategy 
requires that, of two theories that possess virtue S to varying degrees, the 
one that exemplifies more in the way of S is ultimately better confirmed 
than the other, and that this pattern is repeated with at least some other 
pairs of theories (so that an induction may be cautiously made). It is clear, 
however, that the pairs of theories for which this claim can be made cannot 
themselves be underdetermined by all possible evidence. and hence in these 
cases we could simply have played the waiting game before finding good 
epistemic grounds for choosing between them. The only cases in which we 
will ultimately need to appeal to virtues to settle underdetermination disputes 
is. therefore in the case of theories - such as the two interpretations of QIT 
at hand - that are tied with respect to all possible evidence. But it is then 
easy to see that the very existence of such cases where we can do nothing 
but use the strategy to decide between them undercuts the evidence for the 
strategy in the first place. This is because the very existence of theories that 
are empirically tied yet differ regarding S seems to undermine the claim, sup-
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posedly based on historical evidence, that theories with different quantities 
of S tum out to be differently confirmed in the long run. Thus the very fact 
that we may sometimes have no option but to appeal to Musgrave's strategy 
seems to undermine the support that the strategy supposedly enjoys. This un-
happy situation casts doubt on the idea that the strategy can be used to settle 
underdetermination disputes in the very cases in which we most need to use it. 
In sum, then, the a posteriori strategy outlined by Musgrave does not seem to 
support differential epistemic commitment in favour of the anti-fundamentalist 
interpretation of QFT - if, indeed, it can support differential commitments 
anywhere. And given that the a priori argument based on the idea that 
fundamentalist QFT worlds make additional demands on their nomic on-
tology also failed to deliver, if there is yet justification for favouring the 
anti-fundamentalist interpretation on epistemic grounds, we must admit that 
it so far eludes us. 
6.9 First Conclusions 
In contemplating the question of whether the QFT framework carries anti-
fundamentalist implications, I have invoked a variety of considerations. In the 
light of them, I think that the most appropriate thing to say by way of answer-
ing the question is that, while QFT certainly permits anti-fundamentalism, in 
the sense of an infinitely-descending sequence of EFTs, it remains that it un-
derdetermines whether there is a fundamental level of laws or not. While there 
may be good methodological reasons that could be given for not committing 
to the RP as a fundamental principle - such as that empirically superfluous 
principles that lack independent motivation should be banished from our 
theories - we nevertheless seem to lack any convincing epistemic reason for 
favouring the anti-fundamentalist interpretation. But while this might seem 
disappointing for those hoping to defend the idea that we can use physics to 
deny fundamentality, let it not go unrecognized that this is in fact a highly 
non-trivial conclusion. For one thing, the very fact that we currently have 
a set of physical principles that collectively permit an anti-fundamentalist 
interpretation runs counter to the picture that Schaffer presented us with, in 
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which physicists make successive fundamentalist assumptions and it is only 
ever history that proves them wrong. Nor is it in any way obvious that such a 
set of principles could be found that have this property.l03 And let us also not 
forget that it is regarded as something of an open question as to whether any 
physical theory, even a putatively fundamental theory, may not tum out to be 
in exactly the same predicament of possessing an empirically equivalent rival 
that posits a radically different ontological picture of the world. I04 There are, 
furthermore, arguably some real examples of such theories, and indeed frame-
works for theories, that are in fact in precisely this predicament. Lyre, for 
example, has argued that 'the plethora of rivalling quantum interpretations', 
such as the GRW, Everettian and collapse-by-consciousness interpretations, 
cannot be differentiated by any possible evidence in spite of their radical 
incompatibility.IOS One may therefore argue that the anti-fundamentalist 
about QFr stands in an analogous relationship to her fundamentalist rival 
as the Everettian stands to the advocate of GRW, and thus that she has just 
as much - and as little - a right to believe in her picture of reality as the 
latter has to believe in theirs. That is clearly a non-trivial achievement for the 
defender of naturalistic anti-fundamentalism. 
Let me therefore sum up what has been shown so far in this chapter. 
• Theories - or theoretical frameworks - may be consistent with both anti-
fundamentalist and fundamentalist interpretations. Unlike in the case of 
S-matrix theory - in which democracy is unambiguously implied by its 
core principles, and most notably its 'principle of maximal analyticity 
103 As we have seen, QFf presents a picture of fields interacting in accordance with 
laws, where each law is related to a specific expression for amplitudes. We know 
that unless we supplement the principles of QFr with the principle that any given 
law must not only respect any symmetries applicable to the domain in question, but 
also contain only renormalizable interactions, then at some energy the amplitudes 
associated with that law will violate the unitarity principle that is basic to QFf. This 
implies that the law itself has broken down, and that a new law must govern the 
portion of spacetime bound from below at that energy. But at that point the argument 
recurs; since the principles of QFr themselves imply that the available energy space 
is infinite, the argument may be taken to recur without end. In other words, the 
specific principles of QFr play an essential role from start to finish in generating this 
anti-fundamentalist picture, and there is clearly no reason to suppose that any old 
set of physical principles will be capable of producing such an infinitely regressive 
structure. 
l04See, e.g., Hoefer and Rosenberg [1994]. 
10SLyre [2010]. 
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of the second kind' - QFf does not demand anti-fundamentalism about 
laws. This son of situation was in fact anticipated at the end of the last 
chapter, when I noted that it was unlikely that such a characteristically 
metaphysical claim as that concerning the existence of a fundamental 
level would in general carry such a determinate empirical signature 
as it did in the S-matrix context. Nonetheless, the argument shows 
that anti-fundamentalism can be at least as well empirically supported as 
fundamentalism within a particular theoretical framework, thus showing 
that physics may be in a position to deny fundamentality to just the same 
degree that it is able to affirm it. This is clearly a non-trivial achievement. 
If we want to go further in such cases, underdetermination-breaking 
strategies must of course be used. This leads on to the next point. 
• Anti-fundamentalism may, in some cases, be motivated only on method-
ological grounds. In light of the above discussion, progress with our 
argument against fundamentality will rest on whether any strategies 
can be found for defending the truth-tracking nature of the method-
ological features that may be claimed to be present in (and only in) 
the anti-fundamentalist interpretation, and in particular, of its jettison-
ing of an empirically superfluous principle. While there has arguably 
been renewed interest in the truth-tracking import of theoretical virtues, 
whether any of it will be of any use in this context for now remains to 
be seen. (I for one do not see how we could use the methodological ad-
vantages gestured at above to confect a compelling epistemic argument 
in favour of anti-fundamentalism.) I will say, however, that the case 
just discussed demonstrates that baldly stated claims to the effect that 
fundamentalist worlds are 'simpler' in some obvious and unqualified 
sense just do not stand up in general.106 Here, commitment to fewer 
primitive principles entails a commitment to anti-fundamentalism. 
In addition, this argument once again shows that 
• Arguments against fundamentality need not be meta-inductions. While 
QFf is best regarded less as a theory than as a 'framework' for theo-
ries capable of describing many theories, it remains that none of the 
strategies used to deny the existence of a fundamental theory were 
l06See, e.g., the works by Sider discussed in Chapter 3 (cf. his [2011a], [2011b]). 
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meta-inductive in character. Rathe~ the possibility of the infinite regres-
sion issued from a set of physical principles that are available for SUJVeY 
now, and the argument over fundamentality turned upon the status of a 
principle that only has meaning within the QFf conten. Thus although 
we are dealing less with a theory than a/rameworkfor theories, it makes 
sense to call the anti-fundamentalist arguments that I have considered 
in this chapter to be thoroughly internal arguments. 
A final feature, and one that is implicit in the very notion of the internal 
approach, is once again that 
• Internal arguments against fundamentality are limited. As pointed out 
in the last chapte~ this is an unavoidable feature of the internal ap-
proach. After all, this strategy must always at least treat something as 
fundamental - namely, the physical principles from which the relevant 
anti-fundamentalist conclusions are derived. And here, of course, what 
was assumed were the principles of quantum mechanics and relativity 
that lead to QFf in the first place. 
These are the main conclusions that I believe we can draw from this episode. 
They represent non-trivial accomplishments for the anti-fundamentalist, and 
I think that they may be regarded as illuminating with respect to how we 
might deny fundamentality on naturalistic grounds. Nonetheless, they were 
drawn against the background of perrurbatively analysed QFf. What I want to 
discuss, by way of a coda to this chapter, is the significance of this assumption 
for the anti-fundamentalist's case. 
6.10 Coda: Beyond perturbative analysis 
So far in this chapter, I have discussed the issue of whether a law can be 
regarded as fundamental or not in tenns of whether or not it satisfies the 
RP. In particular, I presented this satisfaction as a necessary condition on 
fundamental laws, since (as discussed in Section 6) the perturbative expansion 
of the amplitude suggests that nonrenormalizable theories would blow up 
and thus violate unitarity at some finite energy - hence the designation of 
such theories as merely 'effective'. Renormalizable theories, by contrast, seem 
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to carry no outward indications that they are doomed to collapse at some 
point, so that satisfaction of the RP seems to be necessary for consistency 
in the infinite energy limit. There is, however, another way in which one 
could choose to contemplate the fundamentality of theories, and one that is 
in principle independent of perturbation theory. This is through a study of 
the f3-functions associated with the theory's couplings. Introduced in above in 
Section 2, these functions f3i for the ith coupling Ai are given by (6.8): 
(6.8) 
. where t is a momentum scale-up factor. It can thus be seen that the (3-
functions for all the couplings of a theory will comprise a set of coupled 
differential equations that are in general highly non-trivial to solve. l07 But 
there is very good motivation to at least attempt to try to solve them, since 
these functions are very informative of the high-energy properties of the 
theory. The reason that a theory's (3-functions can yield so much insight in this 
respect is at root very simple, and it is based upon the fact that generically, 
if a theory's couplings are finite then its observable quantities - such as 
its cross-sections, decay rates and amplitudes - can likewise be expected 
to be finite. lOS For example, one can show that QFr cross-sections (j are 
expressible as (j = k- 2u(X, -Xi), where X denotes dimensionless kinematical 
variables (such as scattering angles and ratios of energies), the -Xi denote 
the couplings of the theory expressed in dimensionless units, and k is an 
external momentum. Thus if some of the couplings of the theory diverge as 
t - the momentum scale-up parameter - goes to infinity, then this quantity 
can likewise be expected to diverge, and thus for the unitarity and hence 
consistency of the theory to also be destroyed in that limit. Conversely, if 
a theory's couplings remain finite up to arbitrarily high energy, then there 
is every reason to expect the theory to produce finite observable quantities 
and thus to be consistent to arbitrarily short distances. The simplest way 
to achieve the latter scenario is to assume that in the limit that t -+ 00, the 
couplings stop evolving as t increases and thus may be expected to retain a 
finite value.109 Reference to (6.8) shows that that is just to say that each of 
l07See, e.g., Percacci ems]. 
l08Percacci, [2008], p5; Huggett and Weingard [1995], p17B. 
l09See e.g. Percacci [2009]. Though one often reads that having the couplings flow 
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the ,B-functions of the theory vanish as t increases. 
In this alternative approach to the assessment of theories - an approach in 
which the evolution of the couplings lies centre-stage - it therefore makes 
sense to view theories as inhabiting a space parameterized by all possible 
QFr couplings. Panly on account of the fact (mentioned above in Section 
5) that there are infinitely many possible combinations of fields with any 
given symmetry, each of which requires its own coupling, this space will be 
infinite dimensional and may be thought of as 'containing' all possible QFr 
Lagrangians.110 The investigation of a theory through the evolution of its 
couplings is then translated, in this picture, into the study of the trajectory that 
the theory takes through coupling space, where the trajectory is parameterized 
by the scale-up factor t. The points in coupling space P = (.~i(t), ... Aj(t), ... ) 
for which ,Bi = 0 for all i-indicating that high-energy consistency may be 
possible - are called fixed points for the theory, since they represent points at 
which the trajectories tenninate. 
We can expect such fixed points to be extremely rare features of the space. I II 
But if we do manage to discover a fixed point, we can study the behaviour of 
the couplings in the region around it where the ,B-functions change smoothly 
from zero, since this region provides crucial infonnation about the high-energy 
properties of the theory. If the fixed point is such that the ,B-functions drive 
the couplings up towards the fixed point as t increases from below, but also 
down into the fixed point as t increases from above - so that the .a-functions 
are positive below the fixed point as negative above it, as t increases - then 
we say that the fixed point is 'UV-stable'.1l2 The reason for this is that in 
such a case, the couplings are continually attracted towards the fixed point 
as the energy increases and thus never escape to diverge at some energy. 
If, on the other hand, the .a-functions exhibit the opposite behaviour with 
respect to increasing t, then we say that the fixed point is 'UV-unstable'. 
Putting everything together, then, we may say that a sufficient condition for 
a theory to be well-defined at aU energies is if all its couplings are driven 
towards to fixed point is 'one way', or the 'simplest way', to secure consistency at 
high energies, I do not know what the alternatives are. 
llONote that couplings that 'start off' at zero will in general become non-zero as the 
energy increases, unless they are forbidden by symmetries. 
l11Huggett and Weingard [1995], pl8l. 
l12See e.g. Maggiore [2005], p237. 
158 
Chapter 6. Effective Quantum Field Theories 
into a tN-stable fixed point as t -t 00. Theories that meet this criterion are 
said to be 'asymptotically safe'.113 Asymptotically safe theories may therefore 
be said to produce 'a self-consistent description of a certain set of physical 
phenomena which is valid to arbitrarily high energy scales and does not need 
to refer to anything else outside of it. In this case the theory is said to be 
"fundamental'''.114 Huggett and Weingard refer to such theories as 'continuum 
compatible'.l15 
This alternative method of addressing questions of fundamentality does not 
- or at least not obviously - attach any significance to the mass dimensions 
associated with those couplings. But these, as we saw, are crucial to funda-
me,ntality considerations in the perturbative context. What therefore needs 
to be addressed at this point is what the relationship is between the 'power 
counting' -based approach to fundamentality presented until this coda, and 
the approach currently under consideration. What, then, is the relationship 
between asymptotic safety and the perturbative concepts of renormalizability 
and nonrenormalizability - and indeed between asymptotic safety and the 
use of perturbation theory at all? 
Let us first of all consider the relationship between renormalizability and 
asymptotic safety. The most important point to note in this connection is that 
it is now regarded as having been conclusively shown that renormalizable 
theories may lack UV-stable fixed points, and thus to fail to be asymptotically 
safe.116 Indeed - although there are caveats of various sorts - it now seems 
that both standard QED and the standard electroweak theory (and indeed 
the simple theory <jJ4 that we looked at as our example) fail to possess a tN 
stable fixed point, and thus not to be asymptotically safe. We may therefore 
say that renormalizability is not sufficient for asymptotic safety, and thus that 
it is possible that even a renormalizable theory may break down somewhere 
in energy space. However, given that my primary motivation for discussing 
QFT was to investigate whether it supports an anti-fundamentalist ontology, 
and given that that discussion was framed in terms of the properties of 
1131 am glossing over some subtleties here, since it turns out that this condition 
needs to be satisfied by only a subset of the couplings; see Percacci [2008] p5-6 for 
more detail. 
114Percacci [2008], p5. 
llSHuggett and Weingard [1995], p179. 
1l6See Huggett [2002], p264. 
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nonrenormalizable theories, the more pertinent question for present purposes 
is whether a theory's power-counting nonrenonnalizability may still be taken 
to be sufficient for its breakdown at some finite energy. But here things are 
rather less clear in the nonrenormalizable case, and the best answer to this 
question, at least for now, seems to be: probably not. I will now try to explain 
why this is. 
What we do know for cenain is that there are models of QFI' in two and three 
dimensions that are nonrenormalizable and yet possess a W-stable fixed point. 
What is not yet known is whether there are any realistic examples of such 
theories.117 It is now acknowledged as likely, however, that it is only technical 
obstacles that stand in the way of us ascenaining that there could exist such a 
theory.118 Indeed, there are now real hopes that there may be a fundamental 
quantum field-theoretic description of gravity - despite it being in principle 
nonrenormalizable - and looking for such a theory now represents an active 
area of research. 119 
These technical obstacles confronting the study of continuum-compatible yet 
nonrenormalizable theories are nonetheless fairly formidable. One of the 
fundamental challenges facing any such analysis is that the use of perturbative 
techniques is ruled out. The reason for this is that if such techniques are to be 
used to study the high-energy behaviour of a theory, and thus its behaviour 
around its fixed points (should it have any), then it must have couplings 
that remain sufficiently small in the region around the fixed points. It turns 
out that this implies that the only fixed point we can study through such 
techniques is the so-called 'Gaussian' fixed point, the characteristic feature of 
which is that all of the theory's couplings vanish at it, and thus are guaranteed 
to be small in the region around it. Theories whose UV-stable fixed point is 
the Gaussian are known as asymptotically free; QeD (again, as standardly 
written down) is a famous real example of such a theory. However, it is easy 
to show (though I shall not do so here) that asymptotic freedom is equivalent 
117See Percacci [2009]. 
118Percacci [2008]. 
119 A theory of gravity is necessarily nonrenormalizable since the requirement of 
general covariance brings in its wake a high number of spatial derivatives. Since the 
ax operator increases the mass dimension of a term containing it by 1 unit, these 
terms need to multipled by couplings with highly negative mass dimensions in order 
to keep the action dimensionless. 
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to asymptotic safety plus power-counting renormalizability: that is, those 
theories whose fixed point is the Gaussian must contain only renormalizable 
interactions.120 Thus, while it may turn out that there do exist realistic 
examples of asymptotically safe nonrenormalizable theories, such theories 
cannot be investigated through perturbative techniques, and this compounds 
the already formidable challenges facing any attempt to find them. 121 50 
while it does seem intuitively clear that 'randomly chosen' QFTs - including, 
of course, EFTs - will be very unlikely to exhibit asymptotic safety, it is not 
clear that we can say a great deal more than that about such theories at 
present. 122 
What Q.as thus emerged in this coda is that the discussion I offered in the 
main body of this chapter about whether QFf supports an anti-fundamentalist 
ontology was not only inconclusive insofar as the matter was left underde-
termined - though that was, I argued, non-trivial in itself - but that it also 
approached the matter in too restrictive a manner. This is on account of the 
fact that it took nonrenormalizability to be sufficient for denying a theory's 
fundamentality. In light of the above considerations, however, the idea that 
effective theories necessarily 'contain the seeds of their own destruction' in the 
way that their perturbative expansion seems to suggest they do can no longer 
be taken for granted. What it seems we can say is that, were amenability to 
perturbative treatment regarded as an essential element of any acceptable 
QFT, then our argument would still go through as before; it would remain the 
case that an EFT could not qualify as a fundamental theory as it could not be 
asymptotically free, hence could not be treated by means of these techniques. 
However, the path integral approach to computing the 5-matrix - though not, 
it turns out, that based upon canonical quantization - furnishes us with a 
definition of field theory that is in principle non-perturbative; that we can 
only systematically get a handle on QFT by means of perturbative techniques 
should be regarded as our problem and not Nature's. 123 I will therefore close 
12°Percacci [2009]; Percacci [ms]. 
12lSee e.g. Weinberg [1997a], pll; Rothstein [2004], p64. 
122Thanks to Nazim Bouatta at the University of Cambridge for an illuminating 
discussion on these matters. 
123The basic difference between the two fonnalisms in this connection is that 
the canonical quantization route contains operators in exponentials. Since the 
exponential of an operator is defined by its Taylor expansion, expansion techniques 
must always be used when making calculations within this fonnalism (see Maggiore 
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by saying that the argument I adduced in the main body of this chapter as 
to whether QFf has anti-fundamentalist implications is conditional upon the 
assumption that QFf was to be analyzed perturbatively, and stands or falls 
with that assumption. And that in turn invites a final conclusion. 
• Internal arguments against fundamentality may be sensitive not only to the 
physical principles underpinning the theory through which fundamentality 
is denied, but also to the mathematical framework that is adoped to present, 
and compute with, that theory. 
Since the metaphysical structure of the world is presumably invariant under 
changes in the computational approach that we take to our physics, and im-
pervious to our limitations when it comes our ability to perform the requisite 
calculations, this shows that in pursuing the internal approach to answer-
ing fundamentality questions we must refrain from uncritically projecting 
figments of our mathematical representations and pragmatic limitations into 
our metaphysical conclusions. Nevertheless, it remains that whether one 
ought to believe in a fundamental level or not will tum on questions of what 
principles, what formalisms, and what methods we elect to adopt in physics. 
Questions of fundamentality are thus shown to be continuous with all the 
other questions we might ask when interpreting physical theories, and no 
less difficult to answer. What is certain, however, is that the idea that those 
questions can be fruitfully approached by a priori speculation simply cannot 
be taken to stand up. 
[2005], p219). Nonetheless, one can find in the literature claims to the effect that 
QFf is 'intrinsically perturbative': see, e.g., Anselmi [2003] and Valente [2011], each 
of whom cites Dyson's view that QED 'is in its nature a perturbation theory'. But 
given the growing - and increasingly successful- use of non-perturbative techniques 
in extant QFT practice, it is entirely unclear to me what convincing defence could be 
given of this position. 
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~7 ____________ ----I 
The Limits of the Internal Approach: 
Implications and Interpretations 
7.1 Taking Stock 
The previous two chapters demonstrated that it is indeed possible to mount 
naturalistic arguments against the existence of a fundamental level by utilizing 
the internal approach. In-Chapter 5, I argued that we can use the principles 
underlying Analytic S-matrix theory to deny that there exists a fundamental 
level of objects, in the sense of a set of objects that lack proper parts and that 
are sufficient to compose everything else. In Chapter 6, I argued that the basic 
principles of quantum field theory, at least when viewed through the lens of 
perturbation theory, imply the existence of an infinitely descending ladder of 
laws unless we stipulate that one of those laws satisfies an additional principle 
for which we could find no physical motivation that did not presuppose 
fundamentality. And while I claimed that that in itself means that perturbative 
QFf ultimately underdetermines whether there is a fundamental level or not, I 
argued that it was non-trivial that one could find a set of principles that even 
permit such an anti-fundamentalist interpretation. 
Given that, as pointed out in Chapter 1, it is a standard assumption in 
metaphysics that there exists a fundamental level to reality that physics will 
one day describe, this demonstration that we can use physics to deny the 
existence of a fundamental level represents a significant achievement. It 
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means, among other things, that the widespread belief in the existence of a 
fundamental level is not one that the naturalized metaphysician need share. 
Note, however, that I did not conclude from either of the case studies I looked 
at that the world does in fact lack a fundamental level. We obviously cannot 
draw any such conclusions from the S-matrix case, since this theory has long 
been relegated to the dustbin of scientific history. And while QFf remains 
our most fundamental testable physical framework to date, even the qualified 
conclusion regarding anti-fundamentalism that it permits was drawn against 
the backdrop of perturbative assumptions and thus may have to be abandoned 
when those assumptions are supplanted. As such, Chapter 6 remains at best a 
first stab at discussing the relationship between QFf and anti-fundamentalism, 
and one that awaits a more exact treatment (elusive though that may be at 
present). However, the fact that I did not secure that this world does in 
fact lack a fundamental level is not actually of great relevance for present 
purposes. After all, the task that I set myself was that of investigating whether 
it is possible to deny the existence of a fundamental level through internal 
means, and the case studies amply demonstrated that it is. They showed 
how fundamentality questions can be continuous with other questions in the 
interpretation of physical theories, and that we can have as much right to 
draw conclusions supportive of anti-fundamentalism from them as we have 
to draw other conclusions that transcend their empirical content. 
While the fact that we can use the internal approach to mount defensible 
arguments against the existence of a fundamental level should certainly be re-
garded as significant, it must nevertheless be acknowledged that this approach 
brings with it a profound limitation on the kind of infinitely-<iescending world-
views that can be justified through its means. This was something that was 
flagged up at the end of both of the case studies, and the reason is that the 
use of the internal approach to denying to existence of a fundamental level 
inevitably commits us to certain principles which must at least be treated 
as fundamental within the context of that approach, since they constitute 
the basic assumptions from which our anti-fundamentalist conclusions are 
derived. Thus while we may be able to deny the existence of fundamental 
particles through S-matrix theory, those particles must obey the principles of S-
matrix theory at each and every mereologicallevel that those principles imply. 
Likewise, while we may have grounds to deny the existence of a fundamental 
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law lying at the bottom rung of the ladder of laws that the principles of QFT 
imply, every law in that ladder must accord with those principles (whether it 
has a last rung or not). It is in this sense that the internal approach can only 
ever present us with a sort of 'half-way house' form of anti-fundamentalism 
in which the principles governing the physics of a world must stay the same 
even as its levels unfurl without end. 
But this clearly represents a non-trivial limitation on the sorts of anti-fundamentalist 
conclusions that the approach can be used to draw. It implies, for example, 
that we cannot use the approach to argue for a picture in which the world 
unfolds ad infinitum into regimes as dynamically and ontologically opposed 
as those of classical and quantum physics. But since it was part of Bohm's 
view of the 'qualitative infinity of nature', mentioned in Chapter 4, Section 1, 
that worlds could coherently - even profitably - be regarded as decomposing 
into successively deterministic and indeterministic layers, we will never use 
the internal approach to argue for the existence of the sort of worlds that 
Bohm envisaged. 1 More generally, we cannot use the internal approach to 
argue for the existence of worlds that unfold endlessly into regimes governed 
by ever more fundamental physical principles. But since Popper held that 
the world that is studied by science should be taken to be describable by 
theories of 'greater and greater depth' - or, as Weinberg has characterized 
his view, in terms of a chain of 'more and more fundamental principles' -
this is not a view that we can argue for by means of the approach either. 2 
However, I think we have to agree there is nothing incoherent in the concepts 
of the sort of worlds that Bohm and Popper envisaged. We ought, I think, 
to acknowledge that they constitute genuine pOSSibilities, and that it is even 
possible that this world is just such a world. But since, as was argued in 
Chapter 4, the only acceptably naturalistic way we could hope to deny the 
existence of a fundamental level is through the internal approach, I believe 
that there is no avoiding the conclusion that, although it is possible that our 
world is one such world, whether it is in fact that way is simply something that 
must forever escape our grasp. And that is something that I think we must 
just accept. 
I hold, therefore, that since the internal approach is the only acceptable route 
IBohm [1957], Chapter 4, Section 6. 
2Popper [1972]; Weinberg [1993], pl84. 
167 
Chapter 7. The Limits of the Internal Approach 
we can take toward denying the existence of a fundamental level, and in spite 
of the fact that the approach can generate non-trivial anti-fundamentalist 
conclusions, there is a substantial limitation on the sort of fundamentality 
that we will ever be in a position to deny. Though we can deny the existence 
of fundamental level - in the sense of a set of particles or a fundamental law -
we cannot argue against the existence of fundamental physical principles. That 
is a straightforward but nonetheless profound consequence of the position 
taken so far. But it is also a consequence that suggests we now ask a new 
fundamentality question, and one whose answer will help us to more fully 
comprehend the conclusions that have so far been reached. That question 
is whether the physical principles that must be treated as fundamental in 
the context of the internal approach oUght to be regarded as somehow more 
ontologically fundamental than anything else that we have been discussing 
so far - more fundamental, that is, than either laws or particles, including 
even any putatively fundamental examples of each. This, after all, is a natural 
question to ask once the above limitation is acknowledged, since exactly how 
limited the internal approach is as a means of denying fundamentality is going 
to depend on whether we ought to have regarded principles, and not particles 
or laws, as that which is somehow 'truly' fundamental all along. 
Before we can make sense of this question of whether we ought to regard 
principles as that which is ontologically fundamental, however, it seems we 
face a number of challenges. Three such challenges spring immediately to 
mind. First of all, one might argue that we have not yet been given a suf-
ficiently good reason for even asking the question, since all that the above 
considerations have shown is that it is a product of the dialectical method 
represented by the internal approach that one cannot deny the existence of 
fundamental principles. It follows that the most that has been shown so far is 
that such principles have to be regarded as dialectically or methodologically 
fundamental in the context of arguments against the existence of a funda-
mental level. By contrast, when we talk about the fundamental level, we 
mean to denote something that is ontologically fundamental (be it occupied 
by particles, laws or anything else); but, of course, the fact that something is 
methodolOgically fundamental need not imply, at least not without further 
argument, that it ought to be regarded as ontologically fundamental too. 
Secondly, even if the above challenge can be met so that the question can be 
168 
Chapter 7. The Limits of the Internal Approach 
regarded as well-motivated, it is not clear that it would even make any sense 
to ask it, since the very concept of a 'principle' connotes something that is 
propositional in character. But propositions seem to belong to the realm of 
concepts and representation, and thus to be in an altogether different ontolog-
ical ball park from such physically efficacious entities as particles or laws. And 
thirdly, even if we could construe principles in appropriately ontological terms, 
it is far from obvious at this point how we could construe their conjectured 
fundamentality. The reason is we have so far conceived of the fundamentality 
of objects or laws in terms of their inhabiting the fundamental level, but it is 
clear by now that we cannot construe these principles as being fundamental 
in that way. After all, what was shown above is that we can use these very 
principles to deny the existence of a fundamental level; we clearly cannot 
then go on to say by way of articulating their fundamentality that those same 
principles inhabit it. 
There are therefore considerable challenges facing any attempt to orientate 
physical principles within the concept of ontological fundamentality. But 
they are challenges it will nonetheless pay to face up to. Regarding the first 
of the above challenges, not leaving the discussion of the fundamentality 
of principles at the methodological level surely must be regarded as well-
motivated. For one thing, and as already pointed out, only once we have made 
at least some attempt to understand where principles sit on the fundamentality 
hierarchy will we be in a position to fully understand the limitations of the 
internal approach to denying fundamentality. But for another thing, the idea 
that it is principles - especially symmetry principles - that are somehow to be 
regarded as that which is truly fundamental in particle physics reflects a view 
that seems to be increasingly held by particle physicists themselves. Largely 
due to the success of the gauge principle in (to a great extent) determining 
both the laws of the Standard Model and the associated fundamental particles, 
one can now find physiCists expJicitly alluding to the idea that it is 'the 
principles of elementary particle physics [that] are fundamental to all of 
nature', not particles, forces or laws.3 By taking the time to make sense of our 
question regarding the fundamentality of principles, we will be assisting in 
further articulating how certain particle physicists who have reflected on this 
issue themselves conceive of fundamentality - a project that is, I take it, of 
3Weinberg [1993], p44; see also, e.g., Salam [1979], p528. 
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some philosophical interest in itself. 
Given that doing so has clear motivations, what I want to do now is take some 
steps toward understanding what it might mean to call a physical principle 
'ontologically fundamental', and then begin to consider whether we in fact 
ought to regard principles in that way. I will therefore now try to address the 
second and third challenges that were raised a moment ago. As will be seen 
presendy, doing so will reveal rich connections between Part 1 of this thesis 
and the central tenets of ontic structural realism. 
7.2 Understanding the Fundamentality of Prin-
ciples: The Touchstone to Ontic Structural-
ism 
The second of the challenges laid out above concerned the fact that it is not 
at all obvious at a first pass how we could regard physical principles as being 
fundamental in anything like the way that we take, say, elementary particles 
to be - the reason being that principles seem to belong more to the realm of 
representation than to that of the physical. But there is an obvious and natural 
way to try to resolve this quandary, and that is to consider whatever it is that 
these principles refer to as the proper subject of the fundamentality attribution. 
Now, I will not here be hubristic enough to attempt to anticipate every sort of 
physical principle that might be proposed in fundamental physics. Rather, I 
will try to provide a characterization of principles that is representative of the 
principles we have looked at so far at least, and try to ascertain a candidate 
for their referents. 
Looking back again the case studies, and thus considering once again the 
principles underpinning S-matrix theory and QFf, we find principles such 
as the principle of superposition, the unitarity principle and the principle of 
Lorentz invariance; I have also just mentioned the gauge principle as another 
example that has motivated claims regarding the fundamentality of principles. 
But all of these principles may be naturally construed as constraints upon 
the dynamics. The superposition principle implies, for example, that the 
dynamics must be linear; the unitarity principle amounts to the condition 
170 
Chapter 7. The Limits of the Internal Approach 
that the dynamics must representable by a unitary operator; the principle 
of Lorentz invariance obviously implies that the dynamics must be invariant 
under the transformations of the (inhomogeneous) Lorentz group, and the 
gauge principle demands that they must be invariant under a group of local 
gauge transformations (though, of course, which such group is not pinned 
down by this principle). Now, clearly each of these constraints refers to 
the mathematical form of the dynamics, and as such it seems that we can 
characterize each of these key principles as principles that impose a constraint 
upon the structure of the dynamics. But if we are looking for an ontological 
correlate of these principles, then it seems that the most natural candidate 
is just the structure of the dynamics. It therefore seems right to say that, in 
these (important) cases at least, principles refer to dynamical structures. It 
is therefore the latter that I propose we take to be the proper subject of the 
fundamentality claim made on behalf of principles. 
If that is the case, then the question of whether we should regard these prin-
ciples as in some sense ontologically fundamental becomes the question of 
whether we should regard the relevant dynamical structures as ontologically 
fundamental. But it is, of course, precisely that question that ontic structural 
realists are centrally concerned with - and take to be answered in the affir-
mative. The task of considering whether we ought to regard the physical 
principles that the internal approach treats as methodologically fundamen-
tal as also being ontologicaUy fundamental thus translates into the task of 
adjudicating on whether the distinctive thesis of ontic structuralism can be 
rigorously shown to hold up. It is therefore precisely this question that I will be 
concerned with in Part 2 of this essay. 
Before I attend to that question, however, it will be helpful to get clearer on 
exactly what is meant by calling structures 'ontologically fundamental', and 
thus to address the third of the challenges that were oudined above. We have 
seen that we cannot conceive of the fundamentality of principles - where 
I now take the latter to be an elliptic way of expressing the fundamentality 
of dynamical structures - in terms of their occupation of a fundamental level. 
The question is then how we should understand any claim that they are 
ontologically fundamental. The key here, however, is to realize ~at when 
we talk about a levels hierarchy - that is, a hierarchy in which some level of 
objects or laws is more fundamental than another - we make intra-categorical 
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fundamentality claims. Thus, to say that there exists a fundamental level of 
objects, for example, is to say that there is a set of objects that are privileged 
with respect to all the other entities within the category of objects. Likewise, 
to say that there exists a fundamental law is to say that there is a law that is 
privileged with respect to all other laws. However, given that what originally 
motivated asking the question of whether principles - and hence structures 
- ought to be regarded as ontologically fundamental was the fact that we 
seemed to be able to argue against the existence of fundamental particles 
or laws, but not of fundamental principles, it seems clear that what we are 
concerned with investigating now is an inter-categorical claim. In particular, 
we are concerned with a. claim about the relative fundamentality of the 
category of dynamical structures compared to the category of objects, or the 
category of laws. Thus, to be clear, when the radical ontic structuralists 
Ladyman and Ross write that 'structure is more ontologically fundamental 
than objects', for example, this should not be interpreted as a claim about 
structure lying on a lower level than some level composed of objects. Rather, 
we should understand it as a claim about the relative fundamentality of those 
categories.4 It follows that we can expect the answer to this question of 
whether structure is a fundamental category to be neutral on the question of 
whether or not there exists a fundamental level. 5 
In the second part of this thesis, then, I want to assess whether the flagship 
claim of ontic structuralism - that the category of dynamical structure is an 
onto logically fundamental category - can be rigorously defended. In doing 
so, it will be helpful to be clear that structuralists accuse mo~ contemporary 
metaphysics of being overly 'object-oriented' as a result of its disengagement 
from physics, and that consequently it has failed to recognize that it is structure 
that comprises either the, or at least a, fundamental category.6 Though I take it 
that the view has a certain amount of intuitive force, I will not attempt to argue 
4Ladyman and Ross [2007], p14S. The precise meaning of 'radical' versus 'moder-
ate' structuralist terminology will be clarified in the next section. 
sIndeed, James Ladyman has pressed, in a number of recent talks, the compata-
bility of ontic structuralism with both the existence and the absence of a fundamental 
level. 
6See, e.g., French [2006] for a statement of the 'object-oriented' accusation. (As 
we will see, the use of the definite and the indefinite article here separates the radical 
and moderate views, respectively.) 
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for that accusation here.7 But it is clear that if structuralists are correct in that 
view then examining whether structure should be regarded as a fundamental 
category will represent another attempt to use physics to scrutinize and 
challenge a received view in metaphysics regarding fundamentality. Indeed, 
when radical ontic structuralists state that 'relational structure is ontologically 
fundamental, and individual objects are not', they are clearly making an 
explicitly anti-fundamentalist claim on behalf of particles.8 However, I have 
argued that it is a different such claim than that which was the topic of 
Part 1. While there I considered whether one might deny that there exist 
fundamental particles in the sense of a fundamental level comprised of them, 
ontic structuralists attempt to deny that particles are fundamental in the 
sense of comprising a fundamental category. Although this latter claim is 
clearly a different anti-fundamentalist claim on behalf of particles, it is an 
anti-fundamentalist claim nonetheless, and one that will be our principal 
focus of attention from this point on. The discussion of Part 2 of this thesis 
may thus be seen as complementary to that of Part 1, as well as interpretative 
of it. 
Before I begin contemplating the ontological fundamentality of structures, 
however, it will help to make some clarifications at the outset. First of all, 
while structuralists have, in places, come close to claiming that the structures 
they are concerned with are more fundamental than laws, laws are more often 
seen in the structuralist literature as themselves representative of dynamical 
structures.9 Furthermore, the vast majority of the ontic structuralist literature, 
and the most characteristic examples of it, are concerned with structure's 
ontological standing relative to objects. On account of that, I will focus 
7 Alas, detailed defence of the idea that contemporary metaphysics typically does 
regard objects, and only objects, as fundamental appears to be lacking in the current 
structuralist literature. While I take it that it is reasonably intuitive that much familiar 
contemporary metaphysics does privilege the category of objects, one clearly cannot 
be too facetious with this claim since, for example, Armstrong holds that states of 
affairs constitute the fundamental ontological category (Armstrong [1997]), and 
Russell and Wittgenstein took facts to be fundamental (see e.g. Russell [1918J; 
Wittgenstein [1961]). 
8Ladyrnan and Ross op. cit., pl48. 
9For example, Cei and French [forthcoming] discuss whether we can view sym· 
metries as constraints on laws (as opposed to merely features of them), and thus as 
in some sense 'prior' to laws. On the other hand, Worrall [1989] presents laws as 
paradigmatic examples of structures. 
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exclusively on the relationship of structures to objects in particular, and 
thus examine whether we may say that the category of structure is more 
onto logically fundamental than that of objects. Secondly, I will assume 
throughout that there are only two categories in play. If we can show that 
structure is prior to objects and not vice versa, then structure will be the 
most fundamental category (and mutatis mutandis with 'objects' replaced 
by 'structure'). Should it tum out that each is prior to the othe~ then they 
will, of course, be equally fundamental. It seems correct to me to say in this 
context that if the latter were to be the case, then it is better to regard each as 
a fundamental category rather than neither as a fundamental category, since 
both (and by hypothesis no others) are required to build the world. If we find 
that the priority relations are indeed reciprocated then that is what I shall say, 
though it is, of course, somewhat a semantic matter which stance we choose 
to take on this. In any case, what is most important is the structure of the 
priority relations, and not whether the event of their reciprocation is or is not 
taken to undermine fundamentality attributions. Finally, I note that I will not 
provide much in the way of a survey of the literature on ontic structuralism 
here. Rather, I will give merely the briefest presentation of what I take its 
core claims to be, before moving on to assess them. 
With those clarifications in place, let me therefore introduce ontic structural-
ism. 
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Structure as a Fundamental 
Category 1: Structuralism as a 
Supervenience Thesis 
8.1 Introducing Ontic Structuralism 
I have already pointed out that ontic structuralists hold that structure should 
be regarded as a fundamental ontological category. We may, in fact, take this 
position to be largely definitive of ontic structural realism. In his survey article 
for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, for example, Ladyman introduces 
ontic structuralism on its 'broadest construal' as 'any form of structural realism 
based on an ontological or metaphysical thesis that inflates the ontological 
priority of structure and relations', suggesting that it is a claim concerning the 
priority status of structures relative to objects that we· may take to be most 
characteristic of structuralist metaphysics.1 Indeed, statements attesting to 
this view abound in the structuralist literature. 2 
1 Ladyman [2007], Section 4. 
2French, for example, 'take(sJ as a core feature of [ontic structuralism] the claim 
that the putative "objects" are dependent in some manner upon the relevant relations' 
([2010], pl04); Ladyman and Ross state that 'ontic structural realism is the view 
that the world has an objective modal structure that is ontologically fundamental' 
([2007], pI30); Wolff states that 'ontic structural realists hold that structure is all 
there is, or at least all there is fundamentally' (Wolff [2011J, pI); and so on. 
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As also mentioned in the last chapter, ontic structuralists - hereafter, simply 
'structuralists' - typically additionally hold that mainstream metaphysics is 
highly 'object-orientated', since it presents the category of objects as though 
it has a uniquely privileged ontological status (and mistakenly so in their 
view).3 Whatever exactly the evidence is for this claim, if it is true then 
given that structuralism is about 'inflating' the priority of structures relative 
to objects, it follows that there are two distinct forms of structuralism that 
may be discerned.4 This is because a position that fell short of imparting a 
superior status to structure, but simply raised it to the status of objects, would 
qualify as just as legitimate a form of structuralism on Ladyman's construal 
as one that held the stronger 'superiority' view. One therefore finds two 
positions, of differing strengths, being defended in the structuralist literature. 
On the one hand, there is the 'radical' position in which structures enjoy 
an unreciprocated, one-way priority over objects. This more revisionary of 
theses has been associated primarily with French and Ladyman - both of 
whom even go so far as to recommend the outright elimination of objects 
from our ontology as a result of their analyses. S There is, on the other hand, 
a less radical and so-called moderate position, which is at present associated 
primarily with Esfeld and Lam. According to this position, the two categories 
should be taken to be 'ontologically on a par' with one another, so that -
to the extent that is makes sense to speak of 'priority' at all - these priority 
relations are reciprocated.6 Thus while the radical view takes it that 'relational 
3Though there is also a purely epistemic variant of structuralism (see, for example, 
Section 3 of Ladyman [2007]), as this is a thesis in ontology I will focus on the ontic 
version alone. . 
4 As noted in the last chapter, I will not attempt to defend or rebut this claim 
regarding the 'object-ori~nted' nature of contemporary metaphysics here. All that is 
needed for present purposes is the perception that structure has been neglected as a 
category in comparison to objects; in that case, either of the positions about to be 
adduced will imply a suitable 'inflation' of the priority of structures. 
sSee, e.g., Ladyman [1998], French and Ladyman [2003a]. For statements on 
how the secondary status of objects prompts their elimination, see French [2010]; 
Ladyman and Ross [2007J, Chapter 3. The issue of elimination will be returned to at 
the end of this chapter. . 
6See e.g. Esfeld and Lam [2008], [2009]; Esfeld [2004]. This position has also 
been associated with Eddington (see e.g. his [1939] pp230-231 and French [2003]). 
(It may well be helpful for me to recall at this point my remarks in Chapter I, Section 
2 that while it is awkward to use the word 'priority' when symmetrical relations are 
permitted, I nonetheless use the currendy accepted terminology. And once again, I 
do not take x's being prior to y to be sufficient for x's being more fundamental than y; 
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structure is more ontologically fundamental than objects', according to the 
moderate view objects and structure 'are both on the same footing, belonging 
both to the ontological ground flOOr'.7 As such, structure and objects are to be 
regarded as equally fundamental categories. Since - as mentioned in the last 
chapter - I (i) assume that these are the only categories in play, and (ii) take 
it that, in a case of reciprocated priority between categories, it is better to say 
that both are fundamental (as opposed to saying that neither are), it follows 
that both structure and objects comprise fundamental categories according to 
the moderate view. 
Let me therefore call the claim that structures are prior to objects the 'core 
~laim' of structuralism, since this is shared by both of the positions; the 
positions may then be differentiated from each other in terms of whether 
they assert or deny that objects are likewise prior to structures, and thus 
over whether objects comprise a fundamental category in addition to that of 
structure.8 Since my purpose in Part 2 of this essay is to adjudicate on whether 
there is any case to be made as to whether structure is an ontologically funda-
mental category, I will therefore assess in what follows whether either of these 
positions can be defended. However, in spite of the fact that there is already 
a large body of literature dedicated to defending each view - something that 
certainly cannot be said regarding the existence of a fundamental level - I 
think that more than a mere survey of the extant literature is required in order 
to assess whether structure is indeed more fundamental. The reasons for 
this are twofold. First of all, there is a case to be made that the structuralist 
understanding of priority has in many cases yet to be made fully precise. 
and different and inequivalent characterizations of priority are often used 
interchangeably. 9 As a result, Hawley has complained of radical structuralism 
that 'the ways in which structures are somehow prior to objects', and thus 
I take x to be more fundamental only if, in addition, y is not prior to x; failing that, x 
will be asJundamental as y. 
7Esfeld and Lam [2008], pS. 
8Thus note that the 'moderate' poSition is not - at least not on my rendering -
to be understood as a logically weaker claim than that made by that radical view. 
That is. the radical view should not be thought of as entailing the moderate position. 
Rather, the two are incompatible with one another since each makes an assertion 
regarding the priority of objects over structures that the other explicitly denies. 
9For example, Ladyman and Ross [2007] (see, e.g., p130) and Kantorovich 
[2003] both slide between determination- and dependence-based characterizations 
of priority. (Kantorovich's paper will be discussed below.) 
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what it means for structure to be ontologically fundamental and for objects 
by contrast to fail to be, are as it stands 'deeply unclear' .10 When ascertaining 
whether one or other structuralist thesis can be defended, we will therefore 
have to try to be clearer on the nature of the priority relation involved than 
has often been the case so far. 
A further reason why it is problematic to simply assess the extant arguments 
for one or other of the structuralist positions is that they are arguably just 
inconclusive as they stand (and that is so even putting the ambiguity over 
priority aside). Thus on the one hand, while radical structuralists have in many 
cases presented intuitively compelling grounds for suspecting that structures 
are prior to objects, they generally do not consider the converse question of 
whether there is also a case to be made for the reciprocated priority of objects 
over structures. As such, their arguments do not yet establish that it is the 
radical position, and not the moderate position, that is best recommended 
to us by physics. On the other hand, while moderate structuralists have 
explicidy attempted to make a case for the reciprocated priority of objects 
over structures, that case is arguably just not compelling as it stands, and 
thus radical structuralists have not bothered to spill much ink on it. The 
extant major argument for the moderate position binges on the idea that 
'for relations to be instantiated, there has to be something that instantiates 
them, that is, that stands in the'relations', and that these relata can only 
be construed as objects.ll They call this objection that structures cannot be 
conceived of as instantiated without objects the 'intelligibility objection' to 
radical structuralism.12 But the nature of this requirement that structures 
place on objects is not spelled out, and, in any case, it seems perfectly 
consistent to construe the requirement in terms of relations necessitating the 
existence of relata, but only as an ontologically secondary phenomenon.13 
lOHawley [2008]. 
llEsfeld and Lam [2008], p5; see also their [2009]. 
12Esfeld and Lam [2008]. 
13It is, after all, presumably this circumstance that French and Ladyman have in 
mind when they invoke Cassirer's conception of objects as the 'points of intersection' 
of relations, and thus implied by those relations but only as a derivative phenomenon 
(see French and Ladyman [2003a]; see also Ladyman and Ross [2007], Section 
3.5, Point 1). (Note that I do not mean to communicate that this talk is sufficiently 
perspicuous as it stands, only that it is a coherent idea that Esfeld and Lam fail 
to engage with.) It may also be pointed out that Paul [forthcoming] and Mertz 
[1996] defend the coherence of the view that relations can have other relata as 
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Thus, insofar as we want to go further than establishing structuralism's core 
claim and hence adjudicate between its two rival positions, we need to 
explicitly consider possible justifications for the priority of objects that are 
more compelling than have been offered so far. 
I therefore suggest that, rather than simply review the extant literature, we 
try to view the issue of priority in structuralism with fresh eyes. However, to 
put ourselves in a position to assess any claim regarding the relative priority 
of structures and objects there is some obvious preliminary groundwork that 
must be done first. In particular, we must first of all (i) identify what it is that 
we mean by 'structures', (ii) identify what it is that we mean by 'objects', and 
(iii) .identify an appropriate priority relation that we take to connect these 
two categories. Regarding the first point, it should be noted right away that 
how exactly structuralists ought to define structure in general has proved to 
be a controversial matter. In fact, even providing a loose characterization 
of structure has proved to be somewhat problematic: while structuralists 
often informally characterize structures as 'nexuses of relations', this is ar-
guably insufficiently general to capture the all-important notion of group 
Structure (since the latter is better expressed as 'pattern of interrelatedness 
of relations').!4 But rather than offer any very precise general definition of 
structure and establish their claims with respect to that, structuralists are usu-
ally content to work with a rough-and ready characterization of structure and 
establish their claims with reference to specific examples of (what they take 
to be) paradigmatic structures in physics. Likewise, while there is no general 
definition of 'object' to be found, to my knowledge, in the structuralist liter-
ature, again paradigmatic examples of objects are either chosen or entailed 
by an antecedent choice of structure, and the priority claims then argued 
for. Structuralists thus tend to establish their claims not with respect to some 
general characterization of structures and objects, but rather on a case-by-case 
basis. (Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how a naturalistic approach to the 
structuralist question could proceed in any other way.) Therefore, in order to 
assess structuralism's priority claims, I will choose among their examples and 
see if those claims may be argued to go through in those cases. 
their relations, thus challenging Esfeld and Law's 'intelligibility objection' even more 
directly. 
14See e.g. Ladyman and Ross [2007], p138; French [2012], pl0. 
179 
Chapter 8. Structuralism as a Supervenience Thesis 
To do that, the third of the above points must be addressed, and thus an 
appropriate priority relation be chosen. What is immediately clear in this 
regard is that any such relation, if it is to be appropriate to structuralism, 
must be capable of relating entities of different categories (since it must be 
the case that it is able to relate both structures and objects). Thus the priority 
relations that we focused on in Chapters 5 and 6 - namely, those of parthood 
and nomic derivation - will be unsuitable here, since the latter obviously 
obtains only between laws and the former - at least standardly - only between 
objects. Something more general is therefore required. Looking again Chapter 
2, where a number of priority relations are described, two obvious candidates 
stand out. Recall that it was stated there that we may split priority relations 
into two broad categories, which I called 'relations of determination' and 
'relations of dependence'. As was also mentioned there, while the relation of 
nomic derivation was taken to be a member of the first category, supervenience 
was taken to be a more general sort of determination relation since it could 
apply to entities of different categories (see Chapter 2, Section 1). Likewise, 
although partbood was presented as a type of dependence relation, it was 
noted that there are much more general approaches to dependence that may 
be appealed to in more general cases. IS 
It therefore seems that, prima facie at least, either of supervenience or some 
suitably general notion of dependence may be taken to be candidate relations 
for expressing priority in structuralism. Indeed, structuralists have, at different 
points, utilized both.I6 In order to get things going, I suggest that we pick one 
and run with it, and I propose that we start with supervenience. I7 In addition 
to the reasons just adduced as to why this is a suitable candidate, this relation 
is arguably a natural choice given structuralism's subversive intentions. After 
all, since supervenience is so commonly invoked to express fundamentality 
15Much more on Fine's notion of dependence - one proposal for a general depen-
dence relation - may be found in Chapter 6. 
16Examples of uses of each will be presented anon. 
17To recap from Chapter 2, by saying that A supervenes on B I will mean that 
things that are B-indiscernible are A-indiscernible. This rendering is equivalent 
to saying that B-properties determine (or 'settle') A-properties, since it entails that 
sameness with respect to B-properties implies sameness with respect to A-properties. 
In thinking about whether objects supervene on structures, then, we will be thinking 
about whether the objects could be different without the structures somehow being 
different. 
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theses in contemporary metaphysics, if structuralists can show that objects 
supervene on structures then they will be in a very strong position to claim 
that the overly 'object-oriented' view that they detect in that metaphysics is 
a deeply misguided one. That seems like motivation enough to be getting 
along with for now. (Whether it is in fact the best relation for structuralism is 
something that it will be easier to address in due course.) 
What is now needed to proceed further is a choice of structure and objects. 
Since the focus in this thesis lies squarely on particle physics, I suggest that 
we choose group structure as the example of structure that we will use to get 
started. 18 The reasons for this will be obvious. The importance of symmetries 
in contemporary particle physics simply cannot be overstated. It is indeed the 
unrivalled methodological centrality of symmetry principles in contemporary 
theories that has led particle physicists to hazard that it is symmetries that 
are 'fundamental to all of nature', as was mentioned in the last chapter. Partly 
as a result of this, the notion of group structure has enjoyed a centre-stage 
position in structuralism, though one can find symmetries at the forefront 
of even the earliest of structuralist works. 19 Still, talk of group structure in 
general is a little too abstract to be helpful in this context and, since we are 
going on a case-by-case basis, what we need is a concrete example of group 
structure that is relevant to particle physics. I therefore propose that the 
global SU(3) flavour symmetry - the structure underpinning the 'Eightfold 
Way' classification of hadrons by Gell-Mann and Ne'eman - represents a good 
place to start. 
This specific example is again recommended to us for a number of reasons. 
For one thing, the SU(3) flavour symmetry is an undisputed advocate for the 
power of symmetry considerations in particle physics. Almost half a century 
since its inception, particle physicists have described it as 'probably the most 
successful and fruitful idea for the systemization of elementary particles', and 
l8This structure is to be understood as somehow physically, and not purely mathe-
matically, interpreted; the question of how this type of structure can be considered as 
such will be considered in the next chapter. 
19See, e.g., Cassirer [1956]; Eddington [1939]. Thus, while Roberts has dubbed 
antic structuralism that focuses on symmetry 'group structural realism' (see Roberts 
[2011], French points out that 'group structure is so bound up with antic structural 
realism in the works of myself and Ladyman that one may wonder whether the view 
really deserves a separate designation' (French [2012], p13). 
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one that has served as a prototype for particle physics in the time since.20 
Redhead and Debs have likewise described it as 'perhaps the most celebrated 
example of symmetry considerations being put to heuristic use', and the 
avowed structuralist Kantorovich has likewise dubbed it 'the most successful 
and historically most influential' of the internal (i.e. non-spatiotemporal) 
symmetries.21 The latter has also stated that 'one of the best ways' to establish 
the thesis of ontic structuralism is to examine its implications for structure-
object relations, and given its paradigmatic status in particle physics it does 
indeed seem right to say that if group-based structuralism is to be thought to 
work anywhere, it should be shown to work here. 22 
Since this symmetry pertains to the strong interaction, t4e choice of this as 
our structure entails that the objects of interest will be the strongly interacting 
particles - that is, the quarks and hadrons. Given that I have already singled 
out supervenience as the priority relation in question, what I want to do 
in this chapter is closely study the question of whether - and modulo what 
assumptions - one can say that these particles supervene on this structure. 
Now, something like this issue has already been discussed by Kantorovich, 
since he claims that the global SU(3) symmetry 'dictate[s] via its represen-
tations the hadron spectrum (Le., the variety of charges and other quantum 
numbers, such as total isospin) and determine[s] the possible outcomes of 
hadron interactions'. 23 Since supervenience amounts to determination, I take 
20Guzeyand Polyakov [2004], pp673-4. 
21Redhead and Debs [2007], pp39-40; Kantorovich [2003], p660. 
22Kantorovich [2009], p79. One hesitation one might have about this choice is that 
the global SU(3) symmetry is no longer regarded as a fundamental symmetry, being 
seen instead as an 'accidental' consequence of the fact that the strong interaction has 
a local SU(3) colour gauge symmetry in tandem with the fact that the three lightest 
quarks have masses within 10% of each other (plus, as is often forgotten, the fact 
that the energy scale associated with QeD is so high as to make that 10% difference 
insignificant). But this is not a relevant point for our purposes: I am not here setting 
out to establish which structure out of the category of structures used in particle 
physics is more fundamental than another or more fundamental than the rest (if any), 
but rather whether structure as a category is more fundamental than objects as a 
category, and hence more fundamental than any of the objects in that category. Thus, 
if the strongly-interacting particles - including the fundamental strongly-interacting 
particles - can be shown to supervene upon the global SU(3) flavour structure, then 
the core structuralist claim will go through, regardless of whether this structure is or 
is not the most fundamental structure one could cite in this connection. 
23Kantorovich [2003], p663 et passim. Kantorovich's work is also recounted 
approvingly in Ladyman [2007], Section 4.1 and Ladyman and Ross [2007], Section 
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this language of 'dictation' to amount to a supervenience claim. However, 
he has precious little to say about how exactly this 'dictation' is supposed to 
work, at least not in any detail. Furthermore, as we will see, the idea that 
this symmetry alone suffices to determine the hadrons cannot be regarded 
as correct as it stands.24 This is in fact something that Kantorovich himself 
seems to concede, for he states that 
[o]f course, we do not have here an absolute dictate; once we 
choose a representation for a family of hadrons that have some 
common properties, the classification of the rest of the family is 
determined. However, this kind of 'dictate' is weaker than the 
dynanPcaI dictate that will be discussed when we tum to gauge 
dynamics. 25 
But one would like to know what this lack of an 'absolute dictate' amounts to 
in less metaphorical terms. Certainly, if structuralism is to present itself as a 
viable and compelling alternative to standard 'object-oriented' metaphysics, 
then what exactly is going on with such priority claims will have to be 
presented more sharply.26 
I propose, therefore, that we try to elucidate in more explicit terms the extent 
to which the strongly· interacting particles - hereafter for brevity 'SIPs' -
may be said to supervene on dynamical symmetries. As already implicated, 
the claim that symmetry 'dictates' the SIPs is more complex than it has been 
3.3. 
24There are in fact a number of other problems with Kantorovich's argument in 
addition to the lack of clarity regarding how it is that 'symmetry dictates hadrons'. For 
one thing, as well as presenting the fundamentality of structure along supervenience 
lines, he also adopts something closer to a dependence-based account to express his 
priority views and slips between the two as though they are interchangeable. This 
is problematic in itself, but a second problem is that his argument that the hadrons 
depend upon the symmetries fares even more poorly than his supervenience-based 
argument, since it patently will not convince anyone who does not already share his 
conclusion. I will explain why this is in the next chapter. 
25Kantorovich [2003], p664. 
26If it helps avoid confusion at this point, I, think that the contrast with the gauge 
symmetries that Kantorovich is referring to is that in the latter case - at least in his 
opinion - the specific representations that are entailed is determined, not just the rest 
of a representation given the existence of a subset of the particles in it. Whether or 
not that is right, what this talk of 'specific representations' being determined means 
will be explained imminently. 
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presented in the literature thus far, and it will be helpful to extend at the outset 
the structure we will be concerned with from SU(3) to SU(3)®SU(2)®U(1). 
(Of course, it will not matter from the point of view of structuralism's main 
thesis that a different structure may have to be used to make its claims most 
plausible; all that structuralism demands is that some physical structure can 
be used to establish them.) Here - and as will be gone into in more detail 
immanently - the SU(3) structure relates the internal 'flavour' properties 
isospin and hypercharge, SU(2) pertains to spin and U(1) to baryon number. 
The reason that this extended structure will be used is because the latter two 
groups play a pivotal role in the constituent quark model that followed on 
from, and immeasurably improved, the Original Eightfold Way hypothesis 
that was based on SU(3) alone, and do so in a way that is highly relevant 
to the supervenience claim. Thus, and to be clear at the outset, I shall take 
the first three quarks - that is, the up, down and strange quarks - and all 
the hadrons that can be built up from them as the objects relevant to this 
structure, where each of these particles is defined in terms of the relevant 
specific determinate values of isospin, hypercharge, spin and baryon number. 27 
Furthermore, note that when I talk about 'objects' in what follows, I will 
remain entirely neutral - at least initially - on how they are to be conceived 
of ontologically, beyond that they instantiate the determinate properties that 
I take to define their kind. That is, I will remain neutral on whether we ought 
to consider them in terms of the 'bundle' view, the 'substratum' view and so 
on. Any metaphysical conception of a particle will, after all, have to consider 
it to possess the appropriate determinates of these properties; whether the 
supervenience claims that I will attempt to derive conflict with any of the 
received metaphysical conceptions of objects is a matter I will return to, albeit 
briefly, below. 
With those clarifications of structure, objects, and the choice of priority 
relation in place, I will now move on to present the Eightfold Way hypothesis 
27Thus, when I purport to consider the question of whether the SIPs supeIVene 
on the symmetries, I am really being elliptical since there are other SIPs that do not 
involve these quarks but that are ignored here. Likewise, the SIPs that I do consider 
have more properties than those I present as definitive of them here (such as their 
weak-interaction properties), but these will be abstracted from them for present 
purposes. (The structuralist will of course hope that, if a structuralist story can be 
told about these particles, and considered only with these properties, a similarly 
structuralist story can likewise be told about neglected other particles and properties.) 
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and from there the constituent quark model. As is so often the case, it 
will prove most straightfOlward to begin by more or less just recounting 
the episode historically. While my presentation of how the relevant events 
unfolded will be rather airbrushed and simplified, it will hopefully not be too 
simplified to put us in a good position to assess in the closing sections what, if 
any, priority claims it furnishes for supervenience-based structuralism. 
8.2 From Hadrons to Quarks (and Back to Hadrons) 
8.2.1 Th.e Eightfold Way Hypothesis: Identifying the Struc-
ture of Multiplets 
What inspired the postulation of the Eightfold Way hypothesis was the ob-
servation that the then-known SIPs of the same spin and baryon number, 
and approximately the same mass fell into striking patterns when arranged 
according to their isospin and hypercharge (see Figure 8.1). 
y 
Figure 8.1: Baryons and Mesons: Octets of SU(3) 
The diagram on the left of Figure 8.1 is the 'octet' of the then-known baryons 
('heavy particles'): strongly interacting particles defined as having baryon 
number B = 1. All of these particles are fermions. The masses here are all 
around the 1GeV mark and to within 30% of one another, with the differences 
between the isospin multiplets falling into a definite pattern.28 The diagram 
2sThis may seem to stretch the term 'approximately' to breaking point, but it is 
encouraged by the fact that the mass differences are significantly less than the masses 
of the other known balyons (together with the fact that the differences between the 
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on the right belongs to the mesons Cmedium-mass' panicles); SIPs defined as 
having B = o. All of these particles are hosons. Owing to the conspicuously 
small mass of the pions, the mass differences here are much greater than 
in the fermionic cases, but are nevertheless smaller than the typical masses 
of hadrons, and they again the differences exhibit a definite pattern. (If the 
pions are ignored, however, the meson masses are much closer - to within 
10% of one another in this case.) In both cases, particles with like charge are 
arranged down the diagonal lines sloping upwards from right to left. This 
relation between charge, isospin and hypercharge is in accordance with the 
Gell-Mann-Nishijima formula, which had been empirically established in the 
1950s;29 
Here, Iz is the third component of the isospin and Y is the hypercharge. The 
latter encodes the strangeness S of the particle via 
Y=S+B. (8.1) 
(After the discovery of the fourth quark, charm would be added to the 
RHS.) 
Once one has laid eyes on these patterns, it is impossible not to speculate that 
some deep ordering principle is at work in the strong interaction. What seems 
to be happening is that isospin multiplets of different hypercharge are being 
enmeshed with others of similar mass to form a 'supermultiplet' of higher 
symmetry; or, to quote an endearing analogy from Ne'eman, that apparently 
unrelated sets of particle brothers are being revealed as first cousins.3O Exactly 
how it is that the concept of a 'higher symmetry' can explain this striking 
phenomenon is something I will try to explain in a moment, but in order to 
do so it will be helpful to get a grip on the symmetry concepts already implicit 
in these diagrams and upon which the Eighfold Way would be built. 
The patterns lying along to horizonal axes constitute isospin multiplets. The 
concept of isospin, and its group SU(2), had been introduced by Heisenberg 
isospin multiplets fall into a definite pattern). 
29Nakano and Nishijima [1955]; Gell-Mann [1956]. 
30See Pais [1986], p519. 
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in 1932 as a device to simplify nuclear calculations (though the term 'isospin' 
itself was coined by Wigner).31 Gell-Mann subsequently postulated that 
isospin was a property of all SIPs, and also that strangeness should be common 
to all members of an isospin multiplet. Given the relationship between 
strangeness and hypercharge in (8.1), the isospin multiplets may then be 
arranged vertically in order of increasing Y. Strangeness had been introduced 
as the parameter that, roughly speaking, encodes the peculiarly long particle 
lifetimes observed in the new particles produced as the first accelerators 
came online, and since it manifested itself in the strong interaction simply 
as an additive quantum number with integer eigenvalues, its governing 
group was taken as the 'circle group' U(1).32 However, instead of S the 
quantity Y was used for convenience, since it permitted a unified treatment 
of the mesons and baryons given the Gell-Mann-Nishijima relation. Baryon 
number, like strangeness, was also manifested simply as an additive and 
integral quantum number, so the operator for baryon number, and hence 
that for Y as well, were likewise taken to be generators of U(1) symmetry. 
However, given the evidently tight connection between baryon number and 
spin, it was argued that B invariance should not be treated as part of the 
'internal' symmetry group but should feature instead as a part of the 'external' 
(spacetime coordinate-dependent) group. This permits the baryon number to 
be fixed independently of the internal symmetries. The external symmetry 
was taken include at least the inhomogeneous Lorentz group, or 'Poincare 
group', of which the spin group is a subgroup, and also the space-inversion 
group. And since the particles in the above multiplets all have the same spin 
and baryon number (as well as parity), it was inferred that the associated 
groups commute with the internal symmetry group (for by Schur's lemma, 
31Heisenberg [1932]; Wigner [1937]. 
32Comwell [1984], p431. V(1) is the group consisting of all complex numbers 
with modulus 1 under the relation of multiplication. The reason that additive integer 
eigenvalues are the signature of V(1) symmetry is because there is an irreducible 
representation r n[eiO] of VCl} given by r n[eiO] = einO for every nEZ, where the 
restriction to integers follows from the fact that einO must equal ein (O+27r); these 
representations obviously have the property that r nl .r n2 = r nl +n2' Thus additive, 
integral quantum numbers imply the presence of a V(l) symmetry. (Note, however, 
that the fact that the irreducible representations of V(l) are labelled by integers 
does not entail that the Hermitian operators that generate the V(l) transformation 
them must only have integer eigenvalues; rather, all that is required is that they have 
eigenvalues y such that ny E Z, so that y may be a rational fraction (see Cornwell 
ibid.». This was, of course, to tum out to be the case with quark charge. 
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this means that the eigenvalues of these external group operators can be 
used to label the representations of the internal group). The full group of 
the strongly interacting particles was then taken to have the direct-product 
form 
Ext 0 Int ;2 Poincare 0 Parity 0 B 0 Int :) SU(2)s0U(l)B0 Int 
where the internal group must subsume the SU(2)/ and U(1)y groups. Our 
focus for considering the structuralist priority claims that may be made in 
this context will be on the SU(2)s0 U(1)B0 Int subgroup that appears on the 
right-most equation here (where here I have included subscripts to keep the 
various symmetries clearly distinguished). The next step in the process was to 
ascertain the as-yet unidentified internal group that features here, considered 
in the limit of perfect symmetry. Before I discuss how that was achieved, 
however, I want to make plausible that the Eightfold Way's postulation of a 
'higher symmetry' transcending the SU(2)J and U(1)y symmetries can explain 
the occurence of these patterns.33 
Explaining Particle Patterns through 'Higher Symmetry' 
l\vo things have to be accounted for in the particle patterns above. First of all, 
and most saliently, there is the striking geometric pattern in the distribution 
of Iz and Y eigenvalues. Secondly, there is the approximate equality of the 
masses, which - as a first approximation - we will take as an exact equality. 
What I will try to show now is that postulating a symmetry in the dynamics, and 
interpreting the particles as the basis vectors of an irreducible representation of 
that symmetry group, suffices to explain both phenomena. 
Let us begin with the second phenomenon - namely, that of the fact that all 
the states in each diagram have (approximately) equal masses. To say that 
there is a symmetry in the dynamics of the strong interaction that produces 
these particles is to say that there is a group, G, of transformations that 
leaves the Hamiltonian invariant. Now, since we are dealing with quantum 
mechanics, we need transformations that leave inner products invariant and, 
as Wigner showed us, that means that we can restrict our attention to unitary 
330f course, much more detail may be found in the references, or any textbook on 
particle physics. Here, however, I want just to bring out the basic concepts. 
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and antiunitary operators; we will restrict our attention here to the unitary 
case.34 Thus, if we let unitary operators in G be Ui and the strong interaction 
Hamiltonian be Hs, the statement that Hs is invariant under G is the statement 
that 
hence we have 
(8.2) 
for all U;. Now consider the eigenvectors '1/Jj of Rs, 
(8.3) 
Suppose now that the action of a Ui on some 1/Jj is given by U;1/Jj = 1/Jk, so that 
the 1/Jk form a basis for a representation of the Ui .3S From (8.2) and (8.3) we 
have 
Ui HsU;-IUi 1/Jj = EjU;1/Jj 
=> Hs1/Jk = Ej1/Jk 
and thus we can deduce from the invariance of Hs under the action of Ui 
the existence of another eigenstate, 1/Jk, of Hs with the same energy as 1/Jj. 
Thus the existence of a dynamical symmetry means that we can expect the 
eigenvectors of Hs to resolve themselves into sets of states that all have the 
sa~e energy. However, there is no guarantee yet that all the states that are 
connected via the Ui will have the same energy eigenvalue, as opposed to 
there merely being a number of distinct sets of states, each whose members 
share some one eigenvalue but possibly different such eigenvalues across 
different sets. Indeed, the latter may well be the case if the matrices Ui form 
a reducible representation of the group G. To see this, note that in such a 
representation each matrix is expressible in block-diagonal form, and suppose 
that the Ui are n x n matrices expressible by two such blocks. Suppose further 
that these blocks take up rows 1 to j and j + 1 to n respectively, so that the 
basis vectors for the representation are n-row column vectors. If the Ui were 
34Unitary operators have the property that Ut = u-1, Antiunitary such operators 
are needed to deal with discrete transformations, which will not be considered here. 
3SSee McVoy [1965]. A representation of a group is a homomorphism between the 
group elements and a ~et of operators which act on a linear vector space. 
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so expressible, then we could consistently have HslPIJ = E1lPIJ, where <PI,; 
is a ~olumn vector of j rows, and also HslPj+l,n = E2lPj+l,n, where <Pj+l,n is a 
column vector of n - j rows. By operating with the Uj and turning the handle 
as we did before, we will find one set of vectors all with energy E1, and 
another set of vectors all with E2• But there is no requirement that EI = E2, 
in contrast to the phenomenon we want to explain. The key to avoiding the 
latter scenario is therefore to find an irreducible representation of the group G: 
that is, a representation that is not convertible to block-diagonal form by any 
similarity transformation.36 The states of the spaces such representations act 
in will still be closed under the action of the group operators, but will be such 
that they contain no smaller subspaces that are similarly closed (in contrast 
to the case above). Such a space is called an 'irreducible invariant subspace', 
but it is common in physics parlance to refer to the spaces that the irreducible 
representations act in as the irreducible representations themselves.37 The net 
result is that we can now see that postulating a symmetry in the dynamics, and 
then conceiving of particles as the basis states of irreducible representations of 
the corresponding symmetry group, can explain the existence of particles all 
of which have the same mass.38 The basis states of such a representation are 
said to constitute a multiplet. 
Considering sets of particles, such as those shown in Figure 8.1, as the 
multiplets of a symmetry group can therefore account for why they have 
been produced with (approximately) the same energy. But what is so striking 
about these particles is less the relationships between their masses than 
the pronounced geometric symmetry in the (graphical) distribution of their 
properties, and this too may be explained by postulating a symmetry in the 
dynamics. In order to get a sense of why this is so, the first thing to note is 
that the quantities Iz and Y that label the axes of these diagrams obviously 
36See Lichtenberg [1978], p38 for further details on all of this. 
370r indeed the corresponding weight diagram, to be introduced below. 
38Note that the simple picture we will describe runs into difficulty when symmetry 
breaking - manifested by the only approximate equality of masses in a multiplet - is 
considered, owing to O'Rafertaigh's theorem; see, e.g., Marshak [1993], pp200-202. 
Therefore the internal symmetry was initially treated as though it were a perfect 
symmetry, with the symmetry breaking and the patterns within it to be dealt with 
penurbativelyonce the underlying group was discerned. Both Gell-Mann and Zweig's 
original papers on the quark model were in fact largely devoted to ascertaining the 
pattern in the symmetry breaking, but I will not discuss it here. 
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correspond to observable quantities. Given this, they are to be represented by 
Hermitian operators. Since it may be shown that any unitary operator U may 
be written as U = eiOA , where () is a parameter and A a 'generator' that can be 
shown to be Hermitian, the observable quantities must be taken to correspond 
to the generators of the unitary operators Ui in G. It is therefore useful from 
an operational point of view to work directly with the generators and this is, 
in fact, the approach that particle physics normally takes. That we can in large 
part work with the generators alone in studying the group follows from the 
work of Lie, for Lie's great insight was that all but the global properties of a 
group may be deduced by studying the elements of it that differ infinitesimally 
from the identity, and that all the relevant information about their behaviour 
in this region is contained within the algebra of the generators.39 In fact, since 
the study of particle multiplets is usually impervious to the global properties 
of the group, in particle physics 'the term "group-theoretical" almost always 
means "Lie-algebra-theoretical''', and, insofar as we are primarily interested 
in particle IDultiplets, there is no loss of generality in working directly with 
the algebra.40 
To see how a study of the algebra of a symmetry group can reveal why 
particles materialize in such highly structured sets as those shown above, it is 
most useful to consider an irreducible representation of that algebra and place 
it in 'standard form' - that is, in the Cartan-Weyl basis. Such a basis is always 
available for a semi-simple (hence also a simple) Lie algebra, and since there 
is no known systematic method for extracting the representations of non-semi-
simple Lie groups, we will here follow standard physics practice in restricting 
our attention to semi-simple Lie groups and their algebras (with the exception 
of the circle group U(1), whose representation theory is straightforward).41 
39The algebra of the generators Xi is the set of equations [Xi, X j ] = iEk=l cfjXk> 
where the group is characterized by r real parameters (e.g. two rotation angles). 
40SIansky [1981], p6; Lichtenberg [1978], pS8; see also p36. As Slansky also 
notes, in particle physics literature the same symbol is also often used to denote both 
the group and its algebra; since it is almost always the local properties that are of 
interest, the 'notation is not as sloppy as it first appears' (ibid.). 
41The simplicity or semi-simplicity of a Lie group is defined with respect to its 
algebra as follows. Consider a subset of operators B of a Lie algebra A. If the 
commutator of any operator in A with any operator in B also lies in B, then B is 
said to be an ideal. A lie algebra is simple if it is not Abelian and its only nonzero 
ideal is A itself; a Lie algebra is semisimple if it has no nonzero Abelian ideals. A 
Lie group is then defined as simple or semisimple iff its associated algebra is simple 
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To regiment the algebra in this way, we must first compute the maximum 
number of commuting generators Hi that can be formed in the algebra. The 
number, r, of such generators is called the algebra's rank. The aim then is to 
find linear combinations, Eo, of the remaining generators such that 
- that is, a basis such that the remaining operators may be viewed as 'step 
operators' with respect to all the Hi.42 Such a basis can always be found, and 
we then obtain the following relations between the operators: 
(8.4) 
which defines the components of the root vectors, p( a); 
if (3 = -a; if (3 =I -a but pea) + p«(3) is a non-vanishing root vector, we 
have 
[Eo, E{j] = Na{jEa+{j 
where Na{j is a constant, and otherwise 
The root vectors defined in (8.4) may then be plotted in an r-dimensional 
root space to produce the root diagram associated with the algebra. This root 
diagram is unique to the algebra and may be used to deduce all information 
about it. Crucially, the root diagram may be shown to contain a great deal 
of symmetry - such as that, for any root p( a) contained in the diagram, 
p( -a) = - p( a) is also contained in it, and for any two roots p( a) and 
p«(3), there is a third root p( 'Y) obtained by reflecting p( a) in the hyperplane 
or semisimple respectively. Semi-simple Lie groups (algebras) are direct products 
(sums) of simple groups (algebras), which is why Gartan's classification of the simple 
Lie algebras was simultaneously a classification of the semi-Simple ones. 
42A familiar example is the linear combinations J+ and J- of the Pauli matrices 
in SU(2). 
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perpindicular to p({3). This latter is said to constitute a 'Weyl reflection' of 
p(a). 
So far so abstract, but it is this symmetry in the root diagram which can be 
used to furnish an explanation of the striking patterns such as those in Figure 
8.1. As noted, the commuting generators correspond to the simultaneously 
observable properties that may be used to define particles (such as the prop-
erties Iz and Y above). We can therefore elect to identify a given kind of 
particle in terms of a weight vector, IlL), defined by 
(8.5) 
Here 1'If) is a common eigenvector of the Hi and a basis vector of the (irre-
ducible) representation. The other weights can be obtained from any other 
by repeated action of the operators Ea , the effect of which may be derived 
from the commutation relations between the Hi and Ea in the 'standard form' 
listed above: 
(8.6) 
This equation establishes that Ea shifts the weight I",) to III = p(a)): 
(8.7) 
Thus we can see through (8.7) that the effect of these operators is to shift 
a given weight to make a new weight with eigenvalues IL + p(a), justifying 
their appellation of 'step operators'. This action of the EDt on a given weight 
defines the weight diagram associated with a given irreducible representation. 
The p( a) here are, as before, the roots of the algebra, so that we can see that 
the weights of any representation will be displaced from one another in the 
same way as the roots themselves, and thus that the geometric structure of the 
algebra's root diagram is imported into its weight diagrams. One may discern, 
for example, that sets of weights ('equivalent weights') may be obtained from 
one another by Weyl reflections in planes perpendicular to the roots, so that 
this 'reflection' symmetry of the algebra's root diagram is preserved in the 
weight diagrams of its representations. A theorem that succinctly conveys the 
high degree of symmetry in these diagrams that results from the symmetry in 
the root diagram is that the weights of any irreducible representation must 
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sum to zero.43 While the deduction of the structure of the full weight diagram 
of a given representation from its algebra needs a patient and systematic 
treatment, through (8.7) we can, when we recall the symmetry of the root 
diagram, at least get the sense that that not only does the postulation of a 
symmetry explain the (approximately) degenerate masses of the particles in 
Figure 8.1, but also the striking geometric pattern obtained when they are 
plotted on the Iz and Y axes. At this point, then, we interpret the diagrams in 
Figure 8.1 as the weight diagrams of a semi-simple Lie algebra, and thus the 
particles themselves as the basis vectors of an irreducible representation of that 
albegra - or, in other words, as the members of a multiplet. The next task is to 
ascertain which symmetry group they are the basis vectors of, and let us now 
consider how this was done. 
Identifying the 'Higher SyMmetry' 
As already pointed out, the rank of a group describes the maximal number of 
mutually commuting generators, and since the observed baryons and mesons 
in Figure 8.1 have determinate values of Iz and Y simultaneously, each of 
which is conserved during interaction, the group sought was of rank two. And 
given the observed enmeshing of the various isospin multiplets into patterns 
in the Iz - Y plane, what was needed was a group that contains both the 
corresponding groups SU(2) and UCI) as proper subgroups, but such that its 
structure does not just contain those subgroups simply as a product. This is 
because any semi-simple Lie group is expressible as a direct product of simple 
groups; if the sought rank-two group was semi-simple, it would be a direct 
product of rank-one groups, and hence a direct product of two groups, each of 
which contains only one of Iz or Y. Being a direct product, all the operators 
in the group containing Iz would commute with Y, so that every possible 
isospin multiplet would occur with every possible hypercharge. Were that 
the case, the observed restrictions on possible Y values for each multiplet, 
such that each isospin multiplet aligns with only one Y -value, would not be 
manifest. For this to happen, a more 'intimate' way of conjoining the two 
groups had therefore to be found. 
43Comwell [1984], p564. For a fuller treatment of this issue, see Cornwell ibid. 
and Lichtenberg [1978], Chapters 5 and 6. 
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In seeking a higher-symmetry scheme that would take the various isospin 
multiplets and enlarge them into a 'supermultiplet', what was thus needed 
was a simple Lie groUp.44 Given that the (compact) simple Lie algebras had 
been exhaustively classified by Cartan, what remained to be done was to 
identify the groups meeting the above criteria and compare how well their 
algebras fitted with the observed features of the strong interaction. This task 
is made vastly easier than one might have intitially assumed by the fact that 
there are a finite number of algebras of any given rank - a number that is, 
moreover, small for small rank.4S It turns out that the algebras of all the rank 2 
simple Ue groups contain the algebra of U(l) 0SU(2) as a subalgebra, which 
means that if any of these groups is a symmetry of the hadrons, hypercharge 
and isospin will be conserved.46 In order to move forward, what was then 
needed was a comparison of the implications for particle properties associated 
with each algebra to find which agreed best with experiment, and this task 
was undertaken by Ne'eman.47 On the grounds that the other algebras ruled 
out certain known transitions andlor forbade a nuclear magnetic moment 
for the neutron, for example, the successful candidate was declared to be a 
group from the same stable as isospin - namely, the group SU(3). It thus fell 
to the eight generators of the SU(3) group to 'tie together strongly interacting 
particle multiplets with different values of Iz and Y (but same spin and 
parity) in approximately degenerate supermultiplets', and hence reproduce 
the striking patterns above.48 
These, then, were the steps that were taken to ascertain that there was an 
SU(3) symmetry afoot in the strong interaction. In the wake of this realization, 
Gell-Mann and Ne'eman hypothesized that all strongly interacting particles 
occur in SU(3) multiplets: that is, the SIPs are given by basis states of the 
irreducible representations of 5U(3), so that they will arrange themselves into 
weight diagrams corresponding to these irreducible representations.49 This 
44Lichtenberg [1978] p77; p68. It is in large part due to the fact that the gauge 
group associated with the Standard Model also has this 'pasted-together' structure 
that it is regarded as so imperfect. 
45McVoy [1965], p89. 
46Lichtenberg [1978], p77. 
47Ne'eman [1963]. 
48Gell-Mann [l964b], p7. 
49This oversimplifies the history a bit, since the original group of the Eightfold Way 
was in fact the adjoint group SU(3)/Z(3). This modification was made to screen out 
the representations of 'non-zero triality' - that is, representations containing particles 
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proposal constitutes the Eightfold Way hypothesis.so To put us in a position to 
predict which particles are realized in accordance with this new hypothesis, 
what these irreducible representations are had to be ascertained. Group 
theory supplies the answer; and the representations of SU(3) may be deduced 
to form an (infinite) series with dimensionalities given by 1,3,6,8, 10, 15, 
27 ... , The 8 forms the adjoint representation - that is, the representation 
whose dimensionality equals the number of generators in the group; since the 
then-known baryons and mesons were assigned to this representation, it was 
from this that the approach drew its name. 
The Eightfold Way hypothesis of Gell-Mann and Ne'eman was famously cor-
roborated almost immediately with a triumphant success in the shape of the 
n-, and it will be useful to go through how this happened. By the end of 
1961, 9 new particles were known, including a full isospin multiplet of delta 
particles. But there is no 9 in the above series, and the only nearby candidates 
were the 10,15 and 27. The 15 was ruled out as it did not contain a multiplet 
with the values of the Ll particle. 51 And, at a conference in Geneva in 1962, 
it was announced that two I = 3, Y = 2 particles had failed to materialize 
in scattering experiments designed to produce them - particles that would 
be needed to fill up the 27. Gell-Mann and Ne'eman, both present at the 
conference, saw 'the pyramid being completed before their very eyes' and the 
n- was at that moment predicted as the tip of the triangular 10 multiplet. 
It was observed at Brookhaven in November the next year, complete with 
all the properties - including its mass - that had been predicted the year 
before. 
Although the symmetry approach had already been used in successfully pre-
dicting particles, this was its most jubilant celebration yet. 52 It was therefore 
with non-integer charges, which at the time were regarded as abhorrent (which 
seems rather quaint by today's lights!). All of these can be built up from products 
of the 8; hence initially the 8 was taken as fundamental, and only one-third of the 
SU(3) representations were initially taken as candidates for multiplets. However, 
once quarks had been accepted, the restriction to zero-triality representations was 
dropped. 
50nte classic reference on this is Gell-Mann and Ne'eman [1964]. 
51 Well, it is more accurate to say that it would have been ruled out. Given the 
restriction at this point to zero-triality representations alluded to in the previous note, 
the 15 wasn't even on the table. 
52Isospin symmetry had been used to predict, for example, the neutral pion, kaon 
and hyperon: see Pais [1986], p520. 
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the prediction of this particle on the basis of group-theoretic considerations 
that firmly consolidated opinion on the power of the symmetIy approach 
as a tool of particle physics. 53 Nonetheless, and in spite of this success, the 
Eightfold Way could not be regarded as wholly satisfactory as it stood. While 
it had demonstrated, as the n- example makes clear, its ability to predict the 
missing particles in a multiplet that was almost full, it could not predict which 
of the infinite number of possible SU(3) multiplets would be partially filled 
in the first place. This was clearly a major shoncoming. Addressing it would 
lead physics to the constituent quark model. 
8.2.2 The Constituent Quark Model: Predicting Specific Mul-
tiplets 
Working independently, Murray Gell-Mann and G. Zweig realized that the 
natural strategy for transcending the predictive limitations inherent in the 
Eightfold Way was to statt thinking seriously about the fundamental, or 
defining, representations of SU(3) - the fact that the particles in them had 
not been observed notwithstanding. 54 In the context of the semi-simple Lie 
groups and its representation theory, the fundamental representations are the 
lowest-dimensional, non-trivial irreducible representations - or, alternatively, 
any representation whose highest weight is afundamental weight.55 What is 
distinctive about the fundamental representations is that all the other repre-
sentations of the group can be constructed from them by taking their tensor 
products. In this sense, the fundamental representations may be regarded as 
the 'building blocks' of all the others and it is from this feature that they derive 
their name. (Coupling I-dimensional representations together, by contrast, 
will never produce anything but the I-dimensional representation and it is in 
53See Bangu [2008] for more on the n- prediction and its reception. 
S4Gell-Mann [l964a]; Zweig [1964]. 
55 The fundamental weights, Ai, will be defined below. But to get a sense of what 
makes these weights 'fundamental', it may be helpful to note that a property of the 
Ai is that the highest weight, lit)', of any other irreducible representation can be 
expressed as lit)' = EniAi, where ni is a non-negative integer. Since it turns out 
the whole of a weight diagram is, in tum, determined by its highest weight, we can 
view these fundamental weights as being determinative of the rest of the group's 
multiplets and in this sense 'fundamental'. I will have more to say on fundamental 
weights below. 
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this sense that it is trivial.) Since a rank 1 simple Lie group has 1 fundamental 
representations, SU(3) has two; these tum out to conjugate to one another 
and to each contain three states. 56 They are therefore designated as the '3' 
and '3*', with the latter containing the anti-particles corresponding to the 
former; the full set of states is labelled [anti-] 'up', 'down' and 'strange'. The 
particles corresponding to these representations can be displayed by means 
of the associated weight diagrams, which are shown in Figure 8.2. In general, 
y y 
d u 
Figure 8.2: Quarks and Antiquarks: Triplets of SU(3) 
the irreducible representations that are obtained by taking products of other 
irreducible representation produce a Clebsch-Gordan series. 57 Some examples 
of this series, obtained by taking products of fundamental representations, 
are 
30 3* = 8 EEl 1, and 
3 0 3 0 3* = 15 $ 3 EEl 3 EEl 6*. 
Since from combinations of a finite number of fundamental representations 
only finitely many other representations are produced, the hope was that 
some means of predicting which of the infinitely-many possible representa-
56 Lichtenberg [1978]. Mathematically only one of the two fundamental represen-
tations of SU(3) is needed since 3 <;;9 3 = 6 $3*,3* <;;9 3* = 6* EB 3. But, for reasons of 
? physics (specifically the physics of particles and antiparticles), we keep both. 
57The Peter-Weyl theorem establishes that every finite dimensional invariant space 
of a semisimple Lie group is completely decomposable into irreducible invariant 
subspaces, so that the space of any finite dimensional representation of a semi-simple 
Lie group can be parcelled out into non-overlapping 'multiplets'. This guarantees the 
existence of Clebsch-Gordan expansions. 
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tions of SU(3) are actually realized would be furnished through considering 
which combinations of fundamental representations might be appropriate on 
physical grounds. This was the basis of the constituent quark model. 
The key insight that led to the correct combinations of the fundamental repre-
sentations was that idea that, by analogy with the role these representations 
themselves play in the group representation theory, the particles in these 
representations could be thought of as the 'building blocks' for the hadrons 
in the higher-dimensional multiplets. On these grounds, any particle con-
tained within the fundamental multiplets has a claim to be considered as a 
fundamental particle, and those featuring in the higher-dimensional multiplets 
constructed from t:J:1em could in consequence be regarded as composite. These 
particles Gell-Mann baptized the quarks. 58 It is therefore clear to see that 
the symmetry approach that had been taken toward the hadrons through 
the Eightfold Way hypothesis led naturally to a consideration of prospective 
fundamental particles and the principles that might govern their combination. 
What Gell-Mann and Zweig discovered upon pursuing that thought was that 
the internal (SU(3)) and external (SU(2)s0U(1)B) group structures that were 
flagged up at the outset could be used to determine CO the properties of the 
quarks, and (ii) the composite hadrons we can expect the quarks to compose -
at least to a very great extent. 59 This extent was not total, however; as well as 
some initial conditions (something of course to be expected), considerations 
of simplicity had to be invoked in order to complete the determination as well. 
Let us now see how this works. 
The internal group properties are the most straightforward properties of the 
quarks to deduce, as this can be done directly from the SU(3) structure plus 
an initial condition to fix the normalization.60 This can be seen as follows. 
Each representation is three-dimensional and can therefore decompose into 
isospin multiplets in only three ways: three singlets, one triplet, or a singlet 
5SZweig dubbed them the 'aces' but it was Gell-Mann's nomenclature that stuck. 
Both Gell-Mann and Zweig were initially skeptical that the particles in the funda-
mental representations were real particles. Thus Gell-Mann spoke for a time of 
'mathematical quarks' and Zweig wrote, for example, that 'it is quite possible that 
aces are completely ficticious, merely proving a convenient way of expressing a 
symmetry' ([1964], p2). This hesitancy did not last long in either case. 
59 Note, however, that it was not until QeD that a mechanism to keep the composite 
together was on the table. 
60The follOwing is adapted from Coleman [1966]. 
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and a doublet. The first case is mathematically impossible, for it implies, 
amongst other things, that the representation is degenerate on the boundary 
- something that is provably forbidden.61 The second is mathematically 
possible, but physically unacceptable as it implies that only integral isospins 
are possible in the higher multiplets - thus ruling out the neutron and proton 
(amongst others). This leaves only the third possibility, and this uniquely 
determines the Iz properties of the quark triplet (namely as one Iz = 0 
particle and an 1= 1/2 isospin doublet). This leaves the hypercharge to be 
assigned. In accordance with the observation that the isospin multiplets of 
the observed higher hadrons are separated by one unit of Y - which we may 
take as an initial condition - they must be so here; so if the Y assignments 
of the singlet is y, that of the doublet is y + 1 (or y - 1; the choice serves 
to differentiate the conjugate or 'anti-particle' representation). But since Y 
is one of the two additive quantum numbers measureable simultaneously 
with the energy, it must be representable by a diagonal matrix, and since 
it is a generator of a special unitary group, it must be traceless. Together 
these imply that TrY = 3y + 2 => Y = -2/3.62 This fixes the Y of every 
quark. And with the hypercharge and isospin for the quarks now in place, 
then via the phenomenological Gell-Mann-Nishijima formula - which now 
just corresponds to a rotation in Iz - Y space - we can also retrieve their 
charges. Therefore, the SU(3) structure alone, plus some initial conditions 
provided by the obervation of certain hadrons, suffices to settle the internal 
(Iz and Y) properties of the fundamental SIPs, the quarks. 
With the 'internal' properties of the quarks now established, we can contem-
plate the labels the fundamental representations as a whole, and hence the 
quarks in them, should receive from the spin and baryon groups as well as the 
combinations that the quarks should occur in, in order to produce hadrons. 
(As we will see, these are not independent questions.) Here things are less 
determined, and both Gell-Mann and Zweig had to deploy a number of as-
61 It would also imply that all the operators of the isospin group were the identity. 
But this results in an inconsistency, for unless the other operators in the SU(3) group 
were the identity, then the group structure would be lost; and if they were all also 
the identity, then we would have the trivial (singlet) SU(3) representation, not a 
three-dimensional one as originally assumed. 
62The 'special unitary groups' SU(N) are the groups of unitary representations 
that have unit determinant. The latter condition implies that the corresponding 
generators must be traceless. 
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sumptions at points where possible alternatives presented themselves along 
the way. However; out of a number of possible schemes devised by both Gell-
Mann and Zweig, the 'simpler and more elegant' was in each case plumped 
for and, indeed, all of the assumptions that each of them made in arriving at a 
determinate model could be placed under a banner of simplicity.63 Now, given 
that the baryons - which are fermions - are by this point hypothesized to 
be composites of quarks, it is clear that quarks themselves must be fermions. 
For it follows from the familiar 'vector sum rule' - itself just a statement of 
the Clebsch-Gordan decomposition for SU(2) - that only if the quarks have 
half-integral spin will their products be able to produce half-integral represen-
tations. And since the quarks are being understood as fundamental particles, 
then just as it is natural to put them in the fundamental representation of 
SU(3) it is natural to put them in the fundamental representation of SU(2), 
and thus the natural choice for this half-integer is 1/2 (since this is the value 
of that representation). Call this the lowest eigenvalue assumption.64 Fur-
thermore, since even-numbered products of SU(2) representations produce 
only integral-spin composites, baryons must be composed of an odd number 
of quarks. And the lowest odd number compatible with compositeness is 
obviously 3. This then plausibly represents the simplest choice, and thus it 
was this that was favoured by both Gell-Mann and Zweig.65 Call this the 
fewest parts assumption. From here, we can have a guess at their baryon 
number. Since the baryon number is governed by the U(l) group with its 
63Gell-Mann [19643], p214 (in Gell-Mann and Ne'eman [1964], p168.) 
MIn fact, this assumption is so natural neither Gell-Mann or Zweig seem to have 
flagged it explicitly. but it is, of course, possible to make spin-lj2 baryons from 
products of, say. spin 3/2 particles. Perhaps this is because the S = 1/2 assumption 
accounts for spin 1/2 and 3/2 baryons only. which is all that had been obselVed. But it 
would have been hasty at this point to suppose that higher-spin baryons would never 
be seen (as well as question-begging to appeal to it here). Note as well, however, 
that not all of the currently known or hypothesized fundamental particles belong to 
the fundamental spin representation, or even have the lowest eigenvalue consistent 
with their being fennions or bosons - such as the spin-l weak bosons or hypothetical 
spin-2 graviton. 
65 As Zweig put it, 'to narrow the field and give our problem a more explicit formu-
lation, we will insist on picking a theory which contains the minimum number of units 
consistent with the observed strongly interacting particles and known conservation 
laws' ([1965], p192); as Gell-Mann put it, 'baryons can now be constructed from 
quarks by using the combinations (qqq), (qqqqq), etc ... It is assuming that the lowest 
baryon configurations (qqq) gives just the representations that have been observed' 
(op. cit.). 
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additive eigenvalues, the baryon numbers of these three quarks must add 
up to 1; likewise, the baryon numbers of the three quarks in an anti-baryon 
must add up to -1. The most efficient way to achieve this is to simply divide 
this number evenly between the three constituent quarks, giving them each 
baryon number 1/3. This is equivalent to saying that baryons contain only 
quarks and anti-baryons onlyanti-quarks.66 Call this the uniform division 
assumption. (The only other alternative choice that is consistent with 'fewest 
parts'is qqq, which would produce B(q) = 1.) 
To summarize what has been achieved regarding the baryons by this point. 
the assumptions offewest parts and uniform division, plus the fact that baryons 
are spin-1/2 particles, result in the 30303 composition for baryons-and 
3* 03* 03* for anti-baryons. This in tum fixes the B assignment for the quarks 
as 1/3, which together with the deduced hypercbarge also serves to fix their 
strangeness; the value for their remaining external quantum number, that of 
spin, is fixed by assuming lowest eigenvalue. Since one can find these values 
repeated today in the most up-to-date lists of particle data we have, it seems 
that we can only agree with Zweig when he says that 'simplicity, combined 
with the known complexity of particle physics, leads us to unique spin, isospin 
and strangeness assignments to the units [i.e. the quarks]', where we may 
take it that the 'known complexity' refers to the SU(3) structure that had 
already been deduced for the known hadrons.67 
Moving on now to the mesons, it is clear that we need make no further 
assumptions in order to deduce which of them we can expect to find in nature. 
Since we have established that the quarks are spin 1/2 fermions, the smallest 
number of quarks compatible with a composite meson is 2. In accordance 
with the fewest parts assumption, then, that is the number that was chosen. 
But it is clear that the quark and anti-quarks must collaborate here if their 
baryon numbers are to give us back zero, since we will need baryon numbers 
that are equal and opposite.68 Thus the only combination of quarks in mesons 
compatible with fewest parts is qq, and it is this that was proposed. 
66Mesons must contain both quarks and anti-quarks to produce the value B = O. 
67Zweig [1965], p193. 
68That is, 'uniform division' can only apply in the case of baryons. Perhaps a better 
name for this principle is thus 'uniform division wherever possible'; but I shall just 
leave the name as it is. 
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Having established on symmetry and simplicity grounds the quark compo-
sition of baryons and mesons, we can deploy the 5U(3) group theory once 
again to produce the resultant Clebsch-Gordan series: 
3® 3* = 8 $1; 
3 ® 3 ® 3 = 1 $ 8 $ 8 $ 10, 
3* ® 3* ® 3* = 1 $ 8 $ 8 $ 10*. 
Thus the 'constituent quark model' predicts that baryons and anti-baryons will 
occur in singlets, octets, decuplets and anti-decuplets only, and that mesons 
only in singlets and octets. Exactly which hadrons this implicates - that is, 
exactly which weights, or combinations of Iz and Y, that we can expect to find 
in nature - can then easily be deduced using just the 5U(3) representation 
theory and the corresponding theory of weight diagrams. (I note too that the 
exact quark content of each of the hadrons housed in these representations 
may be deduced in the process.)69 Doing so reproduces both the low-lying 
meson and baryons multiplets known at the time beautifully - recovering, 
amongst others, the baryon decuplet topped off by the n-. Indeed, forty years 
on from the postulation of the quark model, it remains true to say that 'all 
the states predicted by the quark model (at least with the quarks u, d and s) 
have been found, and no others'.70 In terms ofits ambitions to predict the 
SU(3) multiplets that are actually realized in nature, then, it seems that we 
can only affirm that the constituent quark model was an audacious success. It 
is therefore fair to say that the problem of multiplet prediction that was left to 
us by the Eightfold Way hypothesis was in this way essentially solved. 
69See, e.g., He-Kim and Yem [1998], Chapter 7 for a detailed discussion, utilizing 
the Clebsch-Gordan coefficients, of how this is done. 
70Ryder [1996], pll . Likewise, a recent paper on the continued fruitfulness of 
contemporary uses of SU3 states that 'today we can group all experimentally known 
baryons into singlets, octets, decuplets and anti-decuplets ' (Guzeyand Polyakov 
[2004]). To be clear, the current consensus is that the supposed 'evidence' for the 
existence of pentaquarks is little more than a statistical flunctuation; see Yao et al. 
[2006]. 
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8.3 Lessons for a Structuralist Metaphysics 
With this historical reconstruction behind us, let me sum up what has just 
been shown before moving on to consider the conclusions regarding the 
relations between symmetry structure and fundamental particles that may 
be drawn from it. After the SU(3) symmetry in the strong interaction was 
recognized, the 'Eightfold Way' hypothesis that all hadrons would occur in 
SU(3) multiplets was proposed. While that in itself was somewhat predictive 
insofar as it could predict the existence of new particles given prior knowl-
edge of enough particles to almost fill up a multiplet, it could not in itself 
predict which multiplets would be realized in the first place. The 'constituent 
quark model' was then deployed to this end, which exploited the potential 
analogy with the 'building-block' role of the fundamental representations 
with respect to the other representations. The aim of this analogy was to 
allow us to infer which of the latter representations would actually be real-
ized through considerations of which combinations of the former could be 
expected to obtain. This approach resulted in the postulated existence of 
new fundamental particles, which were denoted 'quarks'. We saw that the 
knowledge of the internal SU(3) group (interpreted as encoding the isospin 
and hypercharge) sufficed to determine the 'intrinsic properties' of isospin 
and hypercharge of these fundamental particles, but that the three 'simplicity' 
assumptions of lowest eigenvalue, fewest parts and uniform division had to be 
used alongside the SU(2)s and U(1)y structures in order to determine their 
spin and baryon numbers. The combinations that these particles would occur 
in were simultaneously determined in the process, and thereafter precisely 
what hadrons one could expect to be observed was deducible through the 
SU(3) representation theory. 
While that is clear enough, what is less clear at this point is whether, and 
how, this episode in physics supports structuralism and its signature priority 
claim. It is therefore to that matter that I want to tum now. Recall, first of all, 
that in this chapter I have elected to understand priority via supervenience 
and to understand the relevant structure in terms of symmetry strUcture. 
On this conception, to say that the structure is prior to the objects is to say 
that there can be no difference in the SIPs that exist without there being a 
difference in the symmetry structure; or, in other words, that the symmetry 
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determines those particles. Now, the first and most obvious thing to say at 
this point is that it is not purely the SU(3) symmetry that determines all 
the relevant properties of the fundamental particles, nor of the composites 
they can create - in spite of Kantorovich's claims, noted above, that this 
'symmetry dicate[s] via its representations the hadron spectrum'. While the 
internal group suffices to determine the internal properties of the fundamental 
particles, and determines that all the remaining particles must occur in SU(3) 
multiplets, it does not itself determine which hadrons those quarks will form, 
hence nor which muJtiplers will be realized in nature. (This, no doubt, is what 
Kantorovich means by his otherwise somewhat oblique remark that the SU(3) 
'dictate is not absolute'.) Howevet; and more relevantly for our purposes, 
even the extended group structure SU(3)®SV(2)® V(l) fails to determine 
what hadrons we can expect to find in nature, for the simplicity assumptions 
we made at the various points were also crucial in determining these.7I Had 
the same structure held but it not been the case, for example, that fewest 
parts held - so that baryons contained, say four quarks and an anti-quark 
instead of just three quarks - we would not expect to find only the 1, 8 and 
10 representations. Rather, since 
3 ® 3 ® 3 ® 3 ® 3* = 35 EfJ 3(27) EfJ 4(10) EfJ 2(10*) EfJ 8(8) EfJ 3(1), 
many, many more particles would be expected to make themselves known in 
this case. Likewise, were it not the case that uniform division held, so that 
quarks could have B = 1, we would have for baryons 
3 ® 3 ® 3' = 15 EfJ 3 EfJ 3 EB 6*, 
so that we would again expect to find different hadrons from those we in 
fact do. It therefore seems right to say that the spectrum of SIPs super-
venes not on the structure, but on the structure supplemented by the simplicity 
assumptions. 
71Wolff makes a similar point when she states that it is unclear how one could say 
that relativistic particles, qua representations of the Poincare group, supervene on the 
latter since the existence of the symmetry group is compatible with the existence of 
infinitely many different combinations of relativistic particles (see her [2011J, p11). 
However, here - unlike there - we can try to append the supervenience claim to some 
simplicity principles in order to determine the particles. What the structuralist should 
say in the Poincare group context needs, I think, a rather different treatment. 
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What should the structUralist say in the face of this fact? That is, to what 
extent does the fact that simplicity assumptions have to be made in addition to 
postulating the relevant symmetry if the spectrum of SIPs is to be determined 
undermine the core structuralist claim that 'objects supervene on structure'? 
It seems that there are two questions implicit in this. The first is whether 
these principles may be regarded as something sufficiendy 'structural' as to 
be subsumable under the banner of structure, and thus to pose no threat to 
the claim. Should this be answered in the negative, there is then the further 
question of whether the fact that they cannot be so regarded is enough to 
deny structuralists of their thesis. Let us look at these questions in tum. 
Regarding the first question, it seems correct to say that while it is admittedly 
rather difficult to spell out how these simplicity principles ought to ultimately 
be conceptualized - it is, for example, somewhat unclear whether to class 
them as merely methodological as opposed to ontological in character - it 
is nonetheless obvious that they cannot easily be regarded as structure in 
this context.72 The reason, of course, is that in this chapter I have been 
taking the relevant structure to be a specific symmetry structure. But the 
principles of 'fewest parts' and 'uniform division' do not themselves make any 
reference to structure thus conceived, and we can understand them perfectly 
well in isolation from this structure. Thus, while it is palpably clear that such 
principles cannot be construed as objects, extending the structure so as to 
include elements that seemingly have nothing to do with group structure will 
have a distinct air of 'moving the goal posts'. I therefore do not think that this 
move represents a viable structuralist strategy. 
Let us tum, therefore, to the second question - that of whether the need 
to appeal to these principles is damaging to structuralism, given that they 
cannot (or at least cannot obviously) themselves be regarded as structure. 
One response that has been made in the face of this question is that any 
physicalistic supervenience claim is going to be vulnerable to the objection 
72Thus while it is true that Ockham's razor, for example, is usually construed as a 
methodological principle, it seems wrong to regard it only as such if we believe that 
nature somehow respects it (and thus is presumably of ontological import). (Here I 
am again thinking of the discussion of Musgrave in Chapter 3, which concerned his 
thought that simplicity principles - or at least those employed in empirical theories -
could enjoy confirmation and thus plausibly be regarded as staking out features of 
the world, despite anti-realist claims to the contrary.) 
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that simplicity principles must be smuggled in somewhere if the supervenience 
claim is to go through, so that it is unduly harsh to hold this fact against 
structuralism.73 Consider, for example, Lewis' claim that all supervenes on the 
fundamental level - a level that, moreover, physics will one day describe. Now 
let us grant that for any fundamental physical theory there will be countless 
empirically equivalent alternatives, and let us further grant, for argument's 
sake, that in the face of this fact the 'simplest' will in all cases be plumped 
for and subsequently canonized by physics. It therefore appears that Lewis' 
thesis that the non-fundamental supervenes on the fundamental level also 
invokes a simplicity principle, albeit implicitly, insofar as the content of that 
level is partially identified in terms of such principles. Thus, the claim goes, 
all physicalistic supervenience theses must make some appeal to simplicity 
assumptions, insofar as physics itself does. But if that is right, then this cannot 
be an objection to structuralism's supervenience thesis in particular. 
But it seems that something altogether different is going on in the structuralist 
case in comparison with Lewis' - and that the differences are more problematic 
in the structuralist case. The first thing to note is that simplicity was not 
invoked in the case study discussed above to allow us to choose between 
empirically underdetermined theories, as it arguably may have to be in cases 
such as Lewis'. After all, as we just saw, if the simplicity assumptions had 
been different in this case, then different hadrons would have been observed 
in experiments. Simplicity is therefore not invoked by the structuralist in 
the above case study merely to choose between empirically underdetermined 
alternatives; rather, it is chosen to determine in advance what will be observed. 
Secondly, and furthermore, it is not at all clear that Lewis' supervenience 
claim is compromised by the fact that simplicity may have to be appealed 
to in order to identify the content of the supervenience base, since Lewis' 
claim is principally just that given that base, the rest of the world follows. 
Therefore how the base is identified in the first place, or what content it is 
identified as having, is of secondary interest for Lewis' purposes. But this is 
not the case for the structuralist, because the structuralist is not just making 
a physicalistic supervenience claim to the effect that the non-fundamental 
supervenes on whatever is fundamental in physics. Rather, they are trying to 
go further than that and identify what is fundamental in physics, and to do 
73French, private communication. 
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so by showing that a supervenience relation holds. But in order to establish 
the existence of such a relation, we must invoke simplicity assumptions in 
addition to structures in order to determine those objects; and then we are 
back at the problem we started with - namely, that of deciding whether or not 
the inclusion of such non-structural assumptions undermines the structuralist 
claim. It therefore does not seem that the fact that physics may have to deploy 
simplicity principles when characterizing the fundamental is a problem for 
all supervenience theses that one might put fOlWard in the metaphysics of 
physics, but it does appear to remain a problem for the structuralist thesis 
in particular. The difference, again, is that structuralism is trying to identify 
what is fundamental in physics by means of a supervenience claim, not merely 
state that given the fundamental, all supervenes on that. Since the simplicity 
principles are in each case involved in characterizing the supervenience base, 
the fact that we may have to enlist them seems to be a problem for structuralist 
supervenience only. 
So let us think again about how the structuralist might deal with the presence 
of the simplicity principles in the analysis, given that this presence cannot 
simply be dismissed as a problem for everyone (and hence, in a sense, for 
no-one). One response that the structuralist might be tempted to make is that 
the core structuralist claim - at least when interpreted in supervenience terms 
- should be changed to the claim that it is structure plus simplicity principles 
that objects supervene on. However, I think that would I think not only be 
somewhat ad hoc, but undesirable in other respects too. Structuralism is, 
after all, suppos~d to be a general metaphysical thesis about the fundamental 
category (or categories) of the world, and one that will be established by 
reference to specific, paradigmatic cases. Howeve~ the simplicity assumptions 
governing the construction of hadrons apply only to a proper subset of reality, " 
and so building these principles into the core claim of structualism in general 
thus seems very unwise. It seems to me that it is better that structuralists 
keep the core claim sufficiently general, but append it with the qualification 
that other elements that do not fit neatly into the category of structure may 
have to be added in specific contexts, keeping the specification of those extra 
elements for the discussions of those contexts (though we should insist that if 
the doctrine is not to be utterly trivialized, those extra elements cannot be 
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the objects themse1ves).74 
It therefore seems that the fairest assessment of this episode's lessons for 
structuralism is that the claim that the SU(3)0SU(2)0U(1) structure deter-
mines the strongly-interacting particles must be carefully stated and qualified 
if it is to go through at all. My instinct at this point, however, is that the fact 
that these qualifications must be made does not significantly denigrate the 
basic structuralist proposal- namely, its 'core claim' that objects supervene on 
structures. After all, it seems right to say that were the 'object-oriented' realist 
to dismiss the idea that there is a profound sense in which structure is prior 
to objects on the grounds that we must also assume that the number of parts 
in a composite is minimal or that matt~r particles do not contain unnecessary 
anti-matter, etc., then they would be shirking from the structuralist's chal-
lenge.75 At the moment, however, I will not offer any very principled reason 
as to why we should deny that the fact that the claim does not go through 
without those qualifications means that it does not go through simpliciter. 
While this is, of course, to some extent a merely terminological question, I 
will leave the general significance for structuralism of the fact that we may 
always have to make similar but context-dependent qualifications as a matter 
74Picking up Wolff's criticism mentioned in passing a moment ago, another example 
here may be Wigner's group-theoretic construction of relativistic particles through the 
representation theory of the Poincare group. The problem here is that while Wigner's 
classification 'succeeds in predicting what (combinations of) properties relativistic 
particles must have, it permits infinitely many such particles and does not determine 
which of these will actually be realized in nature. But in this case, it seems that 
the appropriate thing for the structuralist to do is to regard the extra information 
that must be added as a sort of initial condition, and to deny that the fact that we 
need to add initial conditions to the structure in itself denigrates the claim that 
structure is ontologica1ly fundamental- any more than the fact that we have to add 
initial conditions to Newtonian mechanics denigrates the idea that it determines the 
trajectory of classical particles. 
7SIt is, after all, not as if the simplicity assumptions that must be added to the 
structure have an air of being suspiciously ad hoc or convoluted. As one textbook said 
of the idea that baryons are qqq composites and mesons qq, and thus of (what I have 
called) 'fewest parts' and 'uniform division': 'The simplicity of [these assumptions) 
is attractive; a puzzle arises because the assumptions seem oversimplified, yet to 
correspond to what is observed experimentally (Cheng and O'Neil [1979], p334). 
But that the assumptions that must be added to the model in addition to the group 
structure seem so uncomplicated is something that the structuralist will instinctively 
draw strength from. Presumably the more convoluted the principles that have to be 
added to the structure for it to determine what they want, the less convincing is the 
proposal that structure has a claim to being a fundamental category. 
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for another day. 76 I therefore close this section by simply reiterating that I 
believe that the core claim should be taken to go through in this instance, 
modulo the above qualifications. 
8.3.1 Radical or Moderate Structuralism? 
In the previous section, we saw that there are good grounds for a qualified 
version of the core structuralist claim that strong-interaction synunetry struc-
ture determines the strongly-interacting particles. If one understands priority 
in terms of supervenience, then, there are strong grounds for saying that 
structure is ontologically prior to the particles that the structuralists protests / 
that metaphysics presents as (uniquely) fundamental. But since I hold that 
priority relations may be synunetric, we have not yet thereby shown that this 
structure is more ontologically fundamental than these objects.77 If it should 
turn out that the determination is reciprocated, the best the structuralist can 
claim is that the category of structure is as fundamental as that of objects. 
In such a case, of course, the moderate position would be vindicated at the 
expense of the radical one. By way of closing this chapter, I now want to 
consider whether or not these determination relations may be said to be 
reciprocated, and thus which of the radical and moderate refinements is 
recommended to us by this episode. 
The question we are asking is whether we can say that the SIPs determine the 
symmetry structure - or at least, since we saw that the determination of SIPs 
761 note that it is difficult to find any particularly detailed discussion of this issue 
in the structuralist literature. French, for example, notes in a survey article that 
'whether the introduction of "non-structural elements" undermines the structuralist 
tendency is a tricky issue, depending, of course, on both the nature of the element 
and the form of structuralism adopted' ([2006], p176); but 1 can find nothing in 
the literature that discusses this 'tricky issue' at any length. Indeed, while French 
and Saatsi discuss some specific allegations regarding the imposition of allegedly 
non-structural elements into structuralist theories - such as the postulation of a 
linguistically specified natural kind structure - they close by noting that 'how exactly 
such a notion [of' "extra" content going over and above pure structure'] is to be 
developed is still an open question' ([2004], p26). That seems to me to still hold true 
today. . 
77To recap yet again, I do not take x's being prior to y to be sufficient for x's being 
more fundamental than y; 1 take x to be more fundamental only if, in addition, y is 
not prior to x. If y is also prior to x, 1 say x is asjundamental as y. 
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by symmetry was not total, that the SIPs determine the symmetry structure to 
the same degree as was the case there. Recall from Section 2 above that when 
we say we are interested in symmetry structure in particle physics, what we 
are usually interested in is the Lie algebra corresponding to that symmetry 
(since it is this that does most of the work in defining particles in particle 
physics). Recall too that we were restricting our attention to the semi-simple 
Ue algebras (with the exception of U(l)), but that what was sought from the 
outset of the Eightfold Way was a simple Lie algebra, since it is only simple Ue 
algebras that correspond to 'higher' symmetry schemes that can appropriately 
enmesh the multiplets corresponding to lower symmetries. The question we 
are interested in is whether we can use the properties of the SIPs to determine 
the simple algebra that governs their internal properties, and those algebras 
that govern their external properties. As before, we regard the SIPs to be 
defined in terms of their Iz , Y, Band Salone. 
So let us suppose, for argument's sake, that we somehow had epistemic 
access to the SIPs, including the quarks, quite independently of any group 
structure. 78 That is, let us assume that we can take them out of the box 
and examine them, as it were, and thus come to know their Iz Y, Band 
S properties, their total number, as well as the fact that the hadrons are 
composed of the quarks (and· thus that the latter are fundamental relative to 
all the other strongly-interacting particles). Suppose we consider the quarks 
alone first of all. They all have spin 1/2, but the quarks and antiquarIes will 
differ in their values of B. So suppose we then separate them into two sets, 
one composed of the three quarks, the second of the three anti-quarks, and 
plot the Iz and Y values of each member of each set on one of two Iz and 
Y axes. In so doing, we reproduce the iconic quark diagrams reproduced 
Figure 8.2. Being highly symmetric, these will (of course/) look like the 
weight diagrams corresponding to irreducible representations of a symmetry 
group, and so suppose we then understand them as such. Furthermore, given 
that we have agreed that we have 'access' to the fact that these particles are 
fundamental particles, then for the same reasons as offered before in Section 
2 we have some justification to understand these to be the weight diagrams of 
the fundamental representations of some algebra. So the question we must ask 
7BAfter all, I am considering structuralism as an ontological thesis; even if we could 
not have any such access, even in principle, that is not to the point here. 
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ourselves now becomes: may we deduce the simple Lie algebra corresponding 
to the internal symmetry that - as we saw - could detennine the Iz and Y of 
these particles, from the set of these particles? 
But it is straightforward to show that the answer to this is yes: given the 
same particles that the SU(3) structure determines, we can work backwards 
to recover the SU(3) algebra. This may be seen as follows. We have agreed 
to interpret the particles featuring in Figure 8.2 as the weight diagrams of 
some algebra's fundamental representations. Thus each quark is construed as 
a weight IlL), given by 
where the Hi represent the Iz and Y operators. We also know that weights 
of any representation are related to one another by the action of the step 
operators via (8.6): 
where the root vectors p( (l)i are defined by (8.4) above. It was also mentioned 
in Section 2 that the set of these root vectors can be plotted to obtain the 
root diagram, which (i) consists of all the roots of the algebra, (ii) is unique 
to the algebra and (iii) suffices to determine it. However, it turns out that 
the algebra may be classified in a more compact way - namely, in terms of 
the simple roots. The simple roots, ~, have the property that their linear 
combinations can produce any other root of the algebra, and for a simple 
rank I algebra there are I simple roots. It turns out that all the information 
about the root diagram of a simple lie algebra as a whole may be deduced 
from these simple roots and the relationships between them. In particular, all 
infonnation about the algebra may be deduced from the relative magnitudes 
of the simple roots and the angles between them - both of which turn out to 
be severely constrained. Thus, all the essential information about an algebra 
is captured in its Cartan matrix: 79 
(8.8) 
It is this matrix that forms the basis of Cartan's classification of all the semi-
79See, e.g., Cornwell p221; Jones p182. 
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simple Lie algebras.80 
The relevance of these facts to the structuralist priority claim is as follows. 
As already mentioned in Section 2, the fundamental representations (such as 
the 3 and 3* of SU(3» are defined as those representations whose highest 
weight is afundamental weight.81 A fundamental weight, Ai, is defined via its 
orthogonality to the simple roots - that is, via 
(8.9) 
where pj is a simple root. Since a simple rank I group has I fundamental 
representations, it has I fundamental weights. But it is now dear that from 
a knowledge of the fundamental particles - which we are viewing as the 
fundamental representations - we can recover the algebra. For, given these 
l fundamental representations (so in the case of SU(3), all the quarks and 
antiquarks as depicted in Figure 8.2), we can plot the particles, read off the 
highest weight in each of the I representations and plug them into the equa-
tions (8.9) for the simple roots.82 These are l equations in l unknowns, which 
can thus be solved for the simple roots; these simple roots then determine 
the Cartan matrix, which in tum determines the algebra. Therefore given 
a complete set of fundamental particles - construed as a set of fundamen-
tal irreducible representations corresponding to some simple algebra - we 
may work backwards from it to reconstruct the corresponding Cartan matrix 
which in turns determines that algebra. It therefore appears that just as the 
SU(3) structure unambiguously determined the l:. and Y properties of these 
particles, they in tum determine it.83 
Let us now consider whether the spin and baryon properties can be used to 
determine the corresponding SU(2) and U(I) structures. Now, we know the 
quarks have 8=1/2, and lowest eigenvalue postulated that the quarks should 
8OCornwell [1984] p523. It may be useful to note that is the Cartan matrix that is 
expressed in a Dynkin diagram, which is often used in particle physics to represent an 
algebra (where 'represent' is not meant in the homomorphism-onto-operators sense). 
81See Cornwell [1997J, p242. (Note that Lichtenberg [1978], p86 refers to these 
as the 'fundamental dominant weights'.) 
B2Though I haven't mentioned it, both the weights and the roots of the algebra can 
be ordered, and must be ordered by the same convention for this formula to work. 
83See also McVoy [1965J, pl03 for an alternative deduction of the SU(3) algebra 
from the two triplet representations. 
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be put in their fundamental representation on account of their fundamental 
nature. But then since that representation is one-dimensional- being com-
posed of just the 8%=1/2 and 8%=-1/2 weights - then we know that the 
algebra sought is rank one. But there is only one such semi-simple Ue algebra, 
and that is the algebra of SU(2). Thus all we need to consider now is whether 
we can deduce that their baryon number group is given by U(1). Recall that 
before, we assigned B = 1/3 to the particles by assuming fewest parts and 
uniform division, together with the fact that the U(1) group has additive eigen-
values. What we have to go on here are just the fact that the (anti-) quarks 
have B = 1/3 (B = -1/3), (anti-)baryons B = 1 (B = -1), and the fact that 
there are three (anti-) quarks in a (anti-) baryon. In looking for the relevant 
group, then, we need a unitary group whose irreducible representations have 
the property that rb.rb.rb = r ab, and hence whose representations have the 
form eiB8• But these are just the representations of U(1). 
By surveying the properties of the SIPs and the same compositional relation-
ships that the simplicity assumptions were designed to capture, then, we 
can show that the determination goes both ways. That is, just as the SIPs 
cannot vary without varying the structure and the simplicity principles, so 
that structUre cannot vary without also varying that SIPs and those principles. 
Thus while the prediction of the properties of the quarks and hadrons through 
symmetry structure should be taken to be a triumph of structuralism in philos-
ophy of physics, we should be clear that it is a triumph for the moderate stance, 
not the radical stance. Thus, insofar as priority is understood in supervenience 
terms, it is moderate structuralism that represents the right philosophy for this 
beautiful episode in particle physics.84 
8.3.2 A Reply by the Radical Structuralist 
At least one radical structUralist has, however, objected to the idea that the 
above argument shows that the moderate position is vindicated, and thus de-
84To be clear, however, the route taken here is not that taken in the moderate 
structuralism of Esfeld and Lam (op. cit.), in which the reciprocated priority of objects 
over structures was argued for just on the basis of an insistence that 'relations require 
relata' on intelligibility grounds (and unsuccessfully in consequeJ?ce). Rathel; this 
reciprocated claim was established by attending to how objects and suuctUres are 
conceived in the physics itself. 
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rued that the radical position undermined through the above considerations.85 
As French quite rightly points out, the above demonstration that particles 
can determine structure rests on the assumption that we should conceive of 
particles in terms of the representations of symmetry groups - namely, as 
basis vectors in their irreducible representations, or equivalently as members 
of multiplets. After all, had we not made that assumption, we would have no 
idea how to deploy the representation-theoretic machinery needed to deter-
mine the relevant algebras. But according to French, once we have made that 
assumption, we have conceded exactly what the radical structuralist wanted 
us to concede all along, since group-theoretic representations are themselves 
to be regarded as part of the structure. Thus, the claim goes, by conceiving of 
particles in such terms we have implicitly embraced the radical stance; the 
conclusion that it is the moderate stance that is vindicated therefore cannot 
be right, since the two contradict one another. 
There is clearly a fair bit to unpick here, so let us try to see what is going on. 
This view that the representations are themselves to be regarded as part of 
the structure is certainly a view that French has expressed elsewhere. For 
example, he writes in a recent collection on the present state of structuralism 
that metaphysical reflection upon the role of symmetries in quantum physics 
reveals that 
the putative objects are presented and re-conceptualised (and 
hence metaphysically eliminated qua objects) via group-theory 
and it is the particularities of the latter's representations (in the 
technical sense) that reveal, represent and present to us the con-
crete features of the structure of the world.86 
French thus seems to be saying here that the group-theoretic representations 
are to be regarded as part of the structure, and since we may take the 
categories of objects and structures to exclude one another, this then precludes 
us from regarding them as objects. The principal relevance of this to present 
concerns is that it is therefore not particularly surprising that we should get 
the two-way priority relation between symmetries and representations that I 
derived above, since identity is, of course, a symmetrical relation. The space is 
thus cleared for the claim that the existence of symmetrical priority relations 
8sPrench, personal communication. 
86Prench [2012], p26. 
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between symmetry structures and particles does not in fact undermine the 
radical point of view, on the grounds the symmetry of priority arises precisely 
because there are no objects. Since the latter is a big part of the radical 
package, this symmetry of determination in fact supports it. 
But this claim that particles cannot be regarded as objects on account of the 
fact that we understand them in group-theoretic terms is, to my mind, a 
very puzzling move. Note first of all that, if we make the assumption (as in 
the case study outlined above) that there exists a symmetry in the dynamics 
pertaining to some particles, it is just a fact about the quantum-mechanical 
formalism, and the mathematics of symmetry, that those particles will fall into 
multiplets. As such, no real choice was involved in conceiving of particles 
in tenns of representations. Thus were French to be right about the idea 
that there are no objects in (this regime of) particle physics on the grounds 
that they are conceived of in such terms, then it would follow only from (i) 
incontrovertible facts about the mathematics of quantum mechanics that no 
naturalistic metaphysician could ever be in a position to deny. plus (li) what is, 
at least so far, a purely semantic decision not to regard particles as objects once 
they are connected with the concept of representations. But if that is the case, 
it is not clear what there is left for naturalistic metaphysicians to argue about 
- something that seems very suspicious, since I think we can safely assume 
that Esfeld and Lam are likewise committed to naturalism. Some argument 
must therefore be given for the second assumption that we cannot categorize 
an entity as an object once we conceive of it in terms of representations. 
But even if that argument were to succeed (which I do not think it can), it 
remains hard to see how French could consistently maintain, in the face of 
my argument above, that particles are thereby to be regarded as aspects of 
structure. After all, my argument set out to determine whether the radical 
structuralist claim that objects are ontologically secondary to structures could 
be defended, and in order to do that I had, of course, to identify examples 
of each at the outset. In this instance, I selected the first three quarks as our 
examples of objects and the global SU(3) flavour structure, supplemented 
with the spin and baryon number groups, as the example of structure; I then 
showed how the SIPs were determined via this structure and vice versa, in a 
way that seemed to undermine radical structuralism. How, then, can a radical 
structuralist ask me to renege on the idea that these particles are objects in 
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the face of this conclusion, without being guilty of special pleading?87 And 
even if they were to find a way to do so in good conscience, how could they 
then possibly claim that objects are secondary to structures, if we don't even 
have any objects left in the picture?88 
French's claim that being conceived of in group-theoretic terms is incompati-
ble with being regarded as an object is thus deeply confusing from all sorts of 
dialectical angles, and seems - on the face of it at least - to render radical 
structuralism incoherent. However, French's view appears to be an idiosyn-
cratic one, since many other prominent structuralists do not seem to take 
this line. While it is commonplace for other structuralists to similarly claim 
that objects are 'eliminated', that claim more usually is~ues from the assertion 
that objects are not metaphysically fundamental than from the view that the 
category has simply been wiped out of the picture. As Ladyman and Ross put 
it, for example, 'this is the sense in which our view is eliminative; there are 
objects in our metaphysics but they have been purged of their intrinsic natures, 
identity. and individuality. and they are not metaphysically fundamental'.89 
Thus, in the particle physics context, they point out that 'objects are very often 
identified in terms of group theoretic structure' and go on to note approvingly 
that, as a result, both of the structuralists Kantorovich and Lyre have held 
that particles are ontologica1ly secondary to those structures.9O Thus it is 
seemingly not the case that all structuralists take the fact that particles are 
conceived of in terms of group-theoretic representations to rob them of their 
status as objects. Rather, the claim more usually offered is that objects are 
to be identified in such terms, and regarded as ontologically secondary in 
consequence. And on Ladyman and Ross' view of eliminativism, it is only on 
that account that they are to be 'eliminated'. 
Thus, while the word is the same, it is crucial to note that this is a very 
different sort of eliminativism claim than that which French invokes above, 
87To put it differently, given that we started off with the assumption that the 
relevant structure is the SU(3) group - or better, the algebra of its generators - how 
can we say that the vectors in the weight diagrams are also part of the structure 
without being accused of 'moving the goal posts'? 
88This point has also been made, amongst others, by Psillos. As he writes, 'if 
structure is all there is, what are they said to be ontically prior to?' (Psillos [2012], 
pl71). 
89Ladyman and Ross [2007], p131; italics added. 
9OIbid., p145. 
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and we must be careful to keep them separate.91 There is, on the one hand, 
the eIiminativist view seemingly expressed by French above in which 'object' 
turns out to be a failed natural kind term - perhaps akin to 'phlogiston'. On the 
other hand, there is the view that there are objects in particle physics but only 
in a metaphysically secondary sense - perhaps akin to the way that what were 
previously thought to be sui generis chemical forces are now understood to be 
reduced to physical forces. I have ~ed that the first notion of eliminativism 
is dialectically problematic and - on the face of it at least - even incoherent 
from the point of view of radical structuralism, and have noted that other 
radical structuralists adopt instead the second point of view. I thus propose 
that we reject the view that particles cannot be regarded as objects on the 
grounds that they are conceived of in terms of the representations of symmetry 
groups, and instead retain the view that we do have objects in particle physics, 
whilst acknowledging that they are 'constituted' group theoretically.92 We can 
then coherently ask the question whether they can be 'reductively' eliminated 
qua ontologica1ly secondary entity. 
Now, on the basis of the considerations I have adduced in this chapter, the 
answer to that question of course appears to be no, since - from the point 
of view of supervenience at least - the representations, and hence the par-
ticles, seem to be on a par with the symmetries that the structuralist takes 
as fundamental. Whether that ultimately vindicates the moderate fonn of 
structuralism, however, is going to depend on whether supervenience really 
is the right relation with which to express priority in structuralism. That is 
something that I want to consider now. 
91Though. confusingly, French also invokes the 'elimination qua secondary' p0-
sition in places! Analyzing priority in dependence terms. he writes elsewhere that 
'our putative objects only exist. in a sense, if the relevant structure exists and the 
dependence is such that there is nothing to them - intrinsic properties. identity, 
constitution, whatever - that is not cashed out, metaphysically speaking, in terms of 
this structure ... This yields what has sometimes been called the more 'radical'. but as 
I would prefer to call 'strong' eliminativist form of OSR' ([2010], pl06). 
92This terminology is from Castellani [1998]. Some further implications of the 
fact the objects are conceived of in particle physics in group-theoretic terms will be 
developed in the next chapter. 
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Structure as a Fundamental 
Category 2: Structuralism as a 
Dependence Thesis 
9.1 The Right Priority Relation for Structuralism: 
Supervenience or Dependence? 
In the last chapter, I claimed that it is the moderate position that is best 
recommended to us by the particle theories based around the SU(3) flavour 
symmetry. and justified this claim by means of an argument in which priority 
was interpreted in supervenience terms. Insofar as the structure involved 
in this episode is held up as paradigm example of structure in physics, the 
natural conclusion to draw from that argument is that the radical position is 
. untenable as a general thesis in the metaphysics of physics. However, showing 
that radical structuralism is false on one construal of priority need not be 
taken as showing that it is false Simpliciter, provided there is scope to argue 
that some other priority relation is somehow more apt for structuralism. But 
we are now in a better position to consider which, if any, is the best-suited 
relation for the priority claims that structuralism proposes than we were 
when I introduced structuralism in the beginning of the last chapter. There, 
my characterization of structuralism was very shorn-down, and the position 
was presented just in terms of its commitment to certain priority claims. But 
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clearly such a characterization of structuralism cannot itself adjudicate between 
what is and is not the best priority relation for it (beyond, of course, that it 
must be able to relate different categories). It is therefore worth considering. 
with the benefit of hindsight, whether there is a better choice for expressing 
the priority claims definitive of structuralism than relations of supelVenience. 
So let us consider that now. 
One thing that became clear in the last chapter was that. in order to infer 
either of the supervenience claims that were established there, it was necessary 
to conceive of objects in group-theoretic terms - namely, in terms of their 
being basis vectors in irreducible representations of symmetry groups, or in 
_ other words members of multiplets. Without that assumption, there is no 
fathomable way to get the objects and structures 'talking' to each other so 
as to be able to deduce the one from the other. Furthermore, as was noted 
toward the end of that chapter, the act of conceiving of particles in terms 
of group-theoretic representations was not something that involved any real 
element of choice (given the assumption that there is a symmetry in the 
relevant dynamics); nor did it seem to warrant ceasing to regard the particles 
as objects. Nonetheless, it seems incontrovertible that the concept of object 
qua basis vector of a group-theoretic representation is very intimately related 
to the corresponding notion of structure, since the fonner notion cannot even 
be defined without reference to that structure. But given that objecthood 
now appears to be (at least partially) defined in structural terms, it also seems 
intuitively right to say that this conception of objecthood has implications 
that render it markedly different from those more typically presented in 
metaphysics, and as such that this conception of objects in modem physics is 
potentially highly revisionary with respect to received views on the nature of 
objects. 
To appreciate the latter point, consider for example either of the 'bundle', 
or 'substratum' -based views of objects familiar from analytic metaphysics.! 
Simply speaking, we may say that each of these characterizes what it is to be 
an object in terms of how it is that it possesses properties (namely, in terms of 
their being 'bundled' together by a sui generis bundling relation or in terms of 
their inherence in a substratum). Thus presumably what it is to be a physical 
1 Whether the 'bundles' are taken to be of universals or tropes is of no consequence 
here. 
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object on either construal is conceived of in terms of how it is that physical 
properties are possessed. But what those properties are, beyond of course the 
fact that they are physical, is of no consequence to either account. As such, 
neither has anything to say on how the properties of an object might have 
to relate to one another in order to constitute a physical object - something 
on which the group-theoretic approach, by contrast, has a great deal to say.2 
Furthermore, each of the more familiar characterizations articulates what 
it is to be an object without in any way implicating the existence of other 
objects. 3 But since conceiving of an object in terms of its being a member of 
a multiplet will, in the general (i.e. non-trivial) case, imply the existence of 
other objects - recall here the prediction of the n- - this again seems to stake 
out a profound difference with the more familiar views.4 In 'sum, then, the 
group-theoretic conception seems to involve certain inter-object relationships, 
and constraints on combinations of properties, that are simply not present in 
the more familiar conceptions. 
As a result of these apparently profound differences between the group-
.theoretic conception of objects and the more common-or-garden varieties, 
one often finds structuralism's priority claims being accompanied by a claim 
regarding the reconceptualization of objects that the shift to a structuralist 
perspective involves. S To take just one example, French and Ladyman state 
2For example, the fact that particles are regarded as basis vectors in an irreducible 
representation of rank 1 algebra implies that each has 1 determinable properties that 
can be observed simultaneously, and has very specific implications regarding the 
corresponding determinates that may be observed in each particle, via the weight 
diagram structure. 
3Thus while Paul's conception of an object as a 'bundle of n-adic properties' (see 
Paul [forthcoming]) might imply the existence of n - 1 other objects in certain 
cases (if, for example, there are irreflexive n-adic properties involved), her general 
conception is in no way committed to the existence of other objects. 
4More precisely, in some contexts we take an object to correspond to a basis vector 
in an irreducible representation, and in others we take an object to correspond to the 
whole representation. The 'Eightfold Way' case was clearly an instance of the former; 
the case of the constitution of objects via the representations of the Poincare group, 
to be discussed below, will be a case of the latter. 
sFor further discussion of how the group-theoretic conception of objects differs 
from conceptions more standardly assumed, focussing on how modal debates are 
thereby changed, see McKenzie [forthcoming]. I should, however, perhaps under-
line that here I am most interested in considering which priority relation is most 
appropriate for structuralism, as structuralists themselves see the latter. Insofar 
as structuralists evidently do regard objects to be 'reconceptualized', and insofar 
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that as structuralists they 'are not "anti-ontology" in the sense of urging a 
move away from electrons, elementary particles etc. [ ... ] rathet; [they] urge 
the reconceptualization of electrons, elementary particles and so forth in 
structural instead of individualistic terms.16 What I therefore want to reflect 
on now is how structuralists ought to conceive of priority, given that a novel 
priority claim and a claim regarding the 'reconceptualization' of objects are 
both parts of the structuralist package. 
As mentioned in the last chaptet; in addition to supervenience a suitably 
general notion of dependence is a prima jade good candidate for expressing 
structuralism's priority claims, given its ability to relate entities of different 
cat~gories. And as was also mentioned there, structuralists have used both, at 
different points, to trace out their metaphysical views. Ladyman and Ross, for 
example, write that 
OSR is the view that the world has an objective modal structure 
that is ontologically fundamental, in the sense of not supervening 
on the intrinsic properties of a set of individuals. 7 
This demonstrates that structuralists sometimes vouch for supervenience to 
express their priority claims. French, on the other hand, more often alludes to 
relations of dependence to articulate his structuralism, stating that he 
take[s] it that a core feature of OSR is the claim that putative 
'objects' are dependent in some manner upon the relevant relations 
(and hence these putative objects can be reconceptualized as mere 
nodes in the relevant structure).8 
(Note another allusion to 'reconceptualization' here.) Given that each of 
these are prima jacie good candidates and both in play in the literature, it 
is therefore natural to construe the question of which relation is most apt 
for analyzing structuralist priority as that of which, if either, of these two 
as the latter may be argued to be relevant to the priority analysis, precisely how 
structuralists think this reconceprualization should best be cashed out is a some-
what peripheral concern for my purposes. But I take it that structuralists will agree 
that the above sorts of considerations are at least important for what they mean by 
'reconceptualization' . 
6French and Ladyman [2003], p37. See also e.g. French [2006]; Bokulich [2011], 
p.xiv; Pooley [2006]; Brading and Skiles [2012]. 
7Ladyman and Ross [2007], p130; my italics. 
8Prench [2010], pl04; my italics. 
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relations fares better. And since - as was pointed out in Chapter 1 - not only 
are the two conceptually quite distinct but also arguably not co-extensive, this 
question is certainly one that can be meaningfully asked. 
Let us therefore contemplate, for a moment, how the two relations compare. 
I have already mentioned that supervenience is very familiar in metaphysics 
as a means of cashing out priority, and it is also deemed to be amply clear (at 
least insofar as modal concepts are deemed to be clear - a big qualification, 
to be sure). But the idea that supervenience can be used to cash out priority 
has, of course, also had its critics. Such critics often focus on the idea that 
supervenience is not at all explanatory of any relationship between the sub-
and supervenient relata, so that supervenience is often regarded a~ at best an 
indication that it is worth looking for an explanation of the evident connection 
between them, while not itself explanatory of it.9 That need not be a criticism 
in itself, of course - one can in fact imagine situations in which it might be 
positively advantageous, such as when it is believed that there is no such 
explanation to be had. 10 But insofar as it posits a relation between things 
without giving us any indication of why it holds, it may be difficult to stomach 
the idea that supervenience gives us the last word on fundamentality. 
On the other hand, it is fair to say that the predicament with dependence 
has been almost the diametric opposite: while dependence is taken to have 
some deep connection with explanation, it has frequently not been seen as 
sufficiently clear. As evidence for this, one could cite the fact that Lewis - in 
one of his many papers attempting to define intrinsicality - commented that 
'if we had a clear enough understanding of "in virtue of" [i.e. dependence], 
we would need no further definition of intrinsiC'.11 But it seems to be the case 
that philosophers have grown more sanguine about dependence in recent 
years, and that it is increasingly regarded as something of which we have . 
a good enough working grasp. (This is indeed seemingly evidenced by the 
number of new dependence-based analyses of intrinsicality that are now 
on the market.) 12 Whatever it is that accounts for this change, if there are 
good reasons to be more sanguine, it appears that dependence - unlike 
9See Kim [1993], especially pages 146, 148 and 156, and works cited therein. 
l°Emergentists of various stripes believe that there are such cases. 
llLewis [2001], p384. See also Lewis [1983], p29. 
120n the defence of dependence, see Jenkins [forthcoming]. On dependence-based 
analyses of intrinsicality, see Rosen [2010], Witmer et ai. [2005]. 
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supervenience - gets 'a tick in both boxes'. Given, then, that it is increasingly 
regarded as both sufficiently clear and appropriately explanatory, we might 
want to endorse it on these grounds. 
Whatever virtues either relation might have in the abstract, however, the 
principled question we should be asking in this context is which is the more 
pertinent relationfor structuralism; and I think a strong case can be made that 
it is dependence that represents the analytically more fundamental relation for 
structuralism's priority claims.13 I will argue for this in two steps. Step 1 will 
be to motivate the idea that claims that express any priority facts embodied in 
the very fact that objects are structurally reconceptualized should be regarded 
as more basic to structuralism'S priority theses than those that must simply 
assume that that reconceptualization has taken place. Step 2 will be to argue 
that the priority relation most appropriate for capturing any such priority 
facts is a version of dependence. 
Let me therefore start with step 1. Recall first of all that, as pressed at the 
start of this section, structuralism comprises more than just a priority claim: 
it is also an invocation for us to reconceptualize object-based ontology in some 
way that integrates structures. It is in that sense revisionary with respect 
to the nature of objects as well as to their supposed priority. Now consider 
once again the reciprocated supervenience claim that was obtained in the last 
chapter - namely, that of the supervenience of symmetry structures on objects. 
As already pointed out, that claim could go through only given the antecedent 
assumption that the objects were conceived of in group-theoretic terms. But 
it seems eminently plausible that there may be priority facts embodied in 
the very fact of this 'reconceptualization' that are distinct from the priority 
facts that follow from this reconceptualization - in much the same way as 
there may be modal assumptions that are embodied in a particular account 
of lawhood that are distinct from, but entailing of, modal facts regarding 
the behaviour of objects. So suppose we provisionally accept that possibility 
for now. 14 It furthermore seems plausible that any priority claims that may 
be 'embodied in' the fact of reconceptualization should be regarded as more 
basic to the structuralist analysis than the supervenience claims that were 
13This conclusion is in addition to the claim, noted in Chapter 2, Section 2, that 
supervenience is increasingly viewed as insufficiently fine-grained capture concepts 
related to priority and fundamentality. 
14This assumption will be justified in due course. 
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derived in the last chapter, since the latter must take for granted that such a 
reconceptualization has taken place in order to even get off the ground. Let 
us therefore accept that as well. 
Now let us tum to step 2. To recap, step 2 is to make plausible that it is a 
version of dependence that is the most appropriate candidate for articulating 
any priority claims that might be embodied in the fact of reconceptualization. 
As noted, this reconceptualization is intimately related to the fact that the 
objects of particle physics seem to be (at least partially) defined in structural 
terms. As a first stab at making this plausible, we might approach the issue 
negatively: since it is only supervenience and (some version of) dependence 
that we have in the running, and since it seems that supervenience, claims 
regarding the relationship between objects and laws must already assume 
that objects are reconceptualized group-theoretically, if there are priority facts 
embodied in the very fact of reconceptualization then it seems we can only 
conclude that supervenience does not have the resources to analyze them (as 
opposed to merely encode some of their consequences). But, more positively, 
there is an approach to dependence that seems to be tailor-made for analyzing 
such priority facts, and it is the approach to ontological dependence that is 
taken by Kit Fine. To see this, recall first of all that the 'reconceptualization' 
at issue here consists of a shift in perspective with regard to the nature of 
objects in comparison with more familiar metaphysical analyses: after all, 
what divides these analyses is not the properties that such objects have, but 
what their nature is qua objects. Recall secondly that what motivated the idea 
that objects are to be reconceived structurally was the fact that they are now 
defined, at least in part, in terms that make reference to symmetry. What we 
therefore want is an analysis of priority that can locate novel priority facts 
in novel facts about nature, where these facts. about nature are intimately 
related to facts about definition. But if that is the case, then Fine's analysis of 
ontological dependence presents itself as ideal on both counts. Fine's analysis 
is, for one thing, explicitly predicated upon the idea that priority attributions 
should in all cases 'be appropriately tied to the nature of the dependent item', 
and thus that they should go deeper than, for example, the modal profile 
of the item alone. IS But secondly, for Fine the question of what an object's 
nature is just is the question how it should best be defined, so that questions 
lSFine [1995a], p272. 
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of priority will, on this account, be automatically invited by questions of 
definition. For both of these reasons, then, Fine's analysis appears to be an 
ideal resource for capturing any priority claims that might be embodied within 
structuralism's stated reconceptualization of objects. 
If that two-step argument is cogent, then there is a strong case to be made 
that it is Fine's conception of ontological dependence that represents the 
most fundamental priority relation, analytically speaking, for structuralism's . 
priority claims. And if that is correct, then the radical structuralist is, of 
course, back in with a fighting chance, since they can claim that the priority 
claims deduced previously had to take for granted certain facts which may 
yet play into their hands.16 What I therefore think we ought to do at this 
point is put the talk of supervenience behind us, and instead take a closer 
look at what exactly is involved in the account of dependence to which I just 
alluded. With that in place, I will address how structuralists might explicitly 
invoke Fine's account to promote into real demonstrations what in many cases 
have, in the absence of a clear and unambiguous understanding of what 
is meant by 'priority' (or even 'dependence'), largely just been plausibility 
arguments for the priority of structure over objects (and, where appropriate, 
vice versa). In the second of these case studies I will resume the discussion 
of group-theoretic structuralism, and see how the priority claims that can 
be made in that context look once we conceive of priority a La Fine. But to 
broaden things out a little, the first case study concerns a different sort of 
structure that is also highly prominent within the structuralist literature, and 
it is that pertaining to entangled quantum particles. The latter is in fact perhaps 
the most vaunted and most discussed case of priority in structuralism, but 
complaints have nevertheless been lodged that it is unclear how exactly it is 
the relevant priority claims are ultimately supposed to work in this context.17 
16Indeed, this observation may provide us with a more convincing reading of the 
claims made by French described late in the last chapter: While we can (and I believe 
should) deny that the act of conceiving objects group-theoretically warrants ceasing to 
consider them as genuine objects, it may be that this reconceptualization introduces 
dependence relations that exhibit the radical structuralist's supposed asymmetric 
structure. If that is the case, then the very fact that the moderate structuralist's 
supervenience claims presuppose this reconceptualization means that the radical can 
happily accept that moderate's supervenience claims but nonetheless deny that they 
express the most fundamental facts about priority in structuralism. 
17Here I recall Hawley's criticisms mentioned in the last chapter: 
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Showing how those claims can be clarified when viewed through the prism of 
Fine's analysis will thus do nothing if not testify to the advantages of explicitly 
adopting this approach. So with that, let me now expand a little more on 
ontological dependence and, in particular, Fine's account of it. 
9.2 Introducing Ontological Dependence 
If we go with our first intuitions on the matter, we will want to say that an 
entity x is ontologically dependent upon an entity y just if x exists only if y 
exiSts. It seems clear that this should also hold with metaphysical neces~ity 
(for if there were a world in which x could after all exist without y, we 
would presumably want to retract that x was dependent upon it). To a first 
approximation, then, we may say that an entity x is ontologically dependent 
upon an entity y just if, necessarily, x exists only if y does, where the force of 
the necessity is metaphysical. This indeed represents the core of the analysis 
of ontological dependence to be found in Simons and Husserl.18 
Intuitive though it may seem at a first pass, the starting point for Fine's 
analysis is that such a simple and purely modal construal of ontological 
dependence in fact turns out to be hopeless; it is simply not fine-grained 
enough to exclude some patently spurious cases.19 As already indicated, Fine 
proposes in its place an analysis in which 
the necessity of the conditional 'x exists only if y does' should be 
appropriately tied to the nature of the dependent item X.20 
It follows that such conditionals are 'not necessary simpliciter' but are in 
addition 'tied' in some sense to the nature of their relata. Now, the 'natures' 
involved in this 'tying' are to be understood in terms that are at least close 
to what has traditionally been associated with essence - for Fine's analysis is 
indeed explicitly essentialist. This raises an immediate concern, however, for 
we probably do have to grant to French that 'essentialism has not typically 
been viewed all that favourably in the context of modem physics.'21 Hence we 
18See Fine [1995a] for discussion of and references to these purely modal accounts. 
19See however Wildman ems]. 
20Fine [1995a], p272. 
21French [2010], pl06. This is in part because essentialist doctrines in the philoso-
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face the worry that by invoking Fine's theory in discussions of structuralism in 
physics we are attempting to shoe-hom a very contemporary ontology into a 
hallowed framework that was not designed to accommodate it. It is perhaps 
partly for this reason that structuralist discussions of priority have tended to 
focus on the notion of identity without any mention of essence - the former 
being deemed to connote something altogether more innocuous than the 
latter. 22 
However, I would argue that keeping the discussion confined to identity 
considerations to the exclusion of this thing called 'essence' is neither realistic 
nor necessary. Talk of ontological dependence is after all metaphysical talk. 
and thus the fact that physics never speaks explicitly of essence need not 
constitute any reason to shun it. Furthermore, and as Lowe has argued, talk 
of the 'identity dependence' with which structuralists seem more comfortable 
apparently still requires us to ultimately invoke something close to essence 
if we are to put constraints (as we must) on what sort of properties should 
feature in the analysis of the identity of an entity.23 But more positively. we 
should, I think, be open to the possibility that essence too may be relatively 
innocuous in the sorts of structuralist contexts that we will be working within 
here. It may turn out, in fact, that what Fine has in mind by 'essence' is 
just the sort of thing that we are used to dealing with all the time in particle 
physics. But before I can assert any of that, of course, I need to clarify what 
commitment to essence involves. To do so, I will defer to a recent and useful 
survey article on contemporary approaches to ontological dependence. Here, 
Correia writes that 
the conception of essence Fine has in mind is a traditional concep-
tion according to which what is essential to an object pertains to 
what the object is, or defines the object (at least in part).24 
phy of science have tended to be tied up in the language of dispositions, and hence 
of cause and effect - concepts that are problematic to say the least in the context of 
fundamental physics. 
22Thus while French's discussion of dependence in structuralism cites the notion 
of 'essential dependence', he has little more to say than that 'the essence of an object 
is closely bound up with its identity', and thus he effectively reverts to discussing 
identity dependence (French [2010], pIOl). 
23Lowe [1998], pl48. 
24Correia [2008], pIOIS; italics in original. Note that it is better to speak of 
'entities' than 'objects' here; more on this below. 
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This we will take as our starting point. Now, perhaps the two conceptions of 
essence just alluded to are intended in a somewhat technical sense in which 
they come out as synonymous, but it doesn't seem so, and at a first pass they 
do seem to invoke different things - both of which we intuitively want to 
be brought into the discussion. If we understand the first characterization 
in the statement as meaning 'pertaining to what the object is, as opposed to 
what it is not', we seem to have invoked matters of individuation and hence 
of properties that might confer distinctness or individuality - something that 
structuralists are routinely happy to discuss. But since definitions need not 
be individuating, this needn't be the same thing as defining the object. 25 
Indeed, in particle physics we usually take defining an object to be a matter 
of listing off the determinate, supposedly fundamental, state-independent-
properties· common to all members of the particle's kind, all of which are 
indistinguishable with respect to these properties. These properties physicists 
usually call 'intrinsic' properties, but - as Ladyman and Ross remind us - they 
correspond much more naturally to what philosophers would call 'essential' 
properties (partly because such properties are always, among other things, 
permanent and observer-independent).26 
Given that preliminary reassurance, and in keeping with Correia's rough-and-
ready criterion, we can say, to a first approximation, that the properties we 
should take to feature in a particle's essence are 
• the fundamental, determinate, state-independent properties that serve 
to define its kind; and 
• (some of) the properties involved in conferring distinctness from other 
members of its kind. 
I will leave the latter very vague, as I will not go into much depth about 
how essence and individuation fit together; all I am going to do is invoke 
a couple of theorems of Fine's as and when we need them. But hopefully I 
have done enough to dispel at least some of the initial misgivings about what 
essence might involve in the fundamental physics context, and with that, let 
2sWhether a definition is individuating or not will depend on its relationship to a 
pre-agreed principle of individuation. Compare, say, the definition of a set in terms of 
its members, and the definition of an electron in terms of its having mass m, charge 
e and spin s. 
26Ladyman and Ross [2007], p134. 
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me introduce Fine's system. 
9.3 Fine's System 
The first thing to be clear on is that Fine's analysis of ontological dependence is 
intended as completely general in scope, incorporating dependencies between 
(among other things) physical objects, properties, numbers, sets, persons. 
and states of things at a time. Thus it is unfortunate - and especially so in 
the current context - that Fine often uses the term 'object' to refer to the 
relata of dependence relations when the more generic 'entity' would be a 
better term. Therefore while. to preserve ease of reading, I will not replace 
'object' with 'entity' in the ensuing quotes from Fine, the reader should be 
clear that Fine's theory is to apply to (possible) entities of any category and is 
not restricted to the category of objects alone. In the structuralist case studies. 
however, references to objects should be understood as references to entities 
in the category of objects and thus to entities distinct from those in category of 
Structures.27 
What we must acquaint ourselves with next is Fine's primitive operator '0:/. 
which generates the prefix 'it is true in virtue of the identity of x that': 
Ox =def it is true in virtue of the identity of x that 
The idea behind this operator is that when it operates on a predication t/> of an 
object x, it generates the proposition that t/> is an essential property of x: 
Oxt/>(x} =def t/> is an essential propeny of x. 
As I have already pointed out, Fine takes essential attributions to be more 
discriminating than necessary attributions, and as a consequence he 
accept[s] that if an object essentially has a certain propeny then 
it is necessary that it has that property (or has the property if it 
exists); but [he] reject[s] the converse,28 
and it is clear that we can schematize the part he accepts as follows: 
271 would like to thank Kit Pine for clarifying this point. 
28Pine [1994], p4." 
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o,,:f/>(x) - O(Ex - ¢>(x», (9.1) 
which says that if an entity is essentially ¢>, then it is necessary that it is ¢> if 
it exists. Here, following Fine and the standard literature on dependence, I 
use this 'E' to denote 'the existence predicate'.29 As Correia notes again, this 
schema is basically uncontested in the debate; in what follows, I will refer to 
it as the 'basic schema'. Now, given that the necessary truths that we obtain in 
this way are 'not necessary simpliciter' but 'flow from the nature of the objects 
in question', we may say that the necessity attached to the consequent here 
is itself reflective of the nature of x.30 It follows that cf/s being an essential 
property of x plus the basic schema implies 
(9.2) 
which states that it is essential to an entity that if it exists, it is ¢>.31 I have 
also said that, for Fine, 'ontological dependence should be tied to the nature 
of the dependent entity', which we can now express as 
O",(Ex - Ey), (9.3) 
which is Fine's analysis of the statement that x ontologically depends upon y. 
So what I will try to do in what follows is derive statements of this form, with 
objects and structures in the appropriate positions, from what I have called 
the basic schema. 
In order to do that, two more things will be required. First of all, when it is 
the natures of two entities that are involved in some dependence, we need a 
suitable generalization of the basic schema, and this is presumably 
29See for example Correia [2008], pl017. To be clear, Fine does not regard 
'3xx = x' to adequately express 'x exists'; rather than endorsing a quantijicational 
conception of existence, he argues for a predicational conception instead. See Pine 
[2009] for an exposition of his view. 
30Pine [199Sb] p7; p8. 
31Though I will not show it here, this is a theorem of Pine's system and may be 
demonstrated through the principles laid down in Fine [1995b]. I would like to 
express my gratitude to Fabrice Correia for providing me with the proof. 
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OZ,lI1P(X, y) - OZ,lI((Ex&Ey) -1P(x, y», (9.4) 
which says that if 1P holds of x and y in virtue of their essences, then if they 
exist, 1P is true of them. For the same reasons as before, we may infer from 
this, plus the fact that 1P holds essentially of them, that 
Dz,y«Ex&Ey) -1P(x, y)) (9.5) 
is true, which says that it follows from the natures of x and y that if they 
exist, then 1P is true of them. There is also the corresponding statement of 
ontological dependence of a pair x and y on some z: 
OZ,lI((Ex&Ey) - Ez). (9.6) 
As well as these generalizations to two or more entities, we are going to need 
the notion of the consequential essence. According to Fine, the most intuitive 
way to grasp this notion is via the concept of the constitutive essence (though 
we should note that ultimately the constitutive essence may be dispensed with 
to leave a purely consequence-based account).32 As Fine puts matters: 
A property belongs to the constitutive essence of an object if it is not 
had in virtue of being a logical consequence of some more basic 
essential properties; and a property might be said to belong to 
the consequential essence of an object if it is a logical consequence 
of properties that belong to the constitutive essence. [ ... J Thus 
a property of containing Socrates as a member will presumably 
be part of the constitutive essence of singleton Socrates, whereas 
the property of containing some member or other will presumably 
only be part of its consequential essence.33 
Intuitive as that may be, there unfortunately still remains work to do in 
defining the consequential essence - for, as Fine concedes, as it stands the 
proposed definition of consequence will be useless (and this relates to the idea 
that the essential is more fine-grained than necessary). This is because the 
32See Fine [1995a], Section II. 
33Ibid., p276. 
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property of being the same as, or distinct from, any object (or better, 'entity') 
y will be a logical consequence of any proposition about any given object, and 
so will form part of the consequential essence of anything. It will follow that 
everything depends on everything else - clearly an awkward result. What is 
needed is 'an independent way of distinguishing between those objects that 
enter into the consequential essence as a result of logical closure and those 
that enter in 'their own right', i.e. by way of the constitutive essence,' and to 
this end Fine proposes that we impose a test on the logical consequences of 
any essential attribution.34 The test for x to be said to depend upon y is that 
y cannot be 'generalized out' of the consequentialist essence of x, or, in other 
words, that x will depend upon y ~ust in case some proposition P(y) belongs 
to the essence without its generalization belonging to the essence.'35 
While the motivation for this test is clear enough, it is also apparent that if we 
are to gain any purchase on which truths are universalizable and which are 
not, we must first specify of what it is that we take the appropriate domain 
of quantification to consist. Fine states that 'the quantifier can and, indeed, 
should be taken to range over every possible object' in order to preserve the 
Barcan principle (which again we take as the statement that the quantifier 
ought to range over every possible entity), and it is clear that if Fine's thesis is 
to be of any use to structuralism, then the domain had better include any of 
the structures that may be deemed relevant in the metaphysics of present or 
future fundamental physics {such as laws, groups~ metric structures and so 
on).36 While that is clear, what is far less so is that we can specify all of these 
structures that must feature in the domain in a clear and well-defined way. 
There may therefore be a worry that we will not be in a position to state that 
a given proposition P(y} is satisfiable for every y unless we can find a way to 
specify in advance every y that should feature in the domain. Nonetheless, it 
34lbid., p278. 
3slbid., p278. So, for example, 'although it is part of the consequentialist essence 
of Socrates that 2 = 2, it is also part of his consequentialist essence that every 
object whatever is self-identical,' and so the number 2 does not after aU feature 
in the singleton's consequential essence (at least not on this basis). On the other 
hand, while it is also a logical consequence of the nature of, say, Socrates' singleton 
that there is something that it contains, it does not logically follow that, for any 
object whatsoever, that object is contained. In accordance with Fine's criterion, then, 
we recover the idea that the property of containing something does belong to the 
consequential essence of Socrates' singleton set - and hence to its essence simpliciter. 
36Ibid., p277. 
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is obvious that the task of securing positive attributions of dependence will 
not require us to trawl through evety element of an infinite domain, for if we 
can find just one entity that we indisputably do want to be included, but that 
does not satisfy the proposition, then we will be home and hosed. So let us try 
to get along for the moment without worrying too much about how to specify 
the domain beyond the fact that it contains all the entities - including all the 
objects and structures - of which structuralism will want to make use. 
That is basically all that will be needed of Fine's machinety here, so let me 
now show how we can get it to work in structuralism. In what remains, I 
will examine two prominent case studies in structuralism, beginning with 
the case of entangled qu~tum particles and after that returning to consider 
the case of the group-theoretic conception of elementaty particles. In each 
case, I will use Fine's analysis to rigorously recover the core structuralist claim 
that objects ontologically depend on structures. But I will also address the 
issue of whether this dependence is reciprocated, and hence try to make some 
progress toward adjudicating on the issue of which, if any, of structuralism's 
radical and moderate variants is recommended to us in either case. 
9.4 The Dependence of Objects on Structure 1: 
Entangled Quantum Particles 
As already mentioned, where structuralists have gone into any kind of detail 
about the nature of the priority they have in mind it has tended to concern 
identity; structuralism is indeed often explicitly presented as the thesis that 
objects lack 'primitive identity'.37 Perhaps the most discussed and clearly 
presented statements of this thesis revolve around the seminal work by Saun-
ders on Leibniz's principles and their application to physics.38 While this 
work was judged, by many at least, to undermine the underdetermination 
claims that had previous motivated the eliminativist thesis associated with 
radical structuralism, the same work was redeployed to sustain the latter's 
core priority thesis. While the claim that the structure of quantum relations 
37 A review of this approach to structuralism may be found in Section 4 of Ladyman 
[2007]. 
38Saunders [2003]. 
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ruled out the individuality of fermions was dropped, in its place emerged the 
claim that those relations secured individuality only at the price of rendering 
them ontologically secondary (and as such, it is claimed, still metaphysically 
eliminable).39 Ladyman and Ross, for example, note that in their opinion 
'while Saunders' view vindicates an ontology of individuals in the context of 
QM, it is a thoroughly structuralist one in so far as individuals are nothing 
over and above the nexus of relations in which they stand'.40 They take 
this 'structuralist' account of particle identity to form a core plank of the 
foundation for their ontic structuralism as a whole, a position that consists of 
'a conjunction of eliminativism about self-subsistent individuals, the view that 
relational structure is ontologically fundamental, and structural realism.'41 
As already mentioned, however, Hawley has complained that what exactly 
these claims amount to is not clear as it stands. Esfeld and Lam have also 
noted that it is not at all obvious how the observations regarding identity that 
Saunders brings to the table 'could ground an ontological priority of relations 
over relata. >42 Let me now attempt to repair this situation by explicitly setting 
the priority claims that are taken to follow from Saunders' discussion into a 
Finean framework and seeing whether they do indeed follow. 
In order do so, I must first briefly recap the main thrust of Saunders' argument. 
The issue at hand is identity, and Saunders takes as his starting point the 
analysis of identity in a modem logical context. In that context, he argues 
that the principle of identity of indiscemihles or 'PH' - the statement that if two 
objects possess all the same properties and stand in all the same relations to 
all the same things, then it follows that they are identical - can be regarded 
as well motivated. Indeed, Saunders argues that the PH may be identifed with 
(what he calls) the 'Hilbert-Bemays principle', and since he takes the latter to 
provide an explicit definition of identity it follows that the PII may be equally 
well regarded, in this context, as true by definition. 43 
39See e.g. French [1998] and Ladyman [1998] for statements of the underdeter-
mination argument. It is my understanding that, at present, Ladyman accepts that 
Saunders' argument vindicates an ontology of individuals, while French still holds 
that the dilemma persists. 
40Ladyman and Ross [2oo7J, p138. 
41lbid., p14S. 
42Esfeld and Lam [2010], pl48. 
43 See Saunders Op. cit., Section 1. I note that here I am merely presenting Saunders' 
argument as I find it: my principal purpose is to show how priority attributions may be 
rigorously built upon these foundations, not to criticize those foundations themselves. 
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The relevance of this to the specific issue of identity in quantum mechanics 
may be put as follows. It is a postulate of quantum mechanics that the states 
of interacting indistinguishable (i.e. 'same kind') quantum systems must be 
subject to permutation invariance - that is, they must be determinately either 
S}'I1.lII1etric or antisymmetric with respect to the exchange of particle labels, 
producing either bosons and fermions, respectively.44 This invariance under 
exchange has the consequence that there is nothing in terms of the essential 
properties that define their kind, nor in terms of the dynamical relationships 
they bear to one another, that can be used to distinguish between the particles 
in a given state in such a way that we may determinately refer to anyone 
of them to the exclusion of any of the others. This predicament gave rise to 
the 'Received View' that quantUm particles violated the PII and thus could not 
be regarded as individuals.45 Saunders' insight, however, was that the idea 
that entangled quantum particles are thereby indiscernible rests on a view of -, 
discernibility that is unduly restrictive. So long as there exists an irreflexive 
relation between the objects at hand (a relation which, in the context of 
pennutation invariance, will necessarily be symmetric), the particles can be 
regarded. as distinct consistently with the PH: it will not be the case that 
the objects stand in all the same relations to all the same things due to the 
irreflexivity of the symmetric relation. And the relevant states in the case of 
fermions - which we regard as the fundamental constituents of matter - are 
of the fonn 
(9.7) 
which may be interpreted as meaning that two particles stand in the symmetric 
but irreflexive relation of having equal but opposite spin. Objects such as 
these, which may be secured as distinct only by appealing to the presence of 
a symmetric but irreflexive relation, are said to be weakly discernible.46 
That Saunders' argument yields this much has not been without controversy 
but is nonetheless widely accepted. What is by contrast much less clear is 
how exactly his argument may be used to underwrite the claim that fennions 
44Paraparticle states are also permitted, but do not seem to be instantiated. 
4SSee, e.g. French and Krause [2006]. 
46Saunders' analysis was subsequendy extended beyond fermions to bosons (see 
Muller and Saunders [2008]), but this has proved more controversial. 
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are thereby somehow ontologically secondary. By inserting this claim into 
Fine's framework, however, we may justify the claim as follows. 
We have agreed that quantum mechanics supplies an irreflexive relation 
between entangled fennions, and Saunders has shown that objects satisfying 
such a relation are distinct. Thus we may write 
E(R: Rirref(x,y)) -+ x", y, (9.8) 
where I use 'E(R: ]lirref(x,y»' to express 'there exists some irretlexive rela-
tion holding between x and y'.47 What we need now is one of Fine's theorems 
connecting essence and identity that were mentioned before, namely; 
x '::F y ....... O;t,y(x '::F y). (9.9) 
(To get a sense of what this means, it may be helpful to contrast it with 
x = y -+ D",x = y (9.10) 
and note that, as Fine says, 'whereas a true identity x = y depends upon the 
nature of the one object x, a true non-identity depends upon the nature of 
both objects' - which intuitively seems right.48) So while Saunders' analysis 
delivers that entangled fermions are distinct, Fine's analysis then tells us that 
it is essential to them to be distinct, and we have 
(9.11) 
What else can we deduce to be essential to these objects? Recall that, on 
the assumption that we are dealing with particles that are at best weakly 
discernible, it follows from the PIT that if the objects are distinct, there must 
be an irreflexive relation between them. To put it schematically; we may 
write 
47Prench and Krause ([2006], p9) suggest there is a 'worry' that byapppeaIing 
to irreflexive relations we beg the question; see Hawley [2009J, Section 3.2 for 
discussion of related points. Howevet; and to repeat, I am here simply presenting 
Saunders' argument as I find it. 
48Pine [1995b], pp255-6. 
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PIl(x,y) -+ (x =F y -+ E(R: Rirre/(X,y))), (9.12) 
where 'PII(x, y)' symbolizes that x and y obey the PII (that is, that x and y 
are identical if they have all the same properties and stand in all the same 
relations to all the same things). Now, as emphasized above, accord,ing to 
Saunders the PH can be regarded as a definition of identity, so that' PI I (x, y)' 
may be regarded as true by definition ~ well. We may thus move from (9.12) 
to 
x =F y -+ e(R: ~rre/(x,y)). (9.13) 
Now, we know from (9.9) that the property of being distinct that features in 
the antecedent of this expression is essential to x and y. Whatever follows 
logically from this property will therefore pertain to the consequential essence 
of both objects, so long as the implied proposition cannot be universalized -
for that, to recap, is the test we must apply to see if the implied proposition 
belongs to the consequential essence. What is left is to test whether the 
corresponding universalized statement can be derived from the non-identity 
of x and y. Now, while we have remained quiet on the full content of the 
domain, we know that structuralists will hold that physical relations must 
feature in it. But from the fact that our two particles are distinct and obey 
the PII, we of course cannot deduce that every physical relation that the two 
particles enter into is irreflexive: 
(PIl(x,y)&x i= y) =l}All(R: ~rre/(x,y)); (9.14) 
indeed, 'being of the same species' is presumably one physically significant but 
reflexive relation that holds between the (by assumption indistinguishable) x 
and y. We may therefore deduce that 
Ox,IIE(R: ~rre/(x,y)), (9.15) 
and hence confirm that it is essential to x and y that there exists some 
irreflexive relation in which they stand. This, therefore, represents a further 
238 
Chapter 9. Sttuctura1ism as a Dependence Thesis 
essential property of the pail: 
Now let us go back to· (9.4), which is what I called the 'basic schema' extended 
to two objects: 
D:r,I/¢(X, y) -+ Ox,y«Ex&Ey) -+ 1/J(x, y». 
Since we have established that it follows from the natures of x and y that 
there exists some irreflexive relation for them to stand in, we may substitute 
in and write 
Dx,yE(R: R!rre/(x,y» -+ Ox,y«Ex&Ey) -+ E(R: Rirref(x,y»), (9.16) 
or more simply (d. the move from (9.4) to (9.5) above), 
O:z;,y«Ex&Ey) -+ E(R : Rirref(x, y»). (9.17) 
But this is just the statement of the ontological dependence of the particles 
upon irreBexive relations, in accordance with Fine's definition (9.6).49 Since 
structures are supposed to be 'nexuses of relations' (vague though that notion 
no doubt is), we seem to have arrived at just what the structuralists want 
us to buy into: namely, the ontological dependence of quantum objects on 
structures. 
The steps that have just been gone through seem to come close to the sought-
for demonstration of the claim that quantum objects depend on structures 
(and hence are not'self-subsistent'), demonstrated using Fine's principles. 
It thus appears that this flagship statement of structuralism may indeed be 
sustained. In order to fulfil our objectives, however, we need to go further and 
ask whether the radical structuralist claim that 'relational structure is more 
ontologically fundamental than objects' thereby goes through (or at least does 
so in the case of fermions), or whether it is the moderate position that should 
be adopted in this context. Now, it is clear that this question is not settled by 
49Since no particular irreflexive relation is being singled out here, the dependence 
is a generic dependence (to quote some standard terminology: see Correia [2008]). 
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what has so far been shown, for the issue of whether there is any reciprocated 
dependence of relations on objects must be investigated before anyone position 
can be chosen. Whether this reciprocated dependence holds or not will be a 
function of how we choose to conceive of relations - in Fine's picture, on what 
we think their nature is. Traditionally, of course, there have been two ways to 
do this: we can either conceive of them extensionally, or we can conceive of 
them intensionally. But then it becomes clear that whichever is adopted, the 
radical structuralist in particular potentially has a problem. 
The reason for this is that if we choose to conceive of relations extensionally, 
then given the identity criteria for relations in extension - namely, that two 
relations are distinct iff there is an ordered tuple in the extension of one that 
is not in the extension of the other - then, by deploying exactly the same 
sort of reasoning as that just engaged in, we will be able to deduce that 
the relations are likewise ontologically dependent on objects.50 By adopting 
an extensional account of relations, then, the moderate position would be 
immediately vindicated. 51 Now, all that radical structuralists will take that to 
imply is that this route must be rejected - indeed, rejected as nothing other 
than a pillar in the whole 'object-orientated' approach to metaphysics that 
they explicitly denounce. And it is in fact sometimes gestured at that it is an 
intensional understanding that structuralists like Ladyman have in mind. In a 
couple of places, for example, Ladyman writes 
We eschew an extensional understanding of relations [ ... J Accord-
ing to Zahar, the continuity in science is in the intension, not the 
extension, of its concepts [ ... ]52 
Exactly what this is intended to mean does not seem to be fully developed 
anywhere in the literature. 53 But of course, the big problem in the vicinity of 
any consideration of this sort is that the whole reason that Quine, for example, 
rejected intensional entities was that he deemed it very unclear what their 
SONote that once again we would obtain a generic dependence in this case. 
511 note too that Fine's analysis permits cyclical dependence, which would be the 
case here: see Fine [1995a], Section III. 
s2Ladyman and Ross, p128; also Ladyman [1998], p418. 
531t has been suggested to me that it may be connected with the idea that structures 
possess 'primitive modality', but I do not want to put any words in Ladyman's mouth 
here. 
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identity criteria were supposed to be.54 Now, this is of course not to say 
that such criteria cannOt be provided in principle. The point is just that such 
criteria need to be provided, and defended, by structuralists of the radical 
stripe if their priority claim is to go through. For although many of those 
who defend intensional entities do so not because they think that intensional 
entities necessarily have perspicuous and reductive identity conditions, but 
because they reject the idea that they must if they are to be philosophicaUy 
legitimate (and often on some sort of tu quoque-type grounds), this is not an 
option that is available to the radical structuralist (or at least not obviously).55 
Why, after aU, should it be deemed obviously acceptable that relations can 
lack reductive identity conditions and thus possess primitive identity if the 
structuralist judges it to be so objectionable as applied to objects?56 -
The conclusion at this point can therefore only be stated in conditional form. 
If an extensional account of relations is adopted, then it seems that the 
moderate position wins out as the right metaphysics of fermions. If, on 
the other hand, an intensional account should be adopted, then in lieu of 
some identity criteria for relations-in-intension and, in particular, a policy on 
whether those identities are functions of objects or not, we simply have no 
idea whether or not the dependence is reciprocated. It follows that we do not 
know which structuralist stance is best recommended to us either. Without a 
positive statement on the identity criteria for relations, it therefore seems that 
there is nowhere for this debate to go. 
That structuralists have had so little to say about the matter of the identity 
conditions of relations is on reflection a little surprising, given the centrality 
of both relations and identity considerations in structuralist metaphysics. 
And of course, since Fine's analysis assumes an understanding of the nature 
54See, for example, Quine [1981]. 
sSSee for example Loux [2002], p57-7. 
561 am not denying that it may be consistent for a radical structuralist to be a 
quidditist. But since identity considerations do so much work in structuralism, and 
given that proposals for analyses of property identities exist (as an example in the 
intensional case, see Hale [forthcoming]), I do think that structuralists have to say 
something by way of explaining why it is that primitive identities are acceptable in 
the case of properties and relations, if so objectionable in the case of objects. In any 
case, some explicit line must be taken regarding relation identity conditions if radical 
structuralists are to use Saunders' argument as support for their view, but as yet this 
seems to be lacking. 
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of the relata involved in dependence attributions, it can be of no help to 
structuralism in resolving this dispute. What has nonetheless been positively 
established by this point is that the flagship claim of structuralism - that 
objects are dependent on structures - may be shown to go through on Fine's 
conception of dependence. There is thus at least something for us to take 
home from this study of quantum mechanics and identity from a Finean point 
of view. 
9.5 The Priority of Structure 2: The Group-Theoretic 
Conception of Elementary Particles 
While the case just discussed is perhaps the most vaunted of all of the pri-
ority arguments in structuralist philosophy of physics, I want to return now 
to that other aspect of modem physics that is held up as a poster-child for 
structuralism and that was discussed in the last chapter, namely the group-
theoretic conception of fundamental particles. The relevant structure here is 
of course the symmetry structure of physical laws, and the issue at hand is 
whether symmetries may be claimed to be more fundamental than even the 
so-called fundamental particles - where, to recap, that relative fundamen-
tality claim is to be understood to relate categories and not levels. 57 This is 
something that we have already considered in the context of the global SU(3) 
flavour group and the strongly interacting particles (though of course with a 
supervenience-based, and not dependence-based, understanding of priority 
in mind). However, since the group-theoretic conception of particles has its 
roots in earlier work in relativistic kinematics, and it since it is this revisionaJY 
conception of the nature of objects that has largely motivated the privileging 
of dependence as the right priority relation for structuralism, it may be worth-
while to say something about how this conception of objects emerged from 
that earlier context. 58 What I therefore want to do in this section is discuss 
57 Just to remind us, to say that a law possesses a symmetry is to say that there is a 
set of transformations under which the form of that law remains invariant, and such 
a set of transformations may be shown to form a group in the mathematical sense. 
saOf course, the particles discussed in the last chapter will also correspond to 
representations of the relativistic symmetry group, since their full symmetry group is 
taken to be the product of their 'internal' and 'external' groups {d. Chapter 8, Section 
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how structuralism's priority claims regarding symmetries and particles look 
when viewed through the lens of Finean dependence, beginning with a potted 
history of the group-theoretic approach to particles itself. 
The modem attitude to symmetries arguably emerged in the context of spe-
cial relativity, in which Einstein famously deduced the laws governing free 
relativistic systems by assuming invariance under the Poincare transforma-
tions. Einstein's seminal work was subsequently extended by Wigner, who 
used those same symmetries - in combination with the principles of quantum 
mechanics - to deduce not just the laws that relativistic quantum systems 
would satisfy, but also those systems themselves. 59 What made this derivation 
of particles possible is grounded in the fact that the states of physical systems 
obeying laws of a given symmetry will, as we by now know, fall into what 
are known as the irreducible representations of the group associated with 
that symmetry. For brevity, I will call these representations 'irreps'. As was 
described in the last chapter, we may think of these irreps as sets of states 
that are mapped into one another by the action of the transformations that 
together comprise the group, so that an irrep in this sense constitutes a vector 
space.6O The crucial property of irreps for the purposes of Wigner's analysis 
is that states from different irreps cannot be mapped into one another by 
the transformations of the group, and the significance of this in the case 
of, in particular, the Poincare group is that the differences between states 
drawn from different such representations may not be effaced by a mere 
change in perspective. It thus makes sense in this context to regard the states 
from different irreps of this group to be states of objectively different physical 
systems, since any differences between such states must be relativistically 
invariant. As such, it was proposed that different irreducible representations of 
the Poincare group correspond to different species of relativistic particle, and it 
was in this way that the connection between symmetries and particle species 
was born. 
2). 
59The locus classicus of this is Wigner [1939J. Thng [1985J, Chapter 10 also 
provides a full and rigorous, but approachable elucidation of Wigner's analysis. 
6OMore than this is of course required of an irreducible representation - in particular 
that it contain no 'smaller' representations - but this will do for our purposes just now. 
Again, here I follow the standard (if slightly sloppy) physics practice in referring to the 
states that strictly speaking 'carty' the (matrix) representations as the representations 
themselves. 
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To assess the viability of this proposal concerning the intimate connection 
between panicle types and symmetty groups, what was needed was a clas-
sification of the irreducible representations of the Poincare group. This task 
was undertaken by Wigner and - glossing over some the subtleties that led 
to certain representations being discarded - his analysis demonstrated that 
the irreducible representations, and hence relativistic particles, should either 
have 
• some determinate mass E 1R > 0 and spin E Z/2, or 
• some determinate mass = 0 and helicit;y E Z.61 
But it nuns out that these are precisely the properties that the fundamental 
particles do in fact have. The first class descn"bes the electrons, the quarks, 
the massive bosons - pretty much everything, in fact, except the photon and 
gluons, which are in turn described by the second. All of the elementary 
particles we know of so far conform perfectly to this scheme. This spectacular 
success of the classification of free relativistic panicles in terms of the repre-
sentations of the Poincare group caused the general strategy to be emulated 
outwith the context of free inertial motion and in the study of the fundamental 
interactions, and it has been this study of the symmetry groups of dynamical 
laws that has facilitated the successful prediction of whole new families of 
fundamental particles. As we have already seen, the first three (up, down 
and strange) quarks, for example, were identified with the three states in the 
fundamental irrep of the SU(3) flavour group; eleven of the twelve gauge 
bosons were also predicted through an analysis of the representations of the 
local SU(3) and SU(2)®U(1) gauge symmetry groups that are the lynchpin of 
the Standard Model (the photon was already known).62 
This newfound ability to not just describe the particles that we regard as 
61 For example, in the case of massless representations, one simply throws away a 
continuous infinity of irreps on the grounds that the helicities of particles correspond-
ing to such representations will take on the structure of translations: that is, they 
will not be restricted to integers or half integers, and will be unbounded from above 
and below (see e.g. 1\mg [1985], Section 10.14). This point clearly relates to that 
raised by Wolff [2012] and that was mentioned in the last chapter; in that the group 
structure alone cannot be said to determine what representations will be realized. 
62 As noted in the last chapter, in some situations we take the full representation to 
represent a particle and· in others only a basis state. It is interesting to consider why 
this is, but I won't consider it in any detail here. 
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fundamental, but also to predict their existence and properties, clearly rep-
resents an extraordinary development in our understanding of matter. The 
strategy outlined above has in general been so fruitful, in fact, that one can 
find prominent physicists saying things like 
ever since the fundamental paper of Wigner on the irreducible rep-
resentations of the Poincare group, it has been a (perhaps implicit) 
definition in physics that an elementary particle 'is' an irreducible 
representation of the group, G, of symmetries ofnature.63 
Such an adage may in fact be found all over the particle physics literature 
(in one form or another). It therefore seems that through these manifest 
successes, physicists have grown to conceive of an elementary particle as 
something that is inherently group-theoretic, and it is of course this conception 
of fundamental particles that contemporary physicists seem to have adopted 
that structuralists believe should be imported into fundamental metaphysics. 
And we should be clear that the implications of this idea for fundamental 
metaphysics are potentially enormous. In addition to the fact, noted at 
the beginning of this chapter, that the group-theoretic conception of objects 
appears to be starkly different to the conceptions of objects typically found 
in metaphysics, given that fundamental entities are often taken to be those 
'whose existence and features have no further explanation' it is no longer clear 
that there even are any fundamental particles by this definition, since the 
properties that particles have, and the way in which they are knitted together, 
both appear to be explicable via considerations of group structure (at least 
to some significant extent). 64 It is this apparent consequence that fuels the 
structuralist claim that even 'fundamental particles' are not truly fundamental, 
and that what should be regarded as properly fundamental is the symmetry 
structure, or group structure, that explains their basic features. 65 Lyre for 
example takes the above considerations to 'support structural realism' on the 
grounds that 
a group theoretic definition of an object takes the group structure 
as primarily given, group representations are then constructed 
63Ne'eman and Sternberg [1991], p327; quoted in Robens [2011]. 
64This definition of the fundamental is given in deRosset [2010], p2-3. 
6S Again, I would urge that this claim ought to be understood as a claim about 
categories and not levels. 
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from this structure and have a mere derivative status.66 
Likewise, Kantorovich has claimed that these sorts of considerations demon-
strate that the representations of groups, and hence the elementary particles, 
have 'a lower ontological status' than the symmetries themselves.67 These 
claims regarding the 'lower' or 'derivative' status of irreducible representations 
of course seem to be gestUring toward attributions of priority, but so far these 
claims remain largely unanalyzed.68 In order to better articulate them, the 
focus on definition in the quote above naturally invites us to seek an approach 
66Lyre [2004], Section 3.2. This quote may be found repeated all over the survey 
literature: see, e.g., Ladyman and Ross [2007], p147; Ladyman [2007]. 
67Kantorovich [2009], pp79-80. 
681 say 'largely' because, as was noted in the last chapte~ (i) in places Kantorovich 
seems to analyze priority in terms of supervenience, which is a defined notion; and 
(il) as also mentioned, in other places Kantorovich seems to analyze priority in terms 
of dependence, which he explicitly defines. Howevet regarding (i), as we saw in 
the last chapter understanding priority in terms of supervenience does not establish 
that objects are less fundamental than structures (and hence of 'lower status') since 
one can show, at least in the case of simple Lie groups (of which the Poincare group 
is not one!), that the determination goes both ways. Regarding (il), his argument 
that structUre is dependent on objects analysis simply falls to establish its conclusion. 
In more detail, the 'master argument' Kantorovich offers for his dependence claim 
consists of a 'thought experiment' in which we are asked to imagine a physically 
possible world with hadronic matter and consider the global SU(3) flavour symmetry. 
We are then asked to agree there can be a moment in time when that world is free of 
hadron matter and only photons and leptons are left, but it is nonetheless the case 
that hadrons may be produced in high-energy lepton or photon-photon processes. 
Kantorovich holds that this shows that 'the internal symmetry exists as an underlying 
structure whereas hadrons are uninstantiated' (Kantorovich [2003], p664). Now, since 
Kantorovich adopts something like a purely modal definition of ontological priority 
- holding that 'If for any two physical entities A and B there is a possible world in 
which there is a pbysical situation for which A exists but 8 does not, but there can be 
no world in which B exists but A does not, we may say that A is 'ontologically prior' 
to B' (see e.g. [2003], p664) - this is taken to produce the result that the symmetry 
is prior to the hadrons. But even ignoring the deficiencies of such an approach 
to dependence (and here I simply allude again to Fine [1995a]), Kantorovich's 
argument patently begs the question against someone who holds that the existence 
of the SU(3) symmetry is in fact just a summary of the regularities holding amongst 
hadrons, and who thus holds that they would not exist in a world in which hadrons 
were not instantiated (or at least would not for as long as those hadrons were not 
instantiated, assuming that that makes sense). Indeed, even someone who took a 
'global regularity' view of laws and thus countenanced that the SU(3) symmetry can 
be a global property of worlds and thus any hadron-free time-slices of them, they 
would soU deny that his argument shows that symmetries should be regarded as 
prior to hadrons. 
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to ontological priority based on it; but that is of course exactly what we have 
been considering in this chapter. Let me therefore now show how Fine's 
conception of dependence may be used to sharpen up this move from the 
reconceprualization of objects in group-theoretic terms to novel claims about 
priority, focussing for concreteness on the case of the Poincare group and its 
representations. 
If what it is to be an elementary particle is defined in terms of its being an 
irreducible representation of the Poincare group, then - in accordance with 
our discussion in Section 3 above - that forms part of its essence. Thus, where 
x is a relativistic particle, we have 
(9.18) 
where 'J RpG(x)' means 'x is an irreducible representation of the Poincare 
group'. And it is clear that from that essential property one may deduce the 
existence of the Poincare group, for it is the transformations of this group 
that define the representation. (To recap, an irreducible representation of a 
group is defined in tenns of a set of states that is closed under the action of 
the group transformations.) We may represent this as 
JRpG(x) ~ E(G: G = PG), (9.19) 
where 'E(G: G = PG)' stands for 'there exists a group which is the Poincare 
group' (or more simply, that the Poincare group exists).69 What we must 
do now is check that the deduced statement cannot be universalized and 
thus that it passes the test alluded to above. But it is immediately clear that 
it cannot. It is plainly not the case that anything other than the Poincare 
group is the Poincare group; that accolade, obviously, belongs only to that 
particular group itself. We may therefore confirm that it is indeed part of 
the consequential essence of a relativistic particle that the Poincare group 
exists: 
69 Just to repeat, the ontic structuralist will insist that the domain of quantification 
in dependence attributions must contain structures, including group structures. 
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OxE(G: G = PG). (9.20) 
From this, we may then derive the ontological dependence of elementary 
particles on this group, just as we did before; substituting into the basic 
schema we obtain 
OxE(G: G = PG) ~ Ox(Ex ~ E(G : G = PG», (9.21) 
which together with (9.20) gives us 
Ox(Ex ~ E(G : G = PG». (9.22) 
We thus obtain exactly what the structuralists want, namely, the dependence of 
relativistic particles on the Poincare group, and hence on the group structure 
of relativistic laws.70 
Once again, therefore, we see that the central structuralist claim - that objects 
depend upon and hence are not prior to structures - may be straightforwardly 
established through Fine's analysis. But, as before, we are not yet done. 
Insofar as we want to ascertain whether a superior status may be accorded to 
group structure, and hence decide whether it is the radical or the moderate 
position that represents the right philosophy for this revolution in physics, 
we need to address the converse relationship between the groups used in 
physics and their representations. This, however, is a more difficult question 
to answer, because although structuralists (and physicists) have had plenty to 
say about particles qua irreducible representations, it seems that less attention 
has been paid to the ontological interpretation of group structure. Of course, it 
is perfectly straightforward to say how a given group is defined mathematically 
- we can go and look that up in a book - but structuralists take the statement 
that symmetry structure is ontologically fundamental to be a statement about 
what should be regarded as fundamental to physical ontoiogy.71 The question 
of what qualifies some, but only some, mathematical structures to enjoy the 
70 Note that this time it is a 'rigid' dependence: the nature of these particles qua 
representations of the Poincare group demands not just that some group exists, but 
that a specific group does. 
71See e.g. French and Ladyman [2003b]. 
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status of aspects of physical reality is therefore one that structuralists about 
physics cannot avoid facing up to. Given that Fine's analysis ties dependence 
to the nature of the dependent entitity, until we are clearer on this issue there 
is little progress to be made on the question of whether the group structures 
that structuralists promote themselves depend on objects. But there are a few 
things that I think we can say, however. 
The first thing to mention is that not all groups need be on a par with one 
another when it comes to matters of physical interpretation. The Poincare 
group, for example, consists of a set of operations that each have a clear 
physical meaning, since we know very well what it means to boost, or rotate, 
or translate a physical system such as an observer through space and time (and 
can indeed in principle observe that such a transformation has taken place). 
This feature does not, however, seem to be a general feature of the groups 
that we use in physics: the groups mentioned above that encode facts about 
interactions, for example, do not in general enjoy this luxury. 72 Indeed, there 
appears to be no physical interpretation to be had in the case of the local gauge 
transformations that underpin the Standard Model, since such transformations 
may be shown to correspond to mere changes in representation only. 73 
How, then, are we to do it? Something that structuralists such as French and 
Ladyman have cited as a means of distinguishing the structures they wish to 
reify from merely mathematical structures, and thus rebut the accusation of 
'Platonism', is to characterize them as causal.74 Now, while at that time French 
and Ladyman 'acknowledged that causal relations constitute a fundamental 
feature of the structure of the world,' this is something that Ladyman at 
least now seems to have retracted.75 In any case, causality is notoriously 
problematic - especially when dealing with quantum systems - and it would 
be nice not to have to appeal to it. Furthermore, deciding how exactly to cash 
out group structures as 'causal' in anything like the sense in which we regard 
objects as such is likely to prove difficult - not least in the absence of a clear 
physical interpretation of the group in the first place. 76 
nSee e.g. Wigner [1968], p8lO. 
73See e.g. Lyre [2004], p6S0. 1b be clear, I here mean 'representation' in the 
generic sense of mathematical representation, not in the sense of (reducible or 
irreducible) group-theoretic representations. 
740p. cit., p7S; see also French [2010], Section 4. 
750p. cit.; Ladyman and Ross [2007J. 
76In any case, since those who do take causation seriously often offer the funda-
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But there is a related and less metaphysically loaded consideration in the 
neighbourhood. Surely a very minimal, necessary condition on the physical 
significance of some structures over others is that they have empirical con-
sequences. Indeed, this is something that French and Ladyman themselves 
acknowledge; they ask, for example, 
What makes a structure 'physical'? Well, crudely, that it can be 
related - via partial isomorphisms in our framework - to physical 
'phenomena'. This is how physical content enters. 77 
Now, if symmetry structures are to be 'related to phyical phenomena', they 
must of course be relatable to measurement. And it is obvious that modem, 
quantitative empirical testing is all about the detection of determinate prop-
erties - something that is made especially explicit in the basic formalism of 
quantum mechanics, in which a measurement is represented as the obtaining 
of a real eigenvalue. But this makes it clear that some reference to a group's 
representations must enter into any characterization of the group if it is to be 
considered as a part of empirical reality, for it is the irreducible representations 
of the symmetry groups that carry determinate values, not the symmetry 
groups themselves.78 The irreps of the Poincare group, for example, possess 
determinate mass and spin; the Poincare group itself clearly does not. (It 
clearly doesn't make sense to ascribe mass and spin to a set of transformations 
between observers.) Likewise, it is the states in the irreps of the SU(3) flavour 
group that possess the determinate properties of isospin and hypercbarge that . 
define the first three quarks; the SU(3) group does not. Putting everything 
together, then, it seems that reference to representations must be included in 
the definition of group structure qua denizen of physical reality, since it is only 
these that can furnish the required connection with phenomena. And that, as 
will by now be clear, will generate a reciprocal dependence of group structures 
on objects once we tum the handle on Fine's machinery, so that it appears to 
mental determinate properties as the ultimate locus of causal agency, the conclusion 
of the argument regarding the empirically testable nature of structures that I am 
about to put forward will apply even if we choose to cash out the physical nature of 
structures in causal terms. 
770p. cit. . 
781 stress that here I am not saying that something must itself possess determinate 
physical properties to count as part of empirical reality, only that it must be suitably 
related to them. 
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be decisively the moderate stance that is vindicated in this case. 79 
All in all, while one could certainly claim that, qua mathematical abstractions, 
there is no essential dependence of groups on vector spaces or their irreducible 
representations, as denizens of physical reality the matter looks very different. 
And unless the radical structuralist can find another way of characterizing 
the physical significance, including the testability, of the groups used in 
particle physics that does not involve any reference to the representations, 
we cannot assen that the representations have merely 'derivative status'. 
Rather, the irreducible representations and the symmetries of nature are 
each onto logically dependent on the other; given the 'reconceptualization' 
of fundamental particles in terms of group-theoretic representations, that in 
tum means that fundamental particles and group structures are likewise on 
an ontological par. 
9.6 Concluding Remarks 
In the course of this chapter, I firstly argued that ontic structuralism can and 
should make use of Fine's notion of dependence to articulate its character-
istic priority claims, on the grounds that is was this relation that was best 
suited to articulating any priority facts that may be embodied in its attendent 
'reconceptualization' theses. I then put Fine's system to work to show that, in 
both the entanglement and group-theoretic cases, the ontological dependence 
of objects on structure can be rigorously sustained, and thus that (what I 
have called) the 'core claim' of structuralism can in each case be decisively 
established. From that point on, however, the two cases behaved rather 
differently. In the case of entanglement structures, while the dependence 
of objects on structure could be secured without any trouble, bereft of any 
positive statement of the identity conditions of relations we found ourselves 
hamstrung in trying to either establish or deny the existence of reciprocated 
dependence. By contrast, in the context of group-theoretic structures and 
79We should note for completeness that unless there are special reasons for any 
one representation to be realized, we should expect this dependence to be generic. 
(There may be such special reasons in the case of the adjoint representation of the 
gauge symmetry groups featuring in the Standard Model, for example, since these 
correspond to the gauge bosons.) 
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their associated objects we were able, through a plausible interpretation of 
the physical nature of group structures in empirical terms, to mount good 
arguments that the dependence should postively be taken to be reciprocated, 
and thus that the moderate position wins out here. 
As a first conclusion, we may note that in both cases we encountered much 
more difficulty in assessing whether there is any dependence of structures on 
objects than we did in assessing the converse. Given that Fine's analysis ties 
dependence claims to the nature of the dependent entity, this suggests that 
there is a lack of clarity not in our understanding of priority, but rather in our 
understanding of the nature of structures. Since it is precisely these entities 
that structuralists entreat us to regard as constituting the very foundation of 
physical ontology, the fact that we struggled to ontologically articulate these 
entities potentially carries a serious message for ontic structuralists. As a sec-
ond conclusion, however, it seems that we are in a position to determinately 
declare that an unqualified acceptance of the radical position is untenable, 
since our second case study showed that particles do indeed have to be reo 
garded as on a par with at least one extremely important class of structures. 
That of course entails in tum that any 'eliminative' structuralism in which ob-
jects are purged from the fundamental basis is likewise untenable as a general 
thesis about physics, since one cannot eliminate the objects without thereby 
eliminating the structUres - something which would clearly be disastrous from 
the structuralist point of view. 80 Radical structuralists thus cannot maintain 
the two theses most closely associated with them when it comes to particle 
physics: they cannot both maintain that objects must be reconceptualized in 
terms of structures and that they be eliminated, qua metaphysically secondary 
entities, in favour of the associated Structures.81 
The net result of this discussion, then, is that the more radical claims made 
BOOf course, it could be that the moderate stance is vindicated with respect to some 
objects and structures, and the radical stances with respect to others. But radical 
structuralism in particular tends to present itself as an entirely general thesis about 
the relation between the structures and the objects of physics. (Consider - to take 
just one example - Ladyman and Ross' completely unqualified and uncontextualized 
claim that 'relational structure is more fundamental than objects' ([2007], p145.) 
But I will not reflect further on that thought here. 
SI Recall from the end of the last chapter that I hold that, of French's 'failed natural 
kind term' elimination and Ladyman and Ross' 'reductive' elimination, it is only the 
latter that has any initial plausibility. 
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by ontic structuralists must be regarded as unjustified - certainly so in the 
case of symmetry structure. And since I argued that these structures are the 
ontological correlates of the principles discussed in Chapter 7, a corollary 
of this is that the claim of Weinberg that principles are more 'elementary to 
all of nature' than even fundamental particles cannot be regarded as correct. 
Rather, these principles and such particles must be regarded as ontologically 
on a par with one another. But what we are left with nonetheless is a picture 
of the fundamental that is very different from that which is presented to us 
by purely 'object.ariented' metaphysics. It is a picture in which we regard 
even elementary particles as no more fundamental than (at least some 00 the 
dynamical structures of contemporary physics, and in which a rich nexus of 
metaphysical dependencies weaves the two categories together. Thus while I 
think we all must agree that the more radical versions must be left behind, 
it remains the case that ontic structuralism has a highly revisionist, and 
hopefully now more rigorously supported, proposal to make to contemporary 
fundamental metaphysics. 
253 
Chapter 9. Structuralism as a Dependence Thesis 
254 
c: 1 O-___ ----.J 
Conclusion 
We have reached the end of the road. To draw the discussion to a close, let 
me retrace my steps and tentatively suggest some further avenues to which 
the thoughts adduced above might lead. 
I began this thesis by noting that the assumption that there exists a fundamen-
tal level to reality is one that 'pervades contemporary metaphysics'. I noted 
further that it is standardly assumed that physics will describe such a level. 
I then asked whether physics might have more of a role in fundamentality 
metaphysics than it has been allocated thus far, and in particular, whether 
we might be able to use physics to deny that there even exists a fundamental 
level. It was this question that was the principal focus of Part 1 of this thesis. 
After arguing that contemporary metaphysics does not provide us with any 
compelling grounds to believe in a fundamental level, I considered whether 
Schaffer's meta-inductive argument, based on the history of physics, could 
support a positively anti-fundamentalist conclusion. While I argued that Schaf-
fer's argument fell short in its ambitions, its shortcomings recommended that 
we pursue (what I called) the 'internal' approach to denying fundamentality. 
By means of two case studies, the Analytic S-matrix theory and the effective 
approach to quantum field theory, I then went on to argue that the internal· 
approach can indeed be used to argue against the existence of a fundamental 
level - though also that those arguments may have to be regarded as qualified 
in significant ways. 
It therefore seems that it is indeed possible to use physics, through the internal 
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approach, to deny the existence of a fundamental level. In spite of this non-
trivial achievement of the internal approach, however, we saw that using 
this approach imposes a profound limitation on the sort of fundamentality 
that we can hope to deny through its means. In particul~ while we can use 
it to deny the existence of fundamental particles, or fundamental laws, we 
cannot use it to deny the existence of fundamental physical principles. This is 
because some such principles must at least be treated as fundamental in the 
context of the- internal approach - namely, the set of physical principles from 
which our anti-fundamentalist conclusions are derived. This dialectical or 
methodological centrality of physical principles to fundamentality questions, 
howevet; naturally invited the question of how to understand such principles 
from an ontological point of view, and, in particular, whether such principles 
could be regarded as more ontologically fundamental than any particle or law. 
I furthermore pointed out that some contemporary particle physicists, such 
as Weinberg, have mooted precisely this latter view. After reviewing certain 
challenges facing any attempt to construe principles in ontological terms, I 
argued that we ought to understand the proposed greater fundamentality 
of principles relative to particles in terms of the priority of the category of 
dynamical structure over the category of physical objects. I noted further that 
this prioritY claim regarding the category of structure and the category of 
objects constitutes the core thesis of ontic structural realism, and that the 
claim represents a related, though different, anti-fundamentality claim on 
behalf of particles than that which was investigated in Part 1. Therefore, in 
Part 2 of this thesis, I examined whether this claim of ontic structuralism can 
in fact be defended. As part of this project, I attempted to adjudicate between 
structuralism's so-called 'radical' version, in which structure enjoys a one-way 
priority over objects, and its 'moderate' version, in which each category is 
regarded as on an ontological par with the other. 
The tenability of ontic structuralism was investigated by examining some 
of structuralism's classic case studies. The first such study concerned the 
Eightfold Way classification of hadrons and the ensuing constituent quark 
model, and was investigated under the assumption that priority was to be 
understood in supervenience terms. Relative to that assumption, the analysis 
delivered that it is the moderate variant of ontic structuralism that is the better 
justified in this case. Howevet; I then went on to argue that it is Fine's notion 
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of ontological dependence, not the relation of supervenience, that represents 
the most appropriate priority relation for structuralism. On the understanding 
that priority is understood in those terms, I then enlisted further case studies 
featuring aspects of particle physics and assessed structuralism's proposals in 
those contexts. However, close analysis of these further cases only seemed 
to underline that it is the moderate position that is, on balance, the better 
vindicated form of structuralism. I therefore concluded that it is moderate 
ontic structuralism that represents the best metaphysics for particle physics. 
It therefore appears that, contra Weinberg, fundamental physical principles, 
should they exist, are no more and no less fundamental than any putative 
fundamental particles. 
The principal results of this investigation are therefore as follows. Firstly, it is 
indeed possible to use physics to deny the existence of a fundamental level. 
The 'pervasive' assumption that there exists a fundamental level to reality is 
therefore not one that the naturalized metaphysician need share. Secondly, 
however, it seems that even the anti-fundamentalist about levels must admit 
that we will never be in a position to deny the existence of fundamental 
physical principles. Thirdly, the dynamical structures that may be argued to 
be the ontological correlates of these principles ought - again, in the cases 
we looked at - to be regarded as comprising a category no less and no more 
fundamental than that comprised by the objects of particle physics. Since the 
category of physical objects and the category of dynamical structure seem to 
be equally fundamental categories, it is the moderate version of structural 
realism that is vindicated in particle physics. 
These conclusions will, I hope, be of interest to anyone who holds that the 
burgeoning literature on the metaphysics of fundamentality would benefit 
from naturalistic interventions. But given that physicalism, as a thesis about 
the fundamental, is almost universally accepted in metaphysics, it seems that 
the burden of proof is on anyone who holds that physics should not be brought 
to bear on fundamentality questions. Furthermore, my conclusions should 
be of interest to those concerned with structuralist philosophy of physics. In 
particular, I hope that Part 2 of this work constitutes a more developed, and 
perhaps more interesting, defense of the moderate variant than that already 
offered by Esfeld and Lam.1 I furthermore hope that I have done service to 
1 As pointed out in Chapter 8, Section t for them the (reciprocated) priority of 
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structuralism in sharpening up the fundamentality claims that are definitive 
of it, by (i) clarifying that they are to be understood as claims about the 
fundamental category and not the fundamental level, and by (li) precifying 
the notion of priority that is most appropriate to them. 
While I hope that the conclusions I have reached in the course of this thesis 
will be regarded as a serviceable contribution to metaphysics, including the 
metaphysics of physics, it is nonetheless clear that much more could be done 
to improve and expand upon them. I will discuss just three such potential 
developments here. 
Perhaps the most obvious way in which I might enrich the thesis would 
be by expanding the number of case studies used to establish the anti-
fundamentality claim of Part 1. While one could argue that, stricdy speaking, 
only one successful case study is required to establish the claim, the more 
anti-fundamentalist case studies that we can marshal, the more we can dis-
cover about the structure and features that anti-fundamentalist arguments 
can or must have. Furthermore, one could, with some justification, have 
reservations about the. case studies that I did look at. Though it was very 
much the mainstream at one point in time, the Analytic S-matrix theory is 
regarded, by some, as of dubious scientific standing even then.2 Furthermore, 
and as already pointed out, the anti-fundamentality claim that was obtained 
in the QFf case was not only undeterdetermined, but obtained only relative 
to a backdrop of perturbative assumptions. This is clearly a major qualifi-
cation. However, it is equally clear that the more theories we can muster 
that have anti-fundamentalist implications, the less compelling will become 
any objection that the examples cited in support of anti-fundamentalism are 
somehow especially suspect, and the anti-fundamentalist world-view equally 
so. 
objects over structures is established only through an insistence that 'for relations 
to be instantiated, there has to be something that stands in the relations' - a claim 
which does not establish the supposed priority, even if one can argue that it is true. In 
my approach, by contrast, the moderate view is defended by attending directly to the 
mathematics and the physics of the cases at hand, assessed against the background 
of an assumed priority relation. 
2See, for example, the polemics of Woit [2006]. (While most of this book is 
aimed at criticizing string theory, since the S-matrix theory was instrumental in string 
theory's early development, Woit attacks this theory as well.) 
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As mentioned in Chapter 4, it has been suggested to me that the topic of 
dualities in string theory may offer further anti-fundamentalist support, and 
it is thus to this topic that I will first tum in pursuit of this end.3 While I do 
not yet have the wherewithal to assess the content of the anti-fundamentalist 
implications of this concept, it is my understanding that one of its seeming 
consequences is that entities that are regarded as mereologically fundamental 
according to one theory may be regarded as composite in the dual theory.4 
While what this implied 'relativity of fundamentality' may have in store 
for anti-fundamentalism, in particulat; has yet to be seen, the idea that 
fundamentality assumptions must always be assessed relative to a theory is 
clearly in the spirit of the internal approach. (Of course, whether string theory 
has a claim to being a theory, let alone an extant theory, is something that will 
require defence.) 
Another way in which the thesis could be enriched and extended would be by 
pursuing in more detail the relationship between principles and structures that 
was alluded to in Chapter 7. As noted, some eminent physicists have stated 
that principles ought to be regarded as deserving the mantle of fundarnentality 
in modem physics - something that gives the task of articulating the role and 
nature of principles in particle physics some independent motivation. But 
there already exists work on precisely this topic that may be built upon in 
order to do so, as several works have been written recently defending the 
notion of 'principle explanations'.5 Since relative fundarnentality is often, as 
noted in Chapter 6, cashed out in terms of explanation, this is a natural place 
to look in developing how principles might be oriented within fundamentality 
metaphysics.6 Furthermore, preliminary work has been done relating such 
explanations to structuralist philosophy of physics, and thus this constitutes 
a natural place to start in investigating the ontological import of principles 
and their relationship to structuralism - something I myself gestured to in 
31t was Dean Rickles who suggested this to me as a potentially worthwhile line of 
pursuit. 
4See e.g. Castellani [2009], pll. 
sSee, e.g., Felline [2011]. Put simply, principle explanations explain phenomena 
in terms of the dynamical principles governing it; they are typically constrasted wtih 
'constructive explanations', which explain phenomena in terms of the properties of 
its constituents. 
61 have not explicitly discussed how fundamentality relates to explanation in this 
thesis. 
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Chapter 7.7 
Finally, while discussing the Eightfold Way hypothesis and the ensuing con-
stituent quark model in Chapter 8, I claimed that the core structuralist priority 
thesis was not significandy undermined by the fact that simplicity assumptions 
must be postulated in addition to the relevant structure if the corresponding 
objects are to be derived. However, I did little more to justify this claim than 
appeal to the reader's sense of charity and that is, of course, not satisfactory. 
But as also noted there, it appears that little work has been done on the 
question of whether, and how, non-structuralist elements, including putatively 
methodological elements, may be incorporated into structuralism without 
damage to the basic contours of the structuralist thesis. Perhaps this example 
could be regarded as a useful springboard from which to launch a more 
extended discussion of this matter, and thus represents a potential further 
line of development. 
All in all, there is much more work to do in pursuing this investigation into the 
contributions of physics to the metaphysics of fundamentality. But I hope that 
something of value has been shown nonetheless, and that still more insights 
may yet be extracted. 
7See e.g. Dorato and Felline [2011]. 
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Appendix to Chapter 5 
In this Appendix I present some more of the mathematical details of Analytic 
S-matrix theoty than were provided in Chapter 5. Part 1 describes the first 
five postulates of the theory and shows how they can be used to construct the 
S-matrix. Part 2 develops in detail the rationale for and consequences of the 
theory's sixth postulate. In what follows, I will consider only 2 -+ 2 processes, 
treat the external particles as 'non-identical' but of equal mass, and neglect 
the spin of the external particles. 
Part Al The Early Analytic S-Matrix: Derivation of 
the Amplitude 
The S-matrix relates free-particle states to free-particle states. It operates 
in momentum space, and in what follows single-particle states for the ith 
particle are denoted by I~) == Ipi' QNi ), where QNi is specific to each panicle 
type and encodes the quantum numbers of that type, and Pi stands for the 
particle's 4-momentum Ipo, p>. Since the S-matrix always relates free particles, 
this relation is easily generalized to many-particle states I~, ... Pn ) through 
the relation I~, ... , Pn) = I~} 0 ... 0IPn}. The basic idea behind Analytic S-
matrix theoty is that certain constraints upon the matrix suffice to determine it 
Uniquely, and these constraints are expressed in the following principles. 
261 
Chapter 11. Appendix 
AI.I Strong interaction forces are short-range. 
It is known from nuclear physics that the strong interaction operates at dis-
tances no greater than the order of 1O-I5m (a few pion Compton wavelengths). 
This means that we can regard particles as overwhelmingly likely to be free 
except when they are very close together in space. That in tum means that we 
can regard the asymptotic states - the states before and after the experiment 
is performed - as likewise essentially free. These free states are the only states 
that can be observed in the theory. 1 
AI.2 The Principle of Superposition. 
This is the only distinctively 'quantum' aspect of quantum mechanics that is 
explicitly retained by this theory. The superposition principle tells us that, 
given an initial state IPI , P2) of two particles that subsequently come together, 
interact, and separate, the final state can be written as SIPIP2), where S is a 
linear operator.2 As usual, the set of states is assumed to be orthogonal and 
complete. 
AI.3 Lorentz invariance. 
The scattering process, and hence the S-matrix, is assumed to be invariant 
under Lorentz transformations. That is, where L is a proper Lorentz trans-
formation, LIP) = IP), we require that I(~ISIP~W = I(PmISIPn)i2 . The 
definition of the S matrix does not specify the phase uniquely so we can 
strengthen this to I(~ISIP~)I = I(PmISIPn)1 . This has the consequence 
that the matrix elements for 2 -+ 2 scattering I (P3P4 ISIPI P2 ) depend on the 
four-momenta PI, .. , P4 only through their invariant scalar products. Since the 
particles concerned are free particles, the four-momentum of any state satis-
fies the mass-shell condition ro - r = m 2• Lorentz invariance demands that 
we must adopt a covariant normalization, and also implies energy-momentum 
conservation. The latter means that the matrix element for the 2 -+ 2 transi-
tio~ will contain a factor 64(Pl + P2 - P3 - P4). 
IChew [1966], pS. 
2Collins [1977], p6. 
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Since I have just introduced the conservation of momentum, I will also point 
out here that the various strong interaction conservation laws associated 
with the global SU(3) flavour symmetry are simply assumed in this theory. 
While research was done into 'bootstrapping symmetries' and deducing the 
SU(3) group structure from S-matrix principles, it was never shown that 
these internal symmetries were required on this basis, so that the various 
quantum number conservation laws remained as 'natural laws not even linked 
qualitatively' to the basic principles of S-matrix theory.3 As such, the SU(3) 
flavour symmetry entered and remained as a postulate.4 
Al.4 Unitarlty. 
The scattering matrix must be unitary: that is, we require st S = 1, where 't' 
denotes Hermitian conjugation. As always, this is to ensure that probability is 
conserved. 
It is useful at this point to decompose the S-matrix S into S = 1 + iA. Such 
a decomposition has a clear meaning. The first term describes the S-matrix 
when the particles never get close enough to interact. For the reasons already 
given, it is in fact overwhelmingly likely that two particles will not in fact 
do so in a given scattering experiment, and hence this is the dominant term. 
The second term is the non-trivial.part that describes interactions, and it is 
the properties of this amplitude for interaction that we shall study from now 
on. 
The statement that S is unitary gives for A the equation A - At = iA t A, 
or 
where the sum is over all intermediate states allowed by all conservation laws. 
We can write this more compactly as 
2JmAij = L A;nAnj. (A 1. 4a) 
n 
Consider first of all the contribution of a single one-particle state IQ) = 
3Chew, [1968a], p67; see also Chew [1968b], p765, and Chew [1966], p93. 
4Cushing [1990], p159-160. 
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I k, Q N) to the sum. I will take it as implicit throughout that the quantum 
numbers are conserved, so that only states IQ) with QN = QNl + QN2 = 
QN3 + QN4 are allowed.5 Neglecting constant factors, the RHS of (Al.4a) 
can be written as 
Imposing the 4-momentum conservation explicitly on both sides, we have for 
theRHS 
This integration can be performed and gives 
since 4-momentum must be conserved on the LHS as well, this is equal 
to 
Thus we get, for the one-particle intermediate state contribution to the imagi-
nary part of the amplitude, 
(A1.4b) 
where k2 = (PI + P2)2. Contributions from 2-particle, ... , n-particle inter-
mediate states can be computed similarly. For example, for a two-particle 
intermediate state IQIQ2) = Ik1, QN1; k2, QN2), where the particle masses are 
ml and m2, we obtain 
J'm(P3, P4IAIPl, g) = ~64(k; - mn64(k~ - m~)(P3' P4IAt IQIQ2)(QIAIPJ, P2), 
(AlAc) 
where kl + k2 = PI + P2. 
SWhile I neglect to mention explicidy the quantum number delta functions, I 
will include those of 4-momentum. This is because the amplitude is taken to be an 
analytic function of the latter and hence the delta functions in momentum must be 
handled very carefully - as will be seen below. 
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The constraints expressed in (A1.4b) and its many-particle analogues will be 
very useful in obtaining ail explicit expression for the amplitude. 
AI.S The Principle of Maximum Analyticity of the First Kind. 
The scattering amplitudes A are assumed to be maximally analytic functions 
of complex momentum variables, where the modifier 'of the first kind' refers 
to analyticity in the linear momentum variables only.6 Now, the word 'analytic' 
is here used in a looser sense than that meant by mathematicians. When a 
mathematician says that a function is 'analytic'in a given region, what is meant 
is that it contains no singularities at all (it is holomorphic in that region.) What 
is meant here is that it contains only isolated singularities (it is meromorphic 
in that region), such as poles and branch points. The point is simply that it is 
free of the pathological behaviour associated with 'essential' singularities such 
as Kronecker delta functions, Dirac delta functions, step functions and so on. 
Maximal analyticity means that there are only such (isolated) singularities 
as are demanded by unitarity. Though they are assumed to be functions of 
complex variables, it is the real boundary values of the S-matrix that are taken 
to represent the physically meaningful, measurable quantities. 
Maximal analyticity can be put to good use in describing physical processes, 
and it is at this point that we begin the process of actually writing down 
a workable expression for the amplitude. This is because if the physical 
parameters are expressed as the real limits of complex functions, and if the 
singularities in the complex plane are isolated and identifiable, then the 
amplitude A(z), where z are a set of Lorentz-invariant complex variables, can 
be expressed via Cauchy's theorem as 
1 i ·dz' A(z) = -2' -,-A(z'), 
7l'Z c z - z 
(A1.5) 
where the contour loops around all the singularities (poles and branch cuts). 
To see what work Cauchy's theorem can do in producing an explicit expression 
for the amplitude, suppose for concreteness specify that we are interested in 
6Analyticity of the second kind refers analyticity in angular momentum variables, 
and we shall discuss it at length shortly. 
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computing the S-matrix for a 2 --+ 2 reaction 
(0-) 
and refer to this as 'Reaction 0-'. We must first define the variables appropriate 
to this reaction. Lorentz invariance compels us to use relativistic invariants 
as the variables of the S-matrix, so that the amplitude is a function of the Pf. 
Three obvious candidates present themselves, namely, the square of the eM 
energy, and the two squared functions of momentum transfer in that frame. 
We thus define the 'Mandelstam variables's, t and u as follows: 
t = (Po - p-y)2 = (p/J - p.s)2 
u = (Po - p.s)2 = (P/J - p-y)2. 
It is easy to see that only two of these are independent, since s + t + u = Eml, 
where the mi are the masses of the external particles. We may thus consider 
A as A(s, t), or as a function of any other pair of these variables. Since s 
represents the total energy of the reaction, we say that s is in its 'physical 
region' whenever s E lR and s ~ max{{ ma + m{J)2, (m-y + m.s)2}. The other 
two variables represent the 4-momentum transfers and are always real and 
negative in the s-channel physical region. 7 
Looking again at the one-particle contribution to the amplitude (A1.4b), we 
can now replace t5«Pl +P2)2 _m2) with t5(s-m2). Howeve~ now that we have 
introduced the postulate of maximal analyticity, so defined, it is prima facie 
very worrying that the unitarity equations should feature any such t5-functions 
at all. We know that there is a t5-function wherever there is an on-mass shell 
particle or particles which conserve the energy-momentum and quantum 
numbers of the reaction in question, but such singularities are apparently 
forbidden by the postulate of maximal analyticity. However, this wony is 
dispelled by a trick from complex analysis. There is a well-known relation for 
7'ln general, those two [Mandelstam] variables that for a particular channel 
are not the squares of the total energy may be interpreted as the squares of the 
momentum transfer and have physical regions that extend to -00'( Chew [1962], 
p12). 
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a point lying close to the real axis in the complex plane, Z = Zr ± if: it is 
1 1. 
-- = p-- =t= z1n5(zr - c), 
z±c Zr-C 
for an arbitrary point c, where P denotes the 'principal part'.s Now re-cast 
this expression into terms that are relevant here: 
1 1. 2 
---2 =P 2 + Z1rO(Sr - m ), 
s-m Sr-m (A1.Sb) 
Comparison with (A1.4b) shows that a delta function of this sort in the 
imaginary part of the amplitude - that given in the LHS of the unitarity 
equations - corresponds to a simple pole s-'ffi2 in the total (i.e. real plus 
imaginary) amplitude, with residue given by 
(A1.Sc) 
This residue can be taken to be the product of the two coupling constants for 
the interaction so that p = 9a(iE9E-yb (where ~ is the intermediate particle).9 
To make this dependence explicit, we now abbreviate p by g2. And although 
in this part we are generally neglecting spin, it will be useful for future 
reference to note that, where the spin of the particle corresponding to the 
pole is included, we have10 
CAl.Sd) 
Thus we have reached our first substantial result: the one-particle intermedi-
ate states which appear in the unitarity equations correspond to simple poles 
in the amplitude. This is the origin of the S-matrix 'pole-particle correspon-
dence'.ll When more than one particle is produced, we find not simple poles 
at specific mass points but rather branch-cut singularities. These are 'cuts' on 
the complex plane corresponding to the occurrence of a many-particle state 
or 'channel' with the appropriate quantum numbers. These cuts run from the 
8See Jacob and Chew [1964] p21; Joachain [1975], p295. 
9See Martin and Spearman [1970], p287. 
lOSee Martin and Spearman [1970], p287. That the residue is factorizable like this 
is due to the short range of the strong interactions. 
llSee Cushing [1990], pI 09. 
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energy threshold of the channel to infinity, corresponding to the unlimited 
centre-of-mass energies which can be associated with the state consistent with 
all internal particles being on-mass-shell. 
l!. 
.. .... 
Figure 11.1: Pole and branch cuts on the s-axis (front Collins [1977], p30.) 
We know, then, that Reaction (T will have singularities (poles and branch 
cuts) on the s axis at the values of energy wherever there exists a particle 
or particles with (combined) mass equal to the CM energy of the reaction 
and with the combined quantum numbers of particles a and /3. But as we 
have seen, s is not the only variable required to completely specify in the 
amplitude, for there are two independent variables in play. We can therefore 
not be sure that by considering s alone we are uncovering all the singularities 
for Reaction (T. Nonetheless, how exactly it is that the other Mandelstam 
variables could contribute to the singularity structure is not at all clear, since 
the IS-function in the unitarity equation above, (Al.4b), ostensibly involves 
the s variable alone. It is at this point that we can again put analyticity to 
good use, by using it to derive the crossing principle from which a great deal 
of physical information can be extracted. 
A2. The Crossing Principle 
The crossing principle states that the same amplitude governs reactions that 
are related by repeated 'crossing': that is, reactio~ that may be obtained 
from one another by the interchange of incoming particles with outgoing 
antiparticles. By borrowing some concepts gleaned from Dirac theory, I will 
try to bring out the motivation for this principle, and will do so by means of 
the follOwing (informal) argument. 
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Consider again Reaction 0' above. It is clear that the scattering amplitude 
for this reaction be expressed (provisionally) as A17(Pa,P{J,P-y,po) (where I say 
'provisionally' because the momenta must be recast into Lorentz invariants). 
Let us now add to the incoming particles a 'Y particle-anti-particle pair, with 
4-momenta as follows: 
We can do the same to the outgoing state with a (3 particle-anti-particle pair: 
we obtain 
If we adhere to the Dirac idea that a particle-anti-particle pair with equal 
and opposite 4-momentum in some sense amounts to 'nothing' (i.e. the 
vacuum), then in both cases these additions add nothing to the incoming and 
outgoing states. So Reactions {7, {7* and {7"" can be regarded as 'equivalent'. 
Furthermore, since the same idea implies that a general reaction a + (3 --t 'Y + 8 
is equivalent to the reaction a + (3 + E --t 'Y + c5 + E, where E is any set of 
particles whatsoever, then Reaction {7** is equivalent to 
(7) 
By transitivity, {7 and and 7 are 'equivalent' too. Generalizing in the obvious 
way we thus obtain a simple rule that, given any reaction, it is possible 
to obtain another reaction equivalent to the first simply by interchanging 
ingoing particles with 4-momentum P with outgoing anti-particles with 4-
momentum -P (and vice versa). This process is called 'crossing'. Therefore, if 
we introduce an amplitude AT(Pa,P-y,Pjj,po), then we must have that 
(A2a) 
However, we must be very careful in interpreting both Reaction 7 and the 
stated equivalence (A2a) between the amplitudes for crossed reactions. The 
difficulty stems from the all the asymptotic states involved in reactions in this 
theory are supposed to be observables, but if the particle energies in Reaction 
{7 are all positive then the energies of the particles 7J and 7 in Reaction 7 
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cannot be. Therefore (A2a), despite its formal simplicity, has no physical 
meaning as it stands, for 'it is impossible that the two members correspond 
together to a physical situation'. 12 
This impasse is broached by iQvoking analyticity. The basic principle that 
(A2a) establishes is that the same function governs the amplitude for the two 
processes. If we assume that that function is maximally analytic, we should 
be able to find a way to analytically continue the -P(3, -P'Y variables in the 
momentum (i.e. s, t, u) plane until the energy components acquire positive, 
and hence physically meaningful, values. 13 So let us suppose we can do that 
for the above reaction. That is, let us analytically continue and put -P/3 I---> P(3 
and -P'Y I---> P'Y , where the 'I--->' indicates not just replacement but replacement 
by analytic continuation. Then we shall write A x I R(Y) to indicate that we are 
evaluating the amplitude for the reaction X in the physical region for reaction 
y: that is, in the region in which all the particles which feature in Y have 
positive energies. Then 
AT(Po,P-y'Pif,p.s)IR(u) = AT(p(a), -p(r), -p(fj),p(6»IR(u) 
I--->AT (p( a), p(r), p(fi), p( 6» IR(T) = AT (Po, P-y, Pi3, P.s) IR(T) 
so that under this continuationthe input ;y in Reaction T takes on the mo-
mentum of the output 'Y in Reaction 0'; and so for the 73. In terms of the 
Mandelstam variables above, this transformation gives 
s = (Po + p(3)2 I---> (Po - p(3)2 
t = (Po - P'Y)2 I---> (Po + P'Y)2 
u = (Po - p.s)2 I---> (Po - p.s)2. 
We can therefore see that the analytic continuation from negative to positive 
values of the momenta in the 'crossed' reaction has resulted in a permutation 
of the roles of the Mandelstam variables in the continued-into region of the 
plane: now it is t that represents the eM energy of Reaction T, and sand 
u the momentum transfers. Perfectly analogously to the previous case, the 
region of the s, t, u plane in which t ~ (mo + 71l;y)2 and s, u ~ 0 constitutes 
the physical region for Reaction T. 
120mnes and Froissart [1963], p62. 
13For the definition ofanalytic continuation, see Cushing [1975], Section 7.11. 
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We can, of course, play the same game with another crossed reaction that can 
be obtained from Reaction (T. Expressed in terms of the momenta of Reaction 
(T, this is Reaction v : 
(v ) 
We can then continue the momenta of the crossed particles to take equal but 
opposite values in the physical region for Reaction v (which is the just region 
of the s, t , u plane in which u 2:: (mo:+m;5-)2 and s, t ~ 0). The physical regions 
for the three reactions are always disjoint. 
u = 4m2 
\ 
\ 
\ 
I 
I 
I 
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I 
I 
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Figure 11.2: Mandelstam diagram for equal mass elastic scattering, shOwing 
physical regions for each channel. (From Joachain [1975], p33.) 
Analytic continuation between positive and negative momenta, then, permits 
us to link the amplitudes for crossed reactions in a physically meaningful 
way. The amplitude for each reaction is given by one and the same junction, 
evaluated in the physical region for that reaction. In Chew's words, 
These different reactions are distinguished by the sign of the 
energy variables, which are positive or negative according to 
whether ingoing or outgoing particles are involved, but if the 
controlling amplitude is known for one reaction it can be obtained 
from the two others by smooth extrapolation in energy.14 
14Chew [1964a], p32. 
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A3. The Mandelstam Representation of the Ampli-
tude 
Having established that one and the same amplitude governs reactions related 
by repeated crossing, we now resume contact with the problem of actually 
finding the amplitude. We saw in Section A2 that the amplitude in a given 
channel, say that for Reaction (1', is a function of the singularities on the s-axis 
corresponding to the creation of new bound states in that channel. Combining 
Sections 2 and 3, we know that there will also be singularities on the t axis 
wherever there exists a particle or particles with (combined) mass equal to 
the CM energy of Reaction T and with the combined quantum numbers of 
particles 0: and;y; similarly, there will be singularities on the u-axis wherever· 
there exists a particle or particles with (combined) mass equal to the CM 
energy of Reaction v and with the combined quantum numbers of particles 0: 
and 6. 
Having established all that, we can now put these singularities to work in 
finding the amplitude via Cauchy's theorem (Al.Sa). Let us hold one variable 
fixed - the u variable, say - and fix it somewhere in the physical regions 
of Reactions (1' and T so that u = Uo :::; O. With u held fixed, the amplitude 
is a function of the s and t variables only, and since only two of s, t, u are 
independent, we have only one independent variable here. (This is why I 
chose one variable fixed to start with.) We know that s will have a pole at 
s = Sp == m;, the point at which there is one particle with the right mass 
and quantum numbers for Reaction (1', and that there will also be a branch 
point at Sb, the first value at which a plurality of particles collectively meet 
these criteria. As new such sets of particles are produced as t increases, these 
branches will then be superimposed on top of segments of the branch starting 
at Sb. Likewise, there will be poles in t at tp = m~, and branch points at 
the corresponding values tb for Reaction T. Such singularities may be shown 
graphically as a function of S alone, since with u fixed the t singularities can 
be expressed in terms of s. 
The Cauchy integral equation for the amplitude as a function of s is now 
evaluated over a closed contour in the complex plane of the independent 
variable such that A is holomorphic (singularity free) inside and on that 
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Figure 11.3: The intergration contour in the complex s plane, expanded to 
infinity but enclosing the poles and branch cuts. (From Collins [1977], p30.) 
contour. We then expand the contour so that it encircles the poles and 
encloses the branch cuts. Doing so means that we can then write 
A(s, t, uo) = ;8 + ;t + - A(s, t, uo), 2 2 1 i 
ms - s mt - s 7r C 
where C is the large contour. Here A(s, t , u) is a new notation for Aij = UIA li) 
with Ii) = IPa, QNa)lpfJ , QNfJ ) in the region where s represents the square of 
the total momentum (and the other variables the momentum transfer), and 
with Ii) = IPa, QN(O!))I]J;y, QN(;y)) in the region where t represents the square 
of the total momentum (and so on). The residues g2 of the poles are given by 
the same means as at CA1.Sc). The rather drastic assumption is then typically 
made at this point (though it shall later be renounced): it is assumed that 
A(s , t , u) --t 0 as s --t 00, so that the contribution from the circle disappears. 
We are then left with the discontinuities of the amplitude across the right and 
left-hand cuts respectively, defined by 
where s± = s ± ie, and 
The amplitude will be given in the limit that to tends to zero. Now, given 
that the Schwartz reflection principle holds as a consequence of analyticity, we 
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know that A(s*, .. ) = A*(s, .. ).15 It then immediately follows that 
Ds = Im(A(s, t, uo) 
evaluated on the s cut, and 
Dt = Im(A(s, t, uo) 
evaluated on the t cut. We can now write out the amplitude fully as 
A(s,t,uo) = g; + gr +.!.1°O :JmA(s',t,Uo)ds'+.!.100 :JmA(s,t', Uo)dt'. 
m; - s m~ - s 7r Sb S' - S 7r tb t' - t 
(A3a) 
This is the 'Mandelstam representation' of the amplitude. Here, the first two 
tenns on the RHS correspond to the particle poles, and the last two to the 
branch cuts on the sand t axes. Note that since the imaginary parts of the 
amplitude obtained from the discontinuities are evaluated in the phYSical 
region of the appropriate variable, we can use the unitarity equations for the 
corresponding reactions in order to find them. These equations are therefore 
'in principle' sufficient to detennine the amplitude, given the particle poles. 
Now, as can be appreciated by looking again at (Al.4d), 'the unitarity equation' 
for any given reaction is actually best regarded as an infinite set of coupled 
non-linear equations, and is therefore impossible to solve exactly. But it 
nonetheless turns out that the analyticity postulate may tested in special 
cases, even in the absence of an exact solution of these equations in the 
general case. In particular, if we consider reactions, such as 0:' + /3 - 0:' + /3, 
that are elastic in two channels (let them be s and t), and set the Mandelstam 
variable in the remaining channel (hence u) equal to zero so that we are 
looking at zero momentum transfer or 'forward' scattering, we can use the 
optical theorem, namely that 
(1;ot = _1 ro1mA(s, 0) 
2psv s 
15For proof of this Schwartz reflection principle, see e.g. Joachim [1975], p293. 
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to obtain empirically a value of the imaginary part of the amplitude. 16 (Here, 
p-; is the 3-momentum of the s-channel particles as measured in the eM frame 
for Reaction u, and analogously for p-;.) By plugging in the measured values 
of the cross sections, it is possible to subject the amplitude for these sorts of 
elastic reactions to 'exhaustive test'.17 Regarding the case of pion-nucleon 
scattering at zero momentum transfer, 
experiment confirms to very high precision [the amplitude] as 
corrected to take into account the nucleon spin. Hence there is 
every reason to believe that at least in this well-defined instance 
the scattering amplitude has no singularities in energy than those 
we have found. 18 
Though maximal analyticity enters as a postulate, and indeed would appear 
purely mathematical in nature, it nevertheless seems to be susceptible to a 
degree of empirical support. It is also this postulate that ushers the concept 
of force into the analysis, as I will now try to explain. 
A4 The Interpretation of the Amplitude 
A4.l The Physical Interpretation (I): Forces 
The Mandelstam representation of the amplitude, (A3a), gives the amplitude 
for the sand t channel reactions at fixed u. To proceed, let me introduce a 
final bit of jargon: when we are in the physical region of the Mandelstam 
plane for a given reaction, say Reaction u, we say that s is the 'direct channel', 
and that both t and u are crossed channels. When we shift to the t-channel 
physical region, it is now t that is the direct channel and s, along with u, is a 
crossed channel. The essential point behind the Mandelstam representation 
is that the amplitude for the direct channel reaction is always a junction of the 
singularities in the crossed channels. We have so far seen how this symmetry 
arises formally, but now we would like to interpret it. After all, that the 
16See, e.g. Chew [1966], Section 5.3; see Collins [1977], Section 1.9 for the 
derivation of the optical theorem. 
17Chew [1966], p37. 
180mnes [1971], p297. 
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amplitude for the direct channel process should be a function of the particle 
production processes in that channel is hardly surprising; why physically the 
amplitude for this reaction receives an equally important contribution from 
the crossed channels is much more surprising. 
The physical story told here rests upon a comparison of (A3a) with the Born 
approximation, as it appears in quantum field theory, to scattering under the 
influence of a Yukawa potential. The Yukawa potential generated by the 
exchange of a single particle of mass J.l is 
where J.l- 1 is the 'range' of the interaction.19 This gives as the first contribution 
in the Born approximation to the scattering amplitude a term 
(A4.1a) 
where t is the momentum transfer.20 When we are dealing with many-particle 
exchange in field theory, the potential is given by a superposition of Yukawa 
potentials, which is expressed by 
where p(J.l) is a weight function and J.li/ again represents the range.21 This 
potential gives a contribution 
(A4.1b) 
to the Born approximation to the amplitude. 
Comparing (A4.1b) with the cut terms in (A3a), we can agree with Chew that 
the latter 'looks like the Born scattering due to a superposition of Yukawa 
potentials, where the range is 1/..fi'. 22 We can say the same sort of thing 
19Joachain [1975], 172. 
20Chew [1962], p31 (see also p12; Joachain [1972], Section 8.6.1). 
21See Joachain [1972], Section 8.6.2 for full details. 
22Chew [1962], p31. 
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when we compare (A4.1a) with the pole terms in the same equation. Now, 
the 'customary interpretation' of the Yukawa interaction is in terms of particle 
exchange. And it is trivial to show that the particles produced in the crossed 
channels have precisely the right quantum numbers to be exchanged between 
the input (or output) particles in the direct channel consistently with the 
quantum number conservation laws.23 Via this explicit analogy with the (rival) 
QFI' programme, then, we can therefore interpret the contributions of the 
crossed channels to the amplitude for a reaction producing a bound state 
in the direct channel as follows: the input particles in the direct channel 
exchange the intermediate states of the crossed channel. As Chew put it, 
The unphysical singularities [Le., the singularities that occur out~ 
side of the physical region of the direct channel process under 
consideration] of an elastic-scattering amplitude correspond to the 
systems that can be 'transferred' between the particles undergoing 
scattering. Only by such transfers can a force be transmitted, and 
it is well-known that, according to the uncertainty principle, the 
range of the force is ~ 1/ E, if E is the total energy necessary to 
create the transferred system. 24 
The cross channel terms thus provide the interaction potentials. The strength 
and range of the potentials will be controlled by the discontinuity functions 
Dt and Du and hence by the imaginary parts on the RHS of (A3a). The 
longest range potentials will come from the exchange of the lightest systems 
permitted by cross channel unitarity.25 
It seems that we can agree, then, that there is a real sense in which 'cross-
23'The s-channel (ab -+ cd) and the t-channel (ae -+ bd) [are] processes which 
are related by crossing... The particles exchanged in the process ab -+ cd must 
have the quantum numbers of ac and bd' (Collins and Martin [1984], p67). For 
example, in our channel t above the quantum numbers of the intermediate state 
are QNa + QNe == QN,. If particle a in the 8 channel emits particle f and in doing 
so turns into (say) output state c, then we must have QNa = QN, + QNc. But we 
know that QNa + QNe = QNf; so QNa = QNf - QNc = QNf + QNc, as reqUired. 
Analogous stories can be told about particle b emitting the u-channel particle and 
turning into d; particle a emitting and turning into d instead of c, etc. Thus it is 
always the case that the cross channel particles have the right quantum numbers for 
exchange in the direct channel. 
24Chew [1962], p7. 
25See Chew [1962], p31. 
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ing symmetry determines the forces' in S-matrix theory.26 Note that such 
a connection can be forged is highly non-trivial: given that the S-matrix 
deals explicitly with asymptotic states alone - that is, those in which no 
interactions are present - it is not at all obvious that such a correspondence, 
and thus a desription of short-range interactive forces, could ever have been 
achieved.27 
A4.2 The Physical Interpretation (2): Chew and the Recipro-
cal Bootstrap 
As I have noted, there is a formal symmetry operating between the three chan-
nels in the Mandelstam representation of the amplitude (equation (A3a».2B 
Any Mandelstam variable can be held fixed giving the amplitude for a given 
reaction in terms of the other two variables; we can then rotate around 
the Mandelstam plane to take either variable out of its physical region and 
into that of the other channel so that the amplitude for that reaction may 
in tum be computed. It then follows from the definition of the 'direct' and 
'crossed' channels that the two roles may be interchanged in this way, and -
given the discussion above - this in tum seems to mean that the role of the 
intermediate bound state and that of the force-carrying particle are likewise 
interchanged. 
Let us therefore rotate around the plane and permute the roles of the s and t 
channels. Placing the variables in the physical region for Reaction T, it is now 
the s-channel terms in the amplitude which correspond to Yukawa forces, 
and (A3a) may now be interpreted as a formula expressing that the s-channel 
particle fuels the binding of the hadron T in the t channel. This combination 
of force generation by particle exchange and Mandelstam symmetry lies at 
260mnes [1971], p299. 
270f course, the argument offered above - and that Chew offered - borrows ex-
plicitly from QFJ', and thus it is perhaps not so surprising that such a correspondence 
could be forged. 
28As Cushing puts it, 'The representation of [the general equation for the amplitude 
above] places s, t and u each on the same footing and allows one easily to 'cross' from 
one channel (or reaction) to another just by allowing s (or tor u) to play the role 
of, say; the 'energy' variable [i.e. serve as the 'direct' channel] .. .' (Cushing [1990], 
p121.) 
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the heart of the S-matrix dynamical scheme. Chew's own (and oft-repeated) 
summary of the dynamics goes as follows. 
The forces producing a certain reaction are due to the intennediate 
states that occur in the two 'crossed' reactions belonging to the 
same diagram. The range of a given part of the force is determined 
by the mass of the intermediate state producing it, and the strength 
of the force by the matrix elements connecting that state to the 
initial and final states of the crossed reaction. By considering all 
three channels on this basis we have a self-determining situation. 
One channel provides forces for the other two - which in tum 
generate the first.29 
Thus Chew arrives at his 'reciprocal bootstrap': bound-state particles of type 
E depend on bound-state particles of type T to bind them together and vice 
versa. In this way, the fonnal symmetty that exists between the Mandelstam 
variables finds an ontological expression, namely, in a symmetry of dynamical 
dependence between the particles produced in each channel. 
Part A2. Extension of the Analytic S-matrix 
The results so far achieved - both in terms of arriving at an explicit expression 
of the amplitude and in terms of physically interpretating it - are highly non-
trivial. Nonetheless, the story that I have told so far cannot be the whole story. 
Two reasons present themselves as to why the preceding analysis should 
and must be supplemented. First of all, the failure to incorporate partial 
wave analysis, familiar from non-relativistic scattering theory, represents a 
conspicuous absence. S-matrix theory is, after all, a theory based entirely on 
the properties of the scattering matrix; it would thus be almost unthinkable 
not to take advantage of the powerful methods that partial wave analysis 
facilitates for deducing them. However, it turns out that when we analyze the 
scattering amplitudes in terms of partial waves, crossing symmetry will not be 
respected if the principles already governing the S-matrix are not augmented. 
Secondly, the derivation of the Mandelstam representation above relied on 
unrealistic assumptions about the convergence of the amplitude that will have 
29Chew [1962], p32. 
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to be relinquished. This assumption regarding convergence is critical in this 
context since, where that assumption is not fulfilled, the method of imposing 
convergence brings with it arbitrary parameters which are antithetical to the 
S-matrix's 'bootstrap' philosophy, in which every particle's parameters are 
fixed by those of the particles in the relevant crossed channels (see Chapter 5, 
Section 3). This clearly another problem that must be addressed. 
There are thus two reasons why we need to continue the story: first, because 
we must utilize partial waves, though this will bring in its wake a serious 
problem regarding crossing; second, because we must make a more realistic 
convergence assumption even though that will cause problems for the S-
matrix theory's 'bootstrap' philosophy as well. Surprisingly, however, it turns 
out that the same postulate of maximal analyticity of the second kind will solve 
both of these problems in one swoop, since it allows for the construction of 
crossing-symmetric partial wave amplitudes and prohibits the undetermined 
parameters associated with the method of imposing convergence. Together 
with the fact that it represents a natural extension of the analyticity postulate 
already present, these features suggest that this postulate should become an 
essential part of the S-matrix toolkit. I begin, then, with articulating the first 
problem that occasions its inclusion, and that is the incorporation of partial 
wave analysis. To keep things simple, I will focus on bosons - and hence 
states of integer f - throughout. 
AS.l Problems of Convergence (1): The Partial Wave Se-
ries 
Following Wigner's work on the rotation group, there is no ambiguity about 
the definition of the partial wave reaction amplitudes for states of well-defined 
angular momentum i: the partial wave projection rule, in a notation most 
familiar to physicists, is 
Af{E) =! t dZPl(COS(O)A(E, C08(O». 
2 i-I 
Replacing E with the s - the square of the eM energy in the direct channel 
- and using the relation appropriate to equal-mass scattering (which I will 
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assume for simplicity)30 
2t 
cos(O.) = 1 + 2 == z.(t) 
s-4m 
where O. is the angle of scattering in the s-channel CM frame. We thus 
obtain 111 At(E) = 2 -1 dzPt(cos(O)A(E, zs(t». (AS.la) 
The partial wave expansion of the scattering amplitude may then be written 
as 
00 
A(s, zs) = I)2f + I)At(s)Pt(zs). (AS.lb) 
This expression can be shown to be convergent and hence well-defined in 
the s-channel's physical region (defined by s ~ 4m2 and -1 :$ Zs :$ 1). The 
question arises as to whether it is also well-defined in a domain large enough 
to contain the physical regions of all the Mandelstam variables - for only 
if this is answered in the affirmative will it be able to incorporate crossing 
symmetry. But it is clear however that it is not. Consider for example the 
t-channel singularities. Whilst the s-channel singularities may be contained 
in the partial-wave amplitudes At(s), the t-dependence can be contained 
only in the Legendre polynomials Pt(zs); but these are entire functions -
that is, holomorphic (singularity free) over the entire complex plane. Thus 
the singularities in t can manifest themselves only in the divergence of the 
series, which would render it mathematically senseless.31 Since crossing 
symmetry demands that if there are singularities in the s-channel there must 
be singularities in the t-channel, and these singularities are bought only at 
the price of rendering it mathematically ill-defined, this clearly represents a 
significant problem for the theory. 
But all is not lost.32 First of all, it can be shown that, assuming e to be real, the 
'domain of convergence' of A(s, zs) is actually a bit larger than the s-channel 
physical region: it is in fact an elliptical region with foci at +1 and -1 (the 
'Lehmann ellipse'). Nevertheless, it remains that the amplitude cannot be 
continued to regions in which the crossed variables take on arbitrarily large 
30See Collins [1977], p21 for the (straightforward) derivation. 
31This argument is adapted from Barone and Predazzi [2002J, p87. 
32See Barone and Predazzi [2002], Section 5.3. 
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values. However, if we assume that we can let the amplitude take on complex 
f values, and consider the extreme case in which the angular momentum is 
purely imaginary, the domain of convergence as f -... 00 is an open domain: 
in particular, a hyperbola with foci at z = ± 1. This hyperbola overlaps with 
the Lehmann ellipse, and this guarantees that if we can continue the partial 
wave expansion of the scattering amplitude to imaginary f values, the new 
expansion will represent the same analytic function (i.e. the same scattering 
amplitude) in a domain in which either crossed channel can become arbitrarily 
large. 33 
It is thus the extension of the amplitude (AS.lb) to become a function of 
partial waves with complex angular momentum which is the key to creating 
a crossing-compatible amplitude. The proposed new analytic partial wave 
functions must of course coincide with Al(8) at physical (non-negative inte-
gral) f values. By Liouville's theorem, unless these functions are constant they 
must have singularities in the complex plane, and these singularities of the 
partial wave amplitudes are called 'Regge poles'. 34 All of these poles may be 
shown to trace out continuous paths parameterized by the energy, so that we 
may write C = 0:(8), where 0:(8) represents the 'moving' Regge pole.35 The 
path traced out in angular momentum space by the poles as 8 varies is called 
the 'Regge trajectory'. 'Regge theory' as a whole denotes the incorporation of 
the analytic continuation of angular momentum into the complex plane into 
scattering theory. We will see how introducing Regge theory into the picture 
connects up with anti-fundamentalism later on, and momentarily how these 
analytic amplitudes were constructed. But before that, let us recall the second 
problem mooted above. 
33Barone and Predazzi [2002], p86. 
34Tbey may also be cuts, but to stop this discussion getting more complicated still 
I shall focus exclusively on the poles. . 
35See Gribov [2003], Section 3.3 for discussion, and also Barone and Predazzl 
[2002], p84. 
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AS.2 Problems of Convergence (2): The Mandelstam Repre-
sentation 
In the course of deriving the Mandelstam representation of the amplitude in 
Section A3, I assumed that the amplitude tended to zero in the asymptotic 
region of the direct channel energy. This assumption, however, is not in 
general in agreement with experience, for what is experienced is instead a 
power-bound asymptotic behaviour. More precisely, what is found is that, as 
one variable (say s) is held fixed, while a crossed channel (say t) is taken off to 
infinity, t is bounded by a finite power, a power which is moreover a function 
of s. Thus as t -+ 00 with s fixed, we have A(s, t) -+ CtA(s) for some constant 
C, and A(s) < 00.36 Given this much slower convergence than was originally 
assumed, the integrals obtained above in the Mandelstam expression for the 
amplitude (AJa) will diverge, and the method for deriving the Mandelstam 
representation must be revisited as a result. 
The way that convergence is restored is by the method of subtractions, and 
I will briefly go through what is involved here. Given that A(s, t) -+ tA as 
t -+ 00 and that the problem resides in the power of this divergence, we know 
that we can write a dispersion relation for 
A(s, t) 
where N is the smallest integer greater than A, since clearly this disappears 
asymptotically. Ignore for a moment the other terms in the Mandelstam 
amplitude, so that we can write simply 
( ) 1 1.00 Dt d' A So, t =:;;: tb (t _ t') t. 
(The other cut can be treated analogously, and the poles are unaffected.) 
36See Chew [1966], pSO for a discussion of the experimental evidence. 
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'Then for the subtracted version of this amplitude, we have 
where the first tenn on the RHS comes from the contributions of each of the 
poles at t = t}, ___ , tN- Hence we obtain 
A( ) '" () n II( )-1 1 D t So, , N-l N 100 ( t') So, t = L....t en s ts + t - ti - ( , ) (' )( , dt 
n=O i=1 1r tb t - tl --- t - tN t - t) 
(AS.2a) 
where r,::d en(8)t: is an arbitrary polynomial in t of degree N - 1.37 But 
note that the presence of this polynomial means that the amplitude is not 
fixed by its discontinuities, hence nor its imaginary part (see Section Al) -
and hence not by unitarity. The the divergence problem is apparently thus 
solved at the expense of introducing an arbitrary polynomial, and thus one 
which is not detennined by the unitarity equations. But this is of course in 
contradiction with the S-matrix idea that the amplitude can be reconstructed 
using only the axioms already assumed. 
Just as convergence difficulties plagued the familiar partial wave expansion 
and rendered it unsuitable for crossing, here again it seems that convergence 
difficulties in the Mandelstam representation appear to undennine the very 
foundation of S-matrix principles. But just as an analytic extension in angular 
momentum helps ameliorate the first problem, it also effaces the second. To 
see how, I will start from the subtracted equation for the amplitude, (AS.2a), 
and indicate how an analytic expression for the partial wave amplitudes may 
be derived from it. 
A5.3 The Froissart-Gribov Representation 
Suppose again that the s-channel is the direct channel and continue to assume 
that for fixed s the asymptotic behaviour of A(s, t) is A(s, t) - t>. , for some 
finite '\(8). In the new notation, we can write A(s, zs) - z: (recall that Zs = 
37See Collins [1977], p31; Barone and Predazzi [2002], p72. 
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COS 8., a function of t). Consider now the N-times subtracted relation CA5.2a) 
for A(s, z.) at fixed s, where N is the smallest integer greater than ..\ (again 
poles are neglected, and all subtractions are made at Zs = 0 for simplicity). 
Then we have, where Zo is the branch point in the Zs variable, 
A(s z) = ~ r(s)zN + z;' 100 Dtes, t'Cs, z~» d '+ z;' 1-00 Dues, U'(S, z~»d I 
0, S ~....... zlN( I ) z. IN( I ) zS' 
n=O 7r zo • Z. - Zs 7r -zo Z 8 Zs - Zs 
(The limits on that last term follow because cos 8s = 1 + S_~~2 = -(1 + ._~':n2 ).) 
Inserting this into (AS.la), the formula for partial waves, we obtain 
+ ~ jl d N P. ( ) (100 Di(s, t'Cs, Z~»d I j-OO Du(s, u'(s, Z~»d ,) 
2 zzz. f. Zs IN( I ) Zs + IN( I ) z. . 
7r -1 zo Z s z. - Zs -zo Z s z. - z. 
If we restrict ourselves to C 2: N, the first term disappears. We now invoke the 
identity 
1 jl ZN 
-2 dzPl(z) IN( I ) = Qf.(Zl), 
-1 Z Z - Z 
where C 2: N and QI(Z~) is a Legendre function of the second kind.38 We 
then obtain the Froissart-Gribov representation for the Cth partial wave, which 
is 
1100 1 j-OO Al(S) = - dz.Dt(s, t(s, z.»Qf.(z.) + - dz.Du(s, u(s, Z.»Ql(Z.). 
7r zo 7r -zo 
(A5.3b) 
The Froissart-Gribov amplitude shows clearly that, in the region that C is large 
enough, there is no arbitrary polynomial in the corresponding partial wave 
amplitudes. Hence the discontinuities determine the amplitudes in this region 
(as is in keeping with the 'bootstrap' spirit). The only singularities of the 
Qf. in C are poles at the negative integers (beginning with C = -1) so they 
are holomorphic in the right-half f plane. They also behave for large z as 
Qf. ~ Cz-(t'+1), where C is a constant, even for complex C. This ensures that 
the integrals in the Froissart-Gribov representation exist. It can therefore be 
used to define Af.(s) as an analytic function of C, in the region of C ~ N. In 
38See Barone and Predazzi [2002J, p73. 
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fact, it can be shown to be defined for all f such that 9tt( f) ~ N. 39 Hence the 
Froissart-Gribov representation (AS.3b) is valid for all9tt(f) ~ N. 
It might be thought that there is no particular merit in this particular contin-
uation since A(£, s) only has physical significance for integer t, and so any 
interpolation between the integers would be of equal value. However; it can 
be shown (by Carlson's theorem), that given that certain conditions are met 
by the continued partial wave amplitudes (such as that they tend to zero as 
£ -I- 00), any continuation is the unique continuation.40 It can also be shown 
that the continuation used here satisfies these conditions.41 hese extended 
partial wave amplitudes we shall designate not as A((s) but as A(t, s) in order 
to emphasize the functional, dependence on f. 
We have now seen that crossing symmetry suggests that the familiar partial 
wave amplitudes should be complex functions of f, and we have found a rep-
resentation of these amplitudes which is the unique analytic continuation to 
complex values. However; we know that it is only valid for ~e( t) ~ N, where 
N is given by the power of the divergence of the Mandelstam representation. 
Thus it is by no means guaranteed that a partial wave of arbitrary f admits this 
continuation. But, and as we shall shortly see, the question of whether or not 
a particular partial wave does or does not admit of this analytic continuation 
is of central importance to the question of the fundamentality of hadrons. 
I shall therefore continue to press questions regarding the range of f over 
which the Froissart-Gribov projection is defined. 
In order to proceed in pinning down the range of applicability of (AS.3b), 
another result will be needed. It is that the Froissart bound exists - a bound 
which puts a critical constraint on the asymptotic behaviour of the amplitude 
- and I will briefly describe how this is shown now. 
AS.4 The Froissart Bound 
It can be shown that, for amplitudes which satisfy the Mandelstam represen-
tation, unitarity in the direct channel limits the asymptotic behaviour of the 
390n the above points, see Collins and Squires [1968], pS4; Chew [1966], pS3; 
Collins [1977], p64. 
4OBarone and Predazzi [2002], p89. 
41Barone and Predazzi [2002], p94. 
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scattering amplitude in the physical regions of the crossed channels (that is, 
where s is the direct channel, in the regions of t and u with t, U ::; 0). The 
importance of this result cannot be over-emphasized, but I shall not prove 
it here.42 Instead, I will simply quote the result. It is that, as s --. 00 with 
t ::; 0, 
IA(s, t)1 ::5 C.s log2 s, 
where C is a constant. In the range of energies accessible to experiments, 
it is very difficult to distinguish a logarithmic dependence on s, and thus 
the assumption is generally made that such factors can be lumped in to the 
constant.43 Thus in the physical region of the s-channel, the amplitude varies 
at most linearly with s, and cross sections tend to constant values. 
This linearity result is very important in this context, as it means that the 
power bound A in the Froissart-Gribov representation can be taken to be as 
low as 1. Hence, in the s-channel physical region of the variables at least, 
the Froissart-Gribov representation is defined for all £ > 1, and there are no 
essential singularities of the partial wave amplitudes in that region of the 
complex £ plane. This result has been extended to apply all regions of the 
Mandelstam variables, so that the Froissart-Gribov amplitude is mereomorphic 
for all £ > 1, and hence can be used to construct analytic partial waves for 
those £.44 This means in particular (as discussed in Section A1.5) that there 
are, in particular, no 6-function-type singularities in this region of the C plane, 
and all singularities of C > 1 partial waves are by definition Regge poles (see 
Section AS.l).45 This result is important. To see precisely why, we need to 
incorporate the postulate of maximal analyticity of the second kind. 
AS.S Maximal Analyticity of the Second Kind 
While we now know that a (unique) analytic representation of partial waves 
exists for f > 1, we have not yet determined the status of the amplitude 
for these very lowest (f = 0, 1) partial waves.46 The final question that re-
42See, e.g., Collins and Squires [1968], pSI. 
43Collins and Squires [1968], pS3. 
44See references in Collins and Squires [1968], p14I. 
45See also Gribov [2003], pS7. See Chew [1966], pp44-4S for the derivational 
step. 
46The same is true of the l = 1/2, but here I am focussing just on hosons. 
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mains, then, regards the singularities corresponding to these waves. Now, 
the Froissart -Gribov representation is only demonstrably defined for complex 
f> 1, since the existence of the Froissart bound cannot be brought to bear 
below that value. The assumption that the partial wave amplitudes admit 
analytic continuation for aU f is therefore just that: an assumption. But it is 
nonetheless an assumption worth making. For a start, there is no obvious rea-
son why the assumption that the partial wave amplitudes should be analytic 
functions of f is any less natural than in case of the linear momentum vari-
ables. Furthermore, such an assumption is required to efface the ambiguity in 
the Mandelstam representation, as I will now tty to show. 
Consider again the N -times subtracted dispersion relation (AS.2a) used in 
deriving the Froissart-Gribov amplitude (recall that the bound-state poles of 
the amplitude were neglected). The problem was that, since we now have a 
polynomial of degree N - 1 in addition to the discontinuities, the amplitude 
is no longer determined by just those singularities required by unitarity. Now 
let us see what happens when the underdetermined polynomial is slotted 
into the Froissart-Gribov representation, so that the partial wave amplitudes 
are functions of this polynomial (recall too that we are now emphasizing the 
functional dependence in A(f, s): 
Suppose that N = 1, so that there is only one undetermined constant and no 
dependence on z in the polynOmial. Then we get 
The Legendre polynomials are defined as 
and since the only Legendre polynomial independent of z is that for f = 0, 
then using the orthogonality relation 
{AS. Sa) 
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we find that A(t,s) = f(dlO)' Thus this subtraction contributes only to the 
S-wave (I = 0). Likewise, for N = 2 we get a contribution to the amplitude 
A(/, s) = f(dl1)' Therefore, the subtractions, with their attendent undeter-
mined constants, that are needed to ensure convergence in the Mandelstam 
representation correspond to Kronecker deltas in the I-plane. But if we pos-
tulate maximal analyticity of the second kind, and hence postulate that there 
are no delta-function type singularities in the partial waves, then such terms 
are specifically excluded. Thus second degree analyticity requires that all the 
subtraction constants are equal to zero, and the polynomial disappears. By 
incorporating this assumption, we can therefore salvage the idea that the 
asymptotic behaviour of the scattering amplitude is fixed by that of its discon-
tinuities, and hence by unitarity. Even leaving aside the solution it affords 
to the crossing problem discussed in Section AS.I, this seems justification 
enough. So let us invoke the sixth and final axiom of the S-matrix to the five 
adduced in Section AI: 
6. Maximal analyticity of the second kind: The scattering amplitude has 
only isolated singularities in I. 
With the assumption of the analyticity of A(/, s) in place, we can now set 
about extracting implications from its singularity structure. To do this, I will 
proceed in what m~y seem a rather oblique fashion. We first identify the 
effect of the poles in A( I, s) on the scattering amplitude A( s, t) = A( s, zs), and 
express A(s, t) in terms of these poles via the residue theorem. Armed with 
this expression for A(s, t), we can then feed this expression back into A(t, s) 
via the relation (AS.la). This permits us then to uncover the structure of each 
individual pole in A(/, s). 
AS.6 Expression of the Amplitude in terms of Complex An-
gular Momenta 
Let us start of by replacing AI(S) in the partial wave series for A(s, zs), (AS.lb), 
with its analytically continued partner: 
00 
A(s, zs) = L(U + l)A(/, s)Pt(z) (AS.6a) 
1=0 
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I shall now examine the consequences of its analytic properties on the scatter-
ing amplitude, and in particular those of its Regge poles.47 
First of all we show that this series can be expressed by the integral 
A(s, z) = 21 . r (2e + l )A(e, s) Pl .( -zp de 
1, lc sm 7f CAS.6b) 
taken along the contour C in the complex e-plane which encloses all positive 
integers and (by hypothesis) no Regge poles. 
~ ~ ~ 
1m I 
cx , 
cx x ... 3 ... 
........ 
x - - - - - - - -::;- Regge poles 
cx2 _ - -
x .... -a ~rt--------
------~_7,W~tO~~--~2~--~3--~~---Ret a 4 C 
. ~ /"1 
Figure 11.4: The contour C used in the evaluation of the integral on the RHS 
of CA5.6b). (From Joachain [1975], p265.) 
The integral representation is then analytic for !)l C!! > -1/2, 48 except for 
poles which are 
i The Regge poles (Xi(S) 
ii The poles at e = n (arising from the vanishing of sin 7fe). 
The contour C by hypothesis encloses no Regge poles. Therefore, setting 
(f) = 7f(2e+ l )A(e s)Pe(-zs) 
9 sin 7ft!. 
(A5.6c) 
47This presentation is largely adapted from Joachain [1975] . 
48 See Martin and Spearman [1970J and below for (brief) discussion of where this 
value comes from . 
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we have by the residue theorem 
1 i 00 ~ g(f )df = 2: Res (g(f = n) 
~7rZ C n=O 
= f 7r(n + l )A(n, s)( _ l )n Pn(- zs ) 
n=O 7r(- l )n 
00 
= 2:(2n + l )A(n, s)Pn(zs ), 
n=O 
where I have used Pe(zs) = -lepe(- zs) at f = n. Hence the series in (A5.6a) 
can be replaced by the integral (A5.6b) (modulo the postulate that A(f, s) is 
indeed analytic everywhere in the complex f plane). To exhibit the contribu-
tion of the Regge poles to the scattering amplitude, we deform the contour to 
form C' and enclose it at 9le (f ) = - 1/ 2: Applying the residue theorem to this 
Iml 
Figure 11.5: Illustration of the contour C'. (From Joachain [1975] , p267.) 
new contour we find 
We may decompose the integral on the LHS as 
1 1 r 1 l ioo- 1/ 2+< 
27ri ICI g(f)df = Jc g(f)df + !semi-circle g(f )df + -ioo- l /2+< g(f )df 
The first term is simply the scattering amplitude given above in (A5.6b) . The 
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second term may be shown to vanish for Yukawa-like potentials.49 The third 
term is denoted the 'background integral' (B I). Then we can write 
(AS.6d) 
where f3i{S) is the residue of the ith Regge pole of A{t', s). This is known as 
the Sommeifeld-Watson representation of the amplitude, and it allows us to 
analyze explicitly the contribution to the total scattering amplitude from each 
Regge pole. Given the dependence of the denominator on a, it is clear that 
there will be poles in the scattering amplitude whenever the Regge trajectory 
passes -through an integer. 
AS.7 Asymptotic Regge Behaviour 
It is in the high energy (or high momentum transfer) region that distinctive 
Regge behaviour manifests itself. Consider first the high momentum transfer 
(high zs) region. In this region, we need consider only the pole series in the 
Sommerfeld-Watson representation (AS.6d) since the background integral 
may be shown to give and asymptotically negligible contribution. 50 Therefore, 
in the large z limit, only the pole series 
o;(s) 
A{s, z) -+ Ei f3i{S) . Zs () 
SID ?rai 8 
survives, where we have lumped all the other s-dependent and constant 
factors into f3i (the residue of the ith Regge pole). The dominant term in this 
series is the right-most pole, i.e. the one for which 9te{t') is the largest. So in 
this limit as t -+ 00, we can put 
a(s) Zs 
A{s, z) -+ -f3(s). ( ) 
Slll1rO' S 
where now this a denotes specifically the right-most pole (and 13 its residue). 
(Note that nothing can be said about the residue function (3(8).) This formula 
49See Joachain [1975], p266. 
soChew [1966], p58; Barone and Predazzi [2002], p91. 
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may be shown to be valid up to sub-asymptotic corrections. Note that had 
we started not from the s-channel but from the t-channel, we would have 
obtained, as s --. 00, 
a;(t) 
A(s, z) --. -{3i(t) 0 Zs ()" 
sm 7I"Qi t 
This function is not, however, as yet crossing symmetric. It can be shown that 
to accommodate convergence of the partial wave amplitude under crossing, 
we have to separate out even and odd values of e and thus create amplitudes of 
positive and negative signature. The procedure turns out to be straightforward 
and the modification slight, and we obtain, as t --. 00 for fixed s, 
(1 + (e-"1I"a(s))ta(s) 
A(s, z) --. -{3(t) 0 ( ) 0 
sm 7rQ s 
We thus arrive at the simple, but fundamental, Regge theory prediction. It 
is that it is the leading singularity in the crossed channel that governs the 
asymptotic behaviour of the amplitude as the croSS channel energy tends to 
infinity:51 that is, where s is the direct channel, 
A(s, t --. 00) oc taRo (AS.7e) 
Let us compare this to the behaviour of a pole which contributes to only 
one partial wave (i.e. a pole which is not a continuous function passing 
through various f's and hence not a Regge pole). Looking at the Mandelstam 
representation (A3a) and referring to (A1.Sc), we see that the contribution to 
A(s, t) from a particle of spin eo and mass m in the s (direct) channel is 
From the orthogonality of the Legendre polynomials, (AS.Sa), together with 
CAS.la) we know this will produce a delta function singularity in the partial 
wave amplitude, 
(A(e, s) = g2 ~uo 
m -s 
51 Barone and Predazzi [2002], p92. 
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and hence is forbidden by maximal analyticity. But since by (AS.7a) the 
asymptotic behavior of this contribution as t -+ 00 is 
A(s,t -+ (0) <X tLO, (AS. 70 
we now have a difference in the asymptotic behaviour relative to (AS.7e) 
which can be used to test the validity of the postulate. Since 
the two amplitudes (AS.7e) and (AS.70 differ by a factor of t a '(m2 )(s-m2 ), and 
this is a difference which can 'readily be detected'. 52 Thus the postulate of 
maximal analyticity of the second kind, it turns out, has very precise empirical 
consequences. 
To complete this tour of the mathematics of the S-matrix, what I want to do 
now is extract as much interpretation as we can about the nature of the poles 
which are generated under the assumption that the postulate of maximal 
analyticity is respected by nature. I will do so by returning to the function 
from which they carne. 
AS.8 The Physical Interpretation of Regge Poles 
We now wish to go back to the physical partial wave amplitudes and uncover 
what we can about the contribution of the Regge poles. We can extract the 
partial wave amplitudes from (AS.6a), the 'continued' version of (AS.!), 
00 
A(s, zs) = 2)2£ + I)A(t', s)Pt(z) (AS.6a) 
[=0 
by slotting in the Sommerfeld-Watson transform (AS.6d) (minus the back-
ground integral, which disappears asymptotically; see Section AS.n. Quoting 
the property of Legendre polynomials (which holds when t' is a non-negative 
integer, m) that 
11 2 sin 11"0' -1 dzPm(z)pc.( -z) = ;;: (a - m)(m + a + 1)' 
~~-----------------
52 Squires [1971], p74. 
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we get as the contribution from the nth Regge pole to the mth partial 
waveS3 
An(e = m, E) = !3n(e) 1 
7r(m + onCE) + 1) (On(E) - m) 
where we have replaced's' - the square of the eM energy - with 'E for energy 
to keep salient what is going on. This contribution to the e = m partial wave 
will dominate the scattering amplitude if On (E) is close to the integer m, so 
that f3n(E) 
An(l' = m, E) -+ onCE) _ m' 
as f -+ m ~ On (E). Let us now expand OnCE) about the energy Em at 
which 9tt(On} = m. In general, we know that the onCE) are complex, so we 
write 
If we assume that the imaginary part is small, then we can expand On (E) 
about Em as follows: 
Now writing 
and 
we find that 
_ d(9tt(On(Em»)) 
q = dE IE=Em 
r = _Jm_(..:....a_n(_E_m-=-}) 
q 
An(f = m, E) -+ f3n(E) 
m + (E - Em)( d(9tt(an(Em»)/dE) IE=Em + iJm(an(Em») - m 
= .,--~f3n:....:....( E....,:.).:......::/ q~ 
(E- Em) +ir. (AS. Sa) 
But this is just the Breit-Wigner formula, familiar from nuclear physics, for 
a resonance with mass Em and width r. Specializing to the case where the 
imaginary part and hence the width is zero, this gives us the formula for a 
53Here as throughout, the properties of the Legendre polynomials are given in 
Collins [1977], Appendix A. 
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bound state. Therefore the Regge poles, when evaluated at physical (positive 
integral) values of .e, correspond to bound states and resonances. In other 
words, they represent composite particles. This is the result that forges the 
connection between the extended analyticity postulate and the possibility of 
'nuclear democracy'. 
One way to visualize what is going on here is to view the poles as interpolated 
by a function a(s) . Expanding a(s) as a power series about s = 0, we get 
a(s) = a(O) + (\"(s) , where a(O) is the intercept and a' the slope. Then, as we 
traverse up a(O) we can plot particles with all the same quantum numbers 
but their spin and mass at the value of s to which their mass corresponds. 54 
This givE7s the Chew-Frautschi plot. The experimentally discovered linear 
J 
BQ(D) IE) (Kx) 
. . 
~·UI· (. ) 
! 
3ft (OeV') 
Figure 11.6: Chew-Frautschi-plot of Re(a) versus energy for mesons. (From 
Collins [1977] , p145.) 
behaviour is only expected a priori over a small region of the trajectory. It 
54 Actually, the spins on a given trajectory will differ by units of 2. This is because 
the partial wave amplitudes, to be analytically continued and crossing-comp~ti?le, 
must be separated into parts of even and odd signature (even and odd e.) This IS a 
complication I have overlooked, but is straightforward to implement. 
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is the Veneziano 'duality' model which finally explained the linearity, which 
extends over several GeV (and baffled theorists for years).55 It is interesting 
to note that the various trajectories are approximately parallel so that the 
slope a' is approximately universal. Over time, it becomes identified with the 
string tension - the only free parameter in string theory. 
This completes my tour of the basic mathematics of the S-matrix. 
SSSee Collins [1977], p224. 
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